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6. THI3 ATLANTA WEE K L Y STTN. developing, for the particular purpose of Radicalizing the South in time for the THE DAILY .SUN.I ■war, and to resume their obligations to 1 . I the Union, under the Constitution, was Wednesday Morning October 18. [ “trampling on the rights,” and “the very elections in November 1872. ■~ L - " ' " “ life of the State,” then this charge is well j Prominent members of the Ailministra- Tlie Washington Chronicle. founde d; but it comes with an ill grace tion decided yesterday that civil and a I * military arrangements should be periect- ^ This Central Organ of tbe Centralizing 1 * rom *' 1C ( l uar ^ er lfc docs - , ed for the wholesale arrest of members of The assertion, however, that what the so-called Ku-Klux-Klan, and the did in tbe matter, was with j country need not, therefore, bo surprised of securing a seat in the | ^ therecentprodamation of the Presi- Admiuistration at Washington, in its is- j sue of die 7th inst., which has just reached . we us, seems to be not at all pleased with our j a vev? reply to the second letter of "Law and \ United States Senate, is as groundless Order,” republished, some week or more ; au< ^ rec ^ ess 88 ® * 8 graceless. If e\er ago, in The Sun. Fancifully jumbling: action was prompted by motives en- our position, therein stated, with that of some Missouri Democratic editor, so- called, (whose name or paper is not given, leaving the inference to be drawn that the whole of this part of tbe effusion is but tbe work of tbe imagination), the Government Organ thus discourses upon the constitutional remedies proposed by us, in that article, for getting rid of the fraudulent amendments; “The Missouri Democratic editor goes the undiluted Kuklux programme. Mr. 'Stephens treads the ground more gingerly, and would simply ‘down with the Radicals, down with the bayonets,’ without advising just now the use of the bayonet. Mr. Stephens says, down with those ‘highest of crimes,’ the reconstruction acts and the constitu tional amendments; they are ‘frauds’ not yet ‘setup,’ but ‘attempted.’ The Kuklux Missouri editor responds, ‘Down with the fifteenth bedamment! Equal taxation and the rightful representation of all tbe States,’ or another fiufid! Mr. Stephens wants the old Constitution.— The Kuklux answers, I understand you— ‘this is a whiteman’s Government,’and the old Constitution says so. Let us fight, says the Kuklux. Wait awhile, says Mr. Stephens. We are not yet ready. We have Tennessee, Kentucky and Mary land. We shall soon have Georgia. We shall make Virginia all she should be, in due time. She is not well with us yet.— We must not strike too soon. We may carry tbe Presidency, and then, with the whole South a unit, the hour will have come. Those ‘highest of crimes’ per petrated by a ‘Rump Congress’ will then be avenged, and the South will get her own again. “Such is the political moral of Mr. Stephens’ course. He masks himself in his superior learning and astuteness, and keeps the reins on his thoughts, but bis paper is, in fact, no matter what dis claimers he may make, a copious foun tain of Kukluxism. “ <The evil that men do lives after them; The good is oft interred with their bones.’ “Mr. Stephens is * fiviDg the Southern heart,’ and doing evil in Georgia, and, indeed, iu all the lato insurrectionary States, which will Uve after him for years. Why should he do this ? He, who was really so indifferent to the Confederate cause ? “He trampled on the lights—yea, he trampled out the very life of Georgia in 1866, to obtain a seat in tbe National Senate; and when he was refused a seat he turned upon the body and called it a ‘Rump Congress.’ Would it have been a ‘Rump affair’ if Mr. Stephens had been admitted to a seat in it ? Would be have taken a seat in an unauthorized aud ‘ usurping’ body ? Would it not have been a constitutional body, an author ized body, a very respectable body, if Mr. Stephens had got his seat in the Senate V” Now, in reply to all this stuff, for it is entitled to no other term of characteriza tion, so far as our teachings are con cerned, we have a few plain things to say to the Government Organ, and some cat egorical questions to propound, to which we challenge distinct and direct answers: s* 1. Is there a single fact stated, or posi tion assumed,by us, in the article reviewed and thus commented on, which the Chron ide will venture to deny or controvert? If so, let it be specified. Wewearno “masks,” nor do we deal in misrepresentation, in ad dressing the people upon the subjects of their rights and liberties. On those sub jects it is our purpose “to fire the heart, if possible, not only of the people of the South, but of the North, and every sec tion of the country. It is our purpose, as clearly stated, “to fire their hearts, not for resistance or violence to the ad ministration of the laws by those tempo rarily clothed with power to expound and execute them, but to arouse the freemen of the land, every where, to rally to the polls, and put those into official position who will protect their rights, and not sanction gross and palpable usurpations upon them. 2. Is there a sectional idea or thought in a sentence or line uttered by us in that or any other article penned by ns ? If so, let it be specified. 