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the military and naval arsenals, magazines, |
and slcrehougeg, it is believed tlri' such an i
sic* would be regarded hv all as palpable '
lunation of Executive power, subversive ofj
bf the form as well as the fundamental princi- j
pies of our Government. Bi' where)
is the difference in principle, whether the!
public property be in the form of arms, mtini-{
iinns *f war, and supplies, or t'n gold and si l ’- '
ver, ° r bank notes? None can be perceived—■
none is believed to exist. Congress cannot,;
therefore, take onl of the hands nfthe execu-I
five Depnrjmenf, the custody of the public )
pronertv or money, without an assumption of;
Executive power, and a subversion of the first j
principles of the constitution.
T e Congress of the United States have ,
never passed an act imperatively directing that
the public moneys shall be kept in any par- '
ticular place or places. From the origin of
thp Government to the year 1816, the statute
book «as wholly silent on the subject. In
1788 a Treasurer was created, subordinate to
the Secretary of the Treasury, and through
htm to the President. He was required to
give. bond, saf lv to keep, and faithfully to ■
disburse the public moneys, withou* any di J
reclion as to the manner nr places in winch
they should be hep'. Bv reference to the i
practice of the Government, it is found, that
from its first organization, the Secretary of
the Treasury, acting under the sttporversinn
of the Prcsieent, designated the places m
which the public moneys should be kept, and
cpoci dlv directed all transfers from place tn
place. This practice was continued, with the
sihmt acquiescence of Congress, from 1759
down to 1816: and although many banks were]
pelpmod and discharged, and although a por-|
tion of the moneys were first placed in the '
State Banks, and then in the former bank ofj
the United S'ates, and upon the dissolution of j
that, were again transferred to the Stale Bank,
no legislation was thought necessary by Con- '
gross, and al’ ho operations were originated 1
and perfected bv Executive authority. The
St*cr> tary of the Treasury, responsible to the j
President, and with his approbation, made con-:
tracts and arrangements in relation to the I
whole subject matter, which was thus entirely ,
committed to the direction of the President,)
under his responsibilities to the American]
Panpie, and those who were authorized to im
peach and punish him for any breach of this
important trust.
The act of 1916, estnblis’ ing the Bank of
the United States, directed the deposites of
public money *o he made in that bank and its •
branches, in places in which the said bank and i
branches thereof mav be established, “unless j
the Secretary of the Treasurv should otherwise j
or er and direct.” in which event, he was re
quired to give his reasons to Congress. This
was hut a' continuation of Lis pre-existing
powers ns the Head of an Executive Depart
ment. to direct where the deposites - should be
'made, with the sopr.raddcd obligation of giving
his reasons Io Congress for making them else- .
where than in the Bank of the United States >
ami its branches. It is not to be considered :
that ttiis provision in any degree altered the
relation between the Secretary of the frensti- I
r l . and the President, as the responsible Head'
of the Executive Department, or released the |
latter fr”tn his constitutional obligation to
“take care that the laws he faithfully execu-'
ted.” On the contrary, it increased Ins re«j
tqmmsilufities, hv adding another to the long ,
Ji<t of laws which it was his duty to carry into,
©fleet.
It would bean cxt'nordinary result, if, !><•-j
can. e the person charged by law with n public ■
July, is one of the Bcc r etarms, it wore less the
duty of llm President to see ‘hat law faithful
ly executed, thin other laws enjoining duties
upon subordinate officers or private citizens.
Tftbere he any ihlTerenco, it would seem that
♦he obligation is tho stronger in relation to the
former, because the neglect is in his presence,
and the remedy at hand.
It cannot be doubted that it was the legal!
Jittv of the Secretary nf the Treasury tn order (
and direct the deposited of the public mono' to
bo made elsewhere than in the Bank of the
United States, whenever sufficient reasons ex
isted for making the change. If. in such a case
he > rgleetcd or refused to act, he would neg.
