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PAGE 10-B— MAY, 1964—SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS TEN YEARS IN REVIEW FLORIDA Issue Debated For Five Years After Decision MIAMI F lorida debated school deseg regation for five years after the Supreme Court mandate be fore making a token start at two schools in Dade County in Sep tember, 1959. Since then there has been some desegregation of schools in one-third of the state’s districts, which have two- thirds of the population. School boards generally contend this is orderly com pliance but three groups of plaintiffs have returned to the federal courts to complain that the pace is too slow. The actual beginning of school deseg regation in Florida, the admission of a Negro graduate student to the Uni versity of Florida law school in Octo ber, 1958, was the result of litigation begun in 1949. Virgil Hawkins, a middle-aged pub lic relations man at Bethune-Cookman College, filed this suit for admission to the university law school. Hawkins persisted through every available court, including three appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Florida Su preme Court, at one point in this liti gation (Hawkins v. Board of Control) flatly refused to implement a U.S. Supreme Court order to require Haw kins’s acceptance by the university. University Desegregation In 1958 a settlement was worked out. The Board of Control agreed to establish a desegregation policy at all three (now four) branches of the university system, and the University of Florida agreed to accept a Negro student. In the agreement Hawkins bowed out and another Negro who had passed the necessary qualifying examinations was enrolled quietly. Since then Negro students have been accepted at all three predomin antly white universities but no white student has been enrolled at the pre dominantly Negro university branch, although an attempt has been made. At the elementary and high school level, the first suit was filed in Palm Beach County in 1955, by W. M. Hol land, a Negro attorney, in behalf of his son. Before this protracted case was completed, a suit in Dade County (Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County) resulted in an agree ment to accept some Negroes at Or chard Villa Elementary School in a Miami changing neighborhood. This took place without incident. Within two years Orchard Villa had become an all-Negro school. Neighborhood Plan Accepted The Dade school board decided, on the basis of early experience, that desegregation, following neighborhood patterns, would be accepted by the community. It was found also to have economic advantages over a dual sys tem. School after school was desegre gated as Negroes moved into former white neighborhoods. The school board concluded that it could save thousands of dollars by desegregating rather than Courts (Continued from Page 8-B) should not interfere with the opera tion of the schools until such admin istrative procedure has been exhausted —and the intervention of the federal courts is shown to be necessary.” A year later, in the Charlottesville, Va., case, the Fourth Circuit added that “equity does not require the doing of a vain thing as a condition of relief.” As the decade progressed, the fed eral courts showed growing impatience with efforts to avoid compliance. This was most clearly expressed in the de cision of the Supreme Court handed down last spring in a Memphis, Tenn., case. The court said, “Brown never contemplated that the concept of ‘de liberate speed’ would countenance in definite delay in elimination of racial barriers in schools . . .” Just what the court did contemplate by the concept of “deliberate speed” it may specify in the Prince Edward County and Atlanta decisions expected soon. These are some, but by no means all, of the more important decisions on school segregation-desegregation hand ed down since 1954. The net effect of decisions to date has been to narrow the area of maneuverability for those states that resist desegregation. transporting pupils long distances. Teacher desegregation was also tried successfully. In 1963 the school board, by formal resolution, declared the system fully desegregated. All pupils, teachers and administrative personnel were put on notice they must accept assignment without regard to race. The two pro fessional teacher organizations were merged. About 12 per cent of the county’s schools now have mixed classes and a smaller number have mixed faculties. Long-range plans call for extension of this, following neighborhood changes. All Negro high schools, except two serving deep-rooted Negro areas, will be phased out. Other Counties Act Broward, Palm Beach, Hillsborough and Volusia counties began desegrega tion in 1961. All except Hillsborough were prodded by school suits and a suit later was filed in Hillsborough. Escambia, Monroe, Orange, Pinellas and Sarasota counties opened one or more