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ATLANTA WEEKLY EXAMINER. CIROULuATIONT OF ‘I'KCE! JESZKLA-JMCUNTESK., 10000 COPIEM! CHAS. L BARBOUR, Editor VOLUME 11. THE WEEKLY EXAMINER IS Publhed every Thursday morning in the City of Atlanta, at ONE DOLLAR PE« ANNUM, To be paid st rictly in adv, ce. TSF No subscription tak en for less than six months. RATES OF ADV dRTISING. Advertisements are insert I in the Weekly Examiner at the following rates: Seventy-five cent! per square (of 10 lines brevier) for the first insertions, and 37| cents per square for each sub sequent insertion. Advertisements continuing three months or more are charged at the following rates: 1 Square 3 mnths $4 00 1 .< 6 “ 600 j « 12 “ 10 00 2 « 3 « 600 2 « 6 “ 10 00 2 « 12 “ 15 00 3 « 3 “ 800 3 •• 6 '• 12 00 3 «< 12 « ’ 20 00 4 « 3 “ 10 00 4 « 6 « 15 00 4 « 12 “ 25 00 1 Col’n 3 “ 15 00 i « 6 “ 20 00 I « 12 “ 30 00 i « 3 “ 20 00 I .. 8 “ 30 00 | .. 12 - 40 00 One Square, changeable, one year, sls 00 Two “ “ “ 20 00 Three “ " “ » ™ Four “ “ 30 00 Quarter Column “ “ 40 00 y a l f « « “ 55 00 £BF Advertisements leaded and inserted un- Ser the head of Special Notices will be charged •no Dollar per square for the first insertion aud Fifty Cents for each subsequent insertion tir Legal Advertisements published at the usual rates. Obituary Notices exceeding ten lines will be charged as advertisements. ST Vearly Advertisers exceeding in their ad vertisements the average space agreed for, will bo charged at proportional rates. TdT All Advertisements not specified as to time will be published until forbid and charged accordingly. Legal Advertisements. Sales of Land and Negroes, by Administra tors, Executors or Gurdians, are required by law to be held on the First Tuesday in the month, between the hours of 10 in the forenoon and 3 in the afternoon, at the Court House in the County in which the property is situated. Notices of these sales must be given in a pub ic gazette 40 days previous to the day of sale. Notices for the sale of personal property must be given in like manner 10 days previous to sale dav. Notices to the debtors and creditors of an es tate mus» also be published 40 days. Notice that application will be made to the Court of Ordinary, for leave to sell Land or Ne groes, must be nublished for two months. Citations for'letters of Administration, Guar dianship Ac., must be published 30 days—for dis mission from Administration, monthy nx months —for dismission from Guardianship, 40 days. Rules for foreclosure of Mortgages must be published monthly for four months—for establish ing lost papers, for the full space of three months —for compelling titles from Executors or Admin istrators, where bond has been given by the de ceased, the full space of three months. Publications will always be continued accord ing to these, the legal requirements, unless other wise ordered, at the following Rater • Citations on letters of Adn inistration Ac. $2 75 do do dismissory om Adminis- Citation on dismissory from Guardianship, 3 00 Leave to sell Land or Negices, 4 o Notice to debtors and creditors. ■> Sales of personal property, t>n days, 1 square 1 50 Sales of land or negroes by executors, Ac. 5 01 Estray a, two weeks, For a man advertising his wife, (m advance,) 5 0 Letters on business must be (post paid) to en title them to attention. THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1856. Speech of Hon. Hiram Warner. We are indebted to our Representative from the Fourth District , for a copy of the Wash ington Globe containing a report of his truly able speech in defence of Slavery,and that part of the President's message relating thereto.— We regret that our limited space prevents our laying it nt once before our readtrs. We shall commence its publication, however, in to-nior row’s issue. Meantime we copy the following remarks of a correspondent of the Savannah Journal k Courier, uot a word of which is too laudatory of the able speech : “The Hon. Mr. Warner, of Georgia, deliv ered a calm, augmentive and able speech in the House of Representatives today, and was lis tened to with fixed attention by the most quiet and respectful auditory I have looked upon this session. His speech was of a character not admitting of a hasty and graphic sketch. It was a clear and philosophic argument in proof of the assumption that negro slavery, wherever it exists, is sustained by the law of nations.— He quoted authorities in proof of this position, some of which are well admitted in English le gal and legislative tribunals. He also assumed that slavery exists in the United States by vir tue of the Constitution of the Republic, aud that its existence in the territories of the Unit ed States is undoubted until inhibited by legis lation. Mr. Allison, of Pennsylvania, on rising to reply, rvmaked that he would do so with the greatest pleasure because of the spirit that manifestly influenced the Representative from Georgia, wfiostj sincerity was only equalled by the gentleman'r courtesy he had exhibited.— The House. Mr. Alisou remarked, needed such an example, and he hoped its influence might be rmliKd in the future bearing of its members.' THE CHEAPEST POLITICAL AMO NEWSPAPER IN TH- SOUTH—A WEEKLY FIRESIDE COMPANION FOB ONLY ONE DOLLAR A YEAR, IN ADVANCE, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 17. 