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6 THE ATLANTA WEEKLY SUN. THE DAILY SUN. Thursday Mobning November 9 SUP HEME COURT DECISIONS. November 7lb, 1871. Executors of L. J. Dupreo vs. Lucy Y. % Dupree et al. LOCHRANE, C. J. On account of the very largo amount of business before the Court at the pres ent term, it has been impossible for Judge Lochrano to consult the au thorities upon important principles of law involved in the decision of the above case, and we, therefore, order that the Stephens, contra, judgment ot the Court m this case be ^ ’ . postponed until the next term of this nwips Mprr,wpf1 Court, under the provisions of the Con stitution of this State. E. F. and W. W. Lawson, executors, et al. vs. J. W. Grubb, Administrator. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where it appears from the bill that the complainant had a judgment at law for the amount of his debt, be has an ade quate remedy by levy and sale of the pro perty of defendant, and equity will not assume jurisdiction to enforce by a de cree of the Court the collection of the judgment already obtained; where the allegations of the bill set up • insolvency merely; where the processes of the Court is the* proper remedy, and demurrer to such a bill ought to have been sustained. Judgment reversed. E. F. Lawson, J. S. Hook and S. A. Corker for plaintiff; A. R. Wright and J. F. Sherman contra. Mary M. Marshall vs. E. S. Cohen—Nui sance. LOCHRANE, C. J. Where a landlord rents a store in a building of which the upper stories were rented out to other tenants, and there was a water - closet in the upper part, which, by reason of obstructions thrown in by the other tenants, overflowed and damaged goods in the store: Held, That the landlord was liable. The fact that the overflow was caused by the negligence of the other tenants, when the proof showed that the landlord had previous notice that the closet was in a bad condition, and the fact that it was in the premises at the time of the renting, and that the plaintiff had access to it, but did not use it, do not change the liability. It is the duty of a landlord to keep the premises free from the con sequences arising ordinarily from the use of a water closet, which becomes a nuisance from its very nature, when not properlv used and at tended to, and if the landlord fails to keep it properly attended to, and dama ges ensue from his failure, he is liable. Judgment affirmed. T. E. Loyd for plaintiff; G. A. Mercer contra. • Emerlino and J. W. Johnson vs. Jno. R. agreement in writing, that if the Courts should afterwards establish the rule that Confederate contracts were to bo settled according to the valno of that currency at maturity, they would modify their set tlement accordingly. Held, That the right of the plaintiff to open the settlement, &c., is made by the agreement to turn unon the rule that Confederate contracts are to be settled according to the value of that currency at maturity. Before the plaintiff could recover in this case, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the Courts had so decided. J udgment reversed. Wm. McKinley, for plaintiff; Linton Kelley—Guardianship of Idiot. LOCHRANE, C. J. In a contest for the guardianship of an idiot, a colored man, one applicant being a white person and the other an only sis ter and nearest of kin to the ward, the proof showing that both were objection able, the Court charged the jury that, other things being equal, relations were to be preferred, Held: That, under the ,Code, Section 1799, this charge did not, in its full meaning, present the provisions of the law to the consideration of the jury. The language of the code is, “among collate rals applying for guardianship, the near est of kin, by blood, if otherwise unob jectionable, shall be preferred.” The philosophy of the law is wise, and its administration ought to be enforced. Judgment reversed. G. F. Bartlett for plaintiff; Key & Pres ton, Peeples & Howell contra. J. J. Bell and B. J. Mims vs. C. C. Thorpe—Rule against Sheriff. LOCHRANE, C. J. Held, that under the facts of this case, the Sheriff, though out of office, was lia- blo to rule, under the provisions of the Code, and it was error in the Judge, upon the trial of a traverse of the Sheriff’s answer, to reject evidence of the fact that the defendant in fi. fa. had property in his possession sufficient to settle the judgment at the time of the return of nulla bona by such Sheriff upon the exe cutions, and as such evidence was admis sible and ought to have been submitted to the jury for their consideration, under the charge of the Court as to the whole oase. Judgment reversed. W. B. Gaulden for plaintiff. A. M. Stone vs. H. S. Wetmore—Quo Warranto—Military Appointments. LOCHRANE, C. J. Under the facts in this case, Held that General Terry did not, by his removal of Wetmore as the Ordinary of Chatham Co. and his appointment of Stono thereto, convey such a title to the office, as upon the application of Stone to the civil courts, they could enforce under the Constitution and laws of this State. Held, again, The facts recited in the petition for quo warranto, to-wit, that Stone, after the removal of Wetmore, was