Newspaper Page Text
The Daily Herald
B. A. ALSTON. EL W. GfUDT. L AVERT.
ALSTON CO. Proprietors*
Atlanta, Sunday* Way 3* 1874.
FOR THE LADIES
The mulberry flowers came drooping down A
Sweet over the two that stood togttuer,
Parting there by the gateway brown,
Still and sad in the aott May weatner.
Be held her close for a last long kiss;
wall lor you, dear,” she said. “foM^r;
No later hour sba 1 be fats® to this;
For mine is a love that I can alter nj®r!"
The mulberry flowers drop down oapi more
Sweet over the two that stand togroer;
But not the two that stood before,
Parting sad in * lie soft May w thw!
For the earth has changed its bloom again.
And the love has changed that could alter never.
Bat a year has come and gone since then!
And that is the length of a girl’s forever.
PROHIBITION.
Particulars of the Grand Jubi
lee at Palmetto.
The Silver-Tongued Hickman.
J. G. THROWER TRUMPED.
It is universally conceded the temperance
pe' pit) oi Atlanta get np the largest and most
enjoyable pie-uic excursions that leave the
city during each recurring reason. They
ntver tall to carry a monster crowd of sober,
orderly young people with them, who, under
the watoblut guidance of the great apostle ot
temperance in Georgia—J. G. Thrower—al
wajs find p'enty ot recreative amusement.
So, when tbe news flashed over the wires that
our little neighbor, Palmetto, bad thrown ofl
the yoke oi king alcohol by the popular vote
of her citizen.-, which election touk place on
the 18th tf April, tbe temperance people oi
Atlanta at once determined to go down and
rejoice with tbe brave heioes who had so sig
nally routed the insidious foe.
Wenoua Temple of Cold Templars,
at ita next meeting after the erection in Pal
metto, set the ball in motion, and it rolled
throughout the city, gathering streugihasil
went. Every body wanted to go, and hun
dreds were left because of a want oi cars to
carry them the rush at tbe ticket office hi
the car-sin and, tor neatly an hour before the
train lett was tremendous. Men scrambled
over each other in their eagerness to secure
tickets, aud not a tew were seen limpiug to
the train, having obtained tickets at the ex
pense ot 65 cents and mashed toes.
Tbe traiu start, and promptly at 8 o’clock, and
in a few moments was bounding along
through the country, the green verdure and
pleasant breeze raising the enthusiasm of all,
old and young, to au enlivening pitch.
AN INCIDENT.
When tbe train stopped at Fairhuru, a
score of young men who were not temperance
people, jumped off the cars and made a rush
for the bar-rooms, to tbe intense disgust aud
mortification of tbe ladies and gentlemen o;
the excursion. But to their dismay they
ionnd the bar-rooms closed. Not a drink
conld be had, and they returned to the train
amid the glad shouts of the Cold Water Tem
plars. For such shamelessness prohibition
is the only remedy. Had the bar-rooms been
open they would have taken enough of the
vile stall, in the hurry ot tbe moment, proba
bly, to have made themselves general nuis
ances.
At Palmetto the entire population,- black
and white, were assembled in a beautiful
grove on the outiirw, near by a spring and
a large eburoh. Beautiful maidens, bright
eyed children and their parents were there to
welcome them. Tuey were escorted, with
musio and flying banners, to seats under the
shade of the tr. es, in trout of a beautifully
decorated platform, where Maj. E. R. Thorn
ton, of Palmetto, welcomed the excursionists
in a short speech ol tervid eloquence. Every
visitor felt as it he or she were especially und
personally welcomed. Our owu Warren—
tbe champion temperance minister of the
Capital, whom the Good Templars love with
a devotion seldom accorded to any man—re
sponded in a speech lull of thankfulness and
heart-rejoicing. Then came the silver-tongued
Hickman. We will not attempt to follow in
the wake of that grand oration. It was elo
quent, convincing, sweeping the hearts of bis
hearers along witn him. He announced that
he would conclude his speech after dinner,
in the church, after which-he would institut
a Lodge of Good Templars there. As
he resumed his seat a shower ol
flowers fell at his feet—beautiful Irib
utes of beauty and innocence to worth
and eloquence. He sprang to his feet and in
one of tbe graudest fl guts of fervid eloquence
ever heard, addressed one of the little girls
who threw the largest b quet at his feet. Toe
enthusiasm was boundless, arul tbe welkin
rang with applause.