1856. Slavery in the Territories. SPEECH OF HON. 11. WARNER, OF GEORGIA, in the House of Representatives, April lltb, 1856. The House being in the Committee of the Whole, and having under consideration the President’s Annual Message. Mr. WARNER said: Mr. Chairman: The gentleman from Indi ana, [Mr. Brenton,] who last addressed the committee upon the subject of the Presiden’t message, thought proper to arraign that offi cer before the country, for calling the atten tion of the people of the non-slaveholding States to their constitutional obligations, in regard to the institution of slavery as it exists .n the United States. Before final judgement ‘shall be rendered upon that arraignment, it may be proper to inquire, whether there exist ed any necessity, any occasion, for the dis charge of that high and responsible duty, on the part of the Chief Magistrate of the Union? Has there been formed, in any portion of this Confederacy, a sectional political organization, for the purpose of depriving the people of the slaveholding States of rights solemnly guaran tied to them by the Constitution? Passing, by, for the present, the repeated attempts that have been made in some of the free States to nullify the fugitive slave law; what sir, have we witnessed in this Hall in re gard to such a sectioual political organization? When we first assembled here for the purpose of effecting an organization of this House, the senior member from Ohio [Mr. Giddings] de clared the line of policy that should govern him and his political friends in that organiza tion; that line of policy was declared to be, to invoke the power of this Government for the purpose of excluding slave property from the common territory of the Union. The distin guished gentleman from Massachusetts was put in nomination for the Speaker s chair, to curry into practical effect that declared line of policy; and during the nine week's struggle which ensued here, that distinguished gentle man—for tfie purpose of uniting the support of his political friends—declared, in his place, that he was in favor of protecting the property of southern meu as well as northern men in the common territory of the Union: that is to say, all such property as is recognized as property by the universal law of nations, but that prop erty in slaves was not t o recognized by that universal law; therefore, was not entitled to be protected in that common territory; that slav ery existed in the States by force of positive law; and that whenever the owner of thut prop erty took it beyond the territorial limits of such State, it ceused to be entitled to protec tion as properly. With these declared opin ions, the result of that protracted contest is well known to this House and to the coun try. Those who invoke the power of this Gov ernment to exclude slavery from the common territory, give as a reason therefore, that they are in favor of liberty, and in favor of the extention of liberty. I, too, sir, am in favor of liberty, and am in favor if the extention of liberty; but it is not that wild, unbridled, li centious higher law liberty, what whetted the guillotine and deluged the streets of revolu tionary France with blood, but it is that liber ty which brings healing on its wings; it is American liberty; it is constitutional liberty; which protects the citizen in the enjoyment of all his civil an I religious rights, and his rights of property; that liberty, sir, which the fathers of the Republic intended to secure and perpet uate, not only for themselves but their poste i ty, when they sealed the bond of union between the States of this Confederacy. It is the fun damental principles of that American liberty, of that constitutional liberty, which I propose to discuss to-day; aud 1 shall endeavor to maintain and to demonstrate that, in accor dance with those fundamental principles, my constituents have both the legal and equitable right to take their slave property into the common territory of this Union, to have it protected there, aud that this Government has uo power under the Constitution to deprive them of that right. It will be recollected that the Federal Con stitution was not established to create new rights, but to secure and protect existing right. Hence it is material to inquire, what were the rights of the people of the slaveholding States in regard to their slave property, before and at the time of the adoption of that Constitution? I shall maintain, and undertake to establish, that the title of my consti ue its to their slave property is not based upon any positive law of the State, but that it rests for its foundation npon the universal law of notions, which recog nized slaves as property, before, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. That before, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the citizens of the State of Geor gia—the same being a sovereign, independent' State—had the undoubted right, according to; the well established principles of international law—to take their slave property into any foreign territory; provided there was no law iu that foreign territory prohibiting its introduc tion there, and to have it protected in such foreign territory—that the law of nations was adopted as a part of the common law iu the original thirteen States, constituting a part of the law of the land before and at the time ofj the adoption of the Federal Constitution. It has beeu asserted here and elsewhere that I slavery exists in the States by force of positive law; and that whenever the owner takes his slave property beyond the territorial limits of such State, his title to that property