appointed to the office, and filed his bond, and,was commisioned by the Gov ernor, did not confer such a right to the office as the civil courts can recognize. The commission did not convey more t.lmr> tiio order of appointment upon which it was based, and that appoint Charles Merriwether vs. Missouri Smith. Contracts. McKAY, J. Where a contract for laborers, entered into on Sunday, but the labor was per formed afterwards: Held, That the promisor cannot-de fend by setting up the illegality of the contract. When a wife, by the consent of her husband, makes a contract for her own labor, in which contract it is agreed that she is herself to receive the compensa tion for the labor, she may, under our law, sue and recover in her own name. Judgment affirmed. Key & Preston, Peeples & Howard for plaintiff; G. T. Bartlett contra. Bickford & Hold man vs. E. B. Chipmon —Surprise. McKAY, J. A new trial will not be granted because a witness swore on the trial to a fact wholly unexpected to the plaintiff, who at the time knew this statement was false and that he could so prove by a witness whose testimony he could have procured had he thought such evidence necessary. He should have moved'for a continuance of the cose. He cannot take his chances for a verdict in his favor and then plead surprise, os there was some evidence as to the agency of the witness, this Court will ;not disturb the judgment of the Court below, in refusing a new trial. Judgment affirmed. - A. W. Stone for plaintiff; Law, Lovell & Falligaut, H. B. Tompkins contra. A. M. Ross vs. John Williamson—Pro ceeding to obtain books of predecessor in office. McKAY, J. In a proceeding by an incoming officer, who has been commissioned and sworn, against the old officer, to compel him to turn over the books of the office as provided in sections 161,2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Code, the courts will not go be hind the commission to inquire into the legality of the election and the eligibility of the new officer. The simple fact that the officer elected does not give bond and take the oath of office in the time requir ed by law is not sufficient to work a for feiture of his office. It must affirmative ly appear that the failure was by the fault of the officer. Judgment affirmed. A. W. Stone for plaintiff; Hartridge & Chisolm contra. A. B. Smith vs. the Ordinary of Chatham —Mandamus. McKAY, J. A solicitor general elected in 1867 is estopped from claiming compensation under a law passed in 1857 and repealed in 1866. That section of the Constitu tion of 1868 which confirms nearly all the acts of the Legislature of 1865 and 1866 was only intended to quiet doubts and was unnecessary to give them validi ty. In any event, they were the acts of a body in harmony with the United States and good proprio vigore. Judgment affirmed. Tompkins & Garrard for plaintiff. Executors of Martha Whitfield vs. S. J. Wellborn—Tenancy. WARNER, J. This action was brought by the execu tors to recover possession of a tract of land in Jasper county. The plaintiff proved the defendant in possession, and that he rented it from Whitfield in 1864 He also proved the value of the yearly rental, and that the premises in dispute were a part of the land which witness’ father, Robinson, owned in his life-time. On cross-examination the plaintiff’s wit ness stated that defendant went into pos session of the land in 1858, and had been in possession ever since; that Whitfield was in possession of the land; that de fendant never claimed the land as his own; that it was generally agreed by all tne parties that the defendant should take possession of the land. After the plaintiff had closed the evidence the de fendant made a motion to make McAfee and others, who were the devisees of the land under the will of R., parties defen dant to lay a foundation to introduce evi dence to show paramount title to the land in them, and to prove that the de fendant went into possession of the land under them as their tenant, which motion the Court overruled, and the defendant excepted. The defendant then introduced him self as a witness to prove that he was not the tenant of Whitfield, but of persons claiming under the will of John Robin son; that R. had been possessed of the land for forty years prior to his death in 1867. This witness was rejected, because the plaintiff’s testator was dead, and he excepted. The defendant offered, in evidence, a ment expired with the power that gave certified copy of the will of Robinson, to show the title in McAffee and others, which the Court rejected, and the defen dant excepted. The defendant offered to prove by the plaintiff’s witness the same facts, which the Court would not allow, and defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plain tiff, and defendant moved for a new trial, because of errors in the above rulings, which motion was overruled. While we recognize the general rule that the tenant cannot dispute the land lord’s title, yet, under the facts here, we think the Court should have allowed the parties to be made, received the will of R., and evidence as to the identity of the laud in the will, and as to whether the defendant was tenant of the parties