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first quoted, that in multiplying two
fractions, each less than unity, the
-product is less than either the muhi
plieand or multiplier. Ho concluded
that this was impossible, and urged
that as God had commanded the peo
pie of the earth to increase and multi
ply; therefore to multiply signified
to increase !! I Hence, he came to
the conclusion that this thing of the
product of two fractions being less
than either was untrue, and a devico
of the Evil One. .
Reply to “ Gironde” on Paley’s Doc
trine of Utility,”
We are again compelled to differ
with “ Gironde’’ in his views respect
ing “ Paley’s Philosophy,” and in so
doing, protest against being classed
among “ Idealists”—either Absolute
or Cosmothetic—for we belong to
that class called Realists, and believe
in the philosophy of‘Common Sense,’
which has as its fundamental princi
ples the ultimate facts of conscious
ness. In thus expressing a difference
of opinion, we feel that we have not
done wrong; but, if we subscribed to
“ Paloy’s Doctrine of Utility,” we
should hesitate to proceed farther,
for fear that we might do wrong by
advocating an opinion that may be
false, and perhaps, inducingotthers to
believe it; for this would bring about
ik injurious results” and thus be “ in
expedient” and therefore “ wrong.”
Fortunately for our peace of mind we
do not “ subscribe to Paley’s doctrine
o t Utility,” and hence can proceed to
the investigation of “Gironde’s” po
sition without any compunctions of
conscience.
We do not intend to join issue with
“ Gironde” as to the truth of the as
sertion that “ whatever is expedient
is right,” but wish to consider the
doctrine which he impliedly , and Pa
ley expressly , teaches, viz: “ That
utility is the true ground of moral
obligation.” If by the expression
u whatever is expedient is right,” be
meant that expediency and right are
co-extensive, i. e. belong to the same
actions and in the same degrees, we
have nothing to say against it—only
that we would not know whether to
refer expediency to right or right to
expediency, and hence might very
properly reverse the proposition and
say that whatever is right is expe
dient. If, however, by the expres
sion, ‘ whatever is expedient is right,’
be meant that, as ‘ Gironde’ seems to
hold, a thing is right because it is ex
pedient, i. e. productive of the gene
ral good, and that this idea of the
greatest amount of happiness is the
true ground of moral obligation, we
have much to say against it—more
than circumstances will justify.
“ Gironde” says : “ God wishes the
(happiness of His creatures. Outside
THE GEORGIA COLLEGIAN.
of Revelation, actions are estimated
by their utility. Those actions that
contribute to the general good are
right, and those that do not are
wrong. Why ? Because God wishes
the happiness of His creatures.” —
This reasoning is not very clear or
satisfactory, and 'if it proves any
thing, it proves only that an action is
right or wrong because it is, oris not,
in obedience to God’s will, and not
because it is, or is not, productive of
happiness. We do not deny that, in
general, actions which are productive
of general happiness are found to be
right, nor that the moral quality of
some actions is discovered, in part,
from their results; but we do deny
that actions are right simply because
they are productive of general bap
piness, and that the tendency of an
action is the only test of its moral
quality. As we endeavored to show
in our former article, right and
wrong are realities—absolute quali
ties—which inhere in actions from
the very nature of things, and those
actions which possess one or the oth
er of these qualities are right or
wrong simply because God has made
them so; and we have a faculty
(conscience) for discerning these
qualities in actions and teaching us
our duty with respect to such actions
as possess these qualifies. Bat it is
[unnecessary to say more on' this
point. Our chief object at present is
to inquire whether or not “ the idea
of the greatest amount of happiness
is the true ground of moral obliga
tion,” i. e. whether or not we are un
der obligation to perform an action
only on the ground that it will be
productive of the general good. We
may admit that right and the great
est good always coincide, that duty
and happiness go hand in hand; but
this does not prove that we are under
obligation to do a thing because it is
productive of the greatest amount of
happiness. For wo may suppose that,
although God has thus inseparably
connected happiness with duty, He
may have designed (as we think He
did) that our obligation to do certain
things should not rest upon their ten
dency to produce the greatest amount
of happiness.
We account for the fact that duty
and productiveness of happiness al
ways coincide, on the ground that
He ‘ who doeth all things well,’ could
not consistently with His character,
have done otherwise than conformed,
in the creation of man, to that law
of harmony which pervades His en
tire Universe. For, as the desire for
happiness is implanted in our nature,
if we were so constituted that up
rightness would not tend to produce
happiness, there would be a strange
inconsistency in our constitution
which would proclaim the Author of
our beinga bungler and our nature a
failure. The impulse to seek bappi-
ness and the obligation to do right —
“the law of a pure instinct and the
law of a good conscience”—would
wage a constant warfare with each
other. This we conceive to be the
reason why God has so intimately
connected happiness with duty.