Icet or refuse to execute the la w. U hat would
then be the sworn dutv of the President ?
Cmild he sav that the constitution dtd not bind
him to see the Jaw faithfully executed, because
it uasoneofliH Seeretaru s. and not himse-f
noon whom the service was specially imposed?
Might he not be asked whether ther« was any
s>icl. limtißti' n '<> his obligations proscribed in
the Constitution? Whether he is not equally
bound to lake care that the laws be faithfully
executed, whether they impose duties on the
highe-t officer of State, or the lowest subor- '
dinate in any of the Departments? Might he
not be told. that it was for the sole purpose of
causing all executive effi ers. from the highest
to *he lowest, faithfully to perform the servi
ces required of them bv law—that the People
of the United States have ’made him thetr'
Chief Magistrate, and the rotistit ition has
clothed him with the entire Executive power;
of this Government? The principles implied;
in these questions appear ton plain to need elu- I
c»d ition
But here, also we have rntemporancoua
construction of (heart, which shows that it was
noi understood as tn any wav changing the re
lations between the President and Secretary of
the treasury, or ns placing the latter out of
Executive control, even in fetation to the de-1
posites of the public money. Nur on this
point are wo left to anv equivocal testimony, i
Th»* documents nf the Treasury Department
show th-Rt th Secretary of the Treasury did
apnlv tn the President, and obtain his anprn
bation and sanction tn the original transfer of
the public dep<»sites tn the present Bank of the
United States, and did carry the measure mtn
effect in < b»-dience to ho derision. They al
so show that transfers nf th-* public dep >sites
from the Branches of the Bank of the United
Status to State Batiks, at Chilicot k e ; Vine tn-1
naii, and Louisville, m 1849. were made with ]
the approbation of the President, and bv his]
authority. They show, that upon all import- ;
ant questions appertaining tn his Department, |
whither they •■elated to the public deposites o» - ;
other matters, it was the constant practice ofj
the Secretary of the Tieasury to obtain for Ins j
acts tiie approval and sanction of the Presi
dent. T hese acts, and the principles on which j
they were founded, were known to all the de- j
partments of the Government, to Gongress, I
and the, country; and, until ve> v recently, ap-!
pear never to have been called in questton. 'j
I'lms was it settled by the constitution. the .
laws, and the whole practice of the Govern- ;
rnent.. that the entire Executive power is vested i
in the President ofthe United States; that as,
incident to that power, the right of appointing )
and removing those oflv-ers who are to aid ,
him in the execution of the laws, with such re- '
strictinns ordv as the constitution prescribes, j
is vested in the President; that the Secretary,
of the freasury is one of those officers; that
the custody of the public property and money;
is an executive function, which, in rela'ion to '
the money, has always been exercised thro igh '
the Secretary of the Treasury and his subor-i
dinates; that in the performance of these du-j
ties, he is subject to the supervision and con- ,
trol of the President, and in all important mea
sures having relation to them, consults the ■
Chief Magistrate, and obtains his approval and ]
sanction; that trie law establishing the Bank
did not, as it could not, change the relation be
tween the President ami the Secretary—did'
not release the former from his obligation to i
see the law faithfully executed, nor the latter
from the President’s supervision and control;
that afterwards, and before, the Secretary did
in fact consult, and obtain the sanction of the
President, to transfers and removals of the
public deposites; and that all departments of
the Government, and the nation itself, approv
ed or acquiesced tn these nets and principles,
as in strict coulormity with our constitution
and laws.