ceases to be valid aud operative for the protection of that property. I controvert this assumed pro position. There is no statute in the State of Georgia, either colonial, or since the adoption of her State constitution, which declares that slaves shall be property within the territorial | limits of that State; aud, so far as I know or; believe, there is not such a statute iu a single > slaveholding State in this Union, constituting j the original basis and foundation of title to slave property. We have many statuteswhich regulate the institution of slavery—statutes which confer privileges upoh the slave—stat utes which regulate the conduct of the master towards his slave, and which recognize slaves as property—but uo statute dedaring that slaves shall be property within the territorial limits of the State. And when we eome to look into the history of this thing, it would be remarkable, indeed, if any such statute had ever existed. Have you any statutes in the non-slaveholding S'ates which declare that your ships, your merchandise, your looms, and your spindles shall be property within the territo rial limits of your lespective States? I appre hend not; no more have we any statutes in the slaveholding States, declaring that slaves shall be property within the territorial limits there of. The truth is, that title to slave property in the slaveholding States re-ts upon the same foundation as title to any other species of prop erty to wit: the universal law of nations.— Those who assert that slavery exists in the States by force of positive law can, if that as sertion be true, very easily settle the question by the production of the declared will of the supreme power of such States, embodied in the form of a legislative enactment; produce the evidence of that positive law in a legiti mate and authentic form, to sustain the truth of the assertion. Those who assert the affir mative of that proposition, are bound to fur nish the evidence of that positive law enacted by the States, or yield the point. They con tent themselves with relying on the loose dec larations of judges in the slaveholding States; the mere obiter dictum of judges, (in cases in which the question we are discussing was not presented by the record for their consideration and judgement,) as the evidence of positive law enacted by the supreme power in the States declaring that slaves shall be property within the territorial limits of the respective States. The question very naturally presents itself, if those who assert that slavery exists in the States by force of positive law, and that when the own er of slave property takes it beyond the territo rial limits of his State, his title to that pro perty ceases and determines, why is it that they desire to invoke the power of the Federal Gov ernment to exclude slave property from the Te: ritories ? Such an act would be entirely un necessary, if the title of owner ceases and deter mines when he passes with his slave property beyond the limits of the States, where is asser ted his title exists by force of positive law. The fact that you desire to invoke the power of this Government to enact a law to exclude slave property from the common territory, furnishes strong evidence that you have not entire confi denac in the position assumed and asserted, thut slavery ex sts in the States by force of positive law, aud that the owner loses his title to his slave property by taking it beyond the limits of such States. I beg leave to call the attention of the Hous? to the history of the title of my constituents to their slave property. What I shall say in re gard to that title in Georgia, will be equally applicable to the other slaveholding States, so far as the foundation of that title is concerned. The colony of Georgia was originally settled as a free colony ; that is to say, African slavery was prohibited from being introduced there by the charter granted to the trustees; it remained a free colony about fifteen years after its first settlement; the soil and climate was adapted to slave labor; the colonists desired to have it, but the home government refused to repeal the prohibition; the result was, that the colony was about to come to nothing ; the prohibition was taken off, and African slaves were allowed to be brought .into the colony; some few were brought in from the other slaveholding colonies but the most of them were brought in by those who were engaged in the African slave trade; and who they were, the past history of the country furnishes abundant evidence. African slaves were brought into the colony as property ; they were made property before they were brought there; they were sold to our people as property, purchased by them as property, paid for by them as property, held by them as property, precisely upon the same footing as they held every other species of property. Were those from whom my constitnents orig inally purchased their slave property engaged in a lawful trade, in a trade recognized as law ful by the universal law of nations ? This question came before the courts of Great Bri tain in the year 1817. A French vessel called the Le Lou s was engaged in the African slave trade, and was captured by a British cruiser. France at that time not having entereed into treaty stipulations abolishing that trade, the vessel was taken into a British port, and con demned by the vice admiralty court as lawful prize for being engaged iu a trade forbidden by the universal law of nations, and