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Pis that the people of Georgia
J from the true issue before
ho late deletions, and were rim
r log cabins, hard cider, and coon
The people of Georgia led from the
true Issue ? No, sir. No, sir. They well
Understood'the true issue, and were not to
be led oil by the many slanders against Gen.
Harrison. They never would have given
their vote to Mr. Van Huron. And when
General Harrison was nominated, they
looked to his character—his public services
—his fitness—■and the more these qualities
were examined into, the more certainly was
it proved that he possessed all those quali
fications which entitled him to their sup
port.
THE INAU3URAL ADDRESS
of gen. william h. hariuson,
March Ith, 1841,
<>ll entering upon the duties of the office of
I' resident of the Ur.itcd States,
Called from a retirement which I had
supposed was to continue for the residue of
mv life, to till the Chief Executive olliee of
this great and free nation, I appear before
you, fellow-citizens, to take the oaths which
the Constitution prescribes, as a necessary
qualification for the performance of its du
ties. And in obedience to a custom co-eval
with our Government, and what I believe
to be your expectations, I proceed to pre
sent to you a summary of the principles
which will govern me, in the discharge of
the duties which 1 shall be called upon to
perform.
It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in
tilt early period of that celebrated Republic,
that a most striking contrast was observable
in the conduct of candidates for offices of
power and trust, before and after obtaining
them—they seldom carrying out, in the
latter case, the pledges and promises made
in the former. However much the world 1
may have improved, in many respects, in
the lapse of upwards of two thousand years !
since the remark was made by the virtuous ,
and indignant Roman, I fear that a .strict j
examination of the annals of some of the ,
modern elective Governments, would de
vclope similar instances of violated confi
dence.
Although the fiat of the People has gone !
forth, proclaiming me the Chief Magistrate j
of this glorious Union, nothing upon their j
part remaining to be done, it may be thought !
that a motive may exist to keep up the dclu- j
sion under which they may be supposed to j
have acted in relation to my principles and !
opinions ; and perhaps there may bo some j
in this assembly w)jo have come here either j
prepared to condemn those I shall now de- |
liver, or, approving them, to doubt the sin- j
eerity with which they are uttered, liut ‘
the lapse of a few months will confirm or
dispel their fears. The outline of princi
ples to govern, and measures to be adopted,
hv an Administration not yet begun, will
soon be exchanged for immutable history ;
and I shall stand, either exonerated by my
countrymen, or classed with the mass of
those who promised that they might de
ceive, and flattered with the intention to be
trav.
However strong may be my present pur- *
pose to realize the expectations of a mag- j
nanimous and confiding People, 1 too well
understand the infirmities vs human nature, j
and the dangerous temptations to which 1
shall be exposed, from the magnitude of the j
power which it has been the pleasure of the j
People to commit to mv hands, not to place
my chief confidence upon the aid of that
Almighty Power which has hitherto pro- !
tectcd me, and enabled me to bring to favor- j
able issuesother important, but still greatly /
inferior trusts, heretofore confided to me by j
my country.
The broad foundation upon which our
Constitution rests, being the People-*-a
breath of theirs having made, as a breflth
can unmake, change or modify it—it ban
be assigned to none of tlm great divisions of
Government but to that of Democracy. If
such is its theory, those who are called up
on to administer it must recognize, as its
leading principle, the duty of shaping their
measures so as to produce the greatest
amount of good to the greatest number.—
But, with these broad admissions, if we
would compare the sovereignty acknowl
edged to exist in the mass of our People
with the power claimed by other sovereign
ties, even by those which have been con
sidc'cd most purely democratic., we shall
find a mo' 1 essential difference. All others
lay claim to ?ower limited only by their
own will. The of out citizens, on
the contrary, possess a sovereignty with an
amount of power precisely f< l ua ’ t 0 *l iat
which has been granted to tlum ?* v P ar_
ties to the national compac*, and nothing
beyond. We admit of no Government by
Divine right—believing tha, so far as pow
er is concerned, the beneficent Creator has
made no distinction amongst men, that all
are upon an equality, and that the only le
gitimate right to govern is an express grant
of power from the governed. The Consti
tution of United States is the instrument
containing this grant of power to the sever
al departments composing the Government.
