Newspaper Page Text
to the
oppositu do.'.rine, which out
femes the right of protecting tlieir reserved
. vers, and which would vest in the General
t eminent, (it mullets not tlirougli what De-
irrimeut,) »tie tight of deteriuiKining exclit-
■ively ami fimitly (lie poweis delegated to it, i:
icoiupa'.ihfo with the suvereig nlty
states, finJ of the Cunslilutlou its
I'd ns the basis of a Federal Union,
as this,language is, it is not siren
liissimilur geographical interests, *uru more
liable to canto into conflict, and more dangerous
when in that state, than those of tiny other
description; so’ much so, that ours is the first
instance on record, where they hurt not formed
in an extensive tefritury, separate and Ihdepen-
the J dent communities, or subjected ike whole to
It, consider- ■ despotic sway.—That such may not bo pur
As strong j unhappy' fate also, must be the sincere prayer
rjhan tli.it n-j dl'every lover of his country.
*ed by the ilho.t; iuos Jeflerson who said, to give | So numerous and diversified arc ihe interests
to >he General Gttverimittql tlt« final aud- ex- f of our country, that they could not he fairly
i jusive right to judge of its powers, is to make j represented in a single government, organized
“its discretion and not the Constitution the so, os to give to each great urn! leading interest,
measure of its queers;” and that “in all cases ‘ a separate and distinct voice as iu tho Govern-
of compact between parties having m> co;nmnn\ ments to which I have referred. A plan was
Judge, inch party has art opt at right to judge ! theu adopted better suited to our situation, but
•for itself, as well oj "the operation, as of the\ perfectly novel iu its character. The powers of
mode and measur of redress. Language enn- i tho Government were divided, not its lieroto-
npt bo mure explicit; uor can higher authority
be adduced.
That different opinions are entertained on
this subject, 1 consider, hut as ait additional ev-
Eidenr.e of the great diversity of the human ill-'
tellcct. Had not able, experienced and I'utri-
olic individuals, lor whom 1 had the highest re
spect, taken different views, I would have
thought the-right too clear to admit of doubt;
but 1 am taught by this, as -well as by many
similar instances, to treat with deference opin
ions ditferiug fiom my own. The error may
possibly be with am; hut, if so, i can only say,
that after the must mature and conscientious
examination, 1 have not been able to delect it.
But with sill proper ‘deference, 1 must think,
that theirs is the error, who deny, . what
stems to be an essential attributr.efThO Eon-
ceded sovereignity of the States; and- who at
tribute to thn Gt-n-jral Government a right
tf“Cr!y incompatible with what till acknow
ledge to'be its limited and restricted character;
an errror originating principally as 1 must
think, id'out duly redacting on the nature of
our institutions, ai.d oii whit constitutes tlto on
ly rational object of all puli.ical Constitu
tions.
It lias been well said by one of tho most sa
gacious men of antiquity, that tho-pbject of a
Constitution is to restrain the Government, as
that of laws is to restrain individuals. Tlto
remark is correct, nor is it less true, where
the Government is vested iu a majority,
than where it is in asioglo ora lew individuals,
hi u republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy.
No une cun have a higher respect for the max
im, that the majority oeght to govern, than I
have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the
restrictions imposed by the Constitution' and
confined to subjects, iu which every portion of
tjm community have similar interests; but it is
a great error to suppose, as many do, that the
right of of a majority to govern is a natural and
not a conventional right, and therefore, abso-
Tufe and unlimited. Uy.nature every indivi
dual has the right to govern himself; and Gov
ernments, whether founded on majorities, or
minorities, must derive their right from the as-
•unt,-expressed or implied, of the governed, end
‘be subject to such limitations, as they may im
pose. Where the interests are tire same, that
is where the laws that, may benefit one, will
benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper
to place them under the control of the nmjnrity;
but whero they are dissimilar, so that tho law,
that may benefit one portion, may be ruinous to
another, it would be on the contrary unjust and
nbsurd to subject them to its will; - and such,
2 conceive to ho the lltcury on which our Con
solution reels.' - * jjkr |
That such dissimilarity of interest may exist,
it is impossible to doubt. They aro to be
found iu every community, in a greater, or less
degreo, however small, or homogeneous; and
they constitute, every whero, the great diffi
culty of forming, and presetving free institu
tions. To.guard against Ihe unequal action of
thn laws, when applied to dissimilar and oppo-
sing interests, is, iu fact, what mainly renders a
constitution indispensable, to. overlook which,,
in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to
omit the principal element, by which we deter
mine its character.— Were' there no contrari
ety of interests, nothing would be more simple
and easy than to form and preservo froa insti
tutions. The right of sulTrage alone would he
a sufficient guarranty. It is the conflict'of op
posing interests which renders it the most diffi
cult work of man.