therefore crim inal by that law. From the judgement of the vice admiralty court an appeal was taken to the high court of admiralty of Great Britain The appellate court reversed the judgment of of the vice admiralty court, and held'that the African slave trade was not unlawful by the universal law of nations, and was not criminal by that law, which recognized property in Afri can slaves. The judgment of the high court of admiralty was delivered by Lord Stowell, bet ter known as Sir William Scott, and I beg leave to read to the House a portion of that judgement. Speaking of the African slave trade, the learned judge said : “ Let me not be misunderstood or misrepre sented as a professed apologist for this practice when I state facts which no man can deny— that personal slavery arising out of forcible captivity is coeval with the earliest periods .of the history of mankind—that it is found exist ing (and, as appears, without animadversion) in the earliest and most authentic records of the humau race—that it is recognized by the codes of the most polished nations of antiquity—that under the light of Christianity itself, the pos session of persons so acquired has been in every civilized country Invested with the character of property, and secured as such by al! the protec tions ofjaw—that solemn treaties have been framed, and national monopolies eagerly sought to facilitate aud extend the commerce ‘in this asserted property—and all this, with all the sanctions of law, public and .municipal, and without any opposition, except the protests of a tew private moralist’, little heard and less at tended to in every country, till within these very few years in this particular country.— What is the doctrine of our courts of the law of nations relatively to those nations which ad here to the practice of carrying on the African slave trade ? Why that their practice is to be respected ; that their slaves, if taken, are to be restored to them ; and if not taken under in- I nocent mistake, to be restored with costs and damages. All this surely, upon the ground that such conduct on the part of any State is no departure from the law of nations. ■ The notorious fact is, that in the dominions of this country, and others, many thousands of persons are held as legal property, they and their pos terity, upon no other oiiginal ” title than that which I am now called upon to pronounce a crime—every one of these instances attended with all the aggravations that appertains to the long continuation of crime, if it be ; and vet protected by law with all the securities that can be given to property in its most respected forms.”—2d Dodson’s Admiralty Report, on. 256-’l-’2. In Madrazo vs. Willis, sth Eng. Coni. Law Reports, page 315, the same doctrine is fully recognized by the Court of King’s Bench.— Bayly, J., in delivering his judgment in that case, said, speaking of the African slave trade : “ It is true that if this were a trade contrary to the law of nations, a foreigner could not maintain this action. But it is not ; and, as a Spaniard cannot be considered as bound by the acts of the British Legislature prohibiting this trade, it would be unjust to deprive him of a remedy for the wrong which he has sustained. He had a legal property in the slaves of which he has, by the defendant's act, been depriv ed.” Best, J., after citing several authorities, says :. “ It is clear, from these authorities, that the slave trade is not condemned by the general law of nations.” In the case of the Antelope, reported in 10th Wheaton, page 121, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of the legality of the slave trade, says : “ Both Europe and America embarked in it, and for nearly two centuries it was carried on without opposition and without censure. A jurist could not say that a practice thus sup ported was illegal, and that those engaged in it might be punished either personally, or by deprivation of property.’’ But I have still higher authority in favor of the legality of the African slave trade—and that is the Federal Constitution. The African s ave trade was not only recognized a lawfu by that Constitution, but it expressly stipulates for its continuance for twenty years, and pro vides that each slave who might be imported in to the States should be taxed not exceeding ten dollars per head. Mr. Giddings. Will the gentlemen permit me to propound a question to him ? Mr.’ Warner. Oh yes, certainly. Mr. Giddings. I would inquire whether the gentleman holds that those American Chris tians, who were captured and held to slavery, and who were ’ transfered from owner to owner by the Algerines, in the latter part of the last and the first part of the present century, were property? Mr. Warner. I am not discussing the question of Algerine slavery—l am discussing the question of African slavery, as recognized by the Constitution. Mr. Giddings. Does the gentlemun acknowl edge that those Americans, captured and held by the Algerines, were property ? Mr Warner. Ido not make any such ad mission, nor is it necessary that I should do so, for the purposes of my argument. Mr. Giddings. That is what I want an answer to. Mr. Warner. I have not referred to the Americans who were captured by the Alge rines. lam discussing the question of Afri can slavery as it exists in the United States. Mr. Giddings. Africans can be held by Americans as slave property. Mr. Warner. They were recognized as property by the universal law of nations be