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No. 25. Vol. L. MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1869. ia Js/L. ORME Sz SON, EDITORS AND PROPRIETORS. Tcrab—5-3,00 per nnnuin, in Advance. VDVERTisiXG—Persquare of teu lines, each rt ion, $ • HO. Merchants aud ethers foiall uU ts jver $ 23, twenty-live per cent. off. legal advertising. i dintuy's.—Citationsi'or letters oi ad- '.Jstration,guardianship,&c $15 00 ea d notice. , nDlicatioii _ ' ,jatiout'or lettersof dism’u ofguard’n ‘^^lication for leave to sell Land A to Debtors aud Creditors . i . of Laud, per square of ten lines ^ personal, per sq., ten days ' t .f s _Each levy of ten Zines, or less.. tl'hve sales of ten lines or less Collector’s sales, persq. (2 months) 2 UU 5 UP 3 50 5 00 3 00 5 oo 1 50 2 50 5 00 5 00 ■/ f is—Foreclosure of mortgage aud oth- L ./monthly’s, per square 1 00 Estray notices, thirty days 3 00 Tributes of Respect, Resolutions by Societies, Obituaries, «fce.,exceeding six lines, to be charged transient advertising. 4 .^p^ifsof Land, by Administrators, Execu- 4 „ r yaardians, are required by law, to De held ' the tirst Tuesday in the mouth, between the j‘ ilirs ,,f tea iu the forenoon and three in the af- ! rii ion, atthe Court-house in the county in which t „. property is situated. ,;ice of these sales must be given in a public sazette 10 days previous to the day of sale. Notice for the sale of personal property must be :veu in like manner 10 days previous to sale day. Notices to debtors and creditors of an estate must also be published 40 days. Notice that application will he made to the Court of Ordinary for leave to sell land, must be published for two months. Citation* for letters of Administration, Guar- diaasaip, &c., must be published 30days—for dis- . ‘ ,/ou from Administration, monthly six months ; f!,r dismission troin guardianship, 40 days. Kiles for foreclosure of Mortgages must be nublishod 'ninthly for four months—for establish- la r [,m papers, for the full spaceof three months— tor co upeiling titles from Executors or Adminis trators, ,vhere bond has been given by the de- ,'usel. the full space of three months. Charge, jl 00 par sq tafe of ten lilies for each insertion. Pjolicatioas will always be continued accord lug to these, the legal requirements, unless otb (■rivise ordered. v*!i«dule oi* Macon & Augusta R. R. Leaves Camak, daily, at —.'2.30 1 M. >• Milledgeville ti.iOA M. Arrives at Milledgeville 4 F.M. “ Camak 90 r 'A.M. Passengersleaving Augusta or Atlanta on Day ‘asseno-er Train of Georgia Railroad will make lose connection at Camakfor intermed atepoints m the above road, and also for Macon, dice. Pas- en»ersleaving Milledgevilleat 5.30, A M.,reach itlant a aud Augusta same day.and will make lose connections at either place for principal ,ointsinadjoining States. E. W .COLE, Gen’1 Supt. Augusta, January 7,1S68. 4 t* IVTaoon <S& 'W'esUern B.AlLROAI>. —DAY TRAIN — Leave Macon 7.45A. M., arrive at Atlanta, 2 P. M Atlanta 1 ^ A.M.,arriveatMacou, 1.30 P. M —NIGHT TRAIN — ‘ Leave Macon 8.40 P.M., arrive at Atlanta, 4£P. M “ Atlanta/j P. M. .arrive at Macon 3.1U A. M Macon & Brunswick Railroad. OFFICERS. G. II. IIAZLE HURST President. ROB T. SCHMIDT, MasterTransportation. H. C. DAY Secretary & T reasurer. LeaveMacou 3 P M.,arrive at Macon, 10.30 A.M. LeaveHawkinsville7 A. M.,arriveat Hawkins- ville, 6.30 P. M. March 1 1 186s 11 Dissentient Opinion in the Two Cases or Chancelltj vs. Bailey ^ Cleveland if The Central Railroad vs. Ward & Owens— In the Supreme Court of Georgia, June 1860. DRY GOODS! 9 SXt(£>IB8 9 SIATO CROCKERY, Saddlery, and Harness, <fcc., &c., FOR SALE BY T. T. WINDSOR, & CO. MILLEDGEVILLE, GA. SOUTH-WESTERN R. R. CO. OFFICE, MACON,GA.,March24th, 1HG8- Columbus Train—Daily. Leave Macon ; >1 ;’ A- Arrive at Columbus 111; 1 W' u Leave Columbus c on x> ‘xt Arrive at Macon . U.^u tr. i - Eufiula Train—Daily. Leave Macon oa p' u’ Arrive atEufaula , rj Leave Eufaula a’/np’iV Arrive at Macon d.50 P. M. Connecting with Al.han.ij Train at Smithiillc Leave Smithville Arrive at Albany . --- 3.11 P- M. Leave Albany Arrive at Smithville 11.00 A. M. Connecting with Fort Gaines Train at Cuthbcrt. Leave Uuthbert 3.57 P.M. Arrive at Fort Gaines...--- 3.40 P. M. Leave Fort Gaines 7.05 A.M. Arrive at Cuthbert ILL’S A. M. ConneetiBg with Central Railroad and Macon A Western Railroad Trains at Macon, and Mont gomery A. West Point Trains at Columbus. VIRGIL POWERS, Engineer & Superintendent. Schedule of the Georgia Railroad. AX AND AFTER SUNDAY, MARCH 29th HRS, the Passenger Trains on the Georgia Hailruad will run as follows: DAY PASSENGER TRAIN. (Daily, Sundays excepted.) Leave Augusta at — - 16 A. M. “ Atlanta at ..5 A.M. Arrive at Augusta.. 