3. Have we ever recommended any other resort or mode, for the redress of Governmental wrongs of any sort, except the peaceful instrumentalities of the Con stitution ? Is it an “evil” that will live after us, to put forth our utmost exertions to keep alive, in the hearts of the people of all the States, a love of Liberty, and an ardent attachment to those free Institu tions which they received, as a glorious inheritance, from a common ancestry ? 4. Upon what grounds does this Organ of Centralized Imperialism fonnd its as sertion, that we were indifferent to the Confederate cause ? What was that cause but the great, inestimable right of local self-Govemment, on the part of the Peo ples of the several States of this continent? Was any man’s whole life ever more de voted to any cause, than onr’s has been, to this, before, during or since the war ? If so, let specifications to the contrary be made. We, of tbe South, have aban doned its maintenance on the field of arms, but not on the forums of Reason and pa triotic Public Sentiment- • 5. Upon what pretense or pretext, other than bald, un sustained assertion, does this Organ of Imperialism charge us with having “trampled on the rights— yea, with having trampled ont the very life of Georgia, in 1866, to obtain a seat in the National Senate ?” If advising the people of Georgia to accept, in good faith, the results of the tirely disconnected from all personal ob jects or interests, and in consideration, alone, of what was considered best for tbe public good; ours was so prompted, on that occasion; just as it is now, in at tempting to “fire the hearts” of the people everywhere, for a maintenance of their rights in every constitutional mode. Moreover, we thought, and still think, that “the trampling ont of the very life of the State” was the act of that Faction, justly styled the “Rump Congress,” which, after the obtainment of every object that the war had been waged for by them, pnt Geor gia - and nine other States under Military Rule, for the purpose of exact ing from her and the others, at the point of the bayonet, a ratification of those stupendous frauds known as the 14th and 15th Constitutional Amendments! Will the Imperial Organ ven ture to maintain, before an intelli gent world, that this act was not utterly “outside of the Constitution;” that it was not a gross and pal pable usurpation of Power ? We affirm that it was, and we wish to know if issue is joined with us upon this point; for upon it rests the whole question of the validity of these so-called amendments. We propose to stand or fall, not in any renewed conflict of arms, but before an intelligent and patriotic public, upon the immutable Truth of our proposition. Liberty, like Truth, may be crashed to earth for a season; but, like Truth, she will rise again. The eternal years of God are hers. 1 The Imperial Organ may be assured that this “ is the political moral of Mr. Stephens’ course 1” 6. The Chronicle asks, if the usurping Faction (justly styled the “Rump Con gress,” from its resemblance, in many particulars, to the usurping fragmentary Parliament, so known in English History) would have been a -“Rump affair,” “if Mr. Stephens had been admitted to a seat in it ?” To this we say, leaving Mr. Stephens out of the question, if Georgia, and the nine other States, had been permitted to be represented in it—in the House and Senate—as they were clearly entitled to be, under the solemn guaranty of tbe Constitution, that it would not have been a “Rump Congress.” It would have been a Constitutional Body, whether a respect able .one or not. What made it a ‘ ‘Rump affair,” was its rejection of more than a fourth of the States of the Union, and setting itself np as the Congress of all the States? Will the Imperial Organ venture to maintain that they had any authority, whatever, for this most iniquitons act; except what they most flagitiously and tyrannically assumed; and assumed, too, over the very letter, as well as the spirit, of the Constitution which they were sworn to support ? Was not this a usur pation as gross and flagrant as any to be fonnd in the annals of Representa tive Governments ? Was it not “tramp ling out the very life of the Union ? Was it not after the war was over—af ter all its objects were obtained—after peace was declared—nay, more; was it not for the very purpose of defeating what the war had been avowedly waged for by them; that is, the restoration and preservation of the Union of equal States ? Will the Imperial Organ venture to maintain that this usurpation or any that followed it, by this “Rump Congress,” with a view of Revolutioniz ing the Governments of these ten States, and, in this way, of Revolutionizing the Federal Union, was, in any sense, alegiti mate result of the war against Seces sion? Was it not the beginning of a new war, by Congress, so-called, against the Constitution ? Was it not “trampling out of the very life, not only of the States severally, but of the States united ? Was it not trampling out the very life of the liberties of this entire country? We so understand it. We so maintain. Our object, therefore, is to