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right; whatever ia useful is good.
But it ia objected, “there are occa
aione, in which the hand of the assas
sin would be useful. It might be
useful to rob a miser, and give the
fnoney to the poor. It may be use
ful to got a seat in Parliament by
bribery or false swearing ; as by that
means we may serve the public more
effectually than in our private sta
tion." But to all these, and to all
others similar, Paley says, No ! They
are not expedient! They are not
useful ! They may seem so, but they
are not. Because they take not into
consideration the one-billionth part
of the consequence. Paley, then,
does not degrade right; he only ele
vates utility to the level of right, and
makes both synonyms of the will of
God. .This, then, is that utility
which, ft is continually said, seeks
for nothing above this earth* nor
takes into account aught besides the
convenience of an hour. An utility
which hath no limit but infinity, and
whose voice is the voice of God in
the harmony of the past, the present,
and the great to morrow. And as
every atom of matter exerts an influ
ence upon endless worlds and sys
tems beyond the supernatural vision
even of the magical tube of Boss, so
every theught and every action is
felt by an infinity of worlds of
thought and feeling, save by the eye
of God unseen, as they roll ever on
ward in circles,of rythmic
Mpauty and song. Gironde.
For the Georgia Collegian.
Answer to “ Gironde,” on Dr. Paley.
Editors Collegian We object to
the views of “ Gironde" in regard to
conscience, and purpose to investi
gate them, and also attempt to prove
(Dr. Paley to the contrary notwith*.
standing,) that there is “such a
thing as a natural conscience." “Gi
ronde ’ has wronged the opponents
of Dr. Paley, by saying that « they
arc guilty of the fallacy, ‘ lgnoratio
Elenchi , in holding that, in the case
of Caius Toranius’, “as the savage
would have no knowledge of the rela
tions existing between the parties,
“he could not form a judgment in the
premises." For solely upon these
relations, the relations of father and
son, with tbeir attendant incidents
aud full meaning, would depend the
magnitude of the son’s guilt in betray
ing his father; and, of course, with
out a knowledge of these relations,
it vrc-uld be impossible to estimate
that guilt. If you alter the relations
of the parties, you change the nature
of the act of betrayal. The fact that
the savage could not, before ho un
derstood the relations of the parties,
correctly estimate the sou’s guilt,
does not prove “ that he did not have
a natural conscience ," but only shows
that his conscience had never before
been called upon to decide the merits
THE GEORGIA COLLEGIAN.
of such a case. We think that this
argument of Dr. Paley savors some
what of the fallacy, “ Ignoratio
Elenchi.” The fact that a faculty
has not been exercised in a certain
direction does not prove that it does
not exist. Who would be so foolish
as to say that Caspar Hauser had no
natural sense of vision, because be
could form no conceptions of light
and colors when be came forth from
the dark dungeon in which he had
been confined from infancy? When
“ Gironde" admits that the above
mentioned argument “ proves that
the savage has a capacity for moral
education," he virtually admits that
the savage has a natural conscience ;
for as the supposition is, that only
“ the relations of the parties" are to
be made known to him, without any
comments thereon, the expression
“ moral education” as here used must
mean that as soon as these relations
are known he will be enabled to esti
mate the son’s guilt. He has not
been told that the son’s conduct was
wrong, but simply informed of the
relations of the parties. Why does
he pronounce it wrong? From ex
ample? No. For be has had no
example set him in this respect, From
education? No. For he has been
educated only in regard to the rela
tions of the parties. From sympa
thy ? No. For be does nqt know
how the father and the otho: a/elt in
view of the aon’u JPJdMjf
cannot feel with them in order that he
may thus determine the moral qual
ity of the act. From habit? No.
lor he has had no previous expe- 1
rience in the matter. From what
then ? We say, from the operations
of a natuial conscience , from an in
stinctive impulse arising by the prin
ciples of his constitution, so soon as
he understands the relations of the
parties, and which impulse is by the
Creator connected with the very con
ception of these relations.
Now, as the savage would pro
nounce the son’s conduct wrong , the
idea of wrong must have already
been in his miod, or he could not thus
predicate it of the sonfs conduct. So,
if any one affirms that an act is right
or wrong, he must have previously
possessed the ideas of right and
wrong. Whence come they and how
are they obtained? Dr. Paley, as
quoted by “ Gironde," says “ that
they are drawn from example, edu
cation, authority, sympathy and ha
bit." This is not true, as we shall
endeavor to show. If these ideas of
right and wrong are derived from
“ example," then we can make m\>-
ral distinctions only in so far as we
have had examples set us for so do
ing. Such a supposition outrages
common sense. Beside, example, as
well as education, which we will here
consider, presupposes the existence
of these moral distinctions, for a man
cannot imitate, or bo educated to, a
thing that does not exist. Example
and “education” may modify , but
they cannot originate these distinc
tions. They are not derived from
“ authority," if by authority be
meanj, law , for, if they were, then
previous to all law there would have
been no such ideas as those of right
and wrong. But law presupposes
these ideas and is built upon them.
