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PAGE 8—FEBRUARY 1957—SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS
Five School Bills Adopted
By Tennessee Legislature
Gov. Frank Clement signs the five school bills as administration leaders who
negotiated the bills’ passage watch. They are, from left to right, seated, Rep. James
L. Bomar, speaker of the House; Gov. Clement and Sen. Jared Maddux, speaker of
the Senate; standing, Sen. L. B. Jennings, assistant Senate floor leader; Buford
Ellington, state commissioner of agriculture; Rep. Damon R. Headden, House floor
leader; Joe Carr, newly elected secretary of state; and Sen. Ross Dyer, assistant
Senate floor leader.
NASHVILLE, Tenn.
ENNESSEE HAS JOINED the list of
southern states with some sort of
newly-enacted school segregation laws
on its statute books.
On Jan. 25, exactly two weeks after
it was introduced in both houses of the
General Assembly, Gov. Frank Clement
signed into law a school bill package
which includes pupil assignment and
voluntary segregation laws.
The Clement bills were not the only
ones relating to school segregation sub
mitted to the legislature in its first
month. Among the others:
DECISION DENOUNCED
A resolution denouncing and deplor
ing the school segregation decisions of
the U. S. Supreme Court passed the
House but was still bottled up in the
Senate judiciary committee at the end
of the month.
A resolution protesting oppressive
usurpation of power by the Supreme
Court passed the House but had not
been introduced in the Senate.
A bill authorizing school boards to
maintain schools segregated on the basis
of sex rather than race had been intro
duced in the Senate but not in the
House.
As the month ended, Clement denied
that the bills were meant to dodge
court rulings. In a letter to R. G. Cross-
no, chairman of the Anderson County
school board, the governor said, in part:
“I am sure you are well aware of the
fact that no gubernatorial or legislative
action can overturn a decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
“We have not claimed that under the
administration bills a local school sys
tem can operate its schools in contra
vention of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee and the Supreme
Court of the United States. The bills
are designed to afford the local school
boards the greatest possible latitude of
action within the framework of the
law...”
Elsewhere across Tennessee legal ac
tion took the spotlight. (See “Legal Ac
tion.”)
In Nashville, Federal Judge William
E. Miller accepted the city school
board’s gradual integration plan — be
ginning next September with first grade
desegregation—but ordered the board to
have a complete integration plan ready
by Dec. 31.
In Knoxville, 14 Negro students went
to the courts to seek admittance to seg
regated Knoxville schools.
In Memphis, a U. S. Circuit Court of
Appeals sitting in Cincinnati ruled 2 to
1 against U. S. District Judge Marion
Boyd’s November 1955 decision which,
in effect, stymied the bid of five Negroes
seeking to enter Memphis State Univer
sity. The state plans an appeal to the
U. S. Supreme Court.
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
When Tennessee’s 80th General As
sembly convened in Nashville on Jan.
7, the much talked about school segre
gation program to be introduced by
Gov. Frank Clement was uppermost in
the minds of the legislators.
Next day, in an extraordinary move,
Clement appeared before a joint con
vention of the state Senate and House
and delivered a 30-minute address on
the segregation subject in general and
the proposals his leaders would soon
introduce in particular.
The corridor outside was crowded
with people milling about an hour be
fore Clement appeared to deliver his
speech. Seats in the two galleries in
the House chamber were filled on a
non-segregated basis even before that.
DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED
Highway patrolmen, uniformed and in
plain clothes, moved through the crowds
or stood behind the gallery seats. There
were unconfirmed reports that pro
segregation and pro-integration groups
planned to attend the meeting en bloc.
There was talk of demonstrations to be
made either during or after Clement’s
speech.
At 11 a.m., Clement was escorted into
the House chamber by a committee of
senators and representatives and two
plainclothesmen.
This is what he said:
The segregation problem is not only
America’s greatest crisis, it is “our
greatest opportunity” for service.
