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Vol. L, MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1869. No. 32. yC. ORME <Sc SON, editors and proprietors. j, r .jD—> 'J.DII Per annum, in Advance. ilM Kit risisi.—Persquare of ten lines, each no. Mercnauts and others foiall ' ’’„ts i ver $ 23, t wenty-fivcper cent.off. LEGAL ADVERTISING. iir.lu“ ir s' $4 —Citationsfor letter? oi ad miration .guardianship ,&c | 3 OU instead notice . 2 00 ' ^iicatioutorlettera of dism n fromadiuTt 5 ©0 mrauoui'or lettersofdism’uofguard’n 3 f,o lJ ‘ itioiitor leaveto sellEand 5 ^ to Debtors and Creditors 3 00 )t Land, per square of ten lines 5 ou ' l e ofpertoaal, per sq., ten days ] 50 ^^'■jVj—Each levy of fe» tines, or less.. 2 50 1 * sales of ten lines or less..- 5 00 5 00 "jOeetor’s sales, persq. (2 months) T,is0Ji , ^. . .--Foreclosure 01 mortgage and oth- er monthly’s, per square 1 00 E . tra y notices, thirty days 3 00 Trio ttes of Respect, Resolutions by Societies, Obituaries, &c., exceeding six lines, to be charged .transient advertising. •y*j-desof Laud, by Administrators, Execu- . ,j. v .r Guardians, are required by law, to be held '.,j jbe tirst Tuesday in the month, between the j. urs often in the forenoon and three in the af- „, u wit, atthe Court-house in the county in which ,. lf property is situated. V itice of these sales must be given in a public -uette 40 days previous to the day of sale. Notice for the sale of personal property must be . veil in like manner 10 days previous to sale day, Notices to debtors and creditors of an estate Wl[j t also be published 40 days. Notice that application will be made to the (\,art of Ordinary for leave to sell laud, must be paolisiied for two mouths. Citations for letters of Administration, Gnar- diiuship, &c.., must bo published 30days—fordis- :1 ssiou from Administration, monthly six months ; ., r iisinissiou trom guardianship, 40 days. itiles for foreclosure of Mortgages must be p-ulished monthly for four mouths—for estabiish- r [0s 1 papers, for the full spaccof three months— • ir: 1 npeiliug titles from Executors or Adminis- i: iters, where bond lias been given by the dt; ■etsal. the full space of three months. Cnarge, >•[ j:j per square of ten Hues for eaeh insertion. i’oiiicatioas will always be continued accord G . t.1 these, the legal requirements, unless oth - vise ordered. Schedule of Macon & Augusta R. R. Leaves Camak, daily, at 12.30 P. M. •* Milledgeville 6.30 A.M. Arrives at Milledgeville 4 20 P.M. “ Camak 9.00 A.M. Passengersleaving Augusta or Atlanta on Day Ptssenger Train of Georgia Railroad will make ,ose connection at Camaktor inteimediatepoiuts lithe above road, andalsofor Macon,&c. Pas- , enters leaving Milledgeville at 5.30, A. M. .reach Atlanta and Augusta same day,and will make dose connections at either place for principal tintsin adjoining States. E. W .COLE, Gen’l Sup:. Augusta,January 7,1S68 ^ tf SOUTH.WESTERN R. R. CO. OFFICE, MACON,GA., March24th, 1H6U- Columbus Train—Daily. Leave Macon 5.15 A. M. Arrive at Columbus.. 11.15 A.M. Leave Columbus ........ 1245 P.M. Arrive at Macon 6.20 P. M. Eu/aula Train—Daily. Leave Macon 8.00 A. M. Arrive atEufaula 5.30 P.M. Leave Eufaula 7.20 A.M. Arrive at Macon 4.50 P. M. Connecting until Albany Tram at S/nilJivillc Leave Smithville — -- - J Arrive at Albany - 3.11 P. M. Leave Albany 9.35 A.M. Arrive at Smithville 11.00 A. M. ‘ onnutino with Fort Gaines Train at Cutlibert. Leave Cutlibert 3.57 P. M. Arrive at Fort Gaines 5.40 P. M. l.-ave Fort Gaines — - 7.05 A.M. Arrive at Cutbbert 9.05 A.M. Connecting with Central Railroad and Macon »V Western Railroad Trains at Macon, and Mont- s'onierv it West Point Trains.at Columbus. VIRGIL POWERS, Engineer & Superintendent. Schedule of the Georgia Railroad. / AN AND AFTER SUNDAY, MARCH 29th yJ 180S, the Passenger Trains on the Georgia Railroad will run as follows: DAY PASSENGER TRAIN. (Daily, Sundays excepted.) Leave Augusta at 7.10 A M. “ Atlanta at — 5 A. M. Arrive at Augusta 3.30 P. M. “ at Atlanta — 6.10 P. M. NIGHT PASSENGER TRAIN. Leave Augusta at — 3 45 P. M, “ Atlanta at 6.45 P.M. Arrive at Augusta 5.30 A. M. " Atlanta 4.00 A.M. BERZELIA PASSENGER TRAIN. Leave Augusta at 4.30 P. M. iierzeliaat 7.00 A.M Arrive at Augusta 8.45 A M. at Berzelia —--O.lo P.M, Passengers for Milledgeville,4A ashiugtou and Athens,Ga..musttake Day Passenget Train from Augusta and Atlanta. Passengers for West Point, Montgomery, Sel ma. Mobile and New Orleans must leave Augusta 011 Night Passenger Train at -3-45 P. M., to make close connections. Passengers for Nashville, Corinth, Gran d J unc tion, Memphis,Louisville and St. Louis