3.30 P. M. “ at Atlanta — 6.10 P. M. NIGHT PASSENGER TRAIN. LeaveAugustaat...... —.......3 45 P. M. “ Atlanta at 6.45 F. M. Arrive at xAugusta - 5.30 A. M. Atlanta 4.00 A.M. BERZELIA PASSENGER TRAIN. Leave Augusta at - 4.30 P. M. “ Berzeliaat 7.00 A.M. Arrive at Augusta .8.45 A M. ‘•at Berzelia -G.15 P.M. Passengers for Milledgeville,Washington and Athens,Ga.,musttakeDay Passengei Train from Augusta and Atlanta. Passengerst'or West Point, Montgomery, Sel ma, Mobile aud New Orleans must leave Augusta on Night Passenger Train at 3.45 P. M.,to make close connections. Passengers for Nasliville.Corintli, Grand Junc tion, Memphis, Louisville and St. Louis can take either train and make close connections. Through Tickets and Baggage checkedthrough to the above places. Pullman’s Palace SleepingCars on all Night Passenger Trains. » E . W. COLE, Gen’ISuperint’dt. Augusta, March 26,1868 4 tf jltLcuzta SL fWcst fPaLnt HAIL ROAD. Day Passenger Train—Outward. Leave Atlanta 4.45 A. M. Arrive at West Point 9.50 P. M. D_ay Passenger Train — Iniraril. Leave West Point 1.30 P. M. Arrive at Atlanta 6.20 P. M. Vight Freight ami Passenger—Outward. Leave Atlanta --- 4.15 P. M. Arrive at West Point 11-40 P M. -V'Zht Freight and Passenger Train—Inward. Leave West Point......------ 4.20 A. M. Arrive at Atlanta 11.30 A. M. SIkulqc. af: <~PdLe.cLu.Le.. OFFICE SOUTH CAROLINA R. R. CO., ? Augusta, Ga., March 25, 1868. ) AN AND AFTER Sl^NDAr, 29ih March, HG8,the Mai and Passenger Trains of this j *4 will leave and arrive at through Central ■Lepat,Georgia Railroad, as follows*. Horning Mail and Passenger Train ^°r Charleston, connecting Train for Columbia, ■Nouth Carolina, Charlotte Road, and Wilming- tun and Manchester Railroad. Leave Central Depot at 5.50 A. M. Arrive atCentral Depot 3.30 P. M. Night Passenger If Accommodation Train For Charleston, connecting with Train forCo- UT ‘bia, ind with Greenville andColumbiaRail- road: Leave Central Depot at 3.50 P. M. &rnve atCentral Depot at 7.00 A. M. H. T. PEAKE, General Superintendent T HE Citizens of Baldwin and adjoins ing counties will find a large and good assortment of Brown and Bleached Goods of all quali ties. Calicoes, of all grades, Dress Goods in great variety, Hosiery, Gloves and Shelf Goods if all sorts. The most complete assortment of ever offered for sale iu this place, consisting of Miles & Co’s Philadelphia work; Shelley & Bros’North Carolina work; Butchelder & Co’s Brogans, and Children’s Misses’ and Ladies tine work of all styles. HATS, of Wool, Felt, Straw, Panama, &c CR0CK1RY. A full line of everything that can be called for, with Glassware and China in Plain and Gilt Tea Sets. SADDLERY, From the old Army up to the fine Morgan Cavalry Saddle. Harness—Single and Double, Blind Bridles, Riding Bridles, Whips, &c IMiET-A-HIC BURIAL CASES, Plain, Half Satin, aud full Satin Trimmed, in Plain Cases and Caskets. In the Grocery Store next door to the Drug Store of John M. Clark, will be found Provisions, Corn, Bacon, Lard, Floor, Sugars, Coffee, Syrups, Molasses, and everything found in a Grocery Stock, all of which will be sold at lowest market rates for CASH. T. T. Windsor & Co. Milledgeville, Ga., May 18. 1869 20 tf ]?. H. BEHN, COTTON and RICE FACTOR AND General Commission Merchant, West of the Exchange, BAY STREET, September 8,1868 SAVANNAH,GA 36 ly* Dr. <3-. W. JONES, President enlist. ALL DENTAL opera tions performed with skill and care. Artificial teeth [inserted in allstyles known to the profession. Old cases, not comforta bly worn, can be made so. Old Gold Plates takeniu partpaymentfor Deu- tal operations. 13?“Office, East Rooms Darien Bank building. Milledgeville Oct 13,1868. 41 tf To the heirs of Sylvanus Prince, deceased, late of Baldwin county. N OTICE.