Where tho diversity of interests exists in
Separate and distinct classes of the community,
as is the case in Englund, and was formerly
the caso in Sparta, Home, and most of the free
Slates of antiquity, the rational constitutional
provision is, that each should be represented in
the Government, as a separato estate, witlt a
distinct voice, and a negative on (he acts of its
co-estates, iu order to chock their encroach
ments. In England, tho constitution has as
sumed expressly this form; while in the gov
ernment of Sparta and Romo the same thing
we* effected under different but not much less
efficacious foims. Thn perfection of thoir or
ganization in this'particular, was that which
gave to the Constitution of these renowned
States all o( their celebrity, which secured their
liberties for so many centuries and raised them
to so great a height of power and prosperity.
Indeed, a constitutional piovision giving to the
great and separate interests of tho community
tho riglitof self-protection, must appear to those
who will duly reflect eu the subject, not lest
essential to the preservation of liberty, than
the right of suffrage itself.—They in fact have
a common object, to eff»ct which, the ono is ne
cessary as the other; to secure responsibility
that is, that those who make and execute the
laws should be accountable to those, on whom
the laws in reality operate; the only solid and
durable foundation of liberty. If without the
right of suffrage, our rulers would opptess us,
so, without the right of self-protection, tho
major would equally oppress the minor inter
ests of the community. The absence of the
former would make the governed the slaves of
the rulers, aod of the latter, the feebler inter
ests the victim of the stronger.
Happily for us, we have no artificial and
separate classes of society, We have wisely
exploded all such distinctions; but we are not
an that account, exempt from all contrariety
of interests, as the present distracted and
dangerous condition of our country, unfortu
nately, bat too clearly proves. With us they
era almost exclusively geographical, resulted,
mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation,
industry aud production, but are not, therefore,
leu necessary to be protected by an adequato
constitutional jyrovisioo, than where the distinc
i me routs exist in separate c asses. The neces
fore, iu reference to classes, be; geographically.
One General Government «VdS formed for the
whole, to which was delegated nil the powers
supposed to be necessary to regulate the inter
ests coinmun to all of the States, leaving others
subject to the separate control of the States,
being from their local and peculiar character,
such, that they could not bo subject to lift will
of the majority of the whole Union, without
tho certain hazard of injustice and oppression.
It was thus, that the interests of the whole
were subjected, us they ooght to be, to the will
of tho whole, while the peculiar and local
interests were left under the control of the-
States separately, to whose custody only, they
could be safely confided.—This distribution of
power, settled solemnly by a constitutional
compact, to which ull of life States uro parties,
constitutes the peculiar character and excel
lence of our political system. It is traly and
emphatically American, without example or
parallel.
To realize its perfection, we must view the
General Government and the States as a
whole, each in its proper sphere, sovereign
and independent, each perfectly adapted to tlieir
respective objects; the States acting separately,
representing and protecting the local and
peculiar interests; acting jointly, through
one General Government, with ties weight
respectively assigned to each by the Constitu
tion, representing and protecting the interest of
the whole; and thus perfecting by an admirable,
but simple nrraugoment the great principle of
representation and responsibility, without
which no government can bo free or just.
To preserve this sacred distribution, as origin
ally settled, by coercing eacli to move in its
prescribed orbit, is the great and difficult pro
blem on tho solution of which, the duration of
our Constitution, of Union, and, in all proba
bility, our liberty depends. Hotv'is this to be
effected? *
The question is new, when applied to our
peculiar political organization, where the sepa
rate and conflicting interests of society are
represented by distinct, but connected Govern
ments; but is in reality an old question under
a new form, long since perfectly solved.