can ta.:c either train and make close connections. Through Tickets and Baggage checkedthrougJi to the above places. Pullman’s Palace SleepiugCars on all Night Passenger Trains. . E . W. COLE, Geu’lSuperiut dt. Augusta, March 26,1868 I O jitLcuita SL [West fPaini RAIL ROAD. Day Passenger Train—Outward. Laave Atlanta 4-4u A. M. Arrive at West Point 9.;>0 1. M. D.ay Passenger Train—Inward. Leave West Poiut 1.30 I . M. Arrive at Atlanta C.20 P. M. Sight Freight and Passenger—Outward. Leave Atlanta 4.15 P. M. Arrive at West Point 11.40 P. M. flight Freight and Passenger Irani Inward, Leave West Point —— 4.20 A. M. Arrive at Atlanta 11.30 A. M. SI Lancia of. £fcIlccLu.Il OFFICE SOUTH CAROLINA R. R. CO., ? Augusta, Ga., March 25,1868. O N AND AFTER SUNDAY, 29th March, 1868, the Mai and Passenger Trains of this Road will leave and arrive at through Central ^ e pot,Georgia Railroad, as follows: Morning Mail and Passenger Train ^ 0r Charleston, connecting Train for Columbia. South Carolina, Charlotte Road, and Wilming ton and Manchester Railroad. Leave Central Depot at 5.50 A.M. Arrive atCentral Depot -----j-, - 3.30 P. M. Night Passenger 5f Accommodation Train Tor Charleston, connecting with Train for Co lumbia,and withGreenville andColumhiattail* road: Leave Central Depot at. 3.50 P. M. Arrive atCentral Cepotat 7.00 A. Mi H. T. PEAKE, General Superintendent % The following was written a num ber of years ago, by a gentleman now de ceased, and sent to its lately by a friend, with a request to publish. The said gen tleman, was a close observer in religious matters, and became somewhat disgust ed at the sectarian quarrels theft occurred at the time be wrote : I sing the road to bliss above, The different roads by which we move To gain a Heavenly seat; Each stupid sect, in error bound, Think they the only road have found To Paradse complete. The Catholic absolved by Pope, Thinks heretics deserve a rope, Or else the burning flame: Does penance at the Virgin's shrine Feels purified from every crime. And claims a saint by name. The Church of England pay their tith* And read their long prayers with half closed eyes, - And bless their King and Queen. They’ll be nobility in bliss, And look on that sect, and on this, As vulgar, low and mean. The Presbyterian sourly scowls Denouncing all as guilty souls Who are not saved by Fate : “We are the elect, von are the damned, Hell like a wallet will be crammed With God’s own reprobates.” The Baptist washed in puddle clean, Join Presbyterians in their scream . Against the non-elect : “Repent and be baptized in time, Nor Christian babies black with crime Of Adam and his mate.” The Methodist by madness drove, Howls dismal on his road above Denouncing Heavenly ire : Repent or God will in a trice, Shake ye o’er Hell like squeeking mice Suspended o’er the tire. The Quaker smoothly travels on, , j Thiuks cash iu hand is fairly won And all the world are knaves; But he is honest all his life, No money gets by wars or strife And by the spirit prays. The Shaker dancing to the gate Of Heaven, calls Mother Ann to wait, And hear his plea of Love : “I’ve left the world and flesh you know. The Devil and all his works below To dance with you above. The Unitarian complains, “The world is bound in triple chains The Plural Gods adore*' He finds it easier, you see, . To make his peace with One, than Three, And “settle up his score.” The Universalist will glide To Heaven, as swift as school boys ride Down hills of ice and snow, “Huzzah ! my boys, we’ll all be saved. For Hell is nothing but the grave And there is no future woe.” bones. And in numberless cases the very State government, whose judicia ry thus administers the deadly blade to honest claims, forbade by its legisla tive authority the collection of ihesr- ciaims, and is, therefore, responsible that they are to-day defunct. We will notice but one more result of this decision, and then cease. While thousands of judgments will be destroyed that were deemed uncon ditionally solvent, thousands of young er judgments, that were regarded as worthless will gain new vitality from the removal of older conflicting liens. [Atlanta Constitution. ’Mid such confusion who can tell, Which is the road to Heaven or Hell, Or how we may be saved. W hether his life of prayers and fears , Beads and penance for days and years With thoughts fixed on the. grave. My counsel is to walk alone. Keep free from quarrels not your own And all seditious strife. Let madmen at each other roar. Do good to all both great and poor And lead a virtuous life. More Heavy Important Derisions—Anoilier Stroke for Relief. Our Supreme Court, in their