—Three months after date, I will ap ply to the Ordinary of Baldwin county for an order requiring the administrator of said Sylva nus Prince to execute titles to me for three hun dred and twenty-eight acres of land in Baldwin county,according to the terms of the bond for ti tles, of said deceased, dated December 12, 1859— said land being the same sold to me by said de ceased, and now in my possession. |JOHN J. BUCK. March 2.1869 9 3m METALLIC BURIAL CASES. A FULL LOT ON HAND of full trimmed half trimmed, aud plain, of all sizes. Apply to T. T. WINDSOR, or JOSEPH T. LANE. Mr. Lane will also make any kind of wood en Coffins wanted on short notice. Milledgeville,March 10,1868 10 tf For Sale, A FIRST RATE GIN BAND, six inches wide, thirty-four feet long. Also, Wooden running Gear for aGin. Apply at the RECORDER OFFICE. Milledgeville, Feb’y 2.1869 5 tf ARLINaTON Quranc? COMPANY. RICHMOND, VA. tW° Persons desiring to insure their lives wil call upon R. M. ORME, Jr.,Ag’t. Milledgeville, May 19, J868 20 tf Iverson L. Harris, Judge. It is not within the narrow confines of municipal law that we are to look for the principles upon which a correct decision of the questions presented by the record in the above causes can be made. They are lo be collected from the vast field of international law, and especially that portion of it occupied by war. The resolution of the legality and con fiscation and sale ol ihe Railroad shares in the first case, and in the other of the legality of the consideration of the prom issory note given for the services of the plaintiff in error as a substitute in the ranks of ihe Confederate army for one of the p^omissors, can depend, in my opinion, only on two propositions. If either ol those propositions be true, the judgment of the majority of ihis Court cannot for a moment, be supported. Those propositions are : 1st. If ihe Slates which withdrew from the Federal Union and formed af terwards the Southern Confederacy, were sovereign or perfect States at that lime, as such Stales, they had a right lo engage in public war with those Stales which continued in the Federal Union ; or, 2d. If the Slates attempting to with draw from the Federal Union, formed the de facto government called the Southern Confederacy, and engaged in war with those which did not attempt to withdraw, and that war was recog nized by the Federal Government as a civil war, and the Southern Confedera cy as a beUigeraht power, then from such recognition, the Southern Confederacy was invested with ail the belligerent rights and powers which belong unde niably lo sovereign States or nations engaged in public war,or in other words, the question is, whether the .war be tween the States was a public or a civil war. If the view that I have taken of our systems of government be founded in fact, (and I think it is confirmed by all American history,) it must be conced ed by all who reason, that when the Federal Constilulionofl7S9 was adopt ed by the conventions of the separate States then ratifying it, they were each sovereign and independent Slates, with an unquestionable right either to agree lo or reject it. If they were then sov ereign and independent Slates, and could not have been -coerced by their associates under the articles of confed eral ion,(o agree to the more perfect union of the Federal Constitution, the im portant inquiry arises and demands a definite answer—when anti by what in strument was their sovereign and sepa rate existences as States lost or surren dered f That sovereign powers, which ty, such an opinion, or intimation ol opinion would ha\e led to the prooipl and overwhelming rejection of that in strument. This contemporary history ought with every man seaking to understand the structure of American Govern meats, lo be decisive of the great point that the States were as sovereign after the ratification of the Federal Constitution as they were under the articles ol con federation. The inquiry is then, the Slates bcin< perfect Stales according lo \ attel, no whether they had a right to wiihdraw from the Federal Union or Constilu tionaf compact mlhovl incurring the pen altics they hazarded by so doing, but whether the power to witdraw is not a right necessarily inherent in every perfect State ? If they were perfect States, they had an inherent right to alter their forms of government, and to institute new governments. Their obligation to observe the covenants of the Federal Constitution was exactly the same as that resting upon sovereign States in their Conventions, compacts and treaties with each other, the engage merits being between equals, confer ring rights and imposing restric tions. The reasons of justification for a breach of their engagements hould be so strong as to vindi cate their acts before the world of pub lic opinion. Whether broken with or without adequate cause, or however those engagements may have been sought to be enforced, the important fact stands out unaffected by any of these considerations, that the acts done were acts of sovereign or perfect States. From what I have said it will ap pear that 1 assert as propositions which 1 think cannot successfully be contro verted— 1st. That the Federal Constitution was made by the people of separate, sovereign and independent States- 2. That ratifying the Federal Con stitution by separate State Conventions, they, by such action distinctly asserted their sovereign and independent char acter as States. 