During the last year, the approaching ter
mination, accord'ng to the provisions of its
charter, and the solemn decision of the Atner-
I ican People, of the Bank of the United States,
made it expedient, and its exposed abuses and
corruptions, rmde it, in my opinion, the duty
of the Secretary of the Treasury, to place the
, moneys of the United States in other deposi
tories. The Secretary did not concur in that
opinion, and declined giving the necessary or
der and direction. So glaring were the abus
es and corruptions of the Bank, so evident its
fixed purpose to persevere in them and so
palpable its design, by its money and power,
to control the Government and change its cha
racter, that I deemed it the imperative dutv of
the Executive authority, by the exertion of (
every power confidml to it bv the constitution
and laws, to check its career, and lessen its
ability to do mischief, even in the painful al-)
ternative of dismissing the Head of one of the
Departments. Al me time the removal was
made, other causes sufficient Io justify it ex
istcjJ; but il lhev had not, tlto Secretary would
h ive been dismissed for’his cause only.
His place I supplied by one whose opinions
were well known to mt*, and whose frank ex
pression of them, in another situation, and
whose generous .sacrifices of imerest and feel- 1
mg, when tmcxpeci mil v called to the station
he now occupies, ought forever to have shield
ed his motives from suspicion, and his charac
ter from reproach. In accordance with the
miintons long before expressed by him, he pro
ceeded, w«th my sanction, to make arrange
ments for depositing the moneys of the United
States in other safe institutions.
1 he resolution of the Senate, as originally
framed, and us passed if it refers to these acts,
presupposes a right in that body to interfere
, w ith this exercise of Executive power. If the
principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to
oercei e where it,may end. If, by a mere de
nunciation like this resolution, the President
1 should ever he induced to act, in a -natter of
ofirial duty, c ntrarv to the honest convic tons
of his own mind in compliance wi'h the wish
es of the Senate, the constrmion d indepen
dence of the Executive Department would bn
is effectually destroyed, ami its power as ps
i fectualli transferred to the Senate, as if that
tmd bad been accomplished by an amendment
of the constitution. But if the Senate have a
right to interfere with he Executive powers,
they have also the ritfht tn tnak" that interfer
ence elfeotivi-; and if (he assertion oftho pow
er implied in the resolution |»e silently acqui
esced in, we may reasonably apprehend (hat jt
will he followed, at some future day, by an
attempt at actual enforcement. The Senate
mav refuse, except on the condition that he
will surrender his opinions to theirs and obey
their will, to perform their ow n con<(i(utioml
functions; to pass the necessary laws: to sanc
tion appropriations proposed bv the House of
Representatives, and to confirm proper nom
inations made bv the President. It has alrea
dy been maintained (and it is not conceivable
that the resolution of the Senate can be based
on any other principle) that the Secretary of
the Treasury is the officer of Congress, and 1
independent of the President; that the Presi
dent has no right to control him. and con.se-'
q-ientlv none tn remove him.—With the same
propriety, and on similar grounds, may the Se
cretaries nf \\ nr and the Navy, and the Post
master General, each in succession, be declar
ed independent oftho President, the subor :
dinntas of Congress, and removable only w ith
the concurrence of the Senate. Followed tn.
its consequences, thia principle will be found
effectually to destroy one co-ordinate Depart
ment of the Government, to concentrate tn the
hands ofihe Senate the whole Executive pow
er, nnd tn leave the President as powerless as
he w ould be useless—the shadow of authority,
after the substance had departed.