fore, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and are now held as property un der the sanction and guarantee of that instru ment. Mr. Giddings. Are Americans property when held by Africans as slaves ? Mr. Warner. Ido not recollect as this time such a state of things as the gentleman from Ohio supposes. Mr. Giddings. I commend the gentleman to the history of the country. Mr. Warner. I will not allow the gentle man to make a case for me to discuss. I am discussing questions which arise under the laws and Constitution of this country; and in re turn for his admonitory counsel would heartily commend him to the Constitution of his coun try, and the obligations which it imposes. Mr. Chairman, when interrupted by the gen tleman from Ohio, 1 was endeavoring to demon strate that property in slaves was recognized by the universal law of nations before, and long since the adoption of the Constitution ; and ; that my constituents originally purchased their slave property from those who were engage 4 in a lawful trade, and recognized to be lawful : by the universal law of nations, and that their , title to their slave property is based upon that , universal law of nations, as it existed before. < and at the time of the adoption of the Consti- , tution, and not upon any positive law of the , State. 1 am not ignorant, sir, that long since the adoption of the Constitution, and long since the title of my constituents to their slave prop erty accrued, the United States, and most of the independent nations of the world, have en tered into treaty stipulation abolishing the Af rican slave trade : but those treaty stipulations were not intended, and could not have the effect, to divest rights to slave property which had act rued and vested prior thereto, and which were recognized by the Constitution as lawful and valid. After the Revolution, as we all know, the colonies became independent States. The State of Georgia had as perfect and com plete jurisdiction over all persons and property within her territorial limits, as any sovereign State or nation on the face of the earth ; she owed allegiance to no other Power or Govern ment. The commission issued by that State to her delegates to frame the Federal Constitution states her true character at that time. That commission is headed with these memorable words ; "The State of Georgia, by the grace of God. tree, sovereign, and independent.’’ Now, sir.let u- inquire what rights the peo ple of that independent State bad, in relation to taking their slave property into any foreign territory, and to have that property protected there by the universal law of nations before and at the time of the adoption of the Consti tution ? I maintain, sir, that a citizen of Georgia had, according to the fundamental principles ofin ternational law, the undoubted right to take his slave property' into any othern foreign Ter ritory where the introduction of such property was not prohibited by some positive law operative in that foreign Territory, declaring it to be against the policy, or preju dicial to the interests of the Government hav ing jurisdiction over that Territory ; and to have such property protected in that foreign Terri tory’. It is the undoubted right of every inde pendent sovereign State or nation to declare by positive law, that the idtroduction of slave or any other property into the territory ofsueb State or nation, shall be against its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. My position is, that, in the absence of any such declaration as to what shall be its policy, or prejudicial to its interests in regard to the introduction of slave property, a citizen of the independent State of Georgia had the unquestioned right to take bis slave property into foreign territory, violating no law of that foreign Territory, and would be entitled to have that property protected there. Let us see what are the fundamental principles of international law regulating this question.— Huberus, in discussing the conflict of laws be tween independent States and nations, in book first, section second, thus states the rule : “ Every nation from comity admits that the laws of each nation of force within its own ter ritorial limits, ought to be in force iu all other nations, without injury to their respective pow ers and rights ” This great fundamental principle of interna tional law has beeu fully recognized by the Su preme Court of the United States, as applica ble to the States of this Confederacy, in the Bark of Augusta vs. Earle, 13th Peters, 589. Mr. Chief Justice Taney in delivering the opin ion of the court in that case, states the rule in these words: “ In the silence of any positive rule affirming, or denying, or res'.raning the operation of for eign laws, courts of justice, presume the tacit adoption of them by their own Government, unless they are repugnant to its policy, or prej udicial to its interests. It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided.” I have the authority of Mr. Webster upon this point, who in his correspondence with Lord Ashburton, demanding satisfacticn for slaves from the British Government, which had been taken into one of the Bahama Islands, and set free by the authorities of that place. He com bateil the idea that a man's title to his slave property has no extra territorial operation, iu the following strong and emphatic language. After referring to local law in respect to mar riages, he continues: “ Did any one ever imagine, that local law acted upon such marriages to annihilate their obligations, if the party should visit a country in which marriages must be celebrated in another form ? It may be said, in such instan ces. personal relations are founded in contract, and, therefore, ought to be respected ; but that the relation of master and slave is not founded in contract, and therefore is to be respected cnly by the law of the place which recognizes it.