“We must accept the fact that no law,
no judicial decree can erase 300 years
of history.
“But in our recognition of the exist
ence of different backgrounds, we must
not overlook the fact that the Negro is
equal to the white in the eyes of the
law and in the sight of God . . .
NEGRO DEMANDS RIGHTS
“When the Negro reads the Declara
tion of Independence, when he hears our
leaders speak of the rights of man, he
knows that he is a man, he knows that
he is an American, and he will never
be content to be treated as anything
less.
“Whether we like it or not, the Negro
will never willingly keep an assigned
place in society if that place is set in
shame and degradation.”
Analyzing the Supreme Court decis
ion which upset the separate but equal
doctrine, Clement said that while the
court declared compulsory public school
segregation unconstitutional, “it did not
purport to require the states to mix ar
bitrarily persons of different races in
the schools.”
STATE’S DIVERSITY NOTED
Clement then outlined his program,
saying the state must develop a system
based upon “the realities of the situa
tion” but:
“We must also bear in mind that Ten
nessee is a diverse and varied state. In
some counties there are no Negro chil
dren. In others, there are three Negro
school children for every one white. In
some counties, the Negro population is
scattered. In some counties, the Negroes
have excellent schools, in others they
are poor . . . Any new system must be
sufficiently flexible so as to allow for
these differences which exist across the
state.”
The Clement program included:
1) An act authorizing local school
boards to maintain separate schools for
white and Negro children whose par
ents “voluntarily elect” that their chil
dren attend school with members of
their own race.
2) An act authorizing school boards
to assign pupils on the basis of varied
standards ranging from location of resi
dence to “the possibility or threat of
friction or disorder among pupils or
others.” This act also provides for a
system of administrative and judicial
review of board assignments.
3) An act authorizing two or more
school boards to jointly operate a school
or schools.
4) An act to amend the present statute
regulating transportation of pupils on
school buses by eliminating therefrom
any reference to race.
5) An act to amend the present statute
regulating the transfer to permit the
transfer of pupils between county school
systems or between county and city or
special school district systems.
BILLS INTRODUCED
Within 30 minutes, the hundreds of
people who had been in the chamber to
listen to the governor were gone. The
partisans had failed to appear in or
ganized groups. The demonstrations
failed to materialize. The bills were in
troduced immediately in both Senate
and House.
On Jan. 15, the education and judici
ary committees of both houses held a
joint public hearing on the bills. Three
and a half hours and 22 witnesses later,
the hearing ended. Their testimony, in
general, followed two lines of thought:
Witnesses who accepted the Supreme
Court rulings declared there was no
need for any legislative action on the
subject; witnesses who favored the re
tention of segregation in public schools
said the Clement bills were “fine as far
as they go” and suggested amendments
to “strengthen” them. ^
WHAT WITNESSES SAID
Robert E. Lillard is an attorney and
one of two Negro city councilmen in
Nashville. He said:
“I agree with Gov. Clement that 300
years of history cannot be erased by
legislative acts or judicial decree and
I respectfully submit that no bright s
page can be added to our glorious his
tory through contempt of and disobedi
ence to the supreme law of the land.
Lillard said he specifically objected ,
to the pupil assignment and voluntary
segregation bills proposed by Clement.
MORAL, SPIRITUAL ASPECTS
Karl (Jack) Kershaw is an artist,
realtor and chairman of the Tennessee
Federation for Constitutional Govern
ment’s leeislative committee. He also
(Continued On Next Page)
School Board May Begin at First Grade, Submit Further Plans
Following is a partial text of District
Judge William E. Miller’s memorandum
opinion on the Nashville school deseg
regation plan:
On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Board of Education . . .
enunciated the principles which should
govern the district courts in formulat
ing decrees to implement its prior rul
ing in the same case that racial discrimi
nation in public education is unconsti
tutional . . .