On an examination of that instrument,
it will be found to contain declarations
of power granted, and of power with
held. The latter is also susceptible of
of division, into power which the majority
had the right to grant, but which they did
not think proper to intrust to their agents,
and that which they could not have granted,
not being possessed by themselves. In oth
er words, there are certain rights possess
ed bv each individual American citizen,
which, in his compact with the others, he
has never ."•urrendered. Some of them, in
deed, he is Unable to surrender, being,
in the language o. Pour system, unalienable.
The boasted priviuVe of a Roman citi
zen was to him a shield oT'ty against a pet
ty provincial ruler, whilst the proud demo
crat of Athens could console himself under
a sentence of death, for a supposed viola- ,
I
ff
i tionof the national faith, which no ope un- 1
’ derstood, ami which us times Was the sub-
J jeet of the mockery of all, or of banishment
i front liis home, his family, and his country,
with or without ah alleged cause J that it
was the act, not of a single tyrant, or hated
aristocracy, but of his assembled countvy
| mou. Far different is the power of our
sovereignty. It can interfere with no one’s
1 faith, prescribe forms of worship for no
j one’s observance, inflict no punishment, but
I after well asccriuined guilt, the result of
j investigation under rules prescribed by the
j Constitution itself. These precious privi
-1 leges, and those scarcely less important, ot
giving expression to his thoughts and opin
| ions, either bv writing or speaking, unre
! strained but by the liability for injury to
| others, and that of a full participation in all
the advantages which flow from the Gov
j eminent, the acknowledged property of all,
| the American citizen derives from no char- j
! ter granted by his fellow man. He claims
| them because lie is himself a Man, fashion j
i ed by the same Almighty hand as the rest j
’ of his species, and entitled to n full share
i of the blessings with which ho lias endow
ed them.
Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty
possessed by the People of the I nited States,
and the restricted grant of power to the
Government which they have adopted,
j enough has been given to accomplish all
the objects for which it was created. It
1 lias been found powerful in war, and, hith
erto, justice lias been administered, an inti
mate union effected, domestic tranquility
; preserved, and personal liberty secured to
the citizen As was to be expected, how- :
ever, from the defect of language and the
necessarily sententious manner in which the
| Constitution is written, disputes have arisen
; as to the amount of power which it lias ac
j tually granted, or was intended to grant. —
This is move particularly the case in rela
tion to chat part of the instrument which
| treats of the Legislative branch. And not
j only as regards the exercise of powers
1 claimed under a general clause, giving that
i body the authority to pass all laws neces
sary to carry into effect the specified pow
j ers, but in relation to the latter also. It is, j
; however, consolatory to reflect, that most of
j the instances of alleged departure from the i
’ letter or spirit of the Constitution, have ul- j
! timately received the sanction of a majority j
jof the people. And the fact, that many of ;
; our statesmen, most distinguished for talent;
; and patriotism, have been, at one time or I
| other of their political career, on both sides I
j ofeach of the most warmly disputed ques- j
j tions, forces upon us the inference that the j
! errors, if errors there were, are attributa- j
bio to the intrinsic difficulty, in many in- j
[ stances, of ascertaining the intentions of i
I the framers of the Constitution, rather than j
the influence of any sinister or unpatriotic i
| motive
But the great danger to our institutions
\ does not appear to me to be in a usurpation, ;
by tire Government, of power not granted by j
the People, but by the accumulation, in one !
I of the Departments, of that which was as- j
; signed to others. Limited as arc tiie pow
ers which have been granted, still enough
I have been granted to constitute a despo- |
I tisin, if concentrated in one of the depart
i incuts. This danger is greatly heighten- \
\ ed, as it has been always observable that
j men are less jealous of encroachments of
iotic department upon another, than upon
| their own reserved rights.
When the Constitution of the l idtcd
: States first came from the hands of the Con
! vention which formed it, many of the stern
| est republicans of the day were alarmed at
the extent of the power which had been
I granted to the Federal Government, and
| nwrc particularly of that portion which
j had been assigned to the Executive branch,
i There were in it features which appeared
-not to be in harmony with their ideas of a
simple representative Democracy, or Re- j
public. And knowing the tendency of i
power to increase itself, particularly when i
exercised by a single individual, predictions I
were made that, at no very remote period, j
the Government would terminate in virtual
monarchy. It would not become me to say
that the fears of these patriots have been al-
ready realized. But, as I sincerely be
lieve that the tendency of measures, and of
j men’s opinions, for some years past, has
been in that direction, it is, I conceive,
strictly proper that I should take this occa
sion to repeat the assurances I have hereto
fore given of my determination to arrest j
the progress of that tendency, if it really j
exists, and restore the Government to its I
pristine health and vigor, as far as this can
be effected by any legitimate exercise of the ;
power placed in my hands.