claiming under the will, or whether he was in possession a3 tenant of Whitfield. Then the Court should have charged the jury as to the law applicable to landlord and tenant, and left the jury to find the facts. There was no error in rejecting the defendant as witness, the other party being dead. See Executrix of Robinson vs. Leaptrot, decided this term. We or der a new trial. Key & Preston, Peeples, for plaintiff; W. A. Lofton, contra. Russell vs. Chambers—Intruder’s Act WARNER, J. This was a proceeding to remove an intruder under the 400Uth section of the it existence. Held, again, That appointments under the reconstruction acts of Congress to the civil offices by the General’s command, was not by virtue of the Constitution of the State, but by power of the acts of Congress, and did not confer upon the incumbent any title to the same * longer than the acts themselves were of force. Judgment affirmed. A. Sloan, Wm. Dougheity for plaintiff; Hartridge & Chisolm, Jackson, Lawton & Bessinger, contra. Milledgeville Manufacturing Company vs. G. S. Rives—Attachment. McKAY, J. Where an attachment had issued against A., and at the trial term, it was agreed that B. should be.substituted for A.: Held, That this was a dissolution of the attachment, and the cause stood up on the footing of an ordinary suit at law against B., with a waiver of service. An agreement to allow a certain instru ment in writing, to be used as evidence, waives all objections to it for want of a stomp. A settlement was made in 1867, of a contract made in 1862, payable in Con federate currency, the basis of the set tlement being the value of Confederate money at the date of the contract, which the debtor then paid in cotton at 30 cents, a pound, though it was really worth only 26 cents. The parties also made an Code. The defendant filed a counter affi davit, and upon the issue thus formed, the case came on for trial in the Superior Court. The jury passed for defendant. A motion was made for a new trial and overruled, aud the plaintiff excepted.— From the facts there was reason in over ruling that motion. The defendant claim ed possession in good faith, aud under a legal right, as shown by his deed for the same. If the manner of entry thereon, under that legal claim of right made in good faith to the possession of the law, was not legal, the plaintiff’s remedy was for forcible entry and detainer, and for an action to recover possession, but he could not be removed as an intruder un der the Code. 39 Gq. R. 197. Judgment affirmed. Urbanus Dart, Jr. vs. L. J. Dupree.— Motion for new trial.' WARNER, J. This was an action on an open account for wages. The jury found for the plain tiff 8118. A motion was made for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to law, to the charge of the Court, to the evidence, and to the weight of the evidence. The motion was over ruled and the defendant excepted. The evidence was conflicting, and the jury were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight they were entitled to in view of their interest and their relationship to the parties. In such a case the uniform rule has been not to interfere with the vrediot, where no rule of law has been violated in sub mitting the facts to the jnry, which probably might have produced a differ ent result, especially when the presiding Judge is satisfied with the verdict. We find no error in the record that author ize this Court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Judgment affirmed. Harris and Davenport for plaintiff; Harris and Williams contra. J. J. McGowan vs. W. M. Davidson et aL—Injunction. WARNER, J. This was a bill to restrain the defendant as Tax Collector. of Chatham county, from collecting a tax on spirituous liquors in 1868, alleging that there was no tax due thereon for that year; and, also from collecting a penalty of 81000 for not making their return for liquors sold by them during the first of the year 1869, prior to 18th March, 1869, the date of the act. By the 8th section of the act of 1868, providing for a specific tax on liquors sold, it is expressly provided that that section is to go into effect from and after the 1st of October next. The act is da ted the 5th October, 1868, but the 8th section thereof was not to go into effect until the 1st of October next thereafter, which would be the 1st of October, 1869. In view of the provisions of the Consti tution which was adopted in 1868, it can not he said to be of force in relation to this act, after the new Constitution and the .passage of the subsequent acts of 1868 and 1869. Our conclusion, then, is that there was no la.v of force in 1868, subsequent to the adoption of 1868, which will authorize the tax collector now to collect the tax on spirituous liquors for that year, subsequent to that time, and that as the act of 1869 was not passed until ISth March, 1869, it would be a harsh construction of it, to say the least, that the complainants should be compelled to pay the assessment of $1,000 for not making their returns for that por tion of the year 1869 prior to the date of the act. It is true the act is retroactive, inasmuch as it declares that the 8th sec tion of it shall go into effect from and af ter the 12th day of January, 1869; but the defendants could not have known its provisions prior to its passage, on the 18th March, 1869, so as to regulate their conduct by it, and now to assess them $1,000 for not doing what they were not required to do, until the passage of the act, would be contrary to the fundamen tal principles of justice. Judgment affirmed. A. W Stone for plaintiff; R. E. Lester contra. J. K. Jones vs. J. W. Lathrop & Co.