Whenever- separate and dissimilar interests
have been separately represented in any
Government;' whenever tho sovereign power
has been divided in its exercise, the experience
and wirdom of ages have devised but one
mode, by which such political organization can
be preserved; the mode adopted in England,
and hy all Goveninents ancient and modern,
blessed with'Constitutions deserving to bo
called free; to givo to each co-estate (lie right
to judge of its powers, with a negative, or veto
on the acts of the others, in ordor to protect
.against oncroachmeuts, the interest it par
ticularly represents; a principle which all of
our Constitutions recognize in the distribution
of power among their respective Departments,
as essential to maintain the independence of
each, but which to all, who will duly reflect
on the subject, must appoar,far more essential,
for tho same object, in that great and fundamen
tal distribution of powers between tbe States
and tho General Government.—So ossential
is the principle that to withhold the right from
either, where the sovereign power is divided,
is in fact to annul the division itself, and to
consolidate in the one, left in the exclusive
possession of tho right, all of the powers of
the’ Government; for.it is not .possible to
distinguish, practically, between a Government
having all power, and the one having the right
to take what power it pleases. Nor does it in
tho least vary the principle, whether the distri
bution of power be between co-estates, as in
England, or between distinctly organized, but
connected Governments, as with us. Tho
reason is the same in both cases, whilo the
necessity is greater iu our case, as the danger
of conflict is greater, whero the interests of
a society are divided geographically, than in
any other, as has already been shown.
Those truths do seem to mo to be in*'
controvertible; and Tam at a loss to understand
how any one, who has maturely reflected on
tlto nature of our institutions, or who has read
history, or studied the principles of free Govern
ments to any purposo, can call them in
question.—Tho explanation must, it appears
to me, be sought in the fact, that in every free
State, there are thoso who. look more to the :
necessity of maintaining power, than guarding
against its abuses. I do not intend reproach,
but simply to state a fact, apparently necessary;
to explain the contrariety of opinions among
the intelligent, where the abstract consideration
of the subject would seem scarcely to admit
of a doubt. If such bo tho true cause, I must
think the fear of weakening tho Government
too mudh in this caso to be in a great measure
unfounded, or, at least, that the great danger
is much less from, that, titan tno opposite
side. I do not deny that a power, of so high
a nature may bo abused by a State; but when
I reflect that tho States unanimously called the
General Government into existence with all
of it* power, which they freely surrendered on
their part, under tho conviction that their com
mon peace, safetyand prosperity required it; that
they arc bound together by a common origin,
and tho recollection of common suffering and a
common triumph in tno great & splendid a-
chicvment of their indcdendence; and that the
strongest feelings of our nature, St, among thorn,
the love of national power and distinction, are
on the side of the Union; it does teem to me,'
that the fear, which would atrip the states of
their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to
mere dependent corporations,- lest tlioy should
abuse a right indispensable to the peaceaplo pro
tection of those interests, which they reserved
under their own peculiar guardianship, when
they created the General Government, is unoat-
ights
olution supposes, that dangerous powers not
delegated, may not only bo usurped and ex
ecuted by the other Departments, but (hat
the Judicial Department may also exercise, or
sanction dangerous potytrs beyond the grant of
the Constitution, and consequently that the ul
timate right of tho parties to tho ’ Constitution
to judge, whother the Compact has been dan
gerously violated, must extend to violations by
one delegated authority, as' well as by anoth
er—by tho Judiciary, as well as by tho Exec
utive or Legislative.” * >
Against these conclusive arguments, as they
seem to me, it is objected, that if one party has
the right to judge of infractions of the Consti
tution, so has tho other, and that consequently
in cases of contested powers between a State
and - the General Governmon}, each would
have a right to maintain its[ opinion, as is the
case when sovereign powors differ in the con
struction of treaties or compacts, and that of
course, it would como to bo a mere question of
force. The error is in the assumption, that *° ** le abstract question of the relation of iLe
the General Gbvernment is a party to tho Con- j p tatas to the General Gove n nont, and would
stitutiooal Compact. The States, as has been [ aoru conclude, did 1 not believe that a moro
shown, formed the compact, acting as sove- ■ general statement on an abstract question, with,
reign aud independent Communities. Tlioj om tncludiug that which may have caused lt|
created tho system, cannot be trusted to
preserve it, what power cun? So far from
extreme danger, 1 hold, that there never was
a free state, in which this great conservative
principle, indispensable in all, was ever so
safely.lodged. In others, when t'ro co-estates,
representing (he dissimilar and cofliecuo;
interests of tho community catue into coniac ,
the only alternative was compromise, suit-
mission, or furroe. Not so in ours. Should
tho General Government, and a state como
into conflict, wo have a higher remedy; tho
power which called tho General Government
into existence, winch gave it all of its authority, ,
and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers | powers, which -the forms of tho Constitution
nt its pleasure, m.iy be invoked. The States [ could never draw within the control of tho Ju-
thcmselves any be appealed to, three fourths . dicial Department; secondly, that if tbe decis-
of which, in fact form a power, whose decrees ! ion of the Judiciary be raised above tho sove-
aro the Constitution itself, and whose Voice , reign parlies to the Constitution, the decisions
can silence all discontent. The utmost extent: of tho other departments, not carried bv the
then of the power is, that a State acting in its : forms of the Constitution, before the Judiciary,
sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to • fmist be equally authoritative, and final wit.