I proceed to state, in as summary a man- ;
ner as I can, my opinion of the sources of
the evils which have been so extensively J
complained of, and the correctives which j
may be applied. Some of the former are ;
unquestionably to be found in the defects j
of the Constitution ; others, in my judg-
I nient, are attributable to a misconstruction
of some of its provisions. Os the former
is the eligibility of the same individual to a
second term of the Presidency. The sa
gacious mini? of Mr. Jefferson early saw
and lamented th.'s error, and attempts have
been made, hitherto without success, to ap
ply the amendatory of the States to
its correction.
As, however, the mode of correction is
in the power of every President, snd conse
quently in mine, it would be useless, and
perhaps invidious, to enumerate the cv?ls of
which, in the opinion of many of our tal
low-citizens, this error of the sages who
framed the Constitution may have been the
source, and the bitter fruits which we are
still to gather from it, if it continues to dis
figure our system. It may be observed,
however, as a general remark, that Repub
lics can commit no greater error than to
adopt or continue any feature in their sys
tems of Government which maybe calcula
ted to create or increase the love of power,
in the bosoms of those to whom necessity
oblii. es them to commit the management of
thei? affairs. And, surely, nothing is more
likely to proQu’ ce such a state 0? mind ll ? an
the long continual 00 an od * ce
’ trust. Nothing can be more corrupting,
1 nothing more destructive of all those noble
feelings which belong to the character of a
devoted republican patriot. When this
* corrupting passion once takes possession of
j the human mind, like the love of gold, it be
! comes insatiable. It is the never-dying
worm in bis bosom, grows with his growth,
! and strengthens \ itli the declining years of
its victim. If this is true, it is the part of
1 wisdom tor a republic to limit the service of
! that officer, ut least, to whom she has in
trusted the management of her foreign rela
-1 tions, the execution of her laws, and the
command of her armies and navies, to a
j period so short as to prevent his forgetting
that ho is the accountable agent, not the j
i principal—the servant, not the master. — 1
j Until an amendment of the Constitution j
can he effect ed, public opinion may secure
; the desired object. 1 give my aid to it, by 1
j renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, !
under no circumstances, will I consent to j
serve a second term.
But if there is danger to public liberty j
from the acknowledged defects of the Con
stitution, in the want of limit to the continu
ance of the Executive power in the same
hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less
from a misconstruction of that instrument,
as it regards the powers actually given. I
cannot conceive that, by a fair construction,
any or cither, of its provisions would be
found to constitute the President a part of
! the legislative power. It cannot be claim
j ed from the power to recommend, since, al
though enjoined as a duty upon hint, it is a
privilege which be holds in common with
j every oilier citizen. And although there
may be something more of confidence in the
; propriety of the measures recommended in
j the one case than in the other, in the obljga
j tions of ultimate decision there can be no
difference. In the language of the Consti
tution, “all the legislative powers” which
it grants “ are vested in the Congress of the
United States.” It would be a solecism in
language to say that any portion of these is
not included in the whole.
It may be said, indeed, that the Constitu- j
: tion lias given to the Executive the power
1 to annul the acts of the legislative body \
;by refusing to them his assent. >So a simi- I
I lav power has necessarily resulted from that j
; instrument to the Judiciary ; and yet the ]
Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature, i
i There is, it is true, this difference between j
these grants of power : the Executive can
’ put his negative upon the acts of the Legis- j
- iature for other cause than that of want of i
j conformity to the Constitution, whilst the j
! Judiciary can only declare void those which j
| violate that instrument. But the decision !
jof the Judiciary is final in such a ease, *
whereas, in every instance where the veto
of the Executive is applied, it may be over- j
come hv a vote of two-thirds of both llous
|es of Congress. The negative upon the j
acts of the Legislative, by the Executive !
authority, and that in the hands of one in- !
dividual, would seem to he an incongruity ‘
in our system. Like some others of a sim j
| ilar character, however, it appears to bo
highly expedient ; and if used only with
j the forbearance, and in the spirit which was
! intended by its authors, it may be produc
| tive of great good, and be found one of the
i best safe guards to the Inion. At the pe
riod of the formation of the Constitution,
the principle docs not appear to have en
joyed much favor in the State Governments.
