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(’f i nv*inut , rl from “Fourth Vnze>) pabl • than eorrup fl on. and appealing to motives ‘es* profligate than venali ty- will produce an? impression upon th** vote of f en million"* of freemen, scattered over ‘he vast domain whicn i their favored inheritance. The fact that these principle arp x from their very na*ure incaoab'e of acting upon multitude would prevent them from operating upon ‘he people, even 4f w e had not the higher security fur , iehedby their virtue and patriotism. But it ii (Yeq cully objected, that ir'*p3t mans of the people are not stidi ientlv intelligent to decide up oo ihe quttlifi‘-aiin of so important an offi eras the chief magistrate of a great Republic; and yet. that, in voting for electors, who are merely the organs of their will, they in fact determine that question. As tlic history of all nations, of any considerable extent, gives at least a plausible coloring to this objection* it deserves to be deliberately exam ined. No political principle is more firmly established hv the experience of nations* than ihot the freedom ol polifhal institutions cannot rise higher than the intelligence of the people. All attempts to erect free governments upon aov other basis than an intelligent population, have always resulted, and must ever re sult, i?i re-action and disaster If, therefore. I fie committee could be lieve that the people of ihe United States are nit sufficiently intelli gent io perform so essential ts func tion of popular sovereignty os the 1e tin of iheir chief executive ma gistrate, they could not resist the unwrlo’ tne conclusion, that our gytier.i of g vermtent. i- but a de lusive lo'pp. renting unsub foundations, an if ontaiuirg \v.*bi,i i*4©ir the poinciplei of rapid degeneracy a*.d er'ain dissolution. Jto.p -r sd.i’ity t( the J)Pnj)!r. all roust admit, is the only adequate security f.r freedom, tli<* great'"conservative principle of n representative gov ernment. And what would he the value of the responsibility of w pub lie agent, to a people not capable of electing him? If, therefore, it could be shewn that the people are not competent to elect the President, an argument would result, which if Would be difficult to resist, in favor of those political combinations which, under various forms and pretences, are ever ready to os*um the province *f dtel&tingto the peo pie, and whi<*h can only be regard ed, when habitual and permanent, as synonimous with corruption. Under these circumstances, wc have e. source of just consolation ard pride in the reflection, that, in all that relates to the maintenance and enjoyment of a system of prac tical freedom, hist >l7 has left no record of a people at all to be **nm pn'<>d the ciiizeus of these Uni ted States. \ very brief notice oT the prr.mi- Dcni circumsfa'o*cs wl ich d?s*in guish our social ad p-li toil cm.di tioM from tha of the republic n n&. t?c*s of antiquity, a f d of the civil |7 ,] . m ion* of modern *U? ope, w r H furnish, at on e, the evidence and the ex|dHna<ion of ibis superi rity. \o estimate of the comparative condition of this and ibe an ieot re publics can le put. whirh d**es not. embrace tbe invention of the art o’ printing, and the consequent estab lishment of a free press. These causes alone have produced per xn inent revolution in tbe political condition of tbe human race. So cieties of freemen have been impro ved a-*d enlarged, to a degree utter ly unattainable without these effi cient means of diff using intelligence, and tbe republican system has con sequently received a modification and extension, which the wisdom of mi ti<] tit v would have pronounced im possible. The harangues of their orators, delivered to collected mul titudes, were almost the only means of political intelligence enjoyed by the people of the ancient republics. The extent of a republic, or, in other words, of a government ema nating from the people, and respon sible to them, is confined, by ao im perious political necessity, to such limit*, that the proceedings of the central administration may he promptly, certainly, and generally communicated to the extremes of the country. Adverting, therefore, to the limited means id’communica ting intelligence possessed by the an dents, (he reason is apparent why their republics were so extremely contracted. They were, of necessi ty. simple democracies ; and, in the davi of their greatest purity and splejador, the portion of the people which really governed was confined to their chief cities, because that portion alone wai within (he reach of the only existing sources of polit ical intelligence. On the contrary, the great body of the people of the United k tatrs, dispersed over an im mense region, to whine soil they*? are attached jiv the strongest ties, receive daily, in the tranquillity of retirement, from books, docu ment*, ’ legislative discussions, and the chronicles of passing events, that knowledge of !he affairs of the Re public, which the Greeks and Ro -1 mans received almost entirely from (be occasional debites of their ora > trs before the assciabliei of the peo ple. It is, therefore, extremely ob vious. that any inference u ifavora ble t the political capabilities of the American people, which can be drawn from the history of those re publics, must be founded up >n loose analogies, calculated rather to de lude than to ct.ligbten. A con pa? isoo between t*ie United