tlto Constitutional comp-mi, may compel tho i the decision of that Department. But the
Government, created by that compact, to j proper answer to the objection is, that the
submit a question touching its infraction, to j resolution of the Genoral Assembly relates, to
tho parties who created it; to ovoid the supposed f those great and extraordinary cases, in which
dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to all of the forms of tho Constitution may prove
the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, j ineffectual against infractions dangerous to tbe
fatal project of giving to tho General Govern-; ossential rights of the parties to it.—Tho res-
ment tho solo and final right of interpreting
the Constitution, thereby reversing tho whole
system, making that instrument the creature
of its will, instead of a rule of action impressed
on it at its creation, an 1 annihilating in fact
the authority which imposed it, uqd from which
tho government in fact derives its existence.
That such would bo the result, were the
right in question vested in the Legislative, or
Executive branch of the Government, is con
ceded by. all. No one has been so hardy as to
assert, that Congress or the President ought to
have tho right, or to deny that if vested finally
and exclusively In either, the consequences,
which I have stated would not necessarily fol
low; but its advocates liavO been reconciled
to tho doctrino,. on the supposition, that there
is one Department of tho General Govern
ment, which from its peculiar organization, af
fords an independent.tribunal through which
the Government may exercho tho high author
ity, which is tho subject of consideration with
perfect safety to all.' '. * '
I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to
the Judiciary Department, I am fully sensible
of its importagee and would maintain it to the
fullest extent in its constitutional powers and
independence, but it is impossible for me to
beiievo, that it ever was intended by the Con
stitution, that it should exercise the power in
question, or, that it is competent to do so,- and,
if were, that it would be a safe depository of
the power.
Its powersare Judicial and not political, and
aro expressly confined by the Constitution
‘to all cases in law and equity, arising udder
this constitution, the laws of the U. States and
the treaties inudo or which shall bo made under
its authority; and which I have high authority
in asserting, excludes political questions, and
comprehends those only, where these ore par
ties amenable to tho process of the Court.*—
Nor is its incompetency less clear, than its want of
-constitutional authority. There maybe many and
the-most dangerons infractions on the part of Con
gress, of which, it is conceded by nil, the court, as
a judicial tribunal, cannot from its natnro take cog
nizance.. Tbe Tariff itself is a strong caso in point;
and tho reason applies equally lo all othcls, where
Congress perverts a power, from an object intended,
to one notinlendcd, the most insidious and dangerous
of all the infractions; and which may be extended
to all of its powers, more especially to the taxing
and appropriating. But, supposing it competent
to tako cognizance of all infractions of every des
cription', : the insuperable objection still remains,
that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the
power ia question.
It is an universal and fundamental political
principle, that tho power to protect, cun safely
be confided only to those interested in pro
tecting, or their responsible agents, a maxim
not less true in private than in public affairs.
The danger in our system is, that the Goneral
Government, which represents the interests of
the whole’, may encroach on the States, which 1
represent the peculiar and local interests, or
that the lattcrg may encroach on the former.