— Whoever so reasons encounters the authority of the whole body of public law from Grotius down ; Itecause there are numerous instances in which the law itself presumes, or implies con tracts ; and prominent among these instances is the very relation which we are now consid ering, and which relation is ho den to draw after it mutuality to obligation.”— Correspon- j deuce in the Creole case, Senate document, I Twenty-Seventh Congress, vol. 1, p. 117. Mr. Nathan Dane, whose authority I know will not be questioned in the free States, in the sixth volume of Dane’s Abridgement, p. 430, speaking of the law of nations, says : “In the United States, as in England, the law of nations is adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.” In Madrazo vs Willis, (sth Eng. Com. Law Rep., 313.) these fundamental principles of in ternational law were practically applied toslave property by the court of King’s Bench in Great Britain, in the year 1820. The question arose upon the following state of facts : A Spanish subject being engaged in the African slave trade (Spain not having entered into treaty stipulations abolishing that trade) had pur chased three hundred slaves on the coast of Africa, and had them on board his vessel on her return voyage, when she was captured by a British cruiser, and taken into one of the ports of Great Britain, where the slaves, by the law of that kingdom, became free. The Span iard brought his action of trover in the courts of Great Britain against the captain of the Bri tis cruiser to recover the value of his vessel and stores, and the value of his three hundred slaves. On the trial before the Lord Chief Justice, he doubted whether, in a British court, the plaint iff could maintain his action for the value of his three hundred slaves, and directed the jury to find the damages separately; so much fur the vessel and stores, and so much for the three hundred slaves—the latter constituting much the largest sum. On the question being submitted to a full bench of judges, they were unanimously of the same opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full value of his three hundred slaves, as well as the value of his vessel, and stores, and awarded judgment therefor: recog nizing the validity of the Spaniard's title to his slave property, which was good by the laws of bis nation, in a British court. The slaves were not taken by the Spaniard into Great Britain, in violation of her laws, but were seized upon upon the great highway of nations, upon the empire of the seas, upon common ground, where the Spaniard had as much right to be with his property as the Englishman ; and the princi ple would have applied with equal force if the slaves had been seized upon common territory, the joint property of Great Britain and Spain. The same principle is applicable to the common territory of the Union, which is common ground, being the joint property of all the States, where the citizen of Georgia'has as much right to te with his slave property as the citizen of Ohio has to be there with his property—neither vio lating any law of that territory by going into ii with their property. When the citizen of an independent State, who has a title to his property good and valid by the laws of that State—and 1 have shown that slaves were re cognized as property by the universal law of nations, and that the law of nations was a part of the common law—goes into foreign territory with that property, violating no law of that territory, these great fundamental principles of international law go with him: they are above him; he inhales them in the very atmosphere which he breathes; they protect his person and his property ; he cannot escape their binding influence unless, indeed, he goes beyond the pale of civilization, and there the principles of inter national law cease to operate. Mr. Sandidge. Allow we to recall to the mind of the gentleman from Georgia a case precisely in point, to establish that which he is trying to establish before the committee. It is this : I noticed it in the newspapers some time last year. A gentleman from Brazil went to to Prussia, carrying with him a slave. It was there attempted to deprive him of the services of that slave ; and the highest tribunal of that country decided—according to the argument of the gentleman from Georgia—that his owner was entitled to him ; that the matter should be decided according to the laws of the country from which the party came, and that he should have the right to hold his slave, and to carry him with him from the country at his pleasure. The gentleman from Georgia may have seen a notice of the case. Mr. Warner. I do not recollect having seen it, but I have no doubt that that is the correct principle; I have no doubt that it is in consonance with the universal law of nations— with the great principles of international law. It existed in this country, and was a part of the law of the land at the time the State of Georgia and the other States entered into the constitutional compact. I have endeavored to establish the proposi