arouse the people in all the States to a full sense of the imminent danger which threatens them; to cause them to rally, in a common straggle, at the polls, and to use every constitutional instrumentality at their command, for the rescue and preserva tion of the priceless heritage left them by their fathers. , Whatever may be the result, we, at least, will have the consolation of having done our duty. If this be the “evil” that is “to live after us,” may our mem ory be weighed down with it for all time to come. A. H. S dent should be followed by the arrest of well known Southern men. This course seems to have been rendered imperative by the result of the Texas election. Grant is actually stunned by the announce ment of thirty thousand Democratic ma jority in the State, and despairing of car rying the Southern States by fair means, lias resolved to carry them by any means; and so, in a few days, the New Rebel lion—this time of the Federal Govern ment against the South, will be begun. It was well known at the White House, when the recent proclamation was issued, that five days was insufficient to spread it over the counties in South Carolina, therein named, and there is 'hardly any doubt that martial law will be declared in that section before one-third of the citi zens ever hear of the warning. This is sufficient to stamp the whole thing as a base political trick to get control of the Southern States by intimidation. Tne New York Sun of yesterday, has long editorial condemning the action of President Grant in this matter. The Sun says : “The proclamation of General Grant declaring the authorities of South Carolina unable to protect the people in their rights, is probably only a prelimi nary to the act of placing the State un der martial law, with a series of whole sale arrests under the provisions of the Ku-Klux bill. The weight of evidence is entirely against the supposition that there is any necessity for this action, ex cept for the success of his own selfish ends. General Grant wishes it to be be lieved that South Carolina is in a state of anarchy, aud by availing himself of the despotic power which has been conferred upon him by unconstitutional legislation, bo expects to mislead the public in regard to the situation in South Carolina; and what is now doing in the South, may yet be done in the North, under the provis ions of the same law which authorizes President Grant to proclaim himself an absolute Dictator, at his own discretion, whenever and wheresoever, within the United States, he may see fit to do so, the Court erred in rejecting the evidence, relation to the plaintiff’s having colluded It was admissible. If upon the dissolution with Porter, to take possession of the of a law firm, one of two partners gets a farm, and excluding the defendant from note for his part of a fee, evidenco of his ' participation in the management of it, agreement to be represented on the trial I inasmuch as there is no evidence* of such of the case, is competent in a suit on the collusion to authorizo the charge. Not note, and ought to be admitted to the being satisfied with tbe verdict, we re jury under tbe charge of the Court of verse the judgment for error in the fore- the law applicable to the case. I going charge, and order a new trial. Judgment reversed. j Judgment reversed. Warren Akin, for plaintiff; General j Underwood and Rowell, Print-up and Wofford, contra. | Fouche for plaintiff; Wright andl Feath.- erstone, Smith and Branham, contra. Grant and tlie Ku Klux. In The Sun of yesterday, was publish ed some statements made by a Washing ton letter-writer, which served to throw some light upon the motive by which the Administration is governed in the in auguration of the new policy toward the South. Below, is given a special dis patch from Washington, to the Savannah News of Monday, in which reference is had to the same matter. Upon the whole, it seems that a deep and wicked plot is SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. Atlanta, October 17, 1871. Alexis Bragg et al vs. W. H. Tibbs—Re moval of cases to Federal Court. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where, upon tbe call of a case upon tbe docket, the counsel for the plaintiff stated, to the Court, that he had a motion pre pared to transfer the case to the United States Court; and the Court refused to hear the motion, giving precedence to a motion to dismiss the 'case upon the ground of non-payment of taxes, under the Act of 1870: Held, that this was error. W. K. Moore, for plaintiff in error. McCutchen & Shumate, D. A. Walker, contra. A. B. Irick vs. Wm. Wise—Complaint. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where Wise was the tenant of Irick, under an unexpired lease, and Irick wrote him about letting the land, stating in his letter that he would give him five per cent: to get him to sell it, and Wise did act equivalent to an acceptance of the proposition, by showing the land; giving notice that it was for sale, and Crockett, with whom Wise had talked about the land, went to Virginia, where Irick, the owner of the land, lived, and bpught the land, and Wise made him pay §500 for surrendering possession of the land, and demanded five per cent, as commission on the sale; and npon the trial of this cause the Court rejected evidence of the payment of the 6500: . Held, that this was error. If Wise claimed commission upon the sale of the land, such sale contemplated a delivery of the possession of the land. If the jury found, from the evidence, that Wise did honestly aid in the sale, and was en titled to commission, his evidence was admissible to show the payment of $500, which should be deducted from the com missions. On the other hand, the pre sumption is that Irick sold for less than the land was \forih if Wise was to be bought out of possession, and Wise would not be entitled to both compensations. Judgment reversed. Warren Akin, for plaintiff; Wm. T. Wofford, contra. Wm. Worthy, vs. the State—Adultery- Continuance. LOCHRANE, C. J. Upon trial of indictment for adultery, it is error in the Court to refuse a contin uanee for the absence of two witnesses whowereduly suppaenaed, and were with in the jurisdiction of the Court, by whom the prisoner expected to prove his inno cence, and the fact of one’s being the woman accused, does not efiange the rule. The fact that the Judge at the first of the term, announced his readiness to send for witnesses who were not present, does not necessarily deprive the prisoner, who has not availed himself of the Judge’] offer, of the right to a continuance on the ground of the absence of witnesses. Where the evidence in a ease is all presumption, and the jury find a verdict of guilty, this Court will grant anew trial on the ground of absent witnesses, with greater liberality, than in a case where the guilt of the accused was mani fest from the proof. Judgment reversed. Johnson & Me Camy, J. A. Glenn, for plaintiff. C. E. Broyles, Solicitor Gen’l, per D. A. Walker, contra. Benj. G. _ Pool, vs. Margaret Curry, Executrix—Attorney's fee note. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where A employed a law firm to defend a case for a fee of $500, and had paid one of the partners $250, and upon the clos ing up of the business of the firm, the other partner being about to remove to Texas, obtained a note for the balance dne, and traded it, having agreed at the time of the taking of the note to be re presented npon the trial; and npon the trial one of the partners appeared and defended the case, and the other, who had removed to Texas, was not at the Court, and was not represented, and npon the trial of the case, brought to re cover the amount of the note, the Judge rlued out the evidence of this obligation and agreement, and also the fact that the maker' had employed other counsel, and charged the jury in effect that one of the law firm appear ing in the cause in which the firm had been employed generally, consummated tbe obligation of the contract: Held, That under the facts of this case, Francis Wright vs. J. D. W. McDonald— Injunction. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where a note, given for the purchase money of lauds, was traded after due, and suit was instituted by the transfer- ree upon each note, and went into judg ment in 1867; and, in 1869, the vendor of the land died, and his widow set np her claim for dower in the lands, and her dower was allowed, on the ground that the lands came by inheritance through her, and she had never relinquished her right of dower; and the vendee^filed his bill in equity, praying an injunction, which injunction was granted by the Court: Held, That the transferree of the note, after due, took it with the existing equi ties between the original parties, and the claim for dower-in the lands was not such an equity as the defendant was bound to plead in a suit brought in 1867, as the right of dower did not ripen until after the death of the, Tendor, in 1869, and this Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Court below in granting an injunction to restrain the proceeding of the judgment at law, until a hearing, under the facts in this case. Judgment affirmed. A. Farnsworth, W. W. Giddens, John son & McCamy, for plaintiff; D. A. Walker, contra. Benj. F. Pace vs. B. M. Wilkinson—Re lief act of 1870. McKAY, J. Where there was a suit brought on a bond for titles, alleging a breach since first June, 1865: Held, That no affidavit of the payment of taxes, under the act of 1870, is re quired. Judgment reversed. E. D. Graham, D. A. Walker, for plain tiff; S. H. Tatum, contra. W. W. West vs. John Sansom & Fred Cox.—Relief act of 1870. McKAY, J. An affidavit, under the act of 1870, that the plaintiff has paid all legal taxes, since he was the owner ot the note, the foundation of the suit is a substantial com pliance with the act of 1870. Judgment reversed. Johnson & McHenry for plaintiff; W. H. Dabney, J. A. Glenn, contra. Wm. Solomon vs. Daniel Lowry.—Relief act of 1870. McKAY, J. That portion of the act of 1870 which allows the owner of lands subject to exe cution to set off against the judgment the losses he claims to have suffered from the late war, is iu violation of article 1, sec tion 10, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and is, therefore, void. Warren Akin for plaintiff; A. Johnson, contra. Eli Garrett vs. Wm. Adrian.