From the outset the [Nashville]
board of education frankly and openly
recognized its obligation to maintain the
school system upon a racially non-dis-
criminatory basis. It has endeavored by
its careful investigation and study >f
the question to find a solution which
would accomplish the transition as soon
as reasonably practicable consistent
with the public interest and the efficient
operation of the schools.
The problem confronting the board of
education was not one which was con
cerned with a single school but with an
entire school system which has been
maintained for practically a hundred
years—-always on a segregated basis—
and having an aggregate school popu
lation of 27,000 students, of whom 10,000
were Negro students. In this situation
the board concluded that it would need
mo' e time to formulate a workable plan
of integration.
•
In recognition of the reasonableness
of this request for further time, a three-
judge court, at the March 1956 term,
granted the board’s motion for a con
tinuance of the case to the October 1956
term . . .
At the October 1956 term the case was
called and set for trial Nov. 13, 1956.
At the hearing which was begun on that
date, the board of education submitted
its plan, adopted on Oct. 29, 1956. The
primary question presently before the
court is whether the plan so adopted is
adequate to meet constitutional require
ments . . .
It is the considered opinion of the
school authorities, after mature deliber
ation, that the change from a system of
segregated schools should be upon a
gradual or step-by-step basis. They
have concluded that an abrupt change
in all of the city schools would be in
consistent with the public interest and
with the efficient functioning of the
school system itself. They believe that
the soundest approach to the problem
is to begin with desegregation in the first
grade and to make plans for the future
based upon the experience thus gained.
Whether the solution proposed by the
board is the best one which could be
devised is a matter of dispute in the
evidence. The views of the school au
thorities are supported by the testimony
of expert witnesses. Other experts, testi
fying for the plaintiffs, have expressed
contrary opinions. They insist that if a
plan of partial desegregation is adopted,
each step should include not less than
a normal functioning unit, i.e., elemen
tary schools, junior high schools, or high
schools. They further insist that any
plan adopted should be a “total plan” in
that it should set forth all steps to be
taken to accomplish complete desegre
gation together with the time for taking
each step in order that all interested
parties will know definitely what to ex
pect for the future.
•
In passing upon the adequacy of the
plan submitted, this court must give
effect to the implementing opinion in
the second Brown case . ..
... It is thus clear that the district
courts in fashioning decrees in cases of
this nature are to be guided by equita
ble principles and that they are re
quired, therefore, to give due weight to
considerations of public interest. While
it is recognized that the plaintiffs have
a personal interest in admission to pub
lic schools as soon as practicable on a
nondiscriminatory basis, the district
courts, as courts of equity, may take into
account the necessity for time to elimi
nate a variety of obstacles in a syste
matic and effective manner. Primary re
sponsibility for assessing the problems
involved rests upon the local school au
thorities and the function of the courts
is strictly judicial in character, i. e., to
determine first, whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of governing constitu
tional principles, secondly, whether the
school authorities have made a prompt
and reasonable start toward full com
pliance, and third, whether the school
authorities have carried the burden to
establish that more time is necessary in
the public interest consistent with good
faith compliance at the earliest practi
cable date, to carry out the ruling in an
effective manner. It is not the duty of
the court to devise a plan of desegrega
tion nor to substitute its judgment in
matters of school administration for that
of the constituted school authorities . . .
The evidence justifies the conclusion
that desegregation will confront the
board with numerous administrative
problems, including increased difficulty
in procuring and retaining teachers,
teaching adjustments required because
of differences in achievement levels . . .
of Negro and white children, problems
arising from a liberalized student trans
fer system supplanting a strict transfer
system, as well as other problems in
herent in accomplishing a change so
profound and far-reaching in its effects.
While it is possible to argue that the
first step towards desegregation should
include a greater number of grades or
at least a normal functioning unit, the
court is not able to find from the evi
dence that the conclusion reached by
the board is an unreasonable one.