tion, that before and at the time of the adop tion of the Constitution the citizens of the in dependent State of Georgia had the right, ac cording to the well established principles of in ternational law, (which constituted a part of the land.) to take their slave property into any foreign territory where its introduction was not prohibited, and to have it protected there. I have endeavored to show what were the fun damental rights of the people of that Slate to their slave property, before and at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. The next question to be considered is, wheth er the State has delegated the power in the Constitution to this Government to deprive her of those fundamental rights? Has she delega ted the power, in the Constitution to this Gov ernment, to deprive her of the fundamental right which she had, as an independent State, to take her slave property into the common territory of the Union, there being no law in that territory which would be violated by doing so?—lt is contended that this Government basthat power by the clause which declares that— “ Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations re specting, the territory or other property be longing to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” The grant of power in this clause is in regard to the territory as property. Congress has power to dispose of it as property, as well as any other property belonging to the United States ; may make “all needful rules and reg ulations respecting the territory” considered as property; but who can believe that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to ' <lelegate those great inherent rights of property ■ which I have been discussing to day by this j clause of the Constitution? But supp.se we are mistaken in this view of it, and that it was intended by this clause to delegate the powre to the Federal Government to deprive the peo pie of the States of the right to control their property, then the latter portion of the clause forbids you to exercise it so as to prejudice the claim of any particular State, and to exclude slave property would be not only to prejudice the claims of one State, but the claims of fifteen States of this Union; for the common territory being the joint property of all the States, the slaveholding States claim an equal right to en joy it with their property; and if you exercise the power to exclude them with their property, you prejudice their claims to that extent, which you are forbid to do. The principles of equal ity are indelibly stamped on the face of the Constitution. There is one clause in the Con stitntion which declares that— -The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” This principle applies with much stronger force when applied to the common territory, which is the joint property of all the States- Surely the citizens of each State ought, upon principle, to be entitled to the same privileges and immunities in the common territory of all the States as they would in the States. No, sir, the framers of the Constitution never con templated for one moment that they had dele gated the power, in this clause, to Congress to deprive them of those great fundamental rights which belonged to them in respect to their prop erty ; but, on the contrary, the delegates from the southern States refused to enter into the compact until it was expressly stipulated that if their slave property should escape and get into the free States, they should be surrendered U P- Ihe ordinance of 1787 has sometimes been relied on as conferring the power on Congress to exclude slavery from the Territories, but it will be recollected that ordinance was adopted prior to the formation of the Constitution.— That was a compact between sovereign States, having the undoubted right to make it, and live free States have been formed out of the Northwest Territory ceded by Virginia, which, but for the generous session, would have been slave territory. The rights secured by the Constitution are wholly independent of that ordinance, and have no necessary connection with it. Those great fundamental rights which I have been discussing belonged to the people of the States before and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. They entered T. BURKE, PROPRIETOR NUMBER 36. ’ into, and constituted an essential element of ■ their title to their slave properly, part and > parcel of it; and, not having delegated them f in the Constitution, they have them now ; and s it is by virtue of those pre-existing rights which t are solemnly guarantied by the Constitution, ■ that my constituents claim to be entitled to f take their slave property into the ermmon ter t ritory, and be protected there. The States are ? the original source of power; the Federal t Government has no power except tint which I' has been delegated to it by the States in the t Constitution ; and the States have now, as ' declared by the Supreme Court of the United 1 States, in New York vs. Miln, 11 Peters, p. ; 138— ; I “ The same undeniable and unlimited juris diction over all persons and things within their territorial limits as any foreign nation, where ■ that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained 1 by the Constitution of the United States.” But, sir, independent of their legal right, my i constituents have the equitable right to take their slave property into the common territory of the Union. That territory is the joint property of all the States, slaveholding