—. Commercial Law. WARNER, J. This action was brought against the defendants as the drawers of five bills of exchange, dated Savannah, 9th July, 1867, for £200 each payable to the order of plaintiff, in London, at sixty days after sight, and directed to Robert Huchinson, Liverpool, as the drawee. The defendants pleaded that in avowing these bills, they acted merely as the factors of the plaintiff in shipping his cotton to Liverpool to be sold there, and that the bills were drawn by them upon the proceeds of the sale of plaintiff’s cotton, as his agents, and under his instructions, according to the known and usual custom of trade in such cases, and not on their own account, and that- they had not received any valuable con sideration therefor from the plaintiff, as the drawers of said bill. It appears from the evidence that at the time these bills were drawn, Hutch inson, to whom the cotton was shipped, and upon whom the bills were drawn, was of good credit and standing as a merchant; but before the bills were pre sented for payment he became insolvent-. The evidence on the trial was quite vo luminous, being the written correspon dence between the parties in relation to the sale of the cotton and to the sale „of these sterling bills used on which had been delivered by the defend ants to the plaintiff. The jury found for the defendants. A motion was made for a new trial and overruled, and the plain tiff excepted. This action is brought against these drawers for no neglect of duty, as the factors and agents of the plaintiff and the question is, whether they are liable as such drawers, The general rule of law is, that the drawer of a bill of ex change is liable for the payment thereof to the payee named therein, and is found ed on the theory that the drawer has funds in the hands of the drawee, which he sells or assigns to the payee for a val uable consideration. But this presump tion as between the original contracting parties may. be rebutted and overcome by the facts as between them. What are the facts of the case ? The plaintiff had eighty-five bales of cotton, which; he] desired to have shipped to Liverpool and sold there, and receive in payment therefor sterling bills, and for that purpose sent his cotton to the de fendants, as his factors and agents in Savannah. The cotton was received by the defendants about January 28,1867, who were instructed to ship the same to their correspondents in Liverpool for sale. In obedience to their instructions, they shipped the cotton to Hutchinson, who received and sold the same, rendering an account of sales to defendants, dated Liverpool, June 5,1S67. The account is thus stated, “Account of sales of 85 bales of cotton per Sullivan from Savan nah, sold by Robt Hutchinaon for ac count of J. R. Jones, Esq., per Messrs. J. W. Leaptrot & Co.” The cotton was not sold on account of defendants, but on account of plaintiff, and the proceeds of the sale was not jthe property of de fendants, but of plaintiff To enable the plaintiff to receive the proceeds of the cotton in the hands of Hutchison, the defendants’ correspondent in Liverpool, these bills were drawn according to the usage and custom of trade in such cases and were sterling hills in the commercial sense of the term. The evidence shows that the usage was to avow 60 days’ bills, as was done here, by the commission mer chant in Savannah shipping the cotton; that it was the custom to put the proceeds of the cotton sold in Liverpool to the credit of the merchant shipping, but the accounts at Liverpool showed to whom the cotton belonged, and no person except the merchant shipping the cotton, could draw from the proceeds, who would settle with his principal to whom the cotton belonged; that the ac counts rendered in this case were ac cording to the usage and custom of trade. These bills therefore, were in fact drawn by the defendants on the shipping factor and agents of plaintiff to enable him to receive the proceeds of his cot ton, and were not drawn for any valuable consideration received from him. After these bills were drawn and the account of sales rendered, they were de livered to him and he retained them in his possession nearly three months without objection, and in the mean time, corresponded with the defendants as to the best time when to dispose of them at the highest premium, or ster ling bills and finally transmitted them to the defendants to sell for him, as his agents, when, in their judgment they could realize the highest market value. Therefore, as late as the 20th of October, the nlaintiff wrote the defen dants to purchase three barrels of pork and deduct the price thereof from the sales of the bills of exchange then in their hands for sale. After the defendants