white schools to Negroes in 1962. Monroe County was the most note worthy. This small area along the Florida Keys includes extensive naval installations at Key West and the school system receives large subsidies to serve children of Navy personnel. The Department of Justice threatened suit to withdraw these impacted-area aid funds unless the schools were de segregated. The school board voted to do so since the loss of these funds would have been a disaster. Monroe County now has some mixed classes at all but one school. In 1963, Charlotte, Duval, Leon, Okaloosa, St. Johns and Santa Rosa counties were added to the list. All previously desegregated counties (ex cept Broward) assigned more Negroes to white schools. Under Pressure of Suits While most counties desegregated voluntarily, they all were under pres sure of suits in federal court. A pat tern known in Florida as the Escambia plan was established gradually. This called for grade-a-year desegregation beginning with the first grade. It was tried under court direction in 1963 in Duval, Hillsborough and Volusia. Negro plaintiffs in all three complain that it is too slow and the matter is now in the courts. Desegregation of teachers, ordered by the federal court in Duval and Volusia counties, has not taken place. The Duval County order has been upheld by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Sarasota County assigned some white teachers to a Negro school as an experiment and Gibbs Junior College at St. Petersburg, with a pre dominantly Negro student body, has tried white instructors. Miami-Dade Junior College, which is fully deseg- (See FLORIDA, Page 12-B) MARYLAND Wide Variety of Programs Used To Desegregate Public Schools BALTIMORE M aryland since 1954 has of fered a wide variety of deseg regation programs, with results that vary from total desegregation to continued total separation of white and Negro pupils. Of the 23 school districts (out of 24) that have Negro as well as white school children, “all deliberate speed” has meant everything from a volun tary, grade-a-year, transfer plan to compulsory reassignment programs. But all 23 districts have adopted poli cies that permit Negroes to enter white schools. With no overt official reluctance to comply with the Supreme Court’s rul ing, but also with no state policy as to timing, local school officials have moved at whatever rate they consid ered desirable or necessary. In gen eral, desegregation has moved fastest in the urbanized districts and in those having the lowest percentages of Ne groes in their enrollments. Of the counties with less than 10 per cent Negro enrollment, four have elim inated or nearly eliminated all-Negro classes, reassigning the pupils to pre dominantly white schools. Three oth ers have programs headed in that direction, along with two additional districts having slightly higher than 10 per cent enrollments. At the other end of the scale, in districts having from 25 to 50 per cent Negro enrollments, desegregation has tended to be of the “token” variety (apart from Baltimore city, which is in a class by itself). Changes in pre vious segregation patterns have been left to Negro initiative in seeking ad mission to white schools. The extent of that initiative has reflected to some degree the presence or absence of an activist group, or of a Negro ele ment not dependent on the local white economy, such as employees of fed eral installations. Legal Factors Legal suits were a desegregation factor in several districts, but in only one instance, Harford County, did a U.S. District Court directly set a de segregation timetable. The general ab sence of court directives was more than matched by the absence of legis lative direction. The Maryland Gen eral Assembly did not enact any legislation pertaining to school deseg regation, aside from its belated ratifi cation of the 14th Amendment. Mary land experienced no organized, state wide resistance to desegregation, and expressions of hostility were confined to scattered and isolated incidents. The May 17, 1954, action of the U.S. Supreme Court was greeted with prompt statements of acceptance by Gov. Theodore R. McKeldin and state officials. Attorney General D. E. Rollins, however, advised the State Board of Education that the Maryland school segrega tion law would remain in force until final decrees were issued. The state board thereupon adopted a po sition against any immediate “pro gram of integration” but expressed its confidence that local school boards would solve their desegregation prob lems “in a fair, decent and legal man ner with good common sense . . . without resorting to chicanery or de vious methods.” McKELDIN The Baltimore school board disre garded the state position on the advice of the city solicitor, who said that the city’s segregation law had been rendered invalid. The city board voted on June 3, 1954, that city schools should conform “to a non-segregated