rulings, delivered on the 3d inst., delivered one that will be found below, that carries relief a good many degrees to perfec tion. In the case of L. N. B. Battle vs. James A. Shivers, from Warren Supe rior Court, the tremendous, and we are constrained 10 say, in. q iitous dic tum is promulgated that tue suspen sion of the Statute of Limitations clu ing the war, did not apply to'the lien ofjudgments, but notwithstanding the collection ofjudgments, was absolute ly stopped, the limitation of their lien continued, and they must bocoine dor mant unless levied iu the seven years prescribed for keepmgjudgments aiive. It boots us not to look into the law of the thing. The political ruling of the court stands ihc supreme law of the land, and must be obeyed. Judge Warner, who dissents, as he has done heretofore, from all the Courts Radical decisions, rips to pieces the tiimsv rea soning of Chiel Justice Brown and Judge McCav, and exposes in bis own unvarnished and scathing way, the bad law and worse faith of the legal conclu sion of his colleagues. We have to do for practical purpos es now, only with the results ot the de cision. All judgments seven years old, that have no entry upon them to keep them alive, are dormant, and lose their lien, and must be sued like accounts, or notes, or anything else unsued. They are simply subject matter and rights to sue. It is impossible to estimate the a- mount of debts that will thereby be killed. It will run almost, if not quite, to millions. Hundreds upon hundreds of claims, now nestling cosily and safe ly in coders, and pocket-books, and desks, and believed to be as sound as gold, and as certain of recovery as the bond holders deem their fat gold in terest, are as defunct as door nails.— Hundreds of robustious, executions, with broad acres of rich lands legally bound for their payment, have, by this decision, lost their clutch upon solven cy, and now lie as flabby as worthless rags, and as lifeless as de^l men’s L. N. B. Battle, vs. James A. Shivers. Motion to distribute money. From Warren. McCAY, J. An ordinary judgment for money, en tered up in 1S61, upon which no exe cution was aued out in seven years from the dale of the judgment, or upon which execution, if sued out, no entry has been made for seven consecutive years, is a dormant judgment, notwith standing the acts suspending the Stat ute of Limitations, and enacting stay- laws, passed in 1S60, and at different periods since that time. L. N. B. Battle vs. James A. Shivers. Dormant judgments, Statute of Lim itations. From Warren. At April term,‘1868, of Warren Su perior Court, the Sheriff, in answer to a rule, granted at the instance of plain tiff in error, returned, that he had in hand, two thousand and thirty dollars, raised from the sale ofCullen Battle’s properly, by virtue of two fi. fas. in fa vor of the plaintiff vs. said Battle.— The answer also slated that a fi. la. in favor of defendant in error, James A. Shivers, of cider date than plaintiff’s fi. fas. had been placed in his hands, claiming the money, and that the mon ey would not more than pay said last fi. fa. It appeared that the fi. la. in favor of Shivers was issued 12th of April, 1S61, and there had been no entry of any kind thereon by the proper officer to execute and return the same^within seven years from the time it was issued. Thereupon the plaintiff in error tender ed to the defendant in error an issue on two grounds : 1. That Shivers’ fi. fa. was dor mant. 2. That it was paid ofFand discharg ed. Defendant in error joined issue, and the same was tried by a jury. On the trial, the Judge held that tlie fi. fa. was not dormant. There was no evi dence of payment. The jury found the fi. fa. not paid oft'. A motion was made for a new trial,'on the ground which suits shall be brought or pro ceedings commenced in a court of jus tice, and there is hardly a man in the- community so ignorant of legal phrase ology^ that he would not, on hearing them, at first thought, confirm their signification to this use of them. These acts are based on the idea that the defendant has, by lapse of time lost his evidence, and have uniformly these qualifications, that if the plaintiff has been under certain disabilities, as infancy, marriage, etc., they shall not run against him, or if he can prove, that the defendant has, within the time, acknowledged the right, his case shall be saved. The dormant judgment act contains none of the ideas included in this state ment of the essentials of “Statutes 'of Limitation.” It does not prescribe a time within which proceedings shall becommenced but. only a lime within which an entry shall he