PRESENTATION.
M-jor E It. Thornton then arose and pre
sented the great Kentucky orator with a mag
nificent gold badge. It was a model of beau
ty and skilled workmanship. On it were en
graven a Palmetto tree and a man brariDg a
banner wi h appropriate inscriptions. Ol
course, Hickman as touched, and those who
Ujfcave beard him can well imagine the happy,
reply he made to the host of friends
who had thus honored him.
TBE DINNER
Was the most sumptuous ever known
at api i uio Palmetto had p,spared enough
good thiDgs to fi-HSt at hast double the num
ber present. Every body was invited to par
take treely. Tbe excursionists, however,
carried ample supplies with them.
A NEW LODGE
was then organized in the church, which was
densely packed with people two-thirds ot
whom were ladies, the gentlemen giving up
their seats as fast as tbe fair sex crowded iu.
_ Xhe-doers, windows aud aisles of the sacred
edifice being literally jammed with humani
ty. Hon. J. J Hickman concluded his ad
dress of the furenoon and then proceeded to.
organize Hickman Lodge with two hundred
and thirty seven members, an i installed their
officers. During a lull in tho proceedings,
Mr. S. G. Johnson, the heavy weight of
Faironrn, well known in Atlanta aud else
where, hurst forth in a brilliant temperance
song, to the tune ot ‘-Shoo Fly.” We regretted
we poaldnot get the song, as it brought down
the bouse with every Verso. The chorus was
as emphatically temperance as the Inne would
permit. Here it is, as it roiled from the
mouth of the three hundred pounder:
**Bboo wiDe, don’t botber ra€,
bbou gin. doti’i bother me,
Hhoo ram. don't bother
For temperance ta the thin?, you ae !”
If the doughty warbler had only taken tbe
floor an’d sbufled his brogans in accord with
the tune, bis triumph would have been com
plete.
thrower's broken leo.
The noble youths who tried to get drunk
at Fairburn, Hnd failed, text turned their
wits towards the village of Pulmetto. Of
course they couldn't gi t auy liquor there. It
was prohibition day. But they made a run
on the only drug store iu the place, and tell
ing tbe druggist in an excited manner, that
J. G. Thrower had fallen and broken his leg,
obtained a bottle of brandy for the purpose
of bathing tbe wounded. It was rough on
Thrower and the druggist. The picnic ex
eursionis’s returned well pleased at 5:30 p. m.
H. K S.
Abbotsford is in the pqssessiun of Mary
Ho lica Hope Scott, a greatrgrnnddaugbter
fit Sir Wulter, through that daughter Sophia,
who married Lockhart.
The collection of Chinese coins in the mu
seum of the Paris mint consists of nearly
800 specimens, some gold aud silver. One of
tbe pieces doles from 1,700 years before
Christ.
ATLANTA SUNDAY HERALD.
UKWRITrKtU HISTORY
OF THE
HAMPTON ROADS COMMISSION.
BT B. H. HILL.
The Confederate situation in the
winter of 1864 was such as to excite
the most anxious solicitude in the
mind of every one who sincerely de
sired our success in the struggle.
During that year the Federal army,
under Sherman, had passed through
the entire length of the State of
Georgia, leaving a track of fire and
a wail of sorrow behind, and was
safely in the City of Savannah. The
Federal army, under Grant, though
after losses almost unprecedented,
had succeeded, for the first time
since the war began, in making a
permanent entrenchment almost
within cannon shot of Richmond.
The old year was passing away,
bearing whole hecatombs of our
brothers and sons; and the new year
was coming, bringing, we feared,
burial caskets for our hopes. There
had certainly been no period in
Confederate history, and it may be
doubted whether there had been one
in any history, which was to put the
wisdom of leaders, and the courage
and endurance of soldiers and peo
ple, to such a severe test.
But our enemies, too, had their
troubles ; and they were serious.
Gen. Grant’s march could almost
have been causewayed with the dead
bodies of his soldiers; the Northern
people were getting weary of such a
war, as Mr. Seward himself con
fessed ; their finances were going
rapidly; and foreign governments,
as Mr. Stanton admitted, were get
ting impatient for peace—they
wanted the Southern cotton crop.
