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PAGfc 8 GEORGIA BULLETIN THURSDAY, JANUARY 9, 1964 SAIGON SUMMARY U.S. Played Inglorious Role In Fall Of Diem Regime (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1) vatcd. In an admiring magazine article written bv his close friend George J. \V. Goodman, Mr. Halberstam is quoted as saying: “I always said it. The Buddhist campaign was political. ... I thought I always empha sized that this was a political dispute under a religious banner—the only place an opposition had found to gather in an authoritarian regime. . . ." Whatever Mr. Halberstam’s intentions, his and other press dispatches last summer and fall did create the impression in the outside world that some kind of reli gious crisis was going on inside Vietnam. And it was the image of religious persecution—false as it was— that pared the way for Diem’s downfall. Without the embarrassment of being the patron of a country sus pected of battling Buddhists, it is doubtful that the United States would ever have reached the decision to try to get rid of Diem. The authorities in Washington knew, of course, that the conflict in Vietnam was politi cal, not religious. But they were reluctant to speak out lest, in the process, they attract to Washington some of the onus being poured—with hardly any contradiction —on Diem. Bv staying silent, Washington acted as if it thought Diem guilty. And this helped to complete the vicious circle. Or as Roger Ilillsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, put it: “After the closing of the pagodas on August 21, the facts became irrelevant.” So, evidently, did a sense of perspective. What, for ex ample, about the fact that President Diem was far more lenient to his political opposition than President Sukarno of Indonesia or Premier Sarit Thanarat of Tlmiland, both recipients of American aid? Whereas some 300 political prisoners, at most, were found in Diein’s jails, the prisons of Thailand, Indonesia and Burma were filled—and arc? still filled—with tens of thousands of politi cal victims. “But,” explained a pro-coup State Depart ment officer, “the world spotlight is not on those countries, and it is on Vietnam.” At the State Depart ment, there have been some attempts to ra tionalize the coup d’etat by describing it as neces sary to save the Vietnamese war effort from going to pieces. One difficulty with this argument is that it makes liars out of Secretary of Defense McNamara, Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor and Gen. Paul Hark ins, who testified under oath to Congress in October that the war was making reasonable progress. If the State Department ever took seriously the argument that the disturbances in the cities would affect morale in the countryside, it betrays a regrettable lack of understanding of the structure of Vietnam and of the gap between the countryside, where the war will be won or lost, and the cities, where less than ten per cent of the Vietnamese live. For the Buddhists, intellectuals and students who marched the streets in anti-Diem demonstrations could not have eared less about the war—before the coup, or after the coup. Vietnamese students in particular tell you quite frankly that one reason they pi.. e admission to a university is that it enables them to avoid the draft. PET.^you betl" For Convenient Home Delivery In Atlanta Call 636-8677 PET Mil* COMPANY OAltY DIVISION TURN to JUDE St. Jude Solemn Novena February 1st thru February 9th, 1964 Atk St Judo, "1 ha S«w*f of tha Imponibta" for halp. Sind your pout ion t to tha National Shnna of St Judi today A GIFT WIU BE SENT TO THOSE TAKING PART IN THE SOLEMN NOVENA MARK PtmiONS, flU IN, CLIP AND MAIL DEAR FATHER ROBERT PLEASE PLACE MY PETITIONS BEFORE the NATIONAL Shrine OF ST. JUDE IN THE COMING NOVENA R ZToTZL 'R r MA9 * lAGC □ THANKSGIVING CNANCWHM - -O.LD Q u*P,o5ciM35S INCLOSE S^. FOR THE CLARETIAN SEMINARY BUILDING FUNO Name Address __ __ City ___________________ mmm Zone State MAIL TO: NATIONAL SHRINE OF ST. JUDE 221 West Madison Street, Sec. 12 Chicago A, llltneia \ ietnam s intellectuals have narrow horizons, are exces sively inward-turning, and make constant and factional criticism their specialty. Except for a handful of terribly militant leaders, Buddhist monks are rather passive. If the success or failure of the war were to depend on these groups, Vietnam would have been lost from the start. As to the effects in the countryside of the critical clamoring by Vietnam’s spoiled young intellectuals in the cities, it was virtually nil. The American attitude seemed to be that if a Vietnamese student demon strates, virtue is on his side and the government is wrong. But in the countryside there were many peas ants and plain soldiers who disapproved of the defiance of the regime—in those rare places where anyone knew anything whatsoever of what went on beyond the next village. If there was any slowdown in the war in September and October of 1963, it was because the Vietnamese generals—under American prodding—were concentrat ing on thoughts of a coup d’etat, while Diem and Nhu, out of fear of America, were concentrating on how to prevent a coup. It was not until after the coup d’etat that the Viet namese war took a decidedly