Staiea a*u) the civilized nations of modern limes, will lead to results equally fluttering. All ’thegreat political societies of modern Europe having a feudal origin, are const ranted upon feudal principles. A permanent inequali ty of'property, maintained by law, and consecrated by usige, has na turally produced the extremes of a proud arjitoc.racy and a degraded populace, without any intermediate power sufficient (g control their ir regular tendencies. In such a state of thing?, it is not diffi isl, to con ceive. thud papula* electioii of the ohief executive magistrate would (brow (he hostile element! <;fsocio tv in?') sucli vi- lent collision n* to involve in anarchy and ruin all (hat i sacred in (he institutions <*f the country. But nil the American communities which compose (he U. Slaves, ere essentially different, both in their origin and cons'-ruetmn, from those of modern Europe Our ancestors, in the full ma'urity of reason, with no conse -rased errors to embarrass (hern, reared up, trom elements, a system of practical freedom; aod, from the first settlement of the country, eve ry successive generation has been accustomed (o exsroisc the functions of self-government, in every fmtn, and in overy variety of combine sons. Nor are we less favorably distin guished in the nompn-ifioa of our social system, than in its origin The abolition of the law# of pri mogeniture has prodo-ed a general equality of property, an I this again, together with the equality of civil ad political privileges, has pla ced a general diffusion of know ledge, of which history furnishes no example. AJmot the entire miss of our population in character sad situation, with what fs denominated the middle in terest in England’ and which is justly considered, by her most en lightened statesmen, a? the soundest part of her population. In extend ing he elective system in the Uni ted States, therefore, beyond all former precedents, we do nothing more than adapt our p ikies! to our so *!al system. In fact, so widely and ffrrent is our situation ftom that of any oHier nation, that it may be truly said, that the people would fie sJe%s liable to make an injudicious : choice of a chief magistrate, than of any other important officer of the government. Such is the admira ble distribution atid subordination of political powers in our system, and such the variety of practical schools of preparation and trial through which a statesman must pass, be fore he can aspire, with just or rea sonable expectations of success, to the highest office it the republic, ih:.t the qualifications and pieten sions of the candidates can always be determined by the wisdom of their past measures, and the impor tance of their past services. A* these arc the only indications of wisdwti) upon whi< h it would be safe to rely, in (be selection of an offi cer of mi h vast responsibility and importance, •( is satisfactory to re flect, (hat they are indications, al so, of so palpable a kind, (ha* (bey cannot fad (o make (heir just im pression, both upon (be intelligence and gratitude of so enlightened and patriotic people. But another objection, of a kind red spirit with that which has been just considered, is frequently urged against the change pr posed. It is said that (he appointment of eleet ois by the people would so directly involve (lie canvass for the Presi dency kstdf, as to produce a degree ■ of popular oxciteraent subversive of the order and peace of society. The remarks already offered, in relation to the dispersion of our population, (he peculiar structure of our socie ty* and (he general diffusion of in telligence, are sufficient to show, that nothing in the experience of o ther countries can be regarded as a just foundation for suub an ap prehension. But f there are other views of the subject, which will lead us to the conclusion, that the tendency of the proposed change, upon which this objection is found ed, 1* one of its strongest recom mendations. The order of the social virtues and social duties in the U. Spates, is nearly (he reverse of that which existed amongst the Greeks and Ro mans, In an ordinary state of things, when no great emergency calls for patriotio sacrifices, the duly which principally engrosses the feelings and effrts of an Amer ican citizen, i* to make provision for his comfortable subsistence, and to satisfy the edaims es hi* family, Whereas, the fiisi consideration of a Greek or a Roman citizen, both in peace and in war, was the t?lory of his country. Our tendency, therefore, is tn give too exclusive aw attention ?* private pursuits, and sink into indifference in relation to the general concents of the repub lic ; while (ho tendency of the G reeks and flotnan9 was to inter meddle perpetually in pnbli * affairs, to the neglect and detriment of their private concern*. Our dan ger. therefore, is too much popular apathy; then 9 was too much popu lar excitement. And though (he stale of thing*) existing here, is more deeply founded in nature, atid fur nishes a moce substantial basis for a durable and extended system of liberty, *t eerraiid? indicates the nec.estiiy of such constitutional ‘ar rangements as w*!l rouse the atten tion of the people to 90 great n na* tior,d q ie<fin:i as (he election of a chief magistrate. No s'rougar or* idence me*J be offered, of the exis tence of s*idi a nci'cssityj than the ftHtiMl state of pnh ? b* opinio* on that subject, at this moment, in