It was clear, too, from Mr. Lin
coln’s annual message to Congress
in December, that he was too wise
a man to conclude that a people
were conquered because they had
been defeated in battles, and had
lost cities and territory. The unll to
he free, was the eitadel to be taken,
before subjugation could be com
plete. How to conquer this wilt of
the Southern people was, therefore,
the great problem with him. His
plan to do this is plainly set forth in
this message. He represents the
necessity of war as existing between
the Federal Government cm the one
side, and Mr. Davis, “the insurgent
leader,” on the other side, and be
tween these forces he states the
issue thus :
“He,” the insurgent leader, “can
not voluntarily reaccept the Union;
we cannot voluntarily yield it. Be
tween him and us the issue is dis
tinct, simple, and inflexible. It is
an issue which can only be tried by
war and decided by victory. If we
yield, we are beaten; if the Southern
people fail him, he is beaten.” He
then used these remarkable words :
“What is true, however, of him
who heads the insurgent cause, is
not necessarily true of those who fol
low. Although he cannot reaccept
union, they can. Some of them, we
know, already desire peace and re
union. The number of such may
increase.”
Having thus stated that the will
of the insurgent leader could only be
conquered by war, but that the will
of the Southern people might be
conquered otherwise, he proceeds to
state how:
“They can, at any moment, have
peace simply by laying down their
arms and submitting to the National
authority under the Constitution.
After so much the Government
could not, if it would, maintain war
against them. The loyal people
would not sustain or allow it.”
This method, he said, had been
tried for a year, with liberal offers
of pardon and amnesty, and many
bad been won. Some had accepted
and proven faithless, but the means
were still extended and the door was
still open.
It was generally believed in Rich
mond that, from the fall of Atlant*,
Gen, Sherman had been active in
efforts to encourage a movement to
win individuals and separate States
from their support of the Confeder
ate leader and cause. It was be
lieved he was so engaged from his
headquarters in Savannah. There
were, certainly known, some acts and
declarations of Gen. Sherman in this
direction, and Mr. Lincoln, in his
message, certainly announced, offi
cially, actual knowledge of partial
success, and hopes of further suc
cess in inducing the followers of the
“inturgent leader” to desire peace
and reunion.
During the month of December,
1864, the whispers of a counter
revolution, at first faint and then a
full year old, were getting louder.
Several States, it was said, were to
unite in calling a convention of all
the Confederate States, ostensibly
to amend the Constitution and get
rid of Mr. Davis as commander-in
chief of the army; and a movement
for peace by negotiation through
separate State action, was publicly
advocated by many in State and
Confederate positions. Whatever
might have been the motives of such
movements, (and I am not now deal
ing with their motives),every reflect
ing man was obliged to know the
only possible effects must be disin
tegration and subjugation. And we
SUPPLEMENT.
knew these effects were already
eoing on, not only from Mr. Lin
coln’s message, but from a much
nfcre convincing quarter—our army.
during the month of Janu
ary that Gen. Lee complained
befoima committee of Congress (of
whienfcommittee I was one) that he
was losing more from his army by
desertion than by the guns of the
enemy. Be thought tbe discussions
against the constitutionality of Con
federate military laws, and the
clamor for peace through separate
State action, contributed much to
this result. Deserters had been ar
rested with arguments, on these
subjects, from leading men in some
of the States, in their pockets.
The hopes of Lincoln and the
complaints of Lee, united in a pow
erful appeal to every true Confeder
ate to do what he could to promote
harmony, bring about good will,
make sacrifices of opinions and
prejudices, and unite all in earnest
and patriotic efforts to bring back
deserters, and reinspire the people
to resist subjugation, the evils of
which no man could exagerate.
The Georgia delegation in Con
gress, perhaps, more than any other,
were embarrassed and disturbed bv
the rumors and facts alluded to. It
was often said that Georgia was to
lead off in the counter-revolution,
and invite other States to follcw r ;
and, more than once in my place in
the Senate, I felt called on to repu
diate such allusions with energy
and emphasis.
A few days before or after, I
think after, the first day of January,
1865, the Hon. William E. Smith,
the excellent and true member from
the Albany district, received a letter
(I think Judge Hansell was the
writer) giving an account of a popu
lar meeting held at at
which resolutions were passed re
questing the Governor to convene
the Legislature in extra session with
the view of calling a convention of
the people of the State. He also
stated that similar meetings were
called, or spoken of, in other coun
ties of Southern Georgia, and the
letter was a most patriotic one in
deprecation of the movement.