How then can that be the origin of
them which presupposes and is foun
ded upon them ? Tho man who pro
mulged tho first law, “commanding
what was right and prohibiting what
was wrong,” must necessarily. have
possessed these ideas of right and
wrong. They are not derived from
“ sympathy," for if they were, we
would be conscious of this element
in our moral decisions. But we are
not aware of its presence. Beside,
as wo intimated in the case of “ the
savage," a man would have to un
derstand the feelings of others, know
how a certain thing affected them and
then adopt their feelings in order to
determine that moral quality of that
thing; thus making the rule of right
—the standard of morality—uncer
tain and variable, by having it to de
pend upon the feelings of men. This
doctrine is absurd, for, thereby, un
less we know tho feelings of others
and can sympathize with them in re
gard to a thing, we are incapable of
moral "distinctions with\espect to
that thing. Thus if there is no sym
pathy, there is no knowledge of
right, no obligation to do right, and
hence no morality. These ideas of
right and wrong are not derived from
habit,” for habit (like example, ed
ucation and law) presupposes their
existence. From whence then are
they derived ? Their origin is to be
found in our mental constitution, for
they are innate or rather connate,
and present themselves as soon as
the mind reaches a certain stage of
development. They are intuitions,
belonging to that class of ideas call
ed “ first principles of the under
standing,” and are the spontaneous
development of the human soul, a
distinct part of our nature as truly as
are any of our instinctive impulses.
Such are our ideas of right and
wrong. Bight and wrong themselves,
as well as truth, beauty and their
opposites, considered subjectively as
conceptions) of the mind, are simple
ideas incapable of analysis or defini
tion. But regarded objectively they
are realities, qualities absolute and
inherent in the nature of things, not
contingent but necessary ; not sim
ply relative to the human mind, but
independent; universal, and, we
might add, eternal. As we have na
turally a faculty for discerning beau
ty and its opposite in objects, so we
have naturally a faculty for discern
ing right and wrong in actions.—
Beason recognizes the existence of
these qualities, right and wrong.—
Judgment decides that a certain act
possesses one or the other of these
qualities, i. e. is a right or wrong ac
tion. Thero is then an obligation to
perform or not to perform the act,
and a consciousness of merit or de
merit, according as we comply, or
fail to comply, with this obligation.
These mental operations constitute
what we call Conscience, and which
may be thus defined: That faculty
by which we discern the moral qual
ity of actions, and by which we are
capable of certain affections with re
spect to this quality. ' Bupert.
Secret Societies.
[Let not our readers imagine from
this discussion, that our College is
divided into snarling factions. Last
session, it is true, there was much
party spirit; but during the vacation
preceding the present term, a power
ful reaction seems to have set io,and
all our students came back to Col
lege intending to forget the animosi
ty of the past. We do not supposo
there is a College in the U. S. where
greater unanimity prevails than at
ours. The discussion will be tolera
ted only so long as the disputants
maintain a dignified debate and avoid
all personality.— Eds. Collegian.]
For the Georgia Collegian. " \
Messrs. Editors: V ,
We who cliffer from the viewVo^a
writer in your last issue, concerning
“ Secret Societies," are ready to take
up the gauntlet so gallantly thrown
down, and, to this end, we would fain
claim a short space in the columns
of the Collegian.
In entering upon the discussion,
we freely grant, in the first place,
most of the points which our friend,
the author, claims ! We allow that
most of the members of these socie
ties, are men of high intellectual pow*
er; we grant that their pursuits are
of a literary character; we grant
that they receive the sanction of the
College authorities; lastly, we do
not deny that in a College of Virgin
ia, there may be dissentions among
the students, not caused by Secret
Societies.
While we allow that the members
of these secret societies generally
possess a high degree of talent, wo
wish it to be borne in mind that they
do not possess all the talent in the
University ! We claim that there arc
many, possessed of the highest order
of talent, who are connected with tho
University, and who, not only do
not belong td secret societies, but
bitterly oppose them. This fact has
been acknowledged repeatedly, by.
the members of these secret organi
zations, in that, they have on many
occasions, earnestly solicited mem
bers of the College to join their socie
ties, who have positively refused,,.