made bv the officer upon the fi. la. Even a written acknowledg ment of the defendant that a judgment is not dormant, would not, as has al ways been understood among lawyers, save it. Nor has it ever been pretend ed, that the death of the plaintiff’, his lunacy, imprisonment, or in the case of a woman, her marriage, would pre vent its operation. The confusion existing in the minds of those who call this act a “Statute of Limitations,” arise from a want of proper reflection as to ihe nature of judgments, and of the object and intent of the dormant judgment act. A judg ment and the lien of a judgment are distinct ideas—it is not a part of the idea of a judgment that it shall have a lien. The Constitution of the United States provides that full faith and cred it shall be given to the judicial proceed ings of sister States. A judgment of Alabama is also a judgment in Geor gia, but it has no lieu, and must be sued upon. It cannot have error, be controverted and it imports verity.— Many of our own judgments have no lien as such. Judgments in attach ment, judgments in ejectment, judg ments against intruders, judgments foreclosing mortgages, either have no lien, or do not derive it trom the judg ment. Judgment in equity rules ab solute against Sheriff ’s judgments for temporary alimony had error in this State until a recent period, no liens, for the simple reason that they could irot be enforced by the sale of the defend ant’s property. In some Slates this lien is only allowed after levy ; in oth ers only after entry in a certain book. In some States the lien is confined to the county ; in others, to personal prop erty. At common law the judgment the defendant, but to regulate the rights fi. fa. was not dormant, which motion ,lj> nen was IO ' 1 111 a 3 ear an(l a ^ a 3- that the Court erred in holding that the | ’ lse j! nevet ^ x P* re( l lapse of time its hen was lost in a year and It became dormant, not dead. It slept and might be revived, and it then got , , . a new lien. The history of our legis- I am not sure that the verdict was 1 the Judge refused and the plaintiff’ex cepted. _ . ,as j laliori on this subject is as follows: wrong. As far as it went, it seems 1 well enough. I do not think the fi. fa. was paid off’; but one of the distinct issues, was whether the fi. fa. was dor mant ; the Court held that it was, and the jury failed to pass upon that issue. We hold that the Judge erred in thus , . , _ . . . , holding, and thus misled the jury, so I kmd ol re,,ewal was (lone awa - v w,lb ’ The act of 1799, gave judgments a lien from their dale, Prince, 420.— Thisjien lasted only for a year and a day, and the judgment had to be re newed on the Court roll from year to year. In 1811, the necessity tor this of different judgment creditors and purchasers with each other. As to the defendant, the rights of the plaintiff were but slightly interfered with. The right to seize his property could be re joined in thirty days by scire facias, and by that process, or by action in which the severity of the judgment could not be denied, he could, even if by his neg lect, he had allowed to lose its lien, as to the third person, keep it up against the defendant, as long as it was unsat isfied. The leading object of the act was to regulate the relative acts of third par ties—to place a qualification or con dition, on the lien, the failure to ob serve which should cause it to give way to these rights. This condition was a simple entry by a proper officer once in seven years. Not as some suppose an entry, showing some action under llrc fi. fa., any offi cer informing the Court of any fact in reference to the writ which was the proper subject of a return. An entry of no ptoperty ; an ‘entry dismissing a levy ; postponing a levy ; an entry that the detenclanl iesiste.d the officer; an entry that that the plaintiff’ had or dered that the fi. fa. to bo levied on particular property, and that he had ordered such levy dismissed—would any of them, I presume, have been a compliance with the law. These en tries, by the act of 1810,’ were all to be transacted on the Sheriff’s execu tion docket, and filed in the clerk’s of fice, etc., for public inspection. Any entry showing that the plaintifT claim ed that the fi. fa. was not satisfied, would answer the intent of the law. So completely was this act consid ered as having sole reference to the iien, to the rights of third parties, that this Court, in 9th Georgia, declared in general terms that the law did not ap ply to judgments which had no lien, or the lien of which (as mortgages) were fixed by something else than the judg ment. This act of 1S23 is