It was generally believed in Rich
mond, and confirmed by letters
from Georgia, that Gov, Brown was
ready and willing to convene the
Legislature and recommend the call
for a convention ; that the Vice-
President was in full accord with
the Governor, and that his brother,
Judge Linton Stephens, an able
member of the Legislature, would
take the lead for the movement in
that body.
On the reception of this letter by
Mr. Smith, a meeting of the Geor
gia delegation was called to assem
ble at Mr. Stephens’ room in the
afternoon after the adjournment of
the two houses. Senator Johnson
was not present. I think he was
absent from the city. I think one,
or possibly two members of the
House were also absent.
At this meeting the letter referred
to was read, other information on
the subject added, and the threat
ened movement in Georgia was dis
cussed. The result of the discus
sion, or interchange of views, was a
unanimous request from the delega
tion that Mr. Htephens would write
to Gov. Brown, and urge him, in
behalf of the delegation, not to con
vene the Legislature, etc.
Mr. Stephens said he would not
write the letter, as matters then
stood, but if we would unite with
him and aid in getting np a move
ment for a negotiation for peace
from Richmond, he would write to
Gov. Brown and advise and request
him to suspend the call and move
ment in Georgia until the result of
the effort at Richmond should be
known.
lat once said: What plan do you
propose, Mr. Stephens?
He then said that Mr. Atkins, of
Tennessee, had a day or two before
presented to him some resolutions
for his review and revision, which
he (Atkins) proposed to introduce
in the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs for report to the House, and
that he (Mr. Stephens) had drawn
a set himself in lieu of those of Mr.
Atkins, which expressed his views
on the subject.
We asked him to read the resolu
tions he had prepared, and he
did so.
The substance of these resolutions
was that the House of Representa
tives, voting by States, should elect
commissioners, with authority to
proceed to Washington, and, in the
name and behalf of the States, pro
pose peace on the great principles
of 1776.
If the commissioners should not
be received at Washington, or the
offer of peace on the principles pro
posed should be rejected, then we
were all to unite, fire the Southern
heart anew, and rally the people to
the struggle for independence as the
only recourse left to avoid subjuga
tion.
I told Mr. Stephens I thought it
would be more regular and proper
for the resolutions to leave the se
lection of the commissioners to the
President, but I would waive all ob
jection and agree to support his
resolutions without any change or
amendment if he would write to
Gov. Brown to stop the movement
in Georgia, and I moved that the
delegation agree to Mr. Stephens’
resolutions as proposed.
After some discussion the vote
was taken, each member expressing
ihs views, and every member voted to
agree on the terms proposed, except
one. That exception, I think, was
the Hon. James M. Smith, now
Governor. He stated that he voted
nay because the resolutions did not
meet the approval of his judgment;
but he appreciated the motives of
the delegation, and in deference to
their wishes he would not oppose
the resolutions in the House, but
go with the delegation. Thus we
were unanimous.
After this agreement was reached
I said to Mr. Stephens, that if the
House elected commissioners I did
not doubt he would be chosen as
one of them. But if the House, as
I thought was proper and probable,
should amend the resolutions, and
leave the selection of the commis
sioners to the President, I would
insist that he be placed at the
head of the commission, and, there
fore, he might make his arrange
ments, in either view, to go to Wash
ington.
He said he had no idea of going
himself, and did not suppose he
would be either elected or appointed.
He said, also, he did not believe the
commission would sue eed, and he
doubted whether it would even be
received at Washington, and he had
no desire to be one of the commis
sioners.
But we insisted that he had made
our people believe something could
be done by negotiation—that the
people looked to him more than to
any one else in that movement—that
he was the leader of it—that, there
fore, he could not decline to go if
elected or appointed, and that if the
commission was not received, or
failed, and he was not on it, the
people would say it failed because
he was not chosen.
We then interchanged views in
the delegation, as to other proper
persons, to be associated with Mr.
Stephens. He mentioned several.
Judge Campbell, Senator Graham,
and, I think, Gen. Banning and Mr.
Flournoy, were all discussed. Some
of the delegation suggested Mr.