downward turn. The military junta with its uncertain leadership, after purges of key (and scarce) officials, finally plunged much of the countryside into the confusion from which it purportedly was trying to save Vietnam. No wonder the Vietcong took advantage of the situ ation to seize the military initiative for the first time in many months. No wonder that, in the two months after the coup d’etat, the military junta lost more real estate, lives and weapons to the Vietcong than at any previous time in the war. It was precisely out of fear of such predictable con sequences of trying to change regimes in midwar that Secretary of Defense McNamara and Central Intelli gence Director John McCone opposed a coup d’etat. But they were overruled by the pro-coup d’etat faction led by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Undersecre tary of State Averell ffarriman, and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hillsman. The Diem-must-go decision came shortly after the temporary closing of about a dozen (out of 4,000) pa godas on August 21, which outraged Washington. Diem said that his only aim was to get the Buddhist leaders out of politics and back to religion. The Viet namese leader insisted that unless he shut down the propaganda machinery of the pagodas and put a halt to the glorification of suicide by burning, public dis order in the cities would mount and world misunder standing would deepen. Washington disagreed. Fur ther, it felt that Diem had not only humiliated it and flouted its advice, but had broken a promise to be con ciliatory. Washington’s anger was heightened by hor rendous stories of alleged killings and brutalities dur ing the pagoda raids. (There were no such killings, as the monks themselves later said.) I n any case, on August 24, the State Department sent out word—without the knowledge of Secretary McNamara or of C.I.A. Director John McCone— instructing Ambassador Lodge to “unleash” the Viet namese generals with a view to toppling the Diem Government if they could. Plotting among educated Vietnamese, including the generals, is a kind of na tional pastime, as chess is to the Russians. Until lately it had been a pretty harmless pastime, because every body knew that real action was dependent on an Amer ican green light—and until August such a green light had been withheld. But on Sunday, August 25, Washington publicly gave the generals a green light in a Voice of America broadcast that virtually called on the Vietnamese mili tary to take over. At the same time, Ambassador Lodge asked the C.I.A. to poll the Vietnamese generals and see when and if they were ready to translate revolt talk into action. Diem’s shock at the Voice of America broadcast and the C.I.A. poll of the Vietnamese generals can only be imagined by turning the tables around. Suppose the United States were engaged in a war against the Com munists in which we depended almost totally on aid from Vietnam; suppose, in the middle of that war, Vietnam issued a broadcast calling for the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to overthrow the American govern ment? The miracle is that the Diem regime survived as long as it did the virtual declaration of political war served on it that August by Washington. What, after many months of hesitation, finally de cided the generals (in mid-October) to stage the coup? In separate interviews with this correspondent, mem bers of the military junta spoke of these factors; 1. The late President Kennedy called, at a press con ference, for “changes of policy and maybe personnel” in Vietnam. 2. Washington announced the withdrawal of 1,000 American soldiers by the end of 1963, and possible total withdrawal by 1965. (Said one general: “That convinced us that unless we got rid of Diem, you would abandon us.”) 3. The economic aid was cut. Many generals agreed that this cut was psychologically the most decisive goad to a coup d’etat. “It convinced us,’’ a key plotter ex plained, “that the United States was serious this time about getting rid of Diem. In any case, this was a war jWe wanted to win. The United States furnished us with the jeeps, the bullets, the very guns that made the war possible. In cutting economic aid, the United States was forcing us to choose between your country’s help in the war and Diem. So we chose the United States.” Ironically, President Diem did make some important concessions to the United States in September and Oc tober. For example, in mid-September President Diem agreed to every point put forward by the United States in a program to reform and consolidate the strategic hamlet program in the Mekong delta. Many Americans had long felt that this program had been overextended. At last President Diem agreed with the diagnosis and decided to do something about it. Why was this move toward the American position never publicized? One Western diplomat put it this way: “Ambassador Lodge and his deputy, William Truehart, were so determined to get rid of Diem that they were opposed to putting him in a conciliatory light. They were afraid this would strengthen the hands of those in Washington against a coup d’etat.” Even at the eleventh hour, Ambassador Lodge could, of course, have turned off the revolt if he had chosen