It existed hut in two, and in one of these
there was a plural Executive. If we
would search for the motives which opera
j ted upon the purely patriotic and cnlighten
i ed assembly which framed the Constitution
j for the adoption of a provision so apparent
ly repugnant to the leading democratic
principle, that the majority should govern,
we must reject the idea that they auticipa
j ted from it any benefit to the ordinary course
jof legislation. They knew too well the
j high degree of intelligence which existed
j among the People, and the enlightened
j character of the State Legislatures, not to
! have the fullest confidence that the two bo
j dies elected by them would be worthy rep
I resentatives of such constituents, and, of
course, that they would require no aid in j
conceiving and maturing the measures
which the circumstances of the country
might require. And it is preposterous to
suppose that a thought could for a moment
have been entertained, that the President,
placed at the Capitol, in the centre of the
country, could better understand the wants
I and wishes of the people than their own im
mediate representatives, who spend a part
of every year among them, living with
I them, often laboring with them, and bound
i to them by the triple tie of interest, duty,
and affection. To assist or control Con
| gress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could I
! not, I conceive, have been the motive for
| conferring the veto power on the President.
; This argument acquires additional force,
j from the fact of its never having been thus
j used by the first six Presidents—and two of
them were members of the convention, one
presiding over its deliberations, and the
other having a larger share in consumma
ting the labors of that august body than
any other person. But if bills were never
returned to Congress by either of the Presi
dents above referred to, upon the ground of
their being inexpedient, or not as well
adapted as they might be to the wants of the
people, the veto was applied upon that of
want of conformity to the Constitution, or
because errors had been committed from a
too hasty enactment.
There is another ground for the adoption
of the Veto principle, which had probably
more influence in recommending it to the
convention than any other. I refer to the
security which it gives to the just and equi
table action of the Legislature upon all
parts of the Union. It could not but have
occurred to the Convention that, in a coun
try so extensive, embracing so great a va
rietyof soil and climate, and, consequently,
of products, and which from the same
causes, must ever exhibit a great difference
in the amount of the population of its va
rious sections, calling for a great diversity
in the employments of the people, that the
legislation of the majority might not al
tvaysjustly regard the rights and interests of
the minority. And that acts of this char
acter might bo passed, under an express
grunt by the words of the Constitution, and,
therefore, not within the competency of the
judiciary to declare void. That however
enlightened and patriotic they might sup
pose, from past experience, the members
of Congress might be, and however largely
partaking, in the general, of the liberal
feelings of the people, it was impossible to
expect that bodies so constituted should not
sometimes be controlled by local interests
and sectional feelings. It was proper,
therefore, to provide some umpire, from
whose situation and mode of appointment j
more independence and freedom front such
j influences might be expected. Such a one
1 was afforded by the Executive Department,
■ constituted by the Constitution. A person
| elected to that high office, having his con
! stituonts in every section, State, and sub-di
! vision of the Union, must consider himself
j hound by the most solemn sanctions, to
guard, protect, and defend the rights of all,
i and of every portion, great or small, from j
the injustice and oppression of the rest. I
i consider the veto power, therefore, given hv
the Constitution to the Executive of the U.
States, solely as a conservative power. To
he used only, Ist, to protect the Constitution
from violation ; 2dly, the people from the
effects of hasty legislation, where their will i
has probably been disregarded, or not well i
understood ; and 3dly, to prevent the ef
fects of combinations violative of the rights i
of minorities. In reference to the second j
of these objects, I may observe that, I eon- I
siderilthc right and privilege of the people ■
to decide disputed points of the Constitution, j
arising from the general grant of power to
Congress to carry into effect the powers ex
pressly given. And I believe, with Mr. j
Madison, “that repeated recognitions under !
varied circumstances, in acts of the legist a- j
live, executive, and judicial branches of the
Government, accompanied by indications in j
different modes of the concurrence of the
general will of the nation, as affording to J
the President sufficient authority for his
considering such disputed points as set
tled.”