—Ejectment. McKAY, J. Where A, being in possession of land under a bond for title, on payment of tlia purchase money, made by B, sells the land to C, representing his title to be perfect, and makes C a bond for title to be made on payment of the price agreed upon, C having no knowledge of the de fect of A’s title, in good faith goes into possession after his purchase, and pays his money in full, and remains in pos session seven years: Held, That C had a good title against B, the original vendor. Judgment reversed. Johnson & McCamy for plaintiff; D. A. Walker, contra. Wm. Worthy vs, Aaron Kinsman and Jesse George.—Trover. McKAY, J. Where a defendant relies on his title by prescription, he can not tack to his own possession the possession of former holders of the property, unless he shows the character of that possession, as to its good faith, &c., and that he holds under them bona fide. Possession by capture can only be set up by parties belonging to regularly or ganized bodies during the war, and we think this is clearly a case of stealing, of which the defendant should not be al lowed to take advantage. J. A. Glenn, S. P. Green for plaintiff; McCutchen and Shumate contra. Wm. Brown, vs. The State.—Larceny. McKAY, J. Hog stealing is not such au offence as can be settled under 4609, of the revised Code; and under a charge of larceny, the property was described as one black pig, with, a white list, and one white one with a blue rump, both without ear-marks, and the two, of the value of two dollars, and the property of James Drake: Held, That the description is suffi cient. J. C. Reid for plaintiff; H. T. Morton, District Attorney, contra. T. A. Walker, vs. A. M. Rixey. WARNER, J. This was an action on three promisso ry notes for the sum of $16,498, for the rent of a plantation, in the State of Ala bama. Two of the notes were due the 25th of December, 1867, and the other the 25th of December, 1868. The notes were signed by defendant and Porter, who rented the plantation as partners, for three years. After working the plantation one year, Rixey, the defend ant, came to this State. One of the main grounds of the defendant was that the plaintiff had ejected the defendant from the plantation after the first year, and had satisfied the same in conjunc tion with Porter, the other partner, for the remaining two years. The evidence is quite voluminous and conflict ing. On the trial the jury found for the plaintiff $500 only. A motion was made for a new trial on several grounds—one of which was, that the Court erred on charging the jury, at the request of defendant’s counsel, that, if the evidence shows that plaintiff and Porter have colluded together, and hare taken possession of the farm, and have excluded Rixey, the defendant, from participation in its management, then Rixey is discharged from liability from, the time of such collusion, and eviction, and the jury may consider how the cotton raised on the’place was marked, how the crop was made, who controlled the crops, and who made advances in de termining this question. The Court over ruled the motion for a new trial, and the plaintiff excepted. In our judgment, E. G. Barney, Superintendent, and A. D. Breed, Lessee Selma, Rome and Dalton Railroad, vs. Ann Eliza Lacy— . Demurrer. WARNER, J. This action was brought against the Road in the county of Whitfield, to re cover damages for the death of plaintiff’s husband, alleged to have been killed by the running of the engine and train of cars on said Road, at Oxford, in the State of Alabama. The defendant demurred to plaintiff’s declaration on several grounds, and especially on the ground that this action cannot, by law, be maintained against the Selma, Rome and Dalton Railroad Company in the Superior Court of Whitfield county, Ga., because it appears from the plaintiff’s declaration that the injury was inflicted in Alabama. This ground of demurrer was overruled and defendant excepted. There is no allegation in plaintiff’s declaration as to what is the law of Alabama in relation to the alleged cause of action, and in the absence of any such allegation the Courts of this State will presume that the com mon law applicable to the alleged cause of action is of force in that State. By the common law the plaintiff could not have maintained her action against the defendant for the death of her husband. The right of plaintiff to recover dam ages for the homicide is conferred by a special statute of this State, Code 2920, but tbe statute of this State has no ex traterritorial operation, aud tbe Courts of this State cannot administer it for the purpose of redressing injuries in the ter ritory of Alabama. If it had been affirm atively shown that the law of the foreign jurisdiction in which the injury was done, was similar to that of our own as to the alleged cause of action, then it would have presented a different question. Al though the Courts of this State will pre sume that the principles of the common law prevail, and are in force in the other States for the redress of wrongs and in juries done there, as recognized by it, still no such presumption can obtain in regard to tbe positive statute laws of this State, when the same are in conflict with the common law. If it had been alleged in the declaration that the law