3d. That lhe Federal Constitution contains, within itself, no surrender of their individual character as States.’ 4th. ThaL being perfect States, the Southern Stales, renouncing the obli gations of the Federal Union, had an inherent right to form, as they did, the Southern Confederacy. 5th. That as perfect States, they had a right lo engage in war, as other sov ereign Slates could do. If Lhe proposition, then, be true, that they were States, ihen the war in which they engaged with the other States re maining in the Federal Union, was a public war. If the war was a public war, it can admit of no doubt that in its prosecution, according to the rules and rights of war, whatever was done by them was legal, and is so regarded by (he world. To the Stales, thus making public were withheld by the Slates from the . . _ _ Confederate Congress, which preceded j wa f» belong the rights ot raising and the adoption of the Federal Constitu- j maintaining arrnie tion, were by the latter instrument, borrowing money, delegated lo the departments of gov ernment under it, (or the exercise ol those powers for the benefit ot the States thus united, is undeniable ; but upon the authority of what publicist can such delegation lo a common agent of such sovereign powers be held to be a surrender of sovereignly t A complete answer to those who say that the sovereign characteroflhe Stales was surrendered by the creation of the Federal Government, will be found in the following extract from Vattel; “Fi nally, sovereign or independent Stales may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy without ceasing to be each individually a perfect State ; they will together constitute a Federal Re public ; their joint deliberations will not impair the sovereignly of each member, though they may in certain respects, put some restraint on the ex ercise of it in virtue of their voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent when he is obliged tr> fulfil engagements which he has voluntarily contiacted.” The lat ter portion ot this extract is conclusive that the States adopting the Federal Constitution did not cease to be free and independent, because they entered into covenants with each other, and could in consequence thereof, be compelled to fulfil the engagements ■which they had voluntarily contracted Thus it is apparent that the obligation to fulfil covenants made by a sovereign or perfect State is entirely compatible with continuing sovereignty and inde pendence. I may goa step further and concede that those SLates who suffer by a breach of such covenants, may, as in all cases of leagues, conventions, compacts and treaties, (for in principle they stand precisely on the same loot ing,) redress themselves as sovereign and independent States can do : but because such rights of redress have at tached, they can in no wise affect the char acter of the Stales, breaking their cove nants as Stales. Let it be borne con stantly in mind, that that character re mains unaltered and unalterable by any violation of their covenants. There is no fact more indisputable than that, if any prominent advocate of the Federal Constitution had in any one of the Slate Conventions, either directly or indi rectly, intimated an opinion, than by the ratification ot the Federal Consti- luion, the Slates surrendered their sep arate individuality and sovereignty as States, such was the extreme jealousy lor the maintaiuance of State sovereign- coining money using the public credit, issuing treasury notes, employ ing all the instrumentalities neccssaty or appropriate to their defence, weak ening the power of the adversary, as by captures on sea or land, and also by confiscating enemies' properly within their limits. In Brown vs. The United States, 8 Cranch, 143, it is said that as to en emies' property found within the terri tory of a belligerent power the right of confiscation is fully admitted by ali pub licist. War is not itself, an absolute confiscation. It simply confers the right to confiscation, which