| Upwards of half a century has elapsed
| since the adoption of our present form of
j government. It would he an object more
highly desirable than the gratification of
j the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if
j its precise situation could be ascertained,
a fair exhibit made of the operations of
i each of its Departments, of the powers
which they respectively claim and cxer
; eise, of the collisions which have occurred
j between them, or between the whole Gov
! eminent and those of the States, or either
‘of them. We would then compare our
’ actual condition, after fifty years trial of
jour system,with what it was in the coni-j
mencement of its operations, and ascertain
j whether the predictions of the patriots who
• opposed its adoption, or the confident hopes
j oi its advocates, have been best realized,
j The great dread of the former seems to have
j been that the reserved powers of the States
would he absorbed by those of the Federal
! Government, and a consolidated power es
-1 tabliscd, leaving to the States the shadow
- only, of that independent action for which
they had so zealously contended, and on
1 the preservation of w hich they relied as the
j last hope of liberty. Without denying
that the result to which they looked with
i so much apprehension is in the way of being
realized, it is obvious that they did not
clearly seethe mode of its accomplishment.
The General Government has seized upon
none of the reserved lights of the States.
As far as any open warfare may have gone,
the State authorities have amply maintained
their rights. To a casual observer, our
system presents no appearance of discoid
between the different members which com
pose it. Even the addition of many new
ones has produced no jarring. They move
j in their respective orbits in perfect harmo
ny witii the central head, and with each
other. But there is still an under current
at work,by which ifnot seasonably cheeked,
j the worst apprehensions of our anti-federal
! patriots will be realized. And not only
will the State authorities be overshadowed
by the great increase of power in the exe
cutive Department of the Gen. Government,
but the character of that Government, ifnot
its designation, be essentially and radically
changed. This state of things has been in
part effected by causes inherent in the
Constitution, and in part by the never-fail
ing tendency of political power to increase
itself. By making tiie President the sole
distributor of all the patronage of the Gov
ernment, the framers of the Constitution do
not appear to have intieipated at how short
a period it would become a formidable
instrument to control the free operations
of the State Governments. Os trifling
importance at first, it had, early in Mr.
Jefferson’s administration,become so power
ful as to create great alarm in the mind of
that patriot, from the potent influence it
might exert in controlling the freedom of
the elective franchise. If such could have
then been the effects of its influence, how
much greater must be the danger at this
time, quadrupled in amount, as it certainly
is, and more completely under the control
of the Executive will, than their construc
tion of their powers allowed, or the forbear
ing characters of all the early Presidents
permitted them to make. But it is not by
the extent of its patronage alone that the
Executive Department has become danger
ous, but by the use which it appears may be
made of the appointing power, to bring un
der its control the whole revenues of the
country. The constitution has declared it
to be the duty of the President to see that
the laws are executed, and it makes him
the Commander-in Chief of the Armies and
Navy of the United States. If the opinion
of the most approved writers upon that spe
cies of mixed Govern ment,which, in modern
Europe, is termed Monarchy, in contradis
tinction to Despotism, is correct, there was
wanting no other addition to the powers of
our Chief Magistrate to stamp a monarchi
cal character on our Government, but the
control of the public finances. And to me
it appears strange, indeed, that any one.
should doubt that the entire control which
the President posesscs over the officers who
have the custody of the public money, by
the power of removal withor without cause
does, for all mischievous purposes at least,
virtually subject the treasure also to his
disposal. The first Roman Emperor, in
his attempt to seize the sacred treasure,
silenced the opposition ofthe officer to whose
charge it had been committed, by a signifi
cant allusion to bis sword. By a selection
of political instruments for the care of the
public money, a reference to their commis
sions by a President would be quite as eft’ e-
I tuul an argument as that of Caesar to the
i Roman Knight. lam not insensible of the
I great difficulty that exists in devising a pro
per plan for the safe keeping ami disburse
ment ofthe public revenues, and I know the
importance which has been attached by
men of great abilities and patriotism to the
divorce, as it is called, ofthe Treasury
from the banking institutions. It is not the
divorce which is complained of, but the
unhallowed union ofthe Treasury with the
j Executive Department which lias created
; sue!) extensive alarm. To this danger to
; our republican institutions, and that crea
ted by the influence given to the Executive
through tlie instrumentality of the federal
j officers, 1 propose to apply all the remedies
which may be at my command. It was
j certainly a great error in the framers ofthe
Constitution not to have made the officer
■ at the bead ofthe Treasury Department en
i tiroly independent of the Executive. He
j should at least have been removcable only
j upon the demand of the popular branch of
the Legislature. I have determined never
j to remove a Secretary of the Treasury
i without communicating all the circutn
j stances attending such removal to both
j Houses of Congress. The influence of the
j Executive in controlling the freedom ofthe
i elective franchise through the medium ofthe
| public officers, can bn effectually checked
:by renewing the prohibition published by
| Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interference
j in elections further than giving their own
j votes ; and their own independence secured
j by an assurance of perfect immunity, in
! exercising this sacred privilege of freemen
! under the. dictates of their own unbiassed
i judgments. Never, with my consent, shall
I an officer of the People, compensated for
j his services out of their pockets, become
| the pliant instrument of Executive will.