still the law, a- dapted almost in words, by the act of 1S-56, and by the Code. But by the act of 1850, and also by the Code, a new idea is introduced. By the act of 1S56 it is provided that if this entry is not made, the judgment shall not only lose its lien but it shall be taken to be satisfied, and by the Code it is provided, Section —, that if in three years after a judgment be comes dormant, it is not removed, it shall be taken to be satisfied. By the act of 18-50 il was taken to be satisfied as soon as dormant, by the Code in three years after. This provision of the act of 1850, as well as of the Code, fills the idea of a Statute of Limita tions, and was suspended by the acts referred to, and the judgment in this case, if it has not been dormant three years since the suspension of the acts, has ceased, is not dead—satisfied—it cution has been issuer), and seven years have expired, from the time of the last entrv upon the execution, made by an officer authorized to execute and return the same; such judgments may be revived scire facias, or be sued on within three years from the time they become dormant.’* Held: That the latter portion of this section, which limits the period within which a dor mant judgment may be revived, by scire facias, or action, is in the legal sense, a Statute of Limitations, and is properly so classed, as it bars all right of action on the judgment, if proceed ings are not commenced within three years after the judgment became dor mant, by persons laboring under no legal disability. It puts an end to liti gation, and is a statute of repose. Held further: That said portion of said section, which relates to the lieu ol judgments, is not in any legal sense a Statute of Limitations, and was no more suspended‘by the act of 1860, or the subsequent acts suspending the Statute of Limitations, than a mechan ic’s lien, which he may enforce, on condition that he commence proceed ings within a limited lime. Taken in connection with section 3525, it impos es certain conditions on a plaintiff' in judgment; upon compliance with which, he may maintain hia lien. These conditions arc, in case the defendant has sold his property to a honujide pur chaser lor a valuable, consideration, who is in possession ; that the plain tiff must have a levy made on the. prop erty, if personal, within two years—if real, within four years, or the lien is discharged. And if he fails to have ari execution issued within seven years from the date of the judgment, or af ter the execution has issued—if he fails to have an entry made upon il by the proper officer for seven years, he loses all lien upon the property of the de fendant, no matter in whose hands it may be. But in such ca:e the right is not barred, the judgment still lives, litigation is not at an end, and there is no repose. The plaintiff’ may at any time within three years revive the dor mantjudgment by the proper proceed ing, and restore it to all its vitality and vigor, with lien upon the property of the defendant from the date of its re newal, and by having the proper entry made upon it, once in every seven equal benefit of the laws, before the Courts. The 1935th section of the Code declares that “the rights of cred itors shall be favored by the Courts, and every remedy and facilitv afforded them to detect, defeat and annul any effort to defraud them of’ their just rights.” This provision of the Code was recognized and adopted bv the Constitution of 1864. But, in tnv judg ment, the decision of the Court below was right, upon a fair construction of the act of 1866, eommonlv known as the Stay Law. By the first section of that act. executions were to be stayed until the first of January, 1S70; that was a definite 'period of time fixed lor the operation of the act upon execu tions issued upon judgments. The third seciion ot the act declares, “that all Statutes of Limitations relating to liens affected by this act, shall be sus pended during the continuance of the act.” It was the declared intent of the Legislature to suspend the running of ihe Slalule of Limitations relating to liens, until the first day of January 7 , 1870; for that was the time fixed by ihe first section of the act for its contin uance. The intention of the Legisla ture is quite as clear and manifest as il it had been declared in so many words, that the Statute should be sus pended .until the first day of January, 1870. The first section of the act was to continue of force until the 1st Janua- ty, IS70. The Statute of Limitations relating to liens, affected by the act, was suspended until that tune. It is true, that the first and fourth sections of