righl is enforced by legislation. The enemy is not di vested of his properly by war. His ti tle remains in full vigor until a hostile seizure and possession has impaired his title. Whilst the practice of declining lo confiscate debts and credits, and the private property of an enemy, will be found to be the wisest and most liberal policy, and which will, in progress of time, become the settled rule of all civ ilized nations, at this day, # by the laws of war, the right of confiscation is an uncontrolled power, belonging to sover eign belligerents. From, the foregoing line ol argument, it must be apparent that I entertain the opinion that the recent war between the States, was a public war, and that, therefore, the actual confiscation by lhe Courts of the Southern Confederacy, of the Railroad shares owned by North ern citizens, then the enemies of the Southern Confederacy, was authorized by the laws of war, and that the purchas er thereof, under a sale after its condemna tion, acquired a valid title, and further, that the note given in the other case, to the substitute, to take the place of the maker in the Confederate ranks, was founded on a legal consideration. Since delivering, orally, in June last, my dissentient opinion to the judgment of my associates, I have met with, and perused with care, the first volume of a work, by the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens,entitled, “The War Between the States.” I regret that 1 am preclud ed, bv the delay which has already oc curred, and the pressure to forward this opinion foi publication, that I can not make, from that great work, ex tracts that would support the train of thought which I have expressed. I re fer, .therefore, to it generally, regard ing this volume as the most important contribution ever made by an Arneri can Statesman, to political science.— It is destined to become a high author ity, and will, doubiless, be made a text book in our colleges. But it will probably be denied that it was a public war, a war between sov ereign States. As it is not necessary to the maintenance of the conclusions to which rny mind has been conducted, to adhere to the position that it was a public war; I propose, therefore, to con sider the questions in the record, as they are affected by civil war. My associates, when the judgments of the majority were announced, not having preceded them by any exposi tion of the reasons upon which they were predicated, have left me without any means ot reply, but by conjecture. They are constrained, logically, I think, in order lo maintain their judg ments, to assume that the Southern Slates, in attempting to throw oft'the obligations of the Federal Constitution, and forming new government and wag- ng war with the States which remain ed in the Federal Union, were insur gents and rebels against the lawful sover eign authority of the United Stales Govern ment, and that consequently, whatever acts were done by them in theprosecution oj such ins irrection, were illegal and void. If the late war had been marked merely by the armed resistance ofsw«c of the citizens of the State to its laws, lo the laws of the Federal Government, as in the vases in Massa- husetts in 1789, and in Pennsylvania in 1793, it would very properly have been called an insurrection, and the acts of such insurgents have been held as egal, the relations of the States, to wards each other not being affected politically thereby, and those citizens n revolt, not having acquired the epi thet and privileges of enemies. But when such insurrection covers a Territory or State, and the citizens are in arms, not by their own will, but by the compulsory power of the Slate Government, such resistance assumes the proportions, and is acknowledged by the nations as civil war. In the Supreme Court of the United States, in what are familiarly known as the Prize Cases—reported iu 2nd Black, p. 606—it was urged in argu ment, that the people ol the South were insurgents, that they were traitors, and, as such, could not make war. To this ustice Grier, delivering the opinion ol the Court, replied ; “The law of na tions is called the law of nature. It i§ founded in the common consent, as well as the common sense, of the world. It contains no such anomalous doctrine as that which this Couit is, for the first time, desired lo pronounce, to wit :— That insurgents, who have risen in re bellion against their sovereign, expelled her Courts, established a revolutionary government, organized