There is no part of the means placed in
! the hands of the Executive which might
! be used with greater effect, for unhallowed
! purposes, than the control of the public
! press. The maxim which our ancestors
j derived from the mother country, that “the
j freedom ofthe press is the great bulwark
■ofcivil and religious liberty,” is one of
j the most precious! legacies which they have
! left us. We have learned, too, from our
’ own as well as the experience of other
i countries, that golden shackles, by w hom
soever or by whatever pretence imposed,
; arc as fatal to it as the iron bonds of
; Despotism. The presses in the necessary
employment of the Government should
never be used “to clear the guilty, or to
varnish crime.” A decent and manly,
examination of the acts of tile Government
should be not only tolerated but encour
aged.
Upon another occasion I have given my
opinion, at some length, upon the intpropri- !
ety of Executive interference in the legisla
tion of Congress. That the article in the
Constitution making it the duty of the Presi
dent to communicate information, and
authorizing him to recommend measures,
was not intended to make him the source of
legislation, and, in particular, that he should
never be looked to for schemes of finance.
It would he very strange, indeed, that the
Constitution should have strictly forbidden
one branch of the Legislature from inter
fering in the origination of such hills, and
that it should be considered proper that an
altogether different department of the Gov
eminent should be permitted to do so.—
Some of our best political maxims and
opinions, have been drawn from our parent
Isle. There arc others, however, which
cannot be introduced in our system without
singular incongruity, and the production of
j much mischief. And this i conceive to be
1 one. No matter in which of the Houses of
Parliament a hill may originate, nor by
whom introduced, a minister or a member
of the opposition, by the fiction of law-, or
rather ofConstitutional principle, the Sover
eign is supposed to have prepared it agree
ably to his will, and then submitted it to
Parliament for their advice and cousent.
Now, the very reverse is the case here, not
only with regard to the principle, hut the
forms prescribed by the Constitution. The
principle certainly assigns to the only body
constituted by the Constitution (the legisla
tive body,) the power to make laws, and the
forms even direct that the enactment should
be ascribed to them. The Senate, in rela
tion to Revenue bills, have the right to pro-
pose amendments ; and so has the Execu
tive, by the power given him to return them
to the House of Representatives, with his
objections. It is in his power, also, to pro
pose amendments in the existing revenue
laws, suggested by his observations upon
their defective or injurious operation.—
But the delicate duty of devising schemes
of revenue should bo left where the Consti
tution has placed it—with the immediate
representatives of the People. For simi
lar reasons, the mode of keeping the public
treasure should be prescribed by them ;
and the farther removed it may be from
the control of the Executive,the more whole
some the arrangement, and the more in
accordance with Republican principle.
Connected with this subject is the char
acter of the currency : The idea of making
it exclusively metallic, however well inten
ded, appears to me to be fraught with more
fatal consequences than any other scheme,
having no relation to the personal rights of
the citizen, that has ever been devised If
any single scheme could produce the effect
of arresting, at once, that mutation ofcondi
tion by which thousands ofour most indi
gent fellow-citizens, by their industry and
enterprise, are raised to the possession of
wealth, that is the one. If there is one
measure better calculated than another to
produce that state ofthings so much depre
cated by all the true republicans, by which
the rich are daily adding to their hoards,
and the poor sinking deeper into penury,
it is an exclusive metallic currency. Or
if there is a process by which the character
of the country for generosity and nobleness
of feeling may bed ‘Stroyed by the great
increase and necessary toleration of usury,
it is an exclusive metallic currency.