the act of 1866 have heen declared unconstitutional and void, but the third section of that act is not unconstitutional and has never been declared to»be so. That section of the act remains intact, and because t^ie other sections ot the act have been declared unconstitution al, that fact does not prevent a refer ence to them to ascertain what was the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of the third section as to the period of time for which the Statute of Limitations, relating to liens, was to be suspended, that it was the intention, of the Legislature to suspend the running of the Statute of Limitations, relating to liens, until the first day of January, 1870, I think is clear and indisputable, and taking the most favorable view of the question tor the plaintiff’ in error. years, he may keep it in life for an in- j the lime should not be counted against definite period of time, without any i ihe defendant in error, until the rendi- limitaticm whatever. ! lion of the judgment of this Court, de- 2. It is no Statute of Limitations be- ! daring the first and fourth sections of cause none of the. disabilities which J the act of 1866 unconstitutional. stop the running of the Statute of Lim itations in any way affecL the cundi tion upon which the lien is retained. If the person having ihe right of action dies, the Statute of Limitations stops running against his estate tiff represeu- Sorne interesting and important facts are reported as the experience of a couple of balloonists who made an ascent a few days since from Memphis, Tenn. Mr. S. D. Thompson, the sero- as follows : tation is taken upon the estate, if the naut, reports as follows: thrift does not. exceed five, vears. Rm “Ihe highest altitude attained by the balloon, as shown bv the harome- tiine does not exceed live years. But if a plaintiff’ in judgment dies the next day after il is rendered, and there is thai they failed to pass upon, whether the 11. fa. was, or was not dormant.— We. are ol opinion that it was dormant, and on this ground we reverse the judgment. The great, and indeed, the only question in this case, is whether the act of 30th November, 1860, and sub sequent acts, suspending ihe Statute of Limitations, and the several acts en acting stay-laws, suspend also the dor mant judgment act. I11 our minds, is the dormant judgment act a Statute of Limitations ? It is argued that this Court has called it—in 7th Geo., an act limiting the lien, and Oth Geo., act of limitations—and that it is classed in the Code with the Statutes of Limita tions. The dormant judgment act does not limit the lien ofjudginent and there is a certain loose sense, in which it may be called a Statute of Limitations. In this sense, however, duv statute limiting the time within which an act shall tie done is a Statute of Limita tions. This sense would include acts fixing a time within which deeds to laud or mortgages shall be recorded, within which an appeal shall be en tered, a writ of error, or certiorari sued out, or within which a widow shall make her election of a childs part in stead of dower, and many other acts of like character, all of which limit the period within which certain acts shall be done on pain ot loosing a right.— And in a certain loose popular sense, they may be, and sometimes are, spok en of as statutes limiting the rights re ferred to, and some of them are even classed in the Code in the same chap ters with the Statutes of Limitations. But it would be absurd to suppose that the act of November 30th, i860, and the subsequent acts now under consid eration, suspended these acts. It is apparent, therefore, that these suspend - ing acts, from I860 to 1866, musi use the words “Slatuteol Limitations” in a sense less comprehensive than the literal, philological sense of the words themselves.- What is that sense ? The words “Statutes of Limitation” have for centuries had, in legislation and among lawyers, a technical sense.— Books are written upon them ; chap ters in other hooks are devoted to them and they have a well-known, uniform and distinct technical signification.