armies, and commenced hostilities, are not enemies, because they are traitors, and a war levied on the Government by traitors, in order to dismember and destroy it, is not a war, because it. is an insurrec- In this extract there are two materi al declarations ; 1st, it was a war, and 2nd) that the citizens ol the Southern Confederacy were the enemies of the Federal Government. The war was, according to the Supreme Court of the •United Stales, a civil war. I have, before expressed my own conviction that the war was a public war, as much so, indeed, as the recent war between Prussia and Austiia ; but as a tribunal, to which this Court is bound lo conform its judgment in such cases, has decided it to have been a civil war, my associates are constrained,by that judg ment, to ignore the idea that it was no more than an insurrection. They are bound to treat it as a civil war, drawing after it all the consequences ivliich flow from such recognition. “A civil war,” says Vattel, “breaks the bands of so ciety and goverment, or, at least, sus pends their force, and effect. It pro duces, in the nation, two independent parties, who consider each other as en emies, and acknowledge p.o common judge. The two parties, therefore, must, necessarily, be considered, at least fora time, as constituting two sep arale bodies, or distinct societies.— Having no commort- superior to judge between them, they stand in precisely the same predicament as’two nations who engage in a contest, and have re course to arms.” This being the case, it is very evident that the common laws of w*ar, those maxims of moderation and honor, ought to be observed by both parties in every civil war. A civil war is never proclaimed eo nomine, against actual insurgents. Its actual existence is a fact which a, Court is bound lo notice and to know. Its true test is to be found in the fact that the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebel lion or insurrection, so that the Courts of justice cannot be kept open. A civil war exists,hostilities may be prosecut ed on the same footing as if those opposing the Government weie foreign enemies in vading the land. Mr. \V heaton in his treatise on the law of nations, says : “The general usage of nations regards such a war (civil war,) as entitling both the contending parlies to all the rights of war against each other,- and even as re spects neutral nations.”’ Mr. Justice Nelson, iu delivering the dissenting opinion of the minority, in the Prize Cases, (ihe Judges differed only as to the point of time when the Uaited States Government recognized the existence of civil war,) said : “In the case of a rebellion, or a resistance of a portion of the people of a country against an established gov ernment, there is no doubt, if, in its ' progress and enlargement the govern ment thus sought to be overthrown, sees fit lo recognize or declare the ex istence of a civil war, that lecognitiou or declaration will draw after it all the consequences and rights of war between the contending parlies as in the case of public war.” These quotations establish, beyond dispute, that by the laws of nations, where a civil war exists, and it has been recognized by the government claiming paramount authority, that civ il war stands upon the same footing, in all respects, as does a public war be- Iween independent nations, and such recognition draws from it all the rights and consequences which belong to pub lie war. The Act of Congress of the 13th July, 1861, says Mr. Justice Nel son, recognized a slate of civil war be tween the Federal Government and the Southern Confederacy, and made it territorial. In the recognition of civ il war by the Acts cf J3th July, J861, is involved, necessarily the recognition of the Southern Confederacy as a bel ligerent power, or government de fac to ; for they are synonymous. Such recognition was a concession to the Southern Confederacy of the same bel ligerent powers and rights which the Federal Government claimed and could exercise. It drew alter it the acknowl edgment that it was a government, with all the departments necessary to the exercise of the powers and rights belonging to government, and that they were legally invested with such pow ers and rights as instruments or means essential to its existence. Such belligerent power or de facto government, then, could rightfully do, in carding on the civil war and main taining its resistance, what a free and independent State could do—the meas- uft;3 ol