Amongst the other duties of a delicate
character which the President is called
upon to perform, is the supervision ot the
government of the Territories of the United
Stales Those of them which are destined
to become members of our gicat political
family, are compensated by their rapid
progress from infancy to manhood, for the
partial and temporary deprivation of their
political rights.—lt is in this District, only,
where American citizens are to be found,
who under a settled system of policy, are
deprived of these important political privi
; leges, without any inspiring hope as to the
future. Their only consolation, under cir-
cumstances of such deprivation, is that oi
the devoted exterior guards of a camp
—that their sufferings secure tranquility
and safety within. Are there any of their
countrymen who would subject them to
greater sacrifices, to any other humilia
tions than those essentially necessary to
the security of the object for which they
were thus separated from their fellow-citi
zens? Are their rights alone not to ba
guarantied by the application of those great
principles upon which all our constitutions
are founded ? We are told by the greatest
of British Orators and Statesmen, that at
the commencement of the war of the Revo
lution, the most stupid men in England
spoke of “their American subjects.” Are
there, indeed, citizens of any of our States
who have dreamed of their subjects in the
District of Columbia? Such dreams can
never be realized by any agency of mine.
The people of the District of Columbia
are not the subjects of the people of the
State, but free American citizens. Being
in the latter condition when the Constitution
was formed, no words used in that instru
ment could have been intended to deprive
them of that character. Iftherc isany thing
in the great principles of unalienable rights
so emphatically insisted upon in our Dec
laration of Independence, they could neither
make, nor the United States accept a surren
der of their liberties, and become the sub
jects, in other words the slaves, of their
former fellow.citizens. If this be true, and
it will scarcely be denied by any one who
has a correct idea of his own rights as an
American citizen, the grant to Congress of
exclusive jurisdiction in the District of
Columbia, call be interpreted, so far as res
pects the aggregate people of the United
States, as meaning nothing more than to al
low to Congress the controlling power
necessary to afford a free and safe exercise
of the functions assigned to the General
Government by the Constitution. In all
other respects the legislation of Congress
should be adapted to their peculiar position
and wants, and be conformable with their
deliberate opinions of their own interests.
1 have spoken of the necessity of keeping
the respective Departments of the Govern
ment, as well as ail the other authorities of
j our country,within their appropriate orbits,
i This is a matter of difficulty in some ca-
ses, as the powers which they respectively
claim arc often not defined by very dis
tinct lines. Mischievous, however,in their
tendencies, as collisions of this kind may
he, those which arise between the respec
tive communities, which for certain purpo
ses compose one nation, are much more so ;
for no such nation can long exist without
the culture of those feelings of confidence
and affection which are the effective bonds
of union between free and confederated
; States. Strong as is the tie of interest, it
has been often found ineffectual. Men
blinded by their passions, have been known
to adopt measures for their country in di
rect opposition to all the suggestions of
policy. The alternative then, is to destroy
or keep down a bad passion by creating
and fostering a good one : and this seems
to bo the corner stone upon which our
American political architects have reared
the fabric of our Government. The ce
ment w-hich was to bind it, and perpetuate
its existence, was the affectionate attach
ment between all its members. Tp insure
the continuance of this feeling, produced at
first by a community of dangers, of suffer
ings and of interests, the advantages of
each were made accessible to all. N,
participation in any good, possessed by any
memberof an extensive confederacy, except
ill domestic government, was withheld front
the citizen of any other member. By a
process attended with no difficulty, no de
lay, no expense hut that of removal, the
citizen of one might become the citizen of
any other, and successively of the whole.
The lines, too, separating powers to be exer-
oised by the citizens of one State from those
of another, seem to be sodistinctly drawn as
to leave no room for misunderstanding.—
The citizens of each State unite in then
persons all the privileges which that charac
ter confers, and ail that they may claim as
citizens of the United States ; but in no
case can the same person, at the same time,
act as the citizen of two Separate States,
and he is therefore positively precluded from,
any interference with the reserved powers
of any Stale bat that of which he is, for the
time being, a citizen. He may indeed offer
to the citizens of the States his advice as to
their management, and the form in which
it is tendered is left to his own discretion
and sense of propriety.
It may he observed, however, that organ
ized associations of citizens, requiring com
pliance with their wishes, too much resem
ble the recommendations of Athens to her ‘
allies—supported by an armed and powe.
ful fleet. It was, indeed, to the ambition
of the leading States of Greece to control
the domestic concerns of the others, that
the destruction of that celebrated confeder
acy and subsequently of all its members,
is mainly to be attributed. And it is owing
to the absence of that spirit that the Helvet
ic confederacv has for so many years been