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1776 IN GEORGIA
continued from p. 9
Cherokees faced particularly aggressive refugees and opportu
nistic land speculators—a British agent witnessed their alarm:
Congress, he was explicit, "Gentlemen I wou'd have you take it "They became exceedingly alarmed by seeing a row
into your most serious Consideration which of the two Evils will of stockaded forts, 15 miles distant from each other,
be the least, either to supply the Indians with Goods, or run erected by the rebels along their frontiers and at a small
the risque of an Indian War..." distance from their towns. They saw the back inhabit-
His carefully planned May conference with Creek leaders in ants in rebellion and everywhere in arms, the friends of
Augusta was held to explain the nature of the revolutionary government [Tories, loyalists] distressed, disarmed, and
confl : :t and to assure them that the Congress worked in good driven r.oin their houses, many of whom were pursued
faith on the matter of trade, simply needing time to restore the by the rebels into their towns whither they had fled for
"Beloved Path" (the Georgia/Carolina trade) to its former status. shelter and protection. 7he Indians at last flew to arms,
Creek leaders echoed some of the frustrations of their resident attacked, killed or took prisoners many of the pursuing
traders who had not gained the debt relief which the 1773 parties..."
land cession aimed for. In a realistic view of their trade crisis,
Galphin dare not begrudge their growing trade with Pensacola, An infusion of British arms, meant to serve British objec-
even though this remained a British port and the platform of a tives, was simply applied to the Cherokees' immediate dis-
southern strategy to militarize Native America. tresses. Had the royal naval assault on Charleston succeeded
Questions of trade and war soon clashed in Creek councils, that summer, the Cherokee may have been able to sustain
while British arms were moving through their lands, but with recovered territory. This did not happen, and the singular Whig
both patriots and loyalists sweating to bring goods and curry victory in Charleston freed rebel arms to retaliate against the
favors, the Creeks held a middle ground. From the nation a
British agent wrote that the Creeks "complain much against =
the Virginians, as they call all those people now in rebellion; |
yet they do not seem hearty in joining against them but would §
much rather wish to enjoy the advantages of a neutrality by 5
being paid by both parties." This rather crude characterization 3
missed the point. Although they could not know the outcome
of this Anglo war, Creek leaders certainly grasped its signifi
cance and danger. To the frustration of many British officials,
the decided Creek policy of their national council that sum
mer opposed offensive action against rebel Georgians, while
the British port cities of St. Augustine and Pensacola would
be guarded for what remained of the trade. A rational policy,
but due to events over which they had no control, this was a
luxury they could not sustain.
Hardly had the Augusta Congress got underway when
Galphin watched his worst fears take shape. A voice he prob
ably did not expect to hear during the conference explained:
"I have heard your Talks and they are good, now I [Head
Warrior of Cowita] am going to Speak to you. I have
been One day Considering on the matter [breaking news
of a relative's murder]. I lamented in Melancholy Silence
both yesterday and today. Now I say, if you intend the
Path betwixt this and Our Nation should be white [as
in peaceful] You must give satisfaction for my relation,
whom some of your people have killed, or Blood will be
spilt. I tell you so now but if you give Satisfaction it will
be straight as formerly."
Before the meeting, Galphin had learned of a backcountry
Anglo plot to intercept the Creek mission, take their urgently
needed ammunition, and ignite a Creek war. With this fright
ening news, Galphin realized that the greater threat to Creek
and Cherokee neutrality came less from British efforts to
militarize them than from his own rebel neighbors who had
already declared their part in the Revolution—war for land.
This was made official by an ambitious petition later that sum
mer addressed to the commanding general of patriot forces
in the South: "That your petitioners, living on the frontiers
of the western parts of the Province of Georgia... are much
exposed to the barbarous attacks of the Creek Indians...." This
interesting document continued with a glowing account of
the Oconee River country (pointing to motive), and a rumored
willingness of the Creeks to part with it, then turned with
peculiar and self-serving logic into a declaration of war: "That
your petitioners submit to your Excellency's wise consideration
how far prudent it might be to make an attempt to exterminate
and rout those savages out of their nation... and in such case
your petitioners will be ready, at the hazard of their lives and
fortunes, to unite together for so desirable a purpose." This
appears to be the first documented war declaration for the
conquest of the Oconee lands—a vicious borderland conflict,
later called the Oconee War. The formality of the document fol
lowed serious provocations. In June Georgia militants attacked
a Creek family near the Oconee, killing the wife and son of
Tallassee Mico. Wrote Galphin, "They have every temptation to
break with us, and yet I think I could keep them peaceable, if
it was not for the people upon the ceded land."
A lthough intimately related to the struggle for indepen
dence, this borderland war, with others farther north,
remained a distinct and consequential theatre in the
American Revolution—the war's other war. This crisis provoked
a renewed effort among American Indian leaders to confederate
their communities from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico
and coordinate an end to incursions into their territories. The
—
Mico Chlucco, or the Long Warrior (drawn by William Bartram), was in
volved in the defense of East Florida during the American Revolution.
Cherokee towns, their homes burned and crops destroyed by
harvest time. Starving refugees in Creek towns, and a demon
strated British weakness in the South, weighed against notions
of taking up a loyalist cause, but the problem of Anglo intrud
ers continued to vex native communities in the South and
beyond.