right and power and means be ing precisely the same in both belliger ents. It follows from this postulate, that in the administration of justice in the decision of questions before its Courts, indeed, in all matters touching its own defence or security, the acts of the several departments of a belliger ent power or de facto government, are as legal and unquestionable as are those of independent nations. It is insisted by'the counsel for the C. R. R. & Banking Company that the Prize cases shew that nothing more was decided by them than the exist ence of war and of belligerent rights whilst the war continued. ing to arms, insurrection and treason, that Government has condoned it by re cognizing it as civil war ; ail its power over those in arms ceased by raising them to its level and terming them and treating them as enemies, and the epithets of Reb els and Traitors, applied to. them so freely, through ignorance or malice, are as inappropriate and untrue as they are insulting and devoid ot magnanimity. It is evident lrom the premises, that the Federal Government has no right whatever to vacate the judgments of the Prize and other Courts ot the Con federate Government, in sequestering or confiscating enemies properly within its limits, nor in any mode can it di vest the title of a bona fide purchaser of such property actually confiscated, so as to restore it to the original owner, unaffected by what has transpired.* It should be remembered that con quest gives no right to private proper ly not seized and appropriated as boo ty at the time, and hence the Railroad shares in the hands of a bona fide pur chaser, under a judicial condemnation and sale, not having been re-seized or re captured by the arms of the Federal Government, the doctrines of he jus postLiminii could not obtain. Confiscated during the civil war as enemies property and sold, and not hav ing come again into the lianas of the conquering Government, it is inca pable of being restored to its original owners. The claim of the original owners is against the Federal Govern ment for compensation or indemnity for the loss they sustained. If the reasoning employed in this opinion, or, rather so much of it as flows directly from the decisions of the Prize cases, and the laws of nations be sound, it necessarily follows (hat as Ward and Owens are bona fide pur chasers ol the Railroad shares which were confiscated bv the laws of the Confederate Government, judicially condemned as enemies property in one of her Courts, and sold bv a public offi cer of that Government, and thereby passed out of the possession and control of that Government, that their title under such sale, is good againsl the claim of properly of the original owners, and that the Central Railroad and Banking Company should be decreed to cause appropriate entries ot the ownership of Ward and Owens to be made on the block-book of the Corporation. It must follow, also, in the other case, that the note given by Bailey and Cleveland If by this they meant to say that the to Chancely for his services as a sub- Supreme Court of the United States held that it was gn insurrection only, and did not change the relations of the States engaged so as lo make their citizens respectively enemies to each other, they have greatly misun derstood the extent ot the principles of public law upon which the cases were decided. The Prize cases admit that in organ izing the rebellion, the States acted as States claiming to he sovereign ; that it w’as no loose organized insurrection, having no defined boundary or posses sion, it had a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and south of this line slitute for Bailey in the Confederate army .is founded on a valid consideration, and that judgment should have been rendered in favor of Chancely. The termination of the civil war in the conquest ot the Southern Confed eracy as a belligerent poirer, produced consequences which the necessities of this argument do not require me to consider further than to say, that, be yond all denial, the States composing it remained as States during that war with perfect organization, performing all their functions with the same regu larity as they had previously to the war. Conquest dissolved the Confed- is enemies territory, claimed and held in j erate Government, but the Stales corn- possession by an organized hostile belli- ' posing it remained. The conquest m- gerent power. I stored the authority of the Federal But counsel say that