Hunter, but Mr. Stephens objected
to Mr. Hunter. It was at this meet
ing that Mr. Stephens, also, gave us
his views of bow the war ought to be
conducted. Compulsory laws should
be repealed—only volunteers relied
on—West Point generals removed,
and civilian generals appointed.
The ideas were memorable.
I went directly from this meeting,
across the street, to the Executive
mansion, and, in a short time after
my arrival there, was left alone with
the President. I gave Mr. Davis a
full account of the reports from
Georgia—of the meeting of the Geor
gia delegation, the resolutions of
Mr. Stephens, and of all that was
said and done in the meeting.
He was deeply pained at the
movements in Georgia. No man
could be more anxious than himself
to negotiate for peace, if there was
any prospect jbf being met in that
spirit by the other side. He greatly
feared that such irregular move
ments would tend, more than any
thing else, to encourage the enemy
and destroy the hope of peace.
I told him I understood his views
fully. I knew he was willing to ne
gotiate, if it could be done. But his
enemies were clamorous in making
the people believe he was actually
opposed to it, and were, by such
means, causing desertions from the
army and divisions among our peo
ple, and something must be done to
silence these clamors. That while
there was danger, as he suggested,
that an effort to get up negotiations
on our part, without any indication
of a willingness to meet us on the
other side, and with Mr. Lincoln’s
message distinctly repudiating all
negotiations, might be unfortunate
in the impression rnade on the minds
of the enemy, ’to our disadvantage,,
yet, to make no effort, and especially
to oppose an effort when proposed
by the malcontents in our midst,
would continue to weaken our army
and divide our people, and this
would be by far the greater evil of
the two. I told him that Mr. Ste
phens had promised to write to
Gov. Brown at the instance of the
Georgia delegation, if we would
agfte to his resolutions, and this
would, we thought, stop Gov. Brown,
and now we must adopt a policy to
stop Mr. Stephens, and I believed
this would effectually silence the ne
gotiation clamor. That if an effort
at negotiation had to be made and
fail, it was better to make it in any
form by the Confederate authorities,
than let the agitation for such a
movement by separate State action
go on.
After thus discussing the subject
on its merits for some time, I told
the President I had three requests
to make of him. The first was if
the House should not amend the
resolutions, but pass them as drawn
by Mr. Stephens, and elect commis
sioners under them, that the admin
istration would not oppose the move
ment, and would promptly furnish
passports to the commissioners
through our lines.
He said he would certainly respect
the wishes of the House, and
promptly furnish passports, through
our lines, to any person or persons
they might desire to send to Wash
ington.
The second request was, if the
House should amend the resolutions,
as they ought to do, and leave the
selection of the commissioners with
him, that he would select Mr. Ste
phens and place him at the head o 1
the commission.
This led to a free discussion of
Mr, Stephens. The President nei
ther then, nor at any time, said any
thing to me personally unkind o: 1
the Vice-President, though he
greatly deprecated his course ; but
was it wise to place a man at the
head of suoh a commission who was
not only a known enemy of the ad
ministration, but who was so con
stantly condemning the laws of Con
gress as unconstitutional, and the
conduct of the war as oppressive and
unwise ? I said the object of this
movement was to silence the enemies
of the administration and. stop this
hurtful clamor about negotiation;
that Mr. Stephens had made himself
the very head of this negotiation
party—had made the people be
lieve much could be done in that
way, and that if he was not on the
commission and it failed, he and
his friends would say it failed be
cause he was not on it, and thus we
would hazard the evil of the move
ment and not accomplish the good
intended.
The third request was that he
would appoint associates agreeable
to Mr. Stephens, and tram mel the
commission as little as possible with
instructions. My reason for this re
quest was, that, from my knowledge
of Mr. Stephens’ character, if the
commission failed and he could find
any excuso for doing so, I believed
he would charge the fault of the fail
ure on him, the President.
You ask a great deal, said Mr.
Davis, smiling. Appoint an enemy
of the administration at the head of
a commission to make peace with
the enemy, allow him to choose his
own colleagues, and then give them
discretionary powers!
I said I was aware I was asking a
great deal, and my requests were
only suggestions to be weighed by
him—that the disease we were seek
ing to cure was great and growing,
and needed a bold remedy, and I
believed there was no way to cure
it, and stop the demoralization caus
ed by this negotiation clamor, but
by making the negotiation doctors
take their own medicine, mixed to
suit themselves; and that Mr. Ste
phens was under pledge, if the com
mission failed, to unite with us to
rally the people to arms, and make
a harmonious fight for indepen
dence.