had informed the plaintiff of the failure of Hutchinson, he wrote them on the 8th of November : “The loss of the money will be a terrible blow on me—financially speaking. I feel very blue on the sub ject. You will please keep me regularly advised of any new developments in the matter, and for me see what can be made out of the matter.” Again, on the 23d of November, he wrote them that, “if, by the 1st December next nothing satisfac tory is received or heard from Mr. Hutch inson, and you see no reasonable chance to make anything out of the bills for the present, or at an early date, to re imburse you for the pork sent me, I will remit the money to you for the pork.” It is quite apparent that up to that time the plaintiff did not consider the defen dants personally liable to him as the drawers of these bills, and he then had full knowledge of all the facts. jps^ The relation of principal and agent arises whenever one person expressly, or by implication, authorizes another to act for him, or subsequently ratifies the act of another in his behalf: Code 2152. The form in which the agent acts is im material. If the principal’s name is dis closed and the agent professes to act for him, it will be held to be the act of the principal: Code 2169. The plaintiff’s name was disclosed by the defendants as the owner of the cotton, when shipped to Hutchinson by them as the agents of plaintiff, and the account was rendered as the proceeds of the sale of plaintiff’s cot ton, according to the usage and custom of trade, and not as the defendants’ cot ton. The agents’ authority will be con strued to include all necessary and usual means for effectually executing it: Code 2170. According to the evidence the drawing of these bills by the defendants as the factors and shipping agents of plain tiff was the necessary and usual means to enable them as such agents to obtain the proceeds of the cotton in sterling bills. When the agency is known and the credit is not expressly given to the agent, he is not personally liable on the contract. The question to whom the credit is given is a question of fact for the jury in each case—-Code, 2185; As between the de fendants and the plaintiff their agency in this shipment of his cotton to Liver pool, and procuring sterling exchange for the proceeds thereof, according to the usual custom of trade, was well known to him, and the question whether the plain tiff received the bills from them on their credit, as the drawers thereof, or on the credit of his own cotton shioped and sold by them in Liverpool, by his agents, was a question to be decided by the jury under the evidence. Whatever might have been the liabili ty of defendants, as drawers of these bills, if the same had been negotiated and in the hands of a bona fide holder for value, it is not necessary to discuss in this case. The main controlling ques tion presented is, whether the defend ants are personally liable as drawers in this case. In our judgment they are not, and as there is no material error in the charge of the Court to the jury, or in refusing to charge as requested, and the verdict being right, under the law, ap plicable to the facts of the case, we are of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed. Lochkane, C. J., concurs: McKat, J.,, dissents. Lyon, deGraffenried & Irwin, Jack- son, Lawton aud Bassinger for plaintiff; Harden & Levy, contra. November 9, 1871. Wm. H. Bremer vs. Wm. Jones—Injunc tion. LOCHRANE, C. J. / Where, by a mistake of the magis trate in failing to mark the name of counsel to defendants suit, pending in his court, judgment was obtained against the defendant, and such defendant, un der a mistake and in ignorance of the facts, let the time elapse for appeal, and filed his bill stating the facts, and the mistake, and also that'he was not liable for the debt sued, it being, as he alleges, a promise to pay the debt of another,, under conditions which is denied by the defendant to the bill. Before hearing the evidence, the court refused the in junction. Held, That the Court erred under the facts alleged in the bill, the judgment having been obtained by mistake. Equity had jurisdiction, and the fact of liability, was a question for the jury upon the evidence, and it was the duty of the Court to have restrained the levy under such judgment, until the hearing upon all the facts and evidence of the case. Judgment reversed. J. A. Ansley for plaintiff, and S. Lump kin, contra. B. F. Carr vs. A. H. Lee, Executor, et al.