— ‘jTbey aie acts limiting the time within ami judgments were declared to be of full force till satisfied, and that renewal on the Court roll, from year to year, should cease. Prince, 436. The Courts however, still seem to have held that they lost their lien, unless renewed in some way ; for in 1S12, it was provid ed that it should not be necessary to renew judgments in any way whatever. Prince, 440. From this time until 1S22, the lien of a judgment seems to have heen as imperishable as thejudg- ment itself, which was of full force un til satisfied. Under this slate of things, great evils arose. “Judgments were collusively kept open or made tlve instruments of fraud on innocent purchasers, and of ten operated oppressively on vigilant and bona fi.de creditors.” Act of De cember 19th, 1S22. Prince 451. To check this it was provided that the clerk should keep a satisfaction docket tor the special purpose of en tering satisfaction of judgments ; and that the sheriffs should keep fair and regular execution dockets, wherein should be entered the executions de livered to them, the duties of their de livery, and their acts and doings there on. That that, they should file these dockets with'the clerk on the first day of the term of the Court, to which they should be made returnable ; which dockets it was required should remain in said office, subject to the inspection of al I persons concerned. Act of 1SJ 0. • Prince 436. But this seems not to have stopped the evil, and in 1822, Prince, 463, the dormant judgment act was passed, re citing as I have quoted—the evils and enacting as a remedy, that a judgment should be void unless there was a re turn upon it in seven years. Some of the Judges seem to have held that the effect of this was to declare the judg ment incapable of reversal, if the re turn was not made as provided ; and in 1823, Prince, 458, the act was re enacted in terms, a proviso added de claring that judgments might be re versed, and enacting that the judg ments held by the Courts under the act ol 1322 incapable of reversal, sl«uld nevertheless be so capable. No one can read these several acts without being drawn to the conclusion that there intent and object was, not 10 limit the rights of the plaintiff against .nay be revived against the defendant j no representation on his estate during and his property—its lien to dale from j l j ie wbtde period,^ the judgment is still the revival. ter, with the proper correction made for difference of temperature, was 11,- 670 feet. We experienced no difficul- dormant, and the lien lost if the proper | l y in breathing, nor any unpleasant entry is not made within seven years, j sensation, except from the cold, the The same rule would apply in case | thermometer having sunk to 50 degrees the plaintiff in judgment is a married 1 Fahrenheit. woman, au infant, an idiot, insane, or } “Among the other phenomena ob- unprisoned, all of which are exceptions which stop the running of the Statute of Limitations served, I might mention that the bal loon, in ascending, always assumed a whirling motion from right to left,while. 3. But it is insisted that the act ofi in descending, il whirled from left to I860, known as the Slay Law, express- i right, and when the barometer indicat- ly suspends the Statute of Limitations j e< J an equipoise, it remained stationary, The acts of 1865 and 1868, contain ed a provision, which in a very fair sense might be said to have suspended the dormant judgment act. Statute of Limitations relating to liens affected by the act are therein suspended. But that act has by constitutional authority been declared void, unconstitutional— an act that never was the law—an J no liens were affected by it—it therefore suspended no statute relating to liens, and the defendant’s case is not helped by that act. It is a truth, remarkable, f4iat the idea of the suspension of the dormant judgment act, by the act of Nov. 30th, I860, etc., was not present „j s i ature only intended to suspend the being English levers, and in good or e,l ,0 the Court below ... .this case, g „ r Li.nilauous as lo liens <*;<!«. At the height of two miles, two Some ol the tamt lawyers,, o Georgia , thc Law remilillcd | egollv or them stopped, while .ho other two were concerned in .he cause-Gen. I jn * rce _ am| f )() | onger . UmJc r the j continued to run. The poekel com- pas which Dr. Bell furnished me, and as to liens. So it does: But what liens? All liens, -says the Statute affect ed by tliat act. This Court, whether its judgment was right or not, lias de clared the Slay Law unconstitutional i and void. Il is very clear that the Le turning in neither direction. From this observation I am satisfied that latitude and longitude can be calculated iu a balloon al night by means of nautical instruments. “We took with us four watches, all Toombs, Judge Stephens and Mr. Pot- ,• 1 • r< r ^ 1 , . 