of Ala bama gave to plaintiff a right of action to recover damages there for the injury, and had shown what that law was, then the Courts of this State might, in the spirit of comity, have enforced that law here. It is much, therefore, as it does not affirmatively appear from the plain tiff’s declaration, that in Alabama, where tbe injury was done, that the laws of that State are similar to our own in respect to the injury for which redress ‘is sought here under the provisions of our statute, so that the common law is not of force in that State in respect to the injury complained of, the Court below erred in overruling the demurrer. Judgment reversed. Printup & Fouche for plaintiff; Joseph & J. A. Glenn, contra. Warren Akin, exec’r, vs. J. O. McDaniel, President Allatoona Lon Works. Re lief act of 1870. WARNER, J. This was a claim case in favor of Akin, executor of Clayton, plaintiff in fi fa., against McDaniel and his tract of land, defendants, and McDaniel, claimant.— The court, on motion, dismissed plain tiff’s levy, on the ground that the taxes had not been paid on the judgment of the debts, as required by the act of 1870, on the following admitted statement of facts: The plaintiff’s testator, Clayton, died in November, 1864; that Akin, as bis sole executor, was qualified as such on the first Monday in November, 1865, and as such executor had paid all legal taxes due on said executions since he was qualified as such executor, but that said Akin had not sworn, and could not swear, tha.t the legal taxes had been paid on the debts due on said execution prior to his qualification as such executor, and this is the only question. The court held aud decided that the act of 1870 requiring the the plaintiff, as executor, to swear that all legal taxes chargeable by law on tbe debts on which the judgments and exe cutions were founded, had been paid from the time of the making or implying of the same, whereupon the plaintiff ex cepted. The testator died prior to the passage of the act of 1870, and his executor could not swear as to what he had done iu re lation to the payment of taxes on these debts in his lifetime. The testator could not swear, for the very obvious reason that he was dead. The presump tion, however, is, in absence of any evi dence to the contrary, that the testator, when in life, performed all his legal and social duties, and therefore paid all the legal taxes charged by law on these debts, and in view of this state of facts, we think the Courterred in dismissing the levies of the plaintiff’s executions. Judgment reversed. John Doe, on the demise of Stevenson, vs. Richard Roe, casual Ejector, and Shelton and others, tenants in possession— Ejectment. WARNER, J. This was an action of ejectment brought by tbe plaintiff on the several demises alleged in the declaration, against the defendants to recover pos session of a tract of land in Whitfield County. The demise from Stevenson to plaintiff was alleged to have been made May 1st, 1864. The demise from Baker to plaintiff, December 5, 1S69. The ac tion commenced December 20, 1869. The parties offered in evidence their re spective title deeds to the land in dispute, as well as other evidence in regard to their claims to the land. After the testi mony closed, the defendant’s counsel made the point that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the act of 1869, in relation to statute of limitations under the evidence in the case. The Court sustained this position, and held that the plaintiff’s action was barred and dis missed it, and plaintiff excepted. The 7th section of J the act of 1869, de clares that all actions for torts of any character .whatever, when the torts or wrong, was committed, or the right of ac tion accrued, or the injury was done, whether to the persons or property of any person or corporation prior to June 1st, 1865, by any person then, or now in the] State, or any inhabitant of this State, which is nos barred, shall be brought and tho passage of this act, or the right of action, as well as the right to sue, shall be forever barred and foreclosed. This section of the act applies only to such torts as were committed prior to J UUe 3, 1865, and not to torts committed since that date. If the defendant was in pos session before that date, the plaintiff t 0 recover for that wrong or injury, have sued within three mouths from the passage of the act, but if the defendant has been in possession of tbe lands, since that date, as the evidence shows that he was, then for the wrong and injury done since that date, the plaintiff was not bound to sue within three months. Be sides one of the demises in the declara tion to plaintiff, is alleged to have been made on December 5, 1869, and the de fendant was in possession of the land In our judgment, the Court should have allowed the jury to have passed upon the evidence under a charge as to the law applicable thereto, and it was error to dismiss the plaintiff’s action. Judgment reversed. Julius P. Clements etal. vs. J. E. Logan Injunction. WARNER, J. This was a bill filed, praying an in junction to restrain the defendant from obstructing a road on hh own land. Alter hearing the argument, on a motion to show cause why the injunction