as well as non slaveholding. There are but two ways in which property can honestly be acquired in this country : the one is by labor and industry; the other by inheritance or bequest. A citizen of Georgia by bis labor and industry acquires capital-money—a citizen of Ohio by his labor and industry does the same thing ; the citizen of Georgia vests the proceeds of his labor in slave property, the citizen of Ohio vests his in merchandise, or stock, or in whatever he may choose to invest. They both desire to emigrate to the common territory with the proceeds of their labor ; and we will suppose that this Gov ernment shall, by an usurpation of authority, pass a law excluding slave property from that common territory. The citizen of Georgia and the citizen of Ohio meet upon the border of that territory. The citizen of Ohio is told that he can pass into that common territory with the proceeds of his labor and industry and enjoy it; but the citizen of Georgia is told, that he cannot go into that common territory and enjoy the benefit of his labor and industry. “ Why,” he inquires, “ have not I obtained my property as honestly and fairly as tie citizen of Ohio who has just gone in ; and am I not as much entitled to enjoy the bentfit of that com mon territory as he is ?” “ Certainly you are, but your property is of a different specie, and, therefore, you must keep out.” Is that equali ty. or justice, between citizens entitled to equal privileges, and equal rights, under a common Government ? Can any Government that shall pursue such a course of policy maintain the confidence of the people ? But, sir, we have been told by those who ad vocate this line of policy, that they do not de sire to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists; and yet it is their intention to pre vent the extension of slavery by excluding it from the common territory—to surround the slave States ‘with a cordon of free territory, and compel slavery, like a serpent, to sting itself to death!" Now it matters but little with me, whether a man takes my property outright, or restricts me in the enjoyment of it, so as to render it of but little or no value to me. It is an interference with my rights in either case ; the interference is one of degree only. Any restraint upon the use anil enjoyment of my property in ns full and ample manner as I might otherwise do, but for the restriction, is an in terference with it. There is not a slaveholder in this House or out of it, but who knows per fectly'well that, whenever slavery is confined within certain specified limits, its future exist ence is doomed; it is only a question of time as to its final destruction. You may take any single slaveholding county in the Southern States, in which the great staples of cotton and sugar are cultivated to any extent, and confine the present slave population within the limits of that county. Such is the rapid, natural in crease of the slaves, and the rapid exhaustion of the soil in the cultivation of those crops, which add so much to the commercial wealth of the country,) that in a few years it would be impossible to support them within the limits of such county. Both master and slave would be starved out; and what would be the practi cal effect in any one county, the same result would happen to all the slaveholding States.— Slavery cannot be confined within certain spe cified limits without producing the dcstrcct'on of both master and slave; it requires fresh lands, and plenty of wood and water, not only for the comfort and happiness of the slave, but for the benefit of the owner. We understand perfectly well the practical effect of the pro posed restriction upon our rights, and to what extent it interferes with slavery in the States ; and we also understand the object und purpose of that interference. If the slaveholding States should ever be so regardless of their rights, and their honor, as coequal States, to be willing to submit to this restriction, for the sake of har mony and peace, they could not do it. There is a great, overruling, practical necessity which would prevent it. They ought not to submit to it upon principle, if they could, and could not if they would. It is in view of these things, sir, that tho people of Georgia have assembled in convention, and solemanly resolved that, if Congress shall pass a law excluding them from the common territory with their slave property, they will disrupt the ties that bind them to the Union. This position has not been taken byway of threat or menace. Georgia never threatens, but Georgia always acts, whenever it is neces sary and proper for her to act for the protec tion of her constitutional rights and the rights of her people. She wei 1 not act hastily or rash ly, but not the less firmly on that account.— She intends to place herself right in the face of the world, in regard to this question. She has delegated me, in conjunction with my abler and more experienced colleagues, to make known her rights here, and to proclaim them to the American people. She desires to main tain those rights within the Constitution, and for that purpose invokes the support of the friends of the Constitution in every portion of the country, in order that those rights may be respected and observed. I have endeavored to present those rights to the consideration of this House to day, in good temper, and as becomes the Representative of one of the old thirteen States of this Confederacy. CONTINUED ON TUB FOURTH PAQB.