In examining this point, wo ought not to for
get, that the government through all its De
partments, Judicial, as well as others, .is ad
ministered by delegated and responsible agents,
and that the-power 'which really controls ulti
mately all the movements is not in the agents
but those who elect or appoint them. • To un
derstand then its real character, and wbat
would bo tho action of tho system in any sup-
posable case, we must raise our view front tbe
mere agents, to this high controlling power
which finally impels every movement of tbe
maebine. By doing so, wo shall, find all UDder
the control of the will of a majority, of tho
States, taken as corporate bodies, and the ma
jority of the people of the States estimated in
federal numbers. Thcso united constitute tho
real and final power, which impels anddirec(s
the movements of the General .Government.
The majorityjof the States elect the majority of
the Senate; oftlie people of tho States, that of
the House o( Representatives, the two united,
the President;-and the President and a ma
llow {tho .State* afoj to exercise this hlpk
wer of interposition which constitutes so
Were it possible, that reason could settle a
Question where the passions and interests olj • . , : - «u es-
men are concerned, this point would have j scnt.al a pmtton of t,«ij/jc^rved right, tha( it
been long since settled forever, by the State! cannot be deJtgaLd without an active surren-
of Virginia. The report of her Legislatorc.^er of their suvreignty, and converting our
to which t ltavo already referred, has really system front a federal into a consolidated gov .
in my opinion, placed it beyond controversy, nminent, is a question
-Speaking in reference to this subject it says,
“ it has been objected” (to the right of a State
to interpose for tho protection of her (reserved
rights} “that the Judicial authority, is to be
regarded as tho sole expositor of the Constituti-
tion; on this-objection it might Do observed,
first, that there may bo instances of usurped
competent to
question tiiattbe States only-,re
determine. I lie arguments
which prove that they possess the power, eqila j
ly prove, that they are in the ttoguage <T?jSr
let son “the rightful judges of the mode and
manner of redress.” But tho spirit of forbear
unco, as well as the nature of tbe right itself
forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of dan’
gerous infractions of the Constitution; and i|, c ,'
only in the lust resort, when ull reasonable | lon( !
of relief, from tho ordinnry action of the i> ov
eminent, has failed; when if the’ right to in,,."
pose did not oxist, tho alternative would be subl
mission and oppression on otto side, or resist*
unce by force on tho other. That cur system*
should afford, in such extreme cases, an inter
mediate pcint between these dire alternatives*
by which the government may bo brought to a
pause, aud thereby an interval obtained to com
promise differences, or, if impracticable, bo
compelled to submit the question to a constitu
tional adjustment, thro’ an appeal to tho States
themselves, is on evidence of its high wisdom*
an element got, as is supposed-by some of
weakness, but of strength; not of anarchy o r
revolution, but of peace and safety. Its gen
eral recognition would of itself in a great men.
sure, if not altogether, supercede the necessity ’
of its exercise, by impressing on the movements
of the government, that moderation and justice
so essential to harmony and peace, in a coun
try of such a vast extent, and aiversity of inter
ests at ours; uml would if controversy should
come, turn the resentment of the agrteved, flora
the system to thoso who had abused its powers
(a point all important,) and cause them to seek
redress, not in revolution or overthrow, but in
reformation. It is, in fact, properly under?
stood, a substitute where the alternative toouhs
be force, tending to prevent, and if that fails to
correct peaceably the aberrations to which all
political systems are liable, and which, if per
mitted to accumulate without correction, must
finally end in a general catastrophe.
I ltavo now said what 1 intended in reference
General Government is but its creature; and
tho* in reality a government with all the rights
and authority which belong to any other gov
ernment, within the orb of its powers, it is
nevertheless, a government emanating from a
compact between sovereigns, and partaking in
its nature and object, oT tbo character of a
joint commission, appointed to superintend and
administer the interests in which all 'are joint
ly concerned, but having, beyond its proper
sphere, no moro power, than if it did not ex
ist. To dony this would be to deny the most
incontcstible facts, and the clearest conclu
sions, while to acknowledge its truth is to
destroy utterly
would bo to fori
tho objection, that this appeal
inree, In the case supposed. For
if each party has a right to judge, then under
our system of government, tho final cogni
zance of a question of contested, power would
be in the States, and not in the Genclral Gov
ernment. It would be the daty of the latter,
as in all similar cases of a contest between one
or moro of tho principals and a joint commis
sion or agency, to refer the contest to the prin
cipals themselves. Such are tho plain dic
tates of reason and analogy both. On no
sound principto can tbo agents have a right to
final cognizance, as against the principals;
much less to uso force against them, tu main
tain their construction of their powers. -Such
a right would be monstrous; and has never,
heretofore, been claimed in. similar cases.