Tne time and the Occasion which have cal
led Girth the resolution of the Senate, seem to
impose noon me an addi-iona! obligation not
tn pass it over m silence. Nearly foriv-five
yeers had the Presideol exercised, withatfl €
question as to his rightful authority, those pow
ers for the recent assumption of which lo
now’ denounced. The vicissitudes of peac
and tvai‘ had attended our Government; violent
parties, watchful to take advantage o r any
seeming usurpation rm the part of the Execu
tive, had distracted our counsels; frequent re
movals, or forced resignations, in every sense
tantamount to removals, had been made of the
Secretary and other officers of the Tresury;
and vet, in no one instance is it known, that
any man, whether patriot or parties had raised
his voice against it as a violation of the Con
stitution. The expediency and justice of such
changes, in reference to public officers of all
grades, have frequently been the topics of dis
cession; but the constitutional right of the
President to appoint, control, and remove the
Head of the Treasury, as well as all other De
partments, seems to have been universally con
ceded. And what is the occasion upon which
other principles have been first officially as
serted t The Bank of the United States, a
great moneyed monopoly, had attempted to
obtain a renewal of its charter, by controlling
the elections of the People and the action of
the Government. The use of its corporate
funds and power in .that attempt, was fully dis
closed; and it was made known to the Presi
dent that the corporation was putting tn train
the same course of measures,'with the view of
making .another vigorous effort, through an in
terference in the elections of the People, to
control public opinion and force the Govern
ment to yield to its demands. This, with its
corruption of the press, its violation of its char
ter, its exclusion of the Government Directors
from its proceedings, its neglect of duty, and
arrogant pretensions, made it, in the opinion
of the President, incompatible with the publie
interest and the safety of our institutions, that
it should be longer employed as the fiscal agent
of the I’reasury. A Secretary of the Trcastt
ry, appointed in the recess of the Senate, who
had not been confirmed by that body, and
whom the President might or might not at his
pleasure nominate to them, refused to do what
his superior in the Executive Department con
sidered the most imperative of his duties, and
became in fact, however innocent his motives,
the protector of the Bank. And on this oc
casion it is discovered for the first time, that
those who framed the constitution misunder
stood it; that the first Congress and all its
successors hnvo - been under-a delusion; that
the practice of near forty five years, is but a
continued usurpation; that the Secretary of the
Treasury is not responsible to the Pr >sidont;
and that to remove him is a viol ition of the
constitution and I iwg, for which the President
deserves to stand forever dishonored on the
journals of the Senate,
There are al<o some other circumstances
connected with the discussion and passage of
the resolution, to which I feel it to bo, not on
ly my right, but mv duty, to refer. Il appears
by the journal of the S mate, that among the
twenty-six Senators who voted for the resolu
tion on its final passage, and who had support
ed it in debate, in i’.s original form, were one
oftho Senators from t te State of Maine, the
two Senators from New Jersey, and one of
the Senators from Ohio. It also appears by
the same journal, and by the files oftho Sen
ate, that the Legislatures of these States had
severally expressed their opinions in re-ped to ;
the Executive proceedings drawn in question ]
before the Senate.
The two branches <»<* the Legislature of the J
State of Maine, on the 25th of January. 1534, '
passed a preamble and series of resolutions in
the following word- :*
“ Whereas, at an early period after the elee
tion of Andrew Ja kson to the presidency, in
accordance with the sentiments which he had
uniformly expressed, the attention of Congress
was called to ’he constitutionality and expedi
ency of the renewal of (be charter of'he U-
S'a'es Bank; And whereas, the Bn k has
transcend’d its chartered limits in the manage
ment ofi's business transactions, and h is ab tu
<l »n»*d the object of its creation, hv engaging hi
n.fli’icnl controversies, by wield’ng its power
and influence to embarrass the adtninistratioh
ol’ibe Genera! Government, and by bringing
insolvency and distress upon the commercia 1
rommunitv. And whereas, the public security
f rom such an institution consists less in its pre
sent pernniarv ranacitv to discharge its liabili
ties than tn tho fidelity with which the trusts
reposed in it have been exec ted : And where
as. the abuse and misapplication of'he powers
conf' rr<’d have destroyed the confidence of the
public iti ‘ho officers nf the Bank, and demon
strated that such powers endanger the stability
of ronubliean institutions : Therefore, Resolv
ed, That in the removal of the public dep ts
i‘es from the Bank of the United States, as'
well as tn the manner of their removal, we re
cognise in the administration an adherence to
cons’ituiional rights, and the performance of
a public dutv.