should not be granted, the Court refused to grant the same, and defendant excepted. It appears that the obstructions to the road had been complained of as a nui sance, and a trial had before the Jus tices of the Peace, and a jury summoned for that purpose, aud the verdict render ed by them, that the obstruction was a nuisance, which was abated by the Sheriff; that the defendant had obtained a cer tiorari of the proceedings to the Superior Court, and that the defendant had threat ened to renew the obstructions to the road. The complainants do not show that they had a legal right to use this road over defendant’s land, as a pri vate way, either by prescription or otherwise, nor does the evidence show that the Road had ever been established by the proper authorities as a public road, or that it had ever been worked or recognized by the public authorities of the county, as a public road, so as to give complainants a prescriptive right to use it as such over the defendant’s land. In view of tbe facts of this case, we will not interfere with the discretion of the Court below, in refusing to grant the in junction prayed for. Judgmentaffirmed. McCutchen and Shumate for plaintiff; J. and J. A. Glenn, contra. Charles Abercrombie, vs. Nathaniel Bax ter, et al.—Relief Act of 1870. WARNER, J. This was an affidavit of Illegality to an Execution, on the ground that the de fendant had elected to give up the land, which was the consideration of the de fendant, for wliich the execution was is sued to collect, in full discharge of his indebtedness to ‘.be plaintiff, under the provisions of the 15th section of the act of 1870. The Court sustained the affidavit of illegality, and ordered that the title to the laud be vested in the plaintiff, and the execution against the defendant be entered satisfied; to' wliich ruling of the Court the plaintiff excepted. This case comes within the principles of the decision of Gann vs. Henry. So much of the 15th section of the above recited act, as authorizes a defendant to give up the property in his possession, for which the contract was made, in full discharge of his indebtedues, impairs the obliga tion of plaintiff’s contract, and is uncon stitutional and void. Judgment reversed. D. A. Walker for plaintiff; W. H. Dabney contra. East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad Company vs. James Montgomery— Contract. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where a letter was written to B., at Rome, by the Agent of the East Tennes see and Georgia Railroad Company, in reference to inquiries made by B., in which the Agent states that arrange ments are perfected for sending cotton through to New York, via East Tennes- and Georgia, and connecting lines, to Alexandria, by rail, and thence by steamer without detention, &c., “our rate on cotton from Dalton to New York is $9 per bale. Hoping to secure a liberal share of patronage from Rome, I am, &c.” And this letter was shown to Montgomery, who shipped his cotton to Kingston, on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, and by the way of Dalton, over the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad through to New York, and damages were incurred by delays on the route, after it had passed over the road of the defendant: Held, That the letter, written to B, by the Railroad Agent, when shown to Montgomery, did not, without some no tice to the railroad, by him, that he had shipped his cotton from Kingston to Dalton, to be shipped by them in the terms of said letter, constitute in itself an express contract so as to bind the company for delay that occurred beyond its terminus. The contract imposed by the law, section 2058, was to deliver it to the connecting road as in good order and in due time. To require more, wo*dd require an express contract, and the let ter addressed to B, did not, upon being read by Montgomery, constitute such an express contract; and his act of sending the cotton without notice to the Compa ny, going over the entire route, and transported by them as an intermediate line, could not be regarded as embracing the terms of an express contract, arising out of the letter to B, as between such consignor and the company, without no tice to the letter. Where the Court, on the trial of a case, gave in his charge to the jury, principles of law contravening the laws of the State, it was error and a new trial should have been granted. Judgment affirmed. McK’y, J., concurring; Warner, J., dissenting. D. A. Walker, M’Cutchen, & Shumate, for plaintiff; Printnp & Fouche, W. H. Dabney, contra. Axstvessahy.—The H. I. Kimball House celebra. ted its first anniversary last night, by an unusually brilliant hop, which was attended by quite a num ber of the elite of the city. Crittenden was on hand, hearty, genial and happy, acting the host’royally and receiving the compliments and congratulations of his friends with a suavity common only to himself. It was a pleasent evening and every one present was merry a3 a married belle. th e Court erred in charging the fury in 3 fS Fair at Thomas'ViUc, Georgia. The people of Thomas county will hold a fair for five days, commencing the 31st instant, and are making extensive prepa rations for the same.