m%ny pari sos the Unioo. The people hav* b-cn so long aoeustoKied to have no ir (ial agency In the ei erkion of a President, that the idea is not uncommon, thal they have nothing t*> do vrith it. As the ine vitable icdc*n-y of this stfcte of po* pnl-tr I‘d to in ,s rease the power (I isfluenre of political managers end uov.dneipled combi nation*, it is of the last importance (hat it shonld be corrected, if possi ble. The committee arc of the opinion that the plan submitted wilf fucnis’i the remedy. But it yet remains that we in quire whether the people should vole by a general ticket or by dis trict* The committee will, there fore. proceed to state the considers tions which have induced them to adopt the latter system. It was as eveidently !be, intention of the fra mens of (he constitution, as it is the dictate of sound policy, that the President of the United Stales should he the choice of the people and not of ‘he Stales, It i9 true, they contemplated an infusion of the federal principle info the elec tioo, in f!e proportion of the Sena t*P9 to (he Representatives in Con gress ; and thi* prop rtion is retain ed in the plan proposed by the com mittee. But to extend the federal princi ple to the whole body of the elec tors, would be nothing less than sa crificing the rights, the interests, and the power of the people, to the false and imaginary idol of State consolidation. Assuming if a* an undeniable po sition, that a majority of the peo ple of the United States have a right to elect he President, and (hat the wdl of such majority ought to pre vail, it can be demonstrated that the svsfem of voting by a general ticket, would render this fundamen tal principle of our government the sport of accidental combinations. Six of the States, for example, if they give a unanimous vote, can el ect the President. But if they vote by a general ticket, the candidate who obtains a bare majority of the popular vote, receives the unanim ous electoral vote of the State. So that, assuming the population of the United Stales to be eight mill ions, a little more than two millions of the people might elect the Presi dent. Let us again suppose, that there are two States, one contain ing nine hundred thousand people; and entitled to thirty electoral vote, and the other containing eight hund red tfiousand people, and entitled to twenty-six electoral vo(es.—Let us further suppose, that there are two candidates for the Presidency, of whom one is supported by five hun dred thousand of (he people of the first supposed State, and the oilier by the remaining four hundred thousand, aud the entire eight hun dred thousand of the oilier state. Under these circutnitauees, the can didate who obtains the support of only five hundred thousand of the people, would receive thirty electo ral votes,while twelve hundred thou sand people could give the opposing candidate only twenty-six! Accor ding to this sy3texn of false equations a large minority of the people is 4 precisely equal to 00 minority at all. By thus entirely excluding the Slate minorities from the caeula tion, in making up the general ag gregate, the people arc literally immolated, by hundreds of thou sands, at the shrine of an artificial and delusive system, which, by ma king a majority equal to the whole in e* 4i State, gives a minor ity an equal chance f r the ascen dency in the Union. T he true popular principle, in the opinion of the cxnmittee, is that which prevails in all other popular elections throughout the United Satc*. In tlio election, for exam ple, of the Gogeroor of a 8la(e, by (he people, a candidate docs not count the unanimous vote of every county where he happens !o obtain a majority, but the respective ma jorities of the several candidates arc added to their respective minor ities, ami the aggregates thus pro duced, are taken as (he true ex pression of the popular will. If# (hen, hi all that relat#* to the •** ttn ino defence and general welfare,” the people of the United Stales aro really I obi regarded as one people ; if all the citizess of the Republic, whether their lot happen! $0 be cast on the oae side or the other of an imaginary line, as o equally entitled to tiieir vote and (heir voice, in (be common fjoocerns anil common councils of the Union ; if it be wise to exclude from those rouncUs the peculiar and exclusive feelings of states; and if the uian who is to preside over the common destinies of ail, should have peculiar obli gations to discharge ai*d pe idiae feeling* to indulge, towards none of (he States, we are tinder the most 9oleiri < obligations to reject a plau for electing the Presides, which would array States against States, in ambitious •< flirt for the muste rs. and equal It ganrifi ! *e the urm iientible rights of the people, aod the general harmony of the Union. But (here is another object ion to the system of voting, by a general ticket, which the committee consid er ueanswei’&ble. It h a practical proposition, con clusively established by the expert enee cf all the stales where the ex periment has beer; raada. that this system tend#, by an iuevitable ue erssity, to trac. fer into the hands ofa few the power of controlling (be entire suffrage of the state. In a state entitled to thirty electors, aud composed, perhaps, of fifty counties* it must be appareni# that almost every county would vote far an entire ticket of its own ; and that tbe popular will would be thus