Resolved, That this Legislature entertain
the same opinion as heretof' re expressed by
preceding Legislatures of ibis Btnfe. that the
Bank of the United Stalos ought not to be re
chartered
Resolved, That the Senators of 'bis State in
the Congress ofthe I nite>l States be ins'nr’ted
and the Representatives ho requested, to op- j
pose the restoration of the dpnnsites and the )
renewal of tho charter of the United States!
Bank.”
On the 111|> f January. 1834, tho House of;
Assembly and Cnun il eompoa,ng the L■•?<»- j
lature of the State of New Jersey, passed a.
preamble and a series of resolutions in the fol j
lowin'* words ; *
“ W Pereas the present crista in our public
affairs calls for a decided expression nf the i
voice nf the people of this State: and whereas :
we consider it the "ndoubfed right of tho Le- j
gislature of the several States to instruct those I
who represent their interest in the councils of
the nation, in all matters which intimately con
cern 'he puhlio »eal, and mav affect the hap
piness or well be ; nj cf tho pcopla : There
fore i
“2. Pi if r/’.voZiti'rZ f‘i/ ilce. Council and Gen
■‘ra’ I’isembh/ of this Sfote.. Dia’ whil •we ac
knowledge with feelings of devout gratitude
our obligations to the great Ruler of nations
for his mercies to us as a people, that we have
been preserved alike from foreign war, from
the evil, of internal commotions, and the
machinations of d ,*s>gnin ; and atnbt.ious men
•vho would prostrate the fair fabric of our Un
ion; that we ought, nevertheless, to bumble
our-udves in H : s presence and implore His aid
for the perpetuation of our republican institu
tions, and for a continuance of that unexam
pled prosperity which our country has hitherto
enjoyed.
.•2. Resolved, That we have undimtnishccl
confidence in the integrity and firmness ofthe
venerable patriot who now holds the distin
guished post of Chief Magistrate of this nation,
and whose purity of purpose and elevated mo
tives have so often received the unqualified
approbation of a large majority of his fellow
citizens.
3. Resolved, That we view with agitation
and alarm the existence of a great moneyed
incorporation, which threatens to embarrass
the operations of the Government, and by
means of its unbounded influence upon the cur
rency nf the country, to scatter distress and
ruin throughout the community; and. that we,
therefore, solemnly belive the present Bank of
the United States might not to be recharted.
4 Resolved, That our Senators in Congress
be instructed, and our members of the House
of Representatives be requested to sustain, by
their votes and influence, the course adopted
by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. fancy,
in relation to the Bank of the United States
and the deposites of the Government moneys,
believing as we do the course ol the Secretary
to have been constitutional, aud that the public
good required its adoption.
5. Resolved, That the Governor be request
ed to forward a copy of the above resolutions
to each of our Senators and representatives
from this State in the Congress of the United
States-”
On the 21st dtv of February last, the Le
gislature of the same State, reiterated the opin
ions and instructions before given, by join' re
sobit'nns, in he following words:
“ Resolved hi/ fh°. and General Is
se.inbhi of the State of Vein Jersey, I'liat they
do adhere to the resolutions passed bv them on
the 11th dav of January last, relative to the
President of the United States, the Bank of
the United States, and the course of Mr. 'Pa
nov in removing the Government deposites.
R"solved, That the Legislature of New Jer
sey have not seen any reason to depart from
such resolutions since (he passage thereof; and
tit is (heir wish that they should receive from
our Senators and Representatives of this State
in tho Congress of the United States, that at
ten’ion and obedience which are duo to the
opinion of a sovereign State, openly expressed
in its Legislative capacity.”
On the 2d of January, 1834, the Senate and
House of Representatives composing tho Le
gislature of Ohio, pass nd a preamble and re
solutions in the foil >wiug words :
“ AA r h“roas there is reason to believe that the
Bank of tho U tited S'ams will attempt to ob
tain a renewal of its charter at the present ses
sion of Congress; And whereas it is abundant
ly evident that sa d Bank has exercised powers
derogatory to the spirit of our free institutions
and dangerous to the liberties of these U.