As the humiliated British Navy sailed from the Carolina
coast, Georgia's rebel fighting force was soon augmented by
several companies of continental soldiers under the command
of General Charles Lee. Inspired by the successful defense
of Charleston, Lee, with enthusiastic promotion by Georgia
Whigs, took the offensive to lead an invasion of British East
Florida—in part as means to intimidate the Creeks from join
ing the loyalist cause. The expedition had hardly left Savannah
when it became apparent that civil leadership in the state was
divided and weak—at odds with its own military commanders
and unable to supply enough stores, horses and boats for Lee's
operation. Dissent and a thirst for plunder corroded the ven
ture into pillaging forays across the St. Mary's River. In a sharp
critique of Georgia's revolutionaries, Lee contrasted their mili
tary ambitions with their abilities, writing, "Upon the whole
I shou'd not be surpris'd if they were to propose mounting a
body of Mermaids on Alligators."
While Native American fighters, in a defensive role, drove
rebels back into Georgia, Loyalist governor Patrick Tonyn was
anxious that more Creeks had not come to his aid. He blamed
the British Indian Superintendent, John Stuart, for hosting
their chiefs to West Florida at the height of the rebel threat in
East Florida. A passionate advocate of using American Indian
forces, Tonyn pleaded, "The Americans are a thousand times
more in dread of the Savages than of any European troops. Why
not avail of their help?" The governor went on to speculate
that Stuart had personal reasons for discouraging Creek mili
tancy in the British service; his family was detained-by Whigs
in Charleston as a hedge against his requesting such service:
"The letters he wrote to his agents... contained directions to
strike no stroke with the Cherokees or Creeks until they heard
further from him, and for each nation to dispatch messengers
to demand the enlargement of Mrs. Stuart and his family, which
are sent. He stands in need of a strong spur."
One incident on the St. Mary's that summer gives a strong
indication of where Creek sentiments remained. Loyalist rang
ers and Seminol°-Creek warriors were rummaging through an
abandoned post on the south side of the river wnen they came
under fire from Georgia patriots on the north. A lively exchange
of musket-fire ensued with trees screening the Georgians on
one bank, buildings shielding their political adversaries on the
other. The narrative resumes, here in a letter penned by the
naturalist and explorer William Bartram:
"lhe conflict continued for some time when the Chief
of the Indians threw down his Gun and boldly stepped
out from the corner of a House he took off his Hat
and whirling it up in the Air as he advanced to the
River Side, amidst showers of Bullets, he spoke aloud
to the Georgians, declaring that they were Brothers
and Friends and that he knew not any cause why they
should spill each others Blood. Neither I (said he) nor
my Companions the Red-Men, will fire another Gun. He
turned about, shouted, and immediately le'd off the
Indians. This put an end to the contest at that time."
T he lessons of 1776 were profound for the Creeks.
Cherokee action against Anglo (i.e., "Virginian") usurp
ers came at a terrible cost. The weakness of British
military abilities in the South—no British troops came to
support the Cherokee fight, and the King was unable to
strengthen or protect his loyalist subjects in Carolina—caused
some Creeks to question the sincerity of the loyalist rhetoric
altogether. Earning tremendous credit, Stuart finally oversaw a
Creek-Choctaw peace settlement in October, and opened what
appeared to be regular trade. Yet, while Creek hunters that
autumn fanned out across their vast hunting reserves, hoping
for some measure of normalcy, they were faced with the esca
lating violence among their Anglo neighbors and the militari
zation of their borderlands.
Creek leaders could no longer view their English neighbors
as "one people" but as a tumultuous clamor of factions, made
especially clear in the contrast between the official narrative of
the dispute given them by agents of the Continental Congress
("this is a family quarrel"), and the treatment they were expe
riencing on the troubled road to Augusta. This particular class
of rebels (again, "Virginians," as the Creeks called them),
defied congressional efforts to encourage borderland peace,
threatened Galphin as an enemy to their brand of revolution
and were violently determined to bring the Creeks into what
they themselves would characterize as a "general madness."
"I have sat quietly a long time without joining either party,
but the Virginians are now come very near my nation and I do
not want them to come any nearer," Emistisiguo communicated
in a letter of Nov 19, 1776. "...‘If the red warriors to the
northward would hold a red stick against the Virginians there, I
would hold one against them here."'In the winter ahead, Creek
fighters would carry the "red stick" into their eastern border
lands, changing the military ambitions of those Georgians who
would "rout those savages" and take the Oconee lands into
a desperate struggle to hold their own—lands "they are only
[recently] settled on the borders of...." This was a fight which
would outlast the Revolution and profoundly shape Georgia
history for the rest of the 18th century.
In the decades which followed the Revolution, historians
have tried to constellate the Creeks into opposing pro-British
or pro-American camps. Accusations of "disloyalty" and
"duplicity" are common in both Tory and Whig sources, finding
expression in more recent narratives. Shallow conclusions like
this fail to gauge the diplomatic and economic complexities
which they faced during the Revolution, but were typical of the
colonial mindset then, and often of the Eurocentric mindset
today. Like other Native American communities, the Creeks,
when they went to war, fought in their own way and for their
own ends. In spite of difficult odds and power struggles which
threatened to bring civil war into their own towns, the Creeks
managed to keep the battlegrounds of the Revolution out their
own country—a tribute to the political talent of their lead
ers in times of crisis, and a demonstration of loyalty to their
people and devotion to their lands.
Steven Scurry
10 rLAGPOLE.COM ■ MARCH 5,2008
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