basis” by the opening of classes in September. Since Baltimore had not operated on the basis of prescribed at tendance areas, the desegregation pro gram adopted was a “free choice” plan under which children could attend the schools of their choice without regard to race, provided the schools were not officially designated as overcrowded. White Demonstrations Desegregation in Maryland during the 1954-55 school year thus was lim ited to Baltimore, where 4,601 Negroes entered 59 formerly all-white schools, mostly in small numbers. Despite sev eral days of white demonstrations in South Baltimore, which school offi cials attributed to “sparks flying” from the disorders in Milford, Del., the city wide reaction was one of calm accep tance and remained that way in the following years as desegregation be came commonplace. Baltimore began in the first year to assign some Negro teachers to desegregated white schools, and the practice continued until by the fall of 1963 nearly half the city’s schools had racially mixed staffs. Baltimore’s desegregation took place during a period of rapid Negro resi dential expansion which, coupled with a white withdrawal to outlying sub urbs, soon made it difficult to dis tinguish between school desegregation and total neighborhood turnover. Be tween the fall of 1953 and the fall of 1963 Negro enrollment rose from 51. 827 to 105,563, and the white school population edged downward from 86,- 206 to 79,175. About 20 formerly white schools became all-Negro or nearly all-Negro during the decade. Formerly Negro schools and new schools built in Negro areas became filled to over flowing, with the result that Baltimore in 1963-64 had many thousands more Negro school children in segregated situations than it had before deseg regation began. Commence Transition Desegregation in the rest of Mary land began in the fall of 1955 in eight counties, which together enrolled 991 Negroes in 69 formerly all-white schools. The Maryland Board of Edu cation on June 22 of that year, follow ing the Supreme Court’s decrees in the School Segregation Cases, had called upon “local public school officials to commence this transition at the ear liest practicable date, with the view of implementing the law of the land." At the same time the state board abol ished racial distinction at the five state teachers colleges. With one exception, the programs in the first eight counties tended to set a statewide pattern: the adoption of policies that permitted Negroes to shift to white schools if that was their de sire. The initial exception was Mont gomery County, which began deseg regation by closing four small, sub standard schools. In time, eight other counties adopted programs aimed at closing Negro units. But in general the prevailing policy was to open white schools to individual Negro transfers on a voluntary basis, usually all grades at the same time but in seven counties under stairstep arrangements. The Maryland Board of Education in January, 1962, took public notice that desegregation had “not moved as rap idly in some parts of the state as in others or not at all.” While finding “much to be commended,” along with “some hesitation to be regretted,” the state board called upon all local boards to restudy their desegregation progress or “lack of progress,” and to revise their procedures, if need be, in ac cordance with “the declared educa tional policy of the state.” The de- (See MARYLAND, Page 11-B) First Test of Segregation Came in 1849 (Continued from Page 9-B) ing of the two races upon terms un satisfactory to either.” In a dictum, or aside, the court re ferred to the Massachusetts case. It said that public education is “social” and that segregation in public educa tion offered an example of a state’s power to segregate where social rights are involved. The court held that seg regation in travel also is social and constitutional, but it added that, while a state might segregate, it also must secure “to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and equal op portunities for improvement and prog ress.” Thus the “separate-but-equal” doctrine was established. The opinion was unanimous with the exception of Justice John Marshall Harlan, who wrote what has become a famous dis sent He said, “Our Constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tol erates classes among citizens.” Only Three Cases From 1896 until the 1930s only three cases came before the Supreme Court in which the question of racial seg regation in education was involved. The first of these, in 1899, arose from Richmond County, Ga., which had white high schools but none for Ne groes. In Cumming v. Board of Educa tion, Negro parents maintained that their children were entitled to schools equal to those for whites and that, there being no Negro schools, there should be no white schools. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs asked for the wrong remedy and said that they should have sought the establishment of a Negro school rather than the clos ing of the white ones. In 1908 the case of Berea College v. Kentucky came to the Supreme Court. Berea, a private institution, had been founded for the instruction of both races and operated as an inter-racial college for 50 years. Kentucky passed a law banning the teaching of Negroes and whites in the same school. In a test of this law, the Supreme Court ruled against the college on the tech nical ground that it was a corporation and that corporations are subject to state regulation. Chinese Girl The third case came from Mississippi in 1927 as Gong Lum v. Rice. In this case Martha Lum, a Chinese girl, sought to attend a white school in the district where she lived. She was directed to go to a Negro school but refused, although she expressed a will ingness to attend a Mongolian school had there been one. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Taft, the Supreme Court held that the state was within its rights in classifying the Chinese girl as colored and requiring her to go to the Negro school. Chief Justice Taft wrote, “We think that it is the same question which has been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the state legis lature to settle without intervention of the federal courts under the federal Constitution.” In none of these cases was the issue of segregation itself placed before the court. In each instance the court was called upon to decide whether educa tional facilities for non-whites were equal to those provided for whites. This was the legal background of a series of important cases in the score of years preceding the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954. The first of these cases never reached the Supreme Court. It was brought in Maryland in 1935 by Donald Murray, a Negro, who sought admission to the University of Maryland Law School. Maryland, like other Southern states, granted out-of-state scholarships to Negro students who sought training that was not available in the state’s institutions for Negroes. The Maryland Court of Appeals held in 1936 that the state must afford equal educational op portunities in its own institutions, and Murray was admitted to the University of Maryland Law School. Followed Same Principle The U.S. Supreme Court followed this same principle in the Gaines case, de cided in 1938. Lloyd Gaines, a Missouri Negro, sought admission to the Univer sity of Missouri Law School. The Su preme Court decreed that “the state was bound to furnish . . . within its borders facilities for . . . education substantially equal to those which the state has afforded for persons of the white race.” In 1948 the court took another im portant step toward its decision of May 17, 1954. Ada Lois Sipuel sought admission to the University of Okla homa Law School. The court in this case said that a state not only must provide equal facilities to both races within its own borders but that they must be made available to one appli cant as soon as for another. In 1950, the court held that G. W. McLaurin, a Negro who had been ad mitted to the graduate school of edu cation at the University of Oklahoma, “must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as students of other races.” On the same day that it handed down its decision in the McLaurin case, the court rendered its decision in the Sweatt case. Heman Sweatt had applied in 1946 for admission to the University of Texas Law School. The state court had granted Texas six months in which to set up a la# school for Negroes equal to that lot whites at the University at Austin- Sweatt refused to enroll in the Negro school, and his legal fight to gain ad mittance to the university law schoo culminated successfully in the Supreme Court’s decision in his case. Chief Jo*' tice Fred Vinson wrote the courts opinion, in which he said: “. . . the University of Texas L®" School possesses to a far greater d® gree those qualities which are incapao ® of objective measurement but whi make for greatness in a law schooj Such qualities, to name but a few, m elude reputation of the faculty, perience of the administration, P° sl and influence of the alumni, standm* in the community, tradition and P r ® tige.” All these decisions applied the “ sy v. Ferguson “separate but eq principle to graduate and professio ^ schools. In none of them was s ®^ e gation itself an issue. In each of ^ cases, however, the Supreme Cou chipped away bit by bit at the arate-but-equal” doctrine, re y e , ^ the trend that it had followed 1896 until 1927. ^ This, then, is the background of precursors to the May 17, D5 , ^ sion. Here the court was asked ^ a cide whether segregation itseu ^ ve condition of inequality. The coU lL o0 us its answer by saying in a un n e ld opinion: “We conclude that in 0 f of public education the doc ^ ‘separate but equal’ has n0 jn- Separate educational facilities herently unequal.”