But although the court is of this
view, and although it finds that the
school authorities are acting in good
faith and have carried the burden of
showing that more time is necessary to
comply with the decision of the Su
preme Court, it cannot find that they
have carried the burden of supporting
the indefinite time to accomplish full
compliance provided for in paragraph 6
of the plan. Paragraph 6 merely pro
vides that the instruction committee of
the board shall continue its study of the
problem and recommend by Dec. 31.
1957, the time and number of grades to
be included in the next step to be taken
in further abolishing compulsory segre
gation.
There is no indication from the plan
itself or from the evidence what the
instruction committee would recom
mend to the board or whether, in fact,
it would recommend anything more
than further delay. Nor is there any
indication, if the instruction committee
made a recommendation for a substan
tial further step, whether the recom
mendation would be approved or disap
proved by the board itself. Nor does
the plan require the board to take ac
tion upon any recommendation by the
committee at any particular time. Also,
according to the proposal, after the
committee once made a recommendation
for another step to be taken, its func
tion would have been completely ex
hausted with no obligation to make
recommendations for further steps
toward desegregation. It is manifest,
therefore, that paragraph 6 makes the
plan submitted partial and incomplete,
and that it is in effect simply a pro
posal for indefinite postponement of
further desegregation, directly contrary
to the mandate of the Supreme Court
that full compliance with its ruling
shall be accomplished with all deliber
ate speed.
The provisions of the plan for trans
fer ; of students from the school of their
zone to another school were apparently
adopted upon the basis of the interpre
tation of the Supreme Court’s decision
set forth in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp.
177. In that case a three-judge court
presided over by Circuit Judge Parker,
construed the Brown decisions of the
Supreme Court as not requiring inte
gration but as merely forbidding such
discrimination, and as not forbidding
such segregation as occurs as the result
of voluntary action. If this is a correct
interpretation, and the court believes
that it is, provisions which merely con
fer upon white and Negro students a
nondiscriminatory right to transfer
would not appear to violate the Consti
tution. If the provisions should be ap
plied on a discriminatory basis, any ag
grieved party would have an appropri
ate remedy.
The court has examined the recent
opinion of the Court of Appeals in
Booker v. State of Tennessee Board of
Education, in which a gradual plan for
desegregating Memphis State College
was disapproved. But because of ma
terial factual differences the decision in
that case is not deemed to be in con
flict with the conclusions herein
reached.... Manifestly the Nashville
plan does not contemplate or involve
such discrimination between the races.
It merely postpones complete desegre
gation to provide time for the solution
of varied administrative problems with
out impairment or denial of adequate
educational opportunities to both races
during the period of transition.
e
Accordingly, the judgment to be en
tered pursuant to this memorandum win
provide as follows:
a) That paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
the proposed plan are approved;
b) That paragraph 6 of the proposed
plan is disapproved;
c) That the board of education shall
submit to the court not later than Dee.
31, 1957, a report setting forth a com
plete plan to abolish segregation in
of the remaining grades of the cnj
school system, including a tune sch
ule therefor; ,
d) That upon the filing of such reP 0 ^
the plaintiffs shall have a period of
days thereafter within which to file 0
jections thereto; ,
e) That if objections are not filed
the report . . . the report shall be au
matically approved; a
f) That if objections are filed - ■ ■
hearing shall be held thereon before
court upon five days’ written notice -
the plaintiffs to the defendants, wit ^
burden resting upon the defendan s ^
establish that the plan is adequate
meet the constitutional principles
dared in the two Brown opinions; ,
g) That the rights of the plaintiffs
others similarly situated to a ^ ten , Jjje
public schools of the city of Nas ^
without discrimination on accoun
race are recognized and declare , ^
that the issuance of an injunc
withheld pending the filing of ther V"
. . . and the action of the cour a <je
any objections which may be
thereto; and . .,„ n is
h) That jurisdiction of the ac-si-
retained during the period of
tion. _ t th e
In addition to a form of judgm
parties will also submit to the coU . - of
posed findings of fact and conclusi
law to implement this memoran