Mr. Davis said, he had entire con
fidence in Judge Campbell, Senator
Graham, and all the gentlemen
named, but he would prefer to have
one “straight jacket” on Iho com
mission. There was no better or
truer man than Mr. Hunter, aud
there was no good reason why Mr.
Stephens should object to Mr! Hun
ter.
I agreed that the objection to Mr.
Hunter was not reasonable. He
was President, pro. tem., of the Sen
ate, but the Senate could easily
remedy this. I did not believe a
better man, every way, could be se
lected, and there was certainly no
good reason why he should not be
one of the number.
This interview with the President
lasted several hours, and it was mid
night when I left him. 1 had not
mistaken the great character of this
great man. While the President
did not make, nor I ask, any posi
tive promise, yet, the responsibility
I had assumed in presence of the
delegation, I was satisfied, be
fore the sun rose again, was not
recklessly assumed. Qther mem
bers of the delegation approached
the President on the same business,
as both they and the President af
terwards informed me. It is fash
ionable with some to say Mr. Davis
was Unreasonable and impractica
ble. I did not find him so. Such
men as Lee, Jackson, Early, Breck
inridge, Hunter, Howell Cobb, Spar
row and Henry, found no necessity
to quarrel with Mr. Davis during
the war, nor have they abused him
since the war ended. Those who
were themselves notoriously im
practicable, or whose zeal, efficien
cy, or fidelity, in any form, to the
cause, was a matter of debate, could
not agree with Mr. Davis during the
war, and, of writing books in their
own defence since the war, there
seems to be no end. For myself, I
never saw Mr. Davis until he came
to Montgomery to be inaugurated
President. We had belonged to
different political parties. For the
first two years I knew him but slight
ly. The journals of the Senate will
show I often differed with him. But
I never decried the laws, nor weak
ened their administration. As the
struggle grew harder we drew closer
together. I studied his character
Well. A truer man to the cause he
was chosen to lead is not furnished
by the history of human struggles.
Because I know him I shall honor
him while I have breath. It is cu
rious, too, that those who found so
much to quarrel with in Mr. Davis
and the Confederate laws, have
found so little to quarrel with in the
most striking usurpations of those
who were then our enemies, and are
now our oppressors. But this is
not the time for comment and I re
sume the narrative.
I was informed by members of the
Georgia delegation, that, within a
very short time—only a day or two
—after our meeting at Mr. Ste
phens’ room, the identical resolu
tions then read by Mr. Stephens to
us, were reported from the Commit
tee on Foreign Affairs to the House
in secret session. Mr. Hives, the
chairman of that committee, declin
ed to report them, not approving
them, and they were reported by
Mr. Orr, of Mississippi. Some in
decisive action was had by Jthe
House, and a little discussion, when
a day about a week, or less, ahead
was fixed- for their consideration.
The morning after they were so re
ported t met Mr. Hunter on his way
to my house to see me. He seemed
to be as much troubled as I ever
saw him. H 9 expressed alarm at
the resolutions, and especially at
the rumor he had heard that the
Georgia delegation, including my
self, had agreed to them. Could it
be that the rumor was correct? I told
him it was correct, and briefly re
peated the reasons for our course.
Ho seemed a little better satisfied ;
expressed great confidence in the
Georgia delegation, and said he
hoped it would come out all right,
but he was afraid a movement, so
irregular and uninvited by the slight
est indications from the enemy,
would do mischief.
In a day or two after this, and
before the day fixed by the House
to consider the resolutions," Mr.
Blair arrived in Richmond. His
mission was at once understood by
the authorities, and was the general
topic of conversation bv the people.
He had consultations with the Pres
ident, and I soon called on Mr. Da
vis to learn from him what was prop
er for him to communicate on the
subject. He showed me the letter
dated January 12th, in which Mr.
Davis expressed his readiness to
send a commission whenever he had
reason to suppose it would be re
ceived, or to receive a commission
if the United States Government
should be disposed to send one.
The visit of Mr. Blair opened the
way for getting up a commission in
a proper and regular way, and ren
dered further action on the resolu
tions of Mr. Stephens unnecessary.