to give the slightest sign that the New Frontier and President Diem were even beginning to move to heal their rent. As one member of the military junta put it: “We would never have dared to act if we had not been sure that the United States was giving us its moral support.” In the last hours before his death, President Diem was stripped of any doubt whatsoever of Washington’s hostility. Telephoning the American Embassy from the Palace at 4:30 P.M. on November 1, after the bom bardment had started, President Diem asked Ambas sador Lodge: “What is Washington’s attitude toward this?” Lodge replied: “I don’t know Washington’s atti tude. After all, it is four-thirty in the morning there.” “But you must have some idea,” Diem said. Whereupon Lodge turned the conversation to the matter of Diem’s safety, offering him an airplane to take him out of the country. Could anything have indi cated more clearly that in American eyes the success of the coup d’etat was a fait accompli? The only certain thing about the murder of President Diem and Counselor Nhu is that they were shot in the back (Diem in the neck, Nhu in the right side) with their hands tied behind them. Nhu also had a dagger or bayonet wound in the chest, which was apparently indecisive. These facts were established beyond all doubt by this reporter through photographs and through talks with military eyewitnesses, attendants at St. Paul’s Hospital (where the bodies were first taken) and from information given by two relatives, a niece and nephew who handled the preparations for the burial. In the light of the way Diem and Nhu died, there is a strong possibility that the shootings were ordered by some or all members of the military junta. Would a junior officer take such a responsibility on himself? Now for the Buddhist leaders who started it all: have they got what they wanted? I use the word “leaders” advisedly, for of the Buddhists in Vietnam, who form about 30 per cent of the population of 14 million people, the overwhelming majority are largely nonpolitical. Buddhist monks tend to be somewhat pas sive. They would never have dreamed of resorting to violent demonstrations had they not been subjected to the skillful and inflammatory propaganda that poured from the humming mimeograph machines of the Xa Loi pagoda. By the end of last summer, the original grievances of the Buddhist leaders in Hue—matters of property rights, flag flying, etc.-had largely been met by the Diem regime. In the midst of the anti-Diem ferment I wrote an article asking: “What do the Buddhists want? They want Diem’s head—not on a silver platter, but wrapped in an American Flag.” You have to hand it to the Buddhist leaders that they got what they wanted. But will this satisfy the more militant Buddhist leaders? It is heady stuff, even for Buddhists, to have the attention of the entire world focused on you, and to exercise the kind of political power that can topple governments. Will, for instance, the venerable Thich Tri Quang, the mastermind of the Buddhist campaign and by far the most intelligent and militant of all, be satisfied to take a political back seat? Thich Tri Quang is a Buddhist leader from Hue who was granted asylum at the American Embassy even though his past is in some controversy. According to records of the French Colonial Office, he had twice been arrested during the postwar French occupation of Indochina for dealings with Ho Chi Minh. By his own admission, he was a member of the Vietminh Commu nist Liberation Front. He claims to have fallen out with the Communists later. Again according to the French, who still have representatives at Hanoi, Thich Tri Quang’s brother is currently working for Ho Chi Minh in the Communist Vietnam’s Ministry of the Interior. The duties of Thich Tri Quang’s brother are the direction of subversion in South Vietnam. None of this, of course, proves anything about Thich Tri Quang’s current attitude toward the Communist Vietcong. What does seem clear is that he learned a lot from the Communists about organization and prop aganda. He ran his emergency headquarters at the Xa Loi pagoda like a company command post. Orders were barked out, directing a demonstration here, a protest meeting there. Messengers scurried in and out, carrying banners with their newly painted slogans. Respectful monks brought in the latest anti-Diem prop aganda blast for Thich Tri Quang to review word by word. In my discussion with Thich Tri Quang, l was some what taken aback at his indifference about the war against the Communists. When I asked whether the occasional outburst of turmoil might not offer the Viet cong the opportunity to infiltrate among the demonstra tors, Thich Tri Quang shrugged his shoulders and said: “It is possible that the current disorders could lead to Communist gains. But if this happens it will be Diem’s fault, not ours.” In the same interview in the Xa Loi pagoda, Thich Tri Quang told me that his preferred solution for Viet nam was “neutralism,” adding: “We cannot get an arrangement with the North until we get rid of Diem and Nhu.” The Vietcong are suspected of having led several of the attacks against property on November 1, the day of the coup d’etat. For instance, a small but violent gang of young people