S' ites : And whereas, there is just reason to
donut 'lie constitutional power of '’ongress to
gran* '.c's of "icorporation for banking nurp >«-
e- oit of the Disftiet ofColumbia ; And where
as. we believe the proper disposal of the public
I md-to be of the utmost importance to the
P «onl« of these United States, and that honor
a id good faith require tie ir equitable distribu
tion : r'vroforc
Res deed hv the General Assem'dy of the
State of Ohio, That wo consider tho removal
of he public -I 'posites from 'he Bank of the
United States as required by the b’s' interests
of our <•<> m’r . a id tha' a proper sense of pub-
Ip-duty itnperiouslv demanded that that insti
tu'ion should be no longer used as a depository
of the poblic funds.
Resolved, also, That we view, with decided
disapprobation, the renewed attempts in Con
gress to secure the passage of the bill provid
ing for the disposal of the public domain upon
the principles proposed by Mr. Clay, inasmuch
as we believe that such a law would be une
qual in its operations, and unjust in its results.
Resolved, also, That we heartily approve of
the principles set forth in the late veto mes
sage upon that subject, and,
Resolved. That our Senators in Congress
be instructed, and our Representatives request
ed, to use their influence to prevent the re
chartering of the Bank of tiie U Slates; to
sustain tho admin s ia r io i m it- removal of the
pulili’ - deposites; and to oppose the passage <>f
a land lull containing the principles adopted m
the act tmon that subject, passed at the lag!
session of Congr ss.
Resolved. I’liat the Governor he requested
'<• transmit copies of the foregoing preamble
and resolutions to each of our Senators and
Representatives”
It i- th s seen that four S matora have de- *
flared b>, their votes that the President, in the
late Executive nro'-oed:ugs m relation to the
revenue had been g iilty of the imneachnble i
often”e ot ‘ is-’itmtnj upon htm-elf authority!
“and power not cnnfeired bv the constitution
“and I !••«, bit m derogation of both,” whilst
the Leg;-hit'.res of’heir respective States had
deliberat< lv approved those verv proceedings,
as consistent with the ’•♦institution, and de
manded liv the public g< od If these four
votes had b<*' n given in a’-< ' rdance with the
sentirnen sos th** Legislatures, a- above ex
pressed, 'ln re would have been but twenty
tour votes ci.: o* lorty-six for censuring the i
President aud the unprecedented record ofhis
conviction could not have been placed noon
the jouma's of tiie Senate.
In th is referring 'o • e relations and in
structions of the Slate Legislatures; 1 disclaim
j and repudiate ail authority or design to inter"
sere with the responsibility due Ir .tn m ; inhere
of tlie Senate to their own consciences, (heir
constituents, and their country. The facte
■now stated belong Io the history ol the pro
ceedmgs, and are important to the ju-t devel
i nptnenl of the principles and interests involved
■ in them, as well as to the proper vindication of
the Executive Department; and with that
view, and that view only, are they here made
i the topic of remark. 4
| The dangerous tendency of tho doctrine
: which denies to the President the power of’
' supervising, directing, md removing the Sec
, retarv of the I'reasurv, i like manner with
the other Executive offi-ers, would soon bo
manifest in pramim. were the doctrine to be
' established. The President is ’he direct rep
resentative of the American People, but tho
Secretaries are not. If the Secretary oftha
Treasury be independent of the Presideiit in
, the execution oftho laws, then is there no di
rect responsibility to the People in that impof-'
taut branch ofthie Government, to which ig
committed the care of liie national financi s.-w
And it is in the power of the Bank of the Unit
ed States, or any other corporation, body of
men, or individuals if a Secretary shall bp
; found to accord with them m opinion, or can
be induced in practice to promote their views,
to control, through him, the whole action of
the Government, (so far as it is exorcised by
his Depar merit,) in defiance of the Chief Ma
gistrate elected by the people and
; to them-
) But the evil tendency of tho particular doc
trine adverted to, though suffi.-ientlv serious,
would he as nothing in comparison with the
permcious consequences which would inevifq.-
bly flo.x from the approbation and allowance
by the People, and the practice by the Sen
ate, of the tint onsf 11111 iotta I power ol iirrai”n
ing mid censuring the official conduct of ?ho
Executive, in the manner recently pursued.- *
Such proceedings are eminently calculated to
unsettle the fotiudauong of the Government;
to disturb the harmonious action of its different
Departments; and to break down the checks’
and balances by which the wisdom of its fra
mers sought to ensure its stability and useful
ness.