1 7 - • 11 ruling ol uns Court, the btav Law was lie—and the decision was made by no ,, ,- - . . , • • . .1 t i o J c never legally in force lor a single day. ess a jurist than Judge Reese, of 0 J Wilkes; yet it does not seem to have occurred to any oi these astute and learned gentlemen, that the act of 30th November, 18(50, had anything to do with the case, and it cannot but occur to an ordinary mind, that this lact is very significant as to what was the general understanding of the country as to the’ meaning of thc Legislature in the passage of the act of 30fh No vember, 1S60, and the subsequent acts, simply suspending the Statute of Lim itations. One cannot but suspect that but very few persons so understood it, or men of the character of these gentle men would hardly have permitted so vital a point to have passed unnoticed. Ori thc whole, we conclude that the dormant judgment act has not suspend ed by any ol the acts referred to. The judgment in this case is dormant. The act of 1366, so far as it declares judg ments satisfied and discharged, and the provision of the Code limiting the time within which it shall be reversed, were suspended; and if this judgment can be saved by the suspension of that part of the act of 1S56, and that part of section —of the Code, by virtue of the actsyeferred to, it is not satisfied that it may lie reversed. We do not decide that question, as it is not made by the record. Judgment reversed. Brown, C. J., concurring. 1. By section 2683, of the Code, it is declared that: “No judgment here after obtained in the Courts of this State, shall be enforced, after theex- pirat on of seven years, from the time of its rendition; where no execution has been issued upon it, or where exe- It therefore never affected any liens, which was a very delicate instrument, became completely depolarized, and and as the Statute of Limitations was bas since been gradually regaining its only suspended as to liens affected bv j pnlanty, though it is still worthless, it, and none were affected by it, the “The effect of the ascension on my own system is remarkable, and very interesting to me as a matter of specu Statute was suspended as to none. The Slay Law having been declared null and void, it is in law as it it had never been passed; and creditors are no moie entitled to claim legal rights under it now than debtors were when il was brought before this Court and set aside in the interest ot creditors. Warner, J-, dissenting. Thr only question in this case is, whether the fi. la. issued upon a judg ment obtained the 7th ot April, 1859, was 1lor mant under the provisions of the 4th section of the act of 1856. The decision of this question depends upon the fact, whether the act of 1856, as applicable to this case, is a Statute of Limitations. If it is, then, the running ot the Statute of Limitations, was sus- panded during the war by the several acts of the Legislature, including the ordinance of 1865, and the execution was not dormant. In my judgment, the act of 1856, limiting the time, within which, judgments and executions shall be enforced from the tine of the last en try on such executions, is a Stutute of Limitations, and has uniformly been re cognized to be sucli, by the legal pro fession, the Legislature, and by this Court—and so far as I know, or be lieve, the people of this State have reg ulated their conduct under it as such ; and a different construction now will operate as a cheat and a snare, to de prive honest, confiding men of their just rights. Both creditor and debtor have sufficed alike by the calamities of the war, and both shpuld have the tation. As soon as I returned to Mem phis in v friends remarked lliat I looked much more ruddy in the face than be fore. I can scarcely gel enough to eat. I attribute lh>s to the expansion ot the veins and cells of the body in the Tari ffed air, whereby the fluids of the body circulate with greater freedom. Pro fessor Wise was a confirmed dyspep tic before lie began ballooning, but this effected a complete and radical cure. From the great change produced upon my own system, I should not hesitate to recommend a balloon voyage to my one suffering from a disordered stom ach or liver.” Cure for Cancer.—A well known citizen of Philadelphia, who had been using a weak solution of carbolic acid as a wash to correct the offensive order arising from a cancerous affection, dis covered that the application also en tirely removed the cancer. One fourth of au ounce of carbolic acid is diluted with a quart (thirty two fluid ounces) of water, and the lotion is applied three times a day 7 . A weak solution con taining one-eighth of an ounce of car bolic acid to the quart of wafer would probably be a saler application. (Philadelphia Ledger- There is this difference between hap piness and wisdom—he who thinks himself the happiest man really is so ; but he who thinks himself the wisest is generally the greatest fool.