That the doctrine is applicable to tho caso of
a contested power betwoen the States and the
Genoral Government, wo havo the authority
not only of reason and analogy, hut of the dis
tinguished statesman already referred to. Mr.
Jefferson, at a late period of bis life, alter long
cxpurioncoand mature reflection, says, “With
respect to our State and Federal Governments,
I do not think their relations are correctly un
derstood by foreigners. They suppose the for
mer subordinate to the latter. This is not tbo
case. They are co-ordinate departments of
one simple and integral whole. But you may
ask if the two departments should claim each
tho same subject of power, where is the empire
to decide between them? In cases of little ur
gency or importance, the prudence of both par
ties will keep them aloof from the questionable
ground; butifitcan neither bo avoided nor com
promised, a convention of the States must he
called, to ascribe the doubtful power to that de
partment which they may think best.” It is
thus that our Constitution by authorizing amend
ments, and by prescribing tho authority and
mode of making them, has by a sirnplo contri
vance, with its characteristic wisdom, provided
k power which in the last resort supercedes ef
fectually the nesessity, and even ilio pretext
for force; a power to which pone can fairly ob
ject; with which the interests of oil aro safe,
jority of the Senate appoint the Judgos; a ma- which can doGnitely close all controversies in
jority of whom, and u majority of the Senate tho only effectual made, by freeing the corn-
arid tbe House with the President, really ex- pact of every defect and uncertianty, by an a-
crcise all of the powers of tho Government, 1 mendment of the instrument itself. It is im-
with the exception of the enses where tho 1 possiblo for human wisdom, in a system like
constitution requires a greater number than a . ours, to deviso another mode which shall be
majority. The judges are, in fact, as truly tho t safe and effectual, and at the same time con:
Judicial Representatives of this united major
ity, as the majority of Congress itself, or the
President, is its legislative, or executive repre
sentative; and to confide the power to tho Ju
diciary to determine finally and conclusively,
what powers are delegated, and wbat reserved,
would bo in reality to confide it to the majori
ty,whose agents they are, and by whom they
can be controlled in various ways; and, of
course to subject (against the fundamental prin-
ciple'of our system, and all spund political
reusoniog,) the reserved powers of the States,
with all of the local and peculiar interests,
they were intended to protect, to the will of the
very majority, against which the protection was
intended. Nor will the tenure by which the
Judges hold their office, however valuable the
provision in many other respects, materially
vary the case. Its highest possible effect
distent with what are the relations and acknowl
edged powers of the two groat departments of
our government. It gives a beauty and secu
rity peculiar to our system, which, if duly ap
preciated, will transmit its blessings to tho re
motest geucratioos; but if not, our splendid an
ticipation of the future will prove but an empty
dream. Stripped of all its covering, and the
naked question is, whether ours is a federal or
a consolidated government; a constitutional or
absolute one; a government resting ultimately
on the solid basis of tlto sovreignty of the
States, or on tho unrestrained will of a majority,
a form of government, as in all other unlimited
ones, in which injustice and violence, and
force must finally prevail. Let it never be for
gotten that where the majority rules, the mi
nority is the subject; and that if wo should ab
surdly attribute to the former, tho exclusive
agitation, would bo considered by many imper
fect, aud unsatisfactory. Feeling that such
would bo justly the case, I am compelled, re-
luetuntly, to touch on the Tariff, so far.ot least ,
us may bo necessary to illustrate the opinions I
which I have already advanced. Anri^VJ
however, tointrurlo us little as possible, on ihel
public attention,' 1 will bo as brief as possibli 1
and with that view, will, as far as may hecon-f
sistent with my object, avoid all debatable to-|
pics. To be c included in our next,
. . LATE FROM LNtiLANDT"
The ship Robert Pulsford, Cap!. CanbleJ
arriveu at diaries ton, left Liverpool ou tliec 1
ing of the S!d. ult. bringing files of London dl.
and shipping Lists, down to the evening oL
•8th June, and Liverpool papers of tire 1st ult.
