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PAGE 16 —Sept. 3, 1954 — SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS Text of The Brown v. Board of Education (Opinion of the United States Supreme Court, May 17, 1954) Warren, C. J.: These cases come to ' us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Dela ware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal rep resentatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a non- segregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three- judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine an nounced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plain tiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools. The plaintiffs contend that segre gated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws . . . Because of the obvious importance of the ques tion presented, the Court took juris diction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions pro pounded by the Court. Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend ment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial seg regation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own inves tigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid propo nents of the post-war Amendments undoubtedly intended them to re move all legal distinctions among “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state leg islatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of cer tainty. SCHOOL SYSTEM THEN An additional reason for the in conclusive nature of the Amend ment’s history, with respect to segre gated schools, is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxa tion, had not yet taken hold. Educa tion of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Educa tion of Negroes was almost non existent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any ed ucation of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in con trast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public education had already ad vanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on North ern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded Supreme Court Opinion schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compul sory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education. In the first cases in this Court con struing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of “sep arate but equal” did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the “separate but equal” doctrine in the field of public education. In Cam ming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Fer guson should be held inapplicable to public education. In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other “tangible” factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools in volved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segrega tion itself on public education. MODERN EDUCATION In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Fergu- son was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Na tion. Only in this way can it be deter mined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both dem onstrate our recognition of the im portance of education to our demo cratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basis public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in pre paring him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. We come then to the question pre sented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal ed ucation opportunities? We believe that it does. In Sewatt v. Painter, supra, in find ing that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.” In Mc Laurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other stu dents, again resorted to intangible considerations: . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profes sion.” Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifica tions solely because of their race gen erates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: “Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motiva tion of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of the law, there fore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.” Whatever may have been the ex tent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. DOCTRINE REJECTED We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are in herently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because these are class actions, be cause of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the for mulation of decrees in these cases pre sents problems of considerable com plexity. On reargument, the consider ation of appropriate relief was neces sarily subordinated to the primary q u e s t i o n—the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such seg regation is a denial of the equal pro tection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to pre sent further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be per mitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. Bolling v. Sharpe (Opinion of the United States Supreme Court May 17, 1954) W?ahren, C. J.: This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public schools of the District of Coumbia. The petitioners, minors of the Negro race, allege that such seg regation deprives them of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused admission to a public school attended by white chil dren solely because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court for the District of Columbia in obtaining admission. That court dis missed their complaint. We granted a writ of certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question presented. We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four teenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially seg regated public schools. The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applic able in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal pro tection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, there fore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifi able as to be violative of due process. Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with parti cular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitu tionally suspect. As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle “that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race.” And in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his proper ty to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law. Although the Court has not as sumed to define “liberty” with any great precision, that term is not con fined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Seg regation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthink able that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. We hold that racial seg regation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Con stitution. For the reasons set out in Brown v. Board of Education, this case will be restored to the docket for reargu ment on Question 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court. Mississippi Continued from Page 8 of white students of 238,977 (in 1950- 51 it was 247,306) out of an enroll ment of 272,549 (in 1950-51 it was 281,510), and 225,399 Negroes (in 1950-51 it was 247,306), out of an en rollment of 271,856 (in 50-51 it was 274,605). The school census of 1952 of edu- cable children, those between 6 and 21 years of age, listed 398,866 whites and 496,913 Negroes. Hence, 55 per cent of the educable Negroes were enrolled in 1952-53, and 68 per cent of the whites. In the 1952-53 term, the State De partment of Education reported an expenditure of $4,476,753 for trans porting white children to school, and $1,179,826 for Negroes. A total of 146,066 whites and 58,090 Negroes rode to school. That same term, Mississippi sent $23,536,022 on instruction of its white children, and $8,816,670 on Negroes. The total cost of instruction in 1952- 53 compares with $10,394,244 in 1942- 43. In the 1952-53 session, the average white classroom teacher salary was $2,109 against $1,153 for Negroes. Under the new salary equalization these disparities are to be eliminated. In the 1950-51 session, the averages were $1,865 and $918. District Continued from Page 4 of $1,500,000 over present spending money. Because of school integration, Coming said that for the first time in a decade funds were not request ed for additional regular classroom teachers to solve a perennial in structor shortage in Negro schools. The requested operating increase, he said, was sought to provide “extra services” for all children. For example, the school board asked for money to hire traveling music, art and science grade school teachers; instructors for classes for emotionally disturbed children and remedial reading experts. At the budget meeting, Paul Cooke, spokesman for the District’s integrated teachers’ union, urged the school board to spell out in the budget request the new functions of school administrators under integra tion. He said Congress would com plain about duplication if money was requested for the former twin sets of Negro and white officers. Coming explained that the officers filling dual jobs now and in Septem ber will be needed during the imme diate transition into an integrated school system. As time goes on, Coming said, new jobs may be cre ated for these officials as the school system expands its services to chil dren. University of Georgia Libraries Acquisitions Division Athens, Ga. Sec. 34.66, P. L. & R. U. S. POSTAGE PAID Nashville, Tenn. Permit No. 548