It now remains for us to show why
the utility of actions should not con
stitute the ground of moral obliga
tion. This we will proceed to do,
and, at the outset, as the basis of our
arguments, we lay down the follow
ing proposition : The moral govern
ment of God is just and the system
under which He has placed us is per
feet. As this proposition is true, any
doctrine which is subversive of it —
which makes God’s moral govern
ment appear unjust and onr present
system defective—is false and cannot
have the sanction of God. The doc
trine of utility has this effect, as we
shall attempt to prove. It is an in
dispensable requisite to the justice of
every rule of action that it be pub
lished—made known in some man
ner—to those who are to be affected
by it, and it is manifestly unjust that
a person should pay the penalty of
violating a law, the nature of which
he did not know and had no means
of knowing. According to the doc
trine of utility, the only publication
which God has given His laws is to
be found in the fact thatiobedience to
them is productive of general happi
ness, aDd disobedience to them is
productive of general misery; and
therefore our only means of deter
mining whether or not we shall per
form an act is by finding out wheth
er it is productive of general happi
ness or of general misery. Hence, as
there are some rules of moral action
which would be unpublished nod
whose requirements would be un
known, (the consequenoe of obe
dience or disobedience to them bein<*
O
unknown) this doctrine of utility sets
the seal of injustice upon God’s mo
ral government, and must therefore
be false.
Beside, as this doctrine of utility—
the fact that wo are under obligation
to do only that which is productive
of general happiness—would often
place us in a fearful dilemma (in that
we cannot always estimate the con
sequences of actions) and make our
present system appear defective, it
certainly must be erroneous and can
not have the sanction of God. In
fine, we are subject to a law of which
we know nothing, pay the penalty of
violating it through unavoidable ig
norance and can never learn any
thing concerning it save by breaking
it. Verily, this is a beautiful system
of Ethics! We hold that if this doc
trine of utility is true, it must be uni
versally true , and apply as well to our
conduct toward God as to our con
duct toward man. Does it thus ap
ply ? We think not. For in our
conduct toward God we must be not
only moral and vutuous r but also pi
ous.
Now, we maintain that obedience
to God from any other motive than
that He is God, our Creator, Bene,
factor and Preserver, is not piety, but
simply prudence ; and hence, as this
doctrine of utility is, in its opera
tions, insufficient to engender that
which we certainly owe to God —pi-
ety —it is an incorrect moral guide.
We will now, with bared head and
unsandaled foot, go a step farther —
even into the domain of Deity—and
say that if the above doctrine be true
it must apply to and control the con
duct of God himself. If this be true,
then God must have no other rule of
action save that of benevolence. If
then, with God, there is no higher
law than that of benevolence, we
must suppose efther that He never
could have prevented crime (which is
productive of misery) or that a cer
tain amount of crime was necessary
for “the general good.”
Choose your horn, ‘ Giroode.’ But
we need make no such supposition
as the above, for there is a higher
law than that of benevolence—a law
founded upon those eternal principles
of justice which are coeval with God
himself—a law which embodies the
unalterable qualities of right and
wrong, and which, though God crea
ted, binds Jehovah on His Throne,
and cannot, even by Him, be chang
ed. We mean The Moral Law, of
which the Decalogue is but an expo
sition or embodiment. Actions are
right or wrong simply because they
are, or are not, in obedience to this
law; and we are under obligations
to do right and refrain from doing
wrong, solely because this law
(which is the will of God) thus com
mands us. Rupert.
Secret Societies,
The Editors h&vrng been assured
that the readers of the Collegian were
interested in the discussion concern
ing Secret Societies, have reconsider
ed their former decision and will al
low the argument to continue. As
no answer to the article against Se
cret Societies has been attempted,
the writer of that article is willing
that we should first essay a reply.
Our design hitherto has been to
show that College dissensions would
exist independently of Secret Socie
ties. Hence the charge of creating
feud could not be laid at their door ;
for we sustained the statement that
dissensions did arise in College when
no Secret Societies were here—by
the testimony of Alumni—whose ve
racity no man may call in question.
Now the greater part of 1. R.’s piece
was on this issue—“ Whether Secret
Societies ought to exist here,” which
is distinct from the issue, “ Whether
they Lave engendered discord here.”