Tho most interesting intelligence contained i
theso papers, is the favorable aspect of me l’o
cause. It is confidently stated in (he Lnadi
Courier, of the 27th June, that sevetal of the Ru
sian nobility, who had been serving iu the a
for the last three years, had retired to tlieir esti.
being unwilling to fight longer against a no.
nation struggling for its independtnee. X]
gives a compleciiuri to the war, highly favor.ia
to the cause of this long oppressed but ga! J
people.
Prince Leopold, in a letter to the Belgian Col
grass, has accepted the Belgian Crown, on conT
tion that the Congress adopts the measured
eulated to consolidate the new Kingdom, i
to obtain its recognition by Europe.
Tho \Varsaw papers state that, on the ij
General Skryznecki put the main army in motf
in .the direction of Nurr. The news train bnl
oia and tire Ukraine is good. Tits iusnrgeoisl
pear to he gathering strength daily, and serf
successes on their part are mentioned in J
French and German Journals. r
It is repeated that Field Marshal Count I
kwitsh was ill of the Asiatic fevtr at Bt.I
tersburg. U is said (hat he has declined to f
command of tho nroiy. General Toll isf-
prescut at its head.
A letter fromWarsaw dated 19th of June, j
positively that Marshal BicbtSch poisoned I
sell, after an interview with an Aitiede fa*
the Emperor, in which the latter had lercrcl*
sured his military conduct during the hi']
paign, aud particularly the iueorrectncs) f
official reports, Twenty three of the ptori'l
Hungary have addressed the Emperor ink*
the Poles. -.. . .
THE REFORM BILL-
This important bill was brought forward J
House of Commons ou the S£4tn,—passed f
reading—and was to be rend a second tim'J
Fourth of July. After the speech ol Lot"
Russell, a part of winch we subjoin, Sit!
Peel made a few observations, inlimJanH
should not oppose the bill in (ho pies" 11 1
its progress, hut should have something]
when the question should come up •
reading. -The noblo Lord,” he rei*
apprehend, entirely wrong in Ilia exp 1
this measure will be permitted to go 10
mitten without a lengthened diJC uf "*
principle, and the sense of the liouie«_
pronounced upon it.” This annoum-
followed by loud cheers.
would be to retard, and Out finally to resist, l right of construing (lie Constitution, (here
*t refer to the mithorily ot Chief Justice Marstinli in
. the ease of Jonathan Robbins. I have not been able
•Hy a, in tretfc, greater,«' such separate and; mal and unreasonable. If those who VSUnt»ri!y i to refer to the speech »ud speak from memory.
would be in fact between the sovreign and mb
it is useless to multiply arguments* under such a government, no Constitution;
1 or at least nothing deserving the name, or surv-
the will of a dominant majority
But
head-quarters at Kieczewo, near »■
the 10th of June, attributes tM*J**L
Biebstch to’a sudden attack of •“* p
bus. It is stated that previonsly ti
ed perfect health, and on the an}
ceediugly cheerful; but at about - ^
morning of the Oth of June It****
ill, and his malady was immediately■
be the cholera—All medical ttst' 11 *" /
effectual, and after a very P al ® .1,
parted this life on Friday, the '
o’clock in the morning- I‘ 1151 !!^
(says the above mentioned r*P 0, ’l'
that the progress of tho cliolera “ .
mush less to contagion than to 1
the predisposition of the persoo':'- A
time, of tlte General’s death th*
head-quarters of tho RussiaO*
attacked with this malady*.
General Toll has accepted, P^'f
mand of the army. Onthelu
Diebitsch’s death WM n0 }
whero it will, oo doubt, prod* 1 ^
The Russian forces are at ttu’
vided; tho army beyood «>« ,
SO,000 men; a corps ofXO.OW "
has marched iu pursuit ol ,
Guards now form two «J ,VI
ing the legitimate object of so sacred au iostru* j the Itcad-quarters, the «•>« , ^
meni. I General Krouir. has ahau 1 *