['he honest clifTcrences, of opinion which
occasionally exist between the Senate and the
President, in regard to matters in which both
are obliged to participate, are suffi. iently em
barrassing. But the course recently adopted
by the Senate shall hereafter be frequently 1
pursued, it is not only obvious that the harmo
ny of the relations between the President and ’
the Senate will be destroyed, but that other
and graver effects will ultimately enstje. If J
the censures of the Senate be submitted to by
r the President, the confidence of the People in
his ability and virtue,'and the character anil
usefulness of hts administration, will soon bo
at an end, and the real power of the Govern
ment will fall mto the hands of a body, hold
ing tho offices for long terms, not elected by
the People, and not to them directly rosponsj- *
ble. If, on the other hand, the -illegal cen
sures of the Senate should be resisted by the *
President, collisions and angry controversies
might ensue, discreditable tn their progress,,
and tn the end compelling the People to adopt
the conclusion, either that their Chief Magis
(rate was unworthy of their respect, or that
tho Senate was chargable with calumny and ■
injustice. Either these results would impair
public confidence in tho perfection of the sys
tem, and le id to serious alterations of its
frame work, or to the practical abandonment
of some of its provisions. I
I he influence of such proceedings on the
other Departments of’ the Government, and
more especially on the Stales, could not fail
to be extensively pernicious'. When the
judges in the last resort of official
themselves overleap the bounds of their an*
thority, as prescribed by the Constitution,
'vhnt general disregard of its provisions might
not their example be expected to produce?—
Aud who does not perceive that such contempt
of the Federal constitution, by one of its most
important Departments, would hold out tha
strongest temptation to resistance on (he pari
ot the State sovereignties whenever they shall
suppose their just rights to have been invad
ed? thus till the independent Departments
of the Government, and ’he States which com- •*
pose our confederated Union, instead of nf
tending to the r appropriate duties, and leaving
those who may offend, tn bo reclaimed or
punished in the maimer pointed nut in the con
stilu ion, would fall to mutual crimination and
recrimination, and give t<» the People, confu
sion and anarchy, instead of order and law; 1
until at length some form of aristocratic pow
er would be established on the rums of the con
stitution, or the States be broken into separate
communities.
Far be il from me to charge, or to insinuate,
’hat (he present Senate of the United Statee
intend, in the most distant way, to cncoura°(j
such a result. It is not of their motives or
designs, but only of the to; deucy of their acts,
that it is my duty to speak. It is, if possible’
to make Senators themselves sensible of tho
danger which lurks under the precedent set in
• heir resolution; and at any rate to perform my
duty, as the responsible Head of one of the
co-equal Departments of the Government,
that I have been compelled to point out the
consequences to which the discussion and pas
sage of the resolution may lead, if the tenden-*
cy of the measure be not cheeked in its mcep- *
tion.
It i» due to the high trust with which I have
been charged; tu those who may be called to
succe< d in • tn it; to the Representatives of the
People, whose constitutional prerogative hap U
been unlawfully assumed; to (he People and to "
the States; to the constitution they have estab
lished; that 1 should not permit its provision?
to be broken down by such an attack on the
Executive Department, without at least some
effort “to preserve, protect, and defend them.
ilh this view, and for the reasons which have
been elated, I do hereby solemnly pjwtct? i