the belligerent | Government where it had been dis~ rights belonged lo the Southern Con- j placed by the Confederate Govern- federacy only whilst the war continued. | ment, and conferred the right only to It is certainly true, belligerent rights ' change or alter the politicaMaw3 or in- exist only whilst war continues, and if I stitutions adverse to its own, accord ing to its policy or will; but conquest did not, could not give to the corf- quering Government any power over the executed, and past, so as to annul that, which, when done, was legal, and by its own concession, was a rioht be- this truism was all that was meant to be be asserted, it would not have challeng ed remark; but, if thereby, it was meant Lo assert, or covertly lo insinu ate, that the conquering Government could at its will or pleasure retract when the war was ended what it had longing to a belligerent power. granted during the war, and that it could ireatas illegal acts which, during the war were conceded, to be legal, it is a proposition so monstrous from its un mitigated iniquity, as lo shock the rea son and forbid its consideration. Com mon sense would revolt at such a pre tension by a conqueror, as it would be antagonistic to all those maxims of jus tice, honor and equality, which are sup posed to regulate the relations of Gov ernments in war arid in peace. Conquest gives no right to undo what, tin ring the war, was rightfully done. What ever acts were done by a bellig erent power, in the exercise or enforce ment of belligerent rights, stands after wards as they stood when done—legal and unimpeachable. Any other conclu sions would make the concession of belligerent rights, if not sheer nonsense, a mere mockery, a fraudulent device lo lull the fears ot a belligerent adver sary at the time, and to acquire sub stantial and unequal advantages there by, and upon the cessation of hostili ties to re-assert all the powers and claims which had been waived. It is nol for the Federal Government, claiming sovereign rights and suprem acy over the Southern Confederacy, with which it waged war, to reduce ibt? latter to obedience—to treat, after its recognition of the war as a civil war, the Southern States as in insurrection, or their citizens who took up arms at the command of the Stales as rebels or traitors. Its jurisdiction over them has passed away by Us consent and acts. They can be treated only as foreign enemies, over whom the municipal laws of the con quering Government cannot be extend ed. That Government cannot drag the citizens of the conquered de facto Government now before its municipal tribunals to answer lo charges of trea son. II theie was originally, in resort- And here I may be pardoned for re ferring to an opinion entertained in 1865 by the highest functionary of the U. S. Government, as 1 learned it from the then Provisional Governor of Geor gia, viz: “That ail the acts done du ring the civil war by the Stale Govern ments were illegal; ar:d that upon its termination, there was not within the State a single rightful functionary of her own creation, with authority to legis late, to interpret, or execute her laws.” I mention this fact, not directly with in the line of the argument used to de monstrate the incorrectness of the judgments of my associates, though it springs from the same mistake of re garding the late war as a mere insur rection, common to the reasoning of all ot them, but to exhibit how* terrible are the errors into which men of great abil ity, invested with immense power, do fall, from disregarding the clear and simple principles of public law, which I have endeavored to illustrate and apply. The existence of such a political chaos arising from civil war and con quest, as is so distinctly indicated by the opinion just mentioned, it is appre hended is without a type since the crea tion of man. An opinion like this might be viewed with a tolerant indulgence, if the principles of public law were un settled, floating in the mind, vaguely apprehended, and casually drawn into application by statesmen ; but when for centuries they have been explored in all their bearings, considered in all their force, pursued in all their conse quences, and reduced to a code of defi nite rules, furnishing a just and com mon standard to which nations do ap peal with confidence in the adjustment of their controversies, there should be at this day no excuse for ignorance or misapprehension of them. 'These prin ciples, when they come in conflict with