—Injunction. WARNER, J. This was a bill filed praying an injunc tion on the following statement of facts: In March, 1868, Lee, Executor of Hen derson, obtained a judgment against Carr, the complainant, for 3,500 00, on which an execution issued, and was levied on Carr’s property, and advertised for sale by the Sheriff on the 1st. Tuesday of November, 1871; that on the 4th of Oc tober, 1871, Ruth Henderson, a judgment creditor of Lee, whose judgment was ob tained on the 29th of March, 1871, sued out a summons of garnishment against Carr, requiring him to answer at the Superior Court of Rockdale county on the second Monday in March, 1872, what he was indebted to Lee. The Court re fused the injunction, and the complain ant excepted. If Carr’s property had been sold as advertised, on the first Tuesday in November, 1871, and had satisfied Lee’s judg ment against him, then he would not have owed him anything and would have so answered the summons of garnishment in March, 1872. But if the sale of his property did not satisfy Lee’s judgment then he could have answered what amount he then owed Lee, after deduct ing the amount which his property lev ied on had been sold for, so that there would have been no difficulty in protect ing himself from having to pay the debt twice, as the summons of garnishment did not require him to answer until March 22, and Lee’s judgment being of older date than the service of the sum mons of garnishment, would have pro tected him as against Ruth Henderson’s .garnishment as to the amount of the sale of his property. Judgment affirmed. Lochrane, C. J. and McKay, J.. concur for different reasons. A. B. Sims for plaintiff. L. B. Ander son by Z. B. Harrison, contra. S. Zeigler et al., vs. T. H. Beasley—In junction. WARNER, J. This was a bill filed by the complain ant against the defendants, on the 30th of October, 1871, praying for an injunc tion to restrain the collection of a note then in suit, and to restrain the transfer of two other notes not then due, which the complainant did give to defendants for the purchase of a tract of land, that the chief value of said land was the timber then standing on it, whsch was the main inducement in making the pur chase thereof. That, prior to the sale of the land to the complainants, the de fendants had sold the timber on the land to other parties without his knowledge. The injunction was granted, the bill de murred to for want of equity, inasmuch as the complainant had an adequate and complete remedy at law. The Court overruled the demurrer and sustained the injunction, whereupon the defen dants excepted. In view of the facts disclosed by the record, there was no error in the judg ment of the Court below. The bill and injunction were properly retained on the grounds; first, for the purpose of restraining the transfer of the two notes not due at the time of the filing of the bill; second, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, on the several notes given for the land, as the same become due, so as to have the whole controversy between the parties, in relation to the sale of land, settled by the decree on the final hearing of the bill. Judgment affirmed. B. W. Williams and B. Tompkins, for plaintiff; J. C. Nichols, byZ. D. Harri son, contra. D. B. Marshall & Bro. vs. Willis Cleary —Motion for new trial. McKAY, J. Where a bill of exchange was accepted conditionally, if funds of the drawer come in hand, it is for the holder of the bill to show, affirmatively, that funds did come in hand, and the production of a stated account between the acceptor aud drawer, showing a charge against the drawer of $500 in cash, does not, of it- „„ For tho Atlanta Sun Rusting Sword. By H. 8. F. Just where we hung it on tho wall, His sword may now be seen. Though time has bleached our locks since then, And rust bedimmed its sheen, * An eating sorrow since that day ' Has made our old hearts sore, Aud tears perhaps hive helped to rust The sword our dead boy wore. Xo braver hand than his e’er bore In strife a soldier’s sword. Our country had no truer heart Upon her altars poured; And patriot pride illumes our grief For tho child wo so deplore, And the glory of our lone old age Is the gallant sword ho wore. Our old lives flounder iu the stream Of rapid social change. And the nerveless heart is feeble now To strive with customs strange, A fit companion for the lives That have out-lived their day, ' Is that lone sword upon the wall, Rusting itself away. Raytown, Taliaferro county, Georgia. SUN-STROKES. Several women voted York. Forward, the calico! in New The papers are dropping the Fire Fiend, and are resorting to “fiery scourges.” Iu the late Iowa election, a Miss Lizzie Anderson voted and her vote was counted. George Wm. Curtis, editor of Harper's Weeldy, is slated as successor to Secretary Fish. Some honest Kentucky politician has given the Courier-Journal a delicate hint by sending it a keg of Bourbon whisky. No more editorials may be ex pected until that keg is emptied. “The great Writ of Liberty de pending on the blunders of a stupid clerk—this is a specimen of the best gov ernment !”— [Louisville Ledger.) It only shows that the “stupid clerk” is in the employ of stupider masters. Some newspapers seem deter mined to knock alljthe romance out of our country’s history. A Philadeiphia paper is now showing that Pocahontas married a Dutchman ; though it is not reckless enough to say he kept a lager beer sa loon. ►-#-< £Sa?°* The Opelika Locomotive says :— “ Somebody, who seems to have a fond ness for military titles, dubs John Black, of the News, * Major.’ That’s an other good joke. ” Of course it is a good joke, as everybody who knows John Black, knows he is a minor. H@™It is no wonder that John Quin cy Adams could not even be elected to the Legislature of Massachusetts. Du ring the canvass his views upon the Wo man Movement were desired, and he said: “lam, after careful thought and some study, firmly and unequivocably opposed to Woman Suffrage, and I shall feel it my duty, in the very improbable contingency of my ever occupying any considerable public office, to standby the old immemorial division of activities and functions which seems to me to lie at the foundation of society.” This, no doubt, put all the women in the State against him, thereby organizing an op- self, prove that the same was the "funds P os ^ on which all the power of the army of the drawer, there being nothing in ant ^ navy of Massachusetts could not the per cent, to show that at the time of this charge, the acceptor was indebted to the drawer, or had his funds in hand. Ju dgment reversed. W. B. Flemming and J. D. Rumph for plaintiff J. C. Nichols, contra. Lee, Wyly & Co., vs. S. Overstreet.—As sumpsit. McKAY, J. When there is a written agreement that one party would furnish and the other take ail the crude turpentine made on a certain plantation, when delivered in lots of 40 barrels and pay for the lots on delivery, and if either party failed he should forfeit $1,000. Held, that the thousand dollais is to be considered a penalty and not liquid ated damages, and on the failure of either party, the actual damages axe all that can be recovered. Harris & Williams, J. M. Norwood by A. W. Hammond & Son, for plaintiff.— Ware & Nichols, Clark & Spencer, Glenn & Son, contra. B. Parsons, et. al., vs. Atlanta Universi ty. Injunction and the Atlanta Uni versity vs. R. Parsons, et. al. Demur rer from Atlanta. McKAY, J.? A mere project or plat of land on pa per, laying off streets, blocks and lanes in a city, is not itself a dedication of the streets to public use, and where there is a proposition to city authorities to re- have overcome. But, for all that, bis sentiments upon the subject were manly. What Grant’s opinion was five years ago is shown in a bit of record that is ruthlessly raked up by the Washington correspondent of the Savannah News. In 1866, during some riots in Baltimore, Andrew Johnson ordered Grant, who was General of the Army, to take, troops and go to the assistance of the Maryland civil authorities. The proposition smote harshly upon Grant’s idea of State Rights, and he wrote to the President, over his own proper signature, the following par agraph: “The conviction is forced on my mind that no reason now exists for giving or promising the military aid of the Govern ment to support the laws of Maryland. The tendency of giving snch aid, or pro mising, would tend to produce the very result to be averted. So far there seems to be merely a very bitter contest for po litical ascendancy in the State. Military interference would be interpreted as giv ing aid to one of the factions, no matter how pure the intentions or how just the instructions. It is a contingency which I hope never to see arise in this country _ while I occupy the position of General- ceive and adopt such streets as public in-Chief of the armies of the United streets, the dedication is not complete States, to have to send troops into a State unless the authorities affirmatively re ceive and adopt the same, and this must appear by tho minutes of the Council. 2. The City Council of Atlanta in lay- in full relations with the General Gov ernment on the eve of an election, to preserve the peace. If instances do come, the law provides the way of calling ing out or recovering public streets, acts out the military to suppress it. as a court, and its proceedings can only be proved by its records. Parol evidence of its action cannot be received. 3. In the absence of any formal accep tance by the public authorities of the dedication of a street, there must be clear proof of a continuance and notori ous user, for a reasonable time, by the public, to constitute an acceptance.* 4 Where there is controversy pending between the public authorities of a city as to the existence or non-existence of a public street, and the public authorities are temporary enjoined from opening the same, by bill, it is not competent for pri vate citizens, as such, to file a new bill, pending the other to enjoin the obstruc tion of the street, unless they show some special damage to themselves from said obstructions, differing from the injury to the public. Collier, Mynatt & Collier for the At lanta University; Clark & Spencer, New man & -Harrison, contra. Court adjourned to the next term in course, commencing 2d Monday in Jan uary, 1872. Bat whether law has changed or not, Grant has; and we now see him courting occasion to do now what he then repro bated. Alas, that so g? - eat a revolution should have taken place in his mind. An Inquiry Not Answered. Dr. Angier has called upon Judge Con ley for Bullock’s official Bank Book Re port kept by Mr. Scott, his warrant clerk, showing his account with tho Georgia National Rank in this city, but he refuses to furnish it on the ground that it is a private and not a public record. The Bank used to pay large drafts of Bullock, when he was in Washington spending thousands for editorials written by himself, to appear in Forney’s Chron icle. It is desirable to see if his transactions with this Bank resemble those with Clews & Ca