ex po gi to such distraction, as eons pleteiy to endanger its success, without some means of giving it concentration. And as the power of the individuals sr’ected for this pup >se must be 00-exteitsiv® with the wills which it would be (heir object to concentrate, it would fol low, that they would virtually de cide which of the presidential can didates should receive the whole el ectoral vote of (he state. At the first commencement of such a sys tem, whea ?he persons clothed with the authority of uniting (he popular will were really its representatives’ no great evil would he experienced. Bui the slightest attention to the history of ambition, the tendency of power, or the lessors of our own experience, will convince us that such combinations change, in the natural course of things, from tem porary expedient to permanent in stitutions; and that, from beiug tlio mere organs of the will of the peo ple, they assume, under pretexts which ambition is seldom at a loss <o devise, the power of dictating to the people, la making these remarks, the committee feel conscious that they are rather recording the history of the times To which they live, than their own speculations. And it is upon (his high authority that they predicate tfie opinion, that if (he plan jf voting by a general ticket were established, a ceniral power would spring up in almost every stafe, consisting of the ruling poli ti'*itKs3 ot the day, who would be bound to the people by no tie of re gular responsibility, and be, in eve ry respect, more liable to cabal, in trigue, and corruption, than the Legislature itself. Aud when we reflect that the cniire electoral vote of a siale, upon which (he presiden tial election itself might turn, would frequently depend upon the integrity of a few men, perhaps of a single individual, it is difficult to conceive a state of thiogi in whidg[ there would bo stronger induced merits, or greater facilities for in trigue and corruption. By divi ding the states info districts, all these evils would be avoided. The will of the people would be fairly ex- i\o political combinations would be necessary or practicable. Kvery district would, at least, havo its own oonfre of operation.* upon which corruption would be brought to bear, with its inducements vastly diminished; and its consequences proportionality less to be dreaded. ‘Die last branch of the under which the committee are ao- ‘ ting, remains to be oonidered. They have found it impractica ble absolutely to exclude the possi bility of the election of President and Vice President devolving, in a ny event, upon Congress ; but they believe, u idee the plan submitted, the contingency would not happen once in a century, upon which <h<s election would devolve upon that b ody. They propose, in (be event of no person receiving a m*j irity of the electoral votes at the first bal loting, that the electors shall again meet, forthwith, in their respective state*, and vote for the two persons having the highest uu alter of votes in (he first instance. This will al most invaluably ensure an election by the electors, at the second bal lofth-g. Indeed, it may be fairly presumed, that every candidate who is convinced he cannot be one of the two highest in the first instance, wsl! withdraw from (he c*oo<est ; and, in this manner, the probability of an election, at tae (!•%( balloting’ will be very oaeh mrcasd This branch of fpeamendment is recommended by Ml the reasons which can be.urged against the el ection of (be President by the H ouse of Representatives. And these, in the opinion of the committee, are cogent and conclusive All history teaches us the melan choly truth, that, in the election of a Üblef of a gr*at Re public. intrigue aod corruption, un der the various aod insidious dis guises which they ar4 of assuming, areth* deleterious prin ciple* against which the precau tions of human wisdom sre leas* c pable of providing an ftTcetual re sistance. f l he danger to be appre hended from these principles, is in direct proportion to the fempfaiion and the means of rendering them efficient instruments in promoting the views of ambition. And what prize can hold out more attractive temptations to the amhitims than the Presidency of the United Stales? —ln pursuit of what object is even a virtuous mi ni so much exposed to the blandishing delusions of thaC wretched casuistry, whig# makos (he end sanctify the means? And when we advert to the immense store of patronage which weuhl be pl&c.ed fo** di<**cihutian in tffii hands of the successful aspirant, i? cannot be disguised, that be would have precisely those means of tampering with the members of the Home of Representatives, by which the Mage* of wickedness might be receives in the disguise of virtue's recompense; and the wretch who sold his iite grity, might almost delude himself into the belief that be was serving his country. It is exceedingly un pleasant to indulge the idea, (hit the representatives of & virtuous aud enlightened poople could evet be swerved from any duty by selfish or sinister view*; but, we have the authority of more than human wig* dom for saying, “ lead lis not into temtation •” It is, therefore, the deliberate opinion of the committee, that the only effectual mode of pre serving our government Irotn the corruptions which have undermind ed the liberty of so many other na tions. is to confide the election of our chits ttwcutm Mdgittr ate to those