attacked and demolished the newly opened headquarters in Saigon of the Asian Anti-Communist League. This league had no connec tion, financial or otherwise, with Diem. Yet the coup- day rioters systematically removed its anti-Communist literature onto the streets, burned it, then wrecked the headquarters. Whether the new military junta’s government bv committee can do any better than Diem and Nhu re mains in doubt. The junta is ripe for further coups and countercoups. In any case, it was not because he en joyed being condemned by world public opinion that President Diem engaged in repressive measures (mild as they were by Asian standards). The new govern ment will be faced by similar problems, because the fundamental situation has not changed. For example, the change of government has not altered the tendenev of Vietnam’s citified intellectuals to take to the streets. Within two weeks after the coup d’etat, 10,000 stu dents at Hue demonstrated noisily against the military junta because it had not dismissed several professors who had been loyal to Diem. Tliis is but one example of pressure by mob. Can the military junta long toler ate derisions enforced by street mobs, or justice by demand of the newly “freed” and utterly irresponsible Vietnamese press? Three Saigon newspapers have closed—and rightly—already. The smut and sheer men dacity of. the post-coup “free press” of Vietnam is one of the blackest marks of recent months in the annals of Vietnam’s so-called “intellectuals.” In view of the in discipline, factionalism and irresponsibility of citified Vietnamese, can the military' junta long escape resorting to the same tight rein held by President Diem? The only sure thing in Vietnam today is that the United States has set an extremely controversial prece dent by encouraging, for the first time in our history, the overthrow in time of war of a duly elected govern ment fighting loyally against the common Communist enemy. tuiuiui lien Tribune bureau chief in Berlin and Tokyo, has just returned from Saigon. She now reports for Netvsday, Carden City, N. Y. RYBERT • PRINTING • LITHOGRAPHING' TRinity 5-4727 Serviut Atlanta Sinct Mi MMPANY 550 FORREST ROAD. N. E. ATLANTA, GEORGIA HOLY LAND: OUTSIDE HELP? This letter arrives from the Holy Land Just as the Pope U scheduled to visit there on a pilgrimage . . . BISHOP ACtf- CHAER, In LEBANON, writes about DAYR MIMAS. a village rooted in history and the land. DAYR MI MAS is on the border of “no man's land." cut off from the Sea of Gall- C* S fabout 20 miles to the south) by 1 I he fortified Israeli border . . . The H^rish church in DAYR MIMAS is the center of village life. Damaged by earthquake years ago. it is now dreadfully unsafe. Besides, It is much too smatl . . . “For an ade quate church we must have outside help,” writes BISHOP ACH-CHAER. “Will you please ask someone to help us?” . . . We piss on this appeal to you. Like you. we cannot ignore the needs of the poor who want to pray . . . Will you help? To repair and enlarge the church will cost §2,500 altogether. $1, $5, $10, $50, $100, will buy building-supplies, rent builder’s equipment, pay for a hnn dred necessary things.—-We'll be looking for your letter. The Holy fatber’t Minion Aid foe the Oriental Church PALESTINE In some dioceses marriage jubilarlans meet in the cathedral or their parish churches on the Feast of the Holy Family for a special blessing. It's a lovely custom . . . We ask you, at such a time, to remember the families of PALESTINE REFUGEES, still unsettled in the Middle East ... A $10 FOOD PACKAGE helps us feed a family for a month. A $2 BLANKET will mean warmth and comfort to a Bedouin. MATARIA, six miles from CAIRO, is said to be the Town where the Holy Family rested on the flight into Egypt. Both Coptic Christians and Moslems point out trees they insist date from that visit. The Moslems believe the trees must be tended by Christians alone, else the trees will die . . . The work of carrying Christ’s message to the Holy Land depends so much on fostering vocations. We have the names of many semina rians like JOSEPH SCALIA and Sisters-to-be like SISTER ROSE MARTIN who need help In their seminarian and con vent training. The cost is $100 a year for six years for the seminarian and $150 for two years for the Sister-to-be. * MASS STIPENDS These are often the sole daily support for the priests in the Near and Middle East. We ask your continued remembrance of them. ST. AUGUSTINE When God sends a problem, He sends the answer ahead of time. G. K. Chesterton explained Providence In another de lightful way. One day on an English seacoast, he saw a scene he wished to draw. He had paper but no pencil or crayon. Then he realised he was standing on one of England's great chalk cliffs . . . Our priests in 18 countries need the help of Provi dence, They are confident you will be there first to help them. Your STRINGLF.SS GIFTS enable us to give immediate help. KINDLY REMEMBER THE CATHOLIC NEAR EAST WEL FARE ASSOCIATION IN YOUR WILL. THANKS. Dear Monsignor Ryan: Enclosed please find for Name .... Street City Zone State I*i < Kear'£ast01is$ion$j£) .RANCH CARWNAL STILLMAN, h«M ». *r-t itaff b,y CATHOLIC NEAR EAST WELFARE AJROC1A 480 L.xlngton Av«. at 44th St. M«w Tort 17