Mr. Blair returned to Richmond
again, bringing the letter dated Jan
uary 18th, in which Mr. Lincoln ex
pressed his readiness to receive any
agent whom Mr. Davis, or any other
influential person resisting the Na
tional authority, might informally
send. This letter was delivered to
Mr. Davis about the 21st.
Mr. Davis also showed me this
letter and we discussed the pros
pects. He now had some expecta
tion that an armistice, at least,
might be secured, during which dis
cussions might spring up that might
result in a final termination of the
struggle. Mr. Blair was careful to
disclaim all authority from Mr. Lin
coln and his government, but these
disclaimers did not greatly lesson
the significance of his mission and
his conversations. The situation,
all in all, was well calculated to in
spire hope and even confidence. The
change in the manner of getting up
the commission, was to work no
erfange in the persons who were to
compose it on our part. We still
insisted that Mr. Stephens should
read it. At this critical juncture,
the proclamation of Gov. Brown
convening the Legislature of Geor
gia in extra session on the 15th of
February was issued and was tele
graphed to Richmond. It was dated
the 25 th day of January, and my rec
ollection is it reached Richmond the
day, or the day before, Mr. Blair
eft that city. This proclamation
created no little consternation. It
was inexpressibly unfortunate. Mr.
Davis sent for me, and expressed
great surprise at its appearance. I
rad expressed to him great confi
dence, indeed no doubt, thatfthe let
ter of Mr. Stephens conveying to
Gov. Brown the views of the Geor
gia delegation, would stop this
movement in Georgia. It did not
occur to either of us that Mr. Ste
phens had not written the letter,
and the appearance of the procla
mation was wholly inexplicable upon
any hypothesis that Gov. Brown
was willing to act in any accord
with the Confederate authorities.
Nothing was better calculated to de
stroy the prospects of good results
from the commission now about to
be organized by the Confederate au
thorities, than separate State move
ments in what was believed to be a
counter revolution against the Con
federacy; and if Mr. Lincoln should
believe that these separate State
movements were going on, it was
certain he would abandon the idea
of serious negotiations with agents
from Mr. Davis.
The President also received a tel
egram from a high military official
in Georgia, giving account of a de
plorable demoralization in the State,
and urging that something should
be done, if possible, to arrest it.
At Mr. Davis’ earnest request, I
agreed to come to Georgia in time
to meet the Legislature on its as
sembling, and address that body in
opposition to the recommendations
of Gov. Brown for a convention,
which it was well understood he in
tended to make. It was the very
movement winch the Georgia dele
gation sought to pretent rby tfeef
meeting at Mr. Stephens’ room, and
we agreed to support a movement
even an irregular one—few a peace
commission at Hichmond, in order
to get Mr. Stephens’ aid in
ing the movement by Gov. Brown.
In the meantime the President
having determined to propose Mr;
Stephens to the Cabinet as one of
the commissioners', it became neces
sary for him to have an interview
with the Vice President, an event
which, I believe, had not occurred
for a long time. Mr. Hunter under
took to bring about that interview,
and-it took place on Friday the 27th.
On the afternoon of that day Messrs.
Stephens, Hunter and Campbell
were proposed as Commissioners to
the Cabinet, and were appointed.
The President afterwards told me
that when he proposed thename of
Mr. Stephens, it was objected to,
and, I think he stated it was either
rejected or was about to be rejected.
He then stated to the Cabinet the
anxiety of the Georgia delegation
on the subject, the assurances I had
given him, and especially my speech
that “the negotiation doctors must
be made to take their own medi-
cine, and allowed to mix ttto suit
themselves," and they ratified his
nomination. On Saturday, • the
28th, the President and the
Commissioners had the conversatum
fd interview preparatory to their de
parture on their mission—a full ac
count of wbich conversation the
President reported to me on the 3d
of February, preparatory to my de
parture for Georgia.
On Sunday morning, the 29th of
January, the Commissioners left
Richmond. Up to this time we all
expected they were going to Wash
ington City. This was desirable for
many reasons. It was thought they
would have the opportunity of see
ing and conversing with many prom
inent men on the other side, and the
prospects for a successful mission
and good impressions would be
more favorable. But they were un
expectedly delayed at Petersburg,
or Gen. Grant’s headquarters, and
only got an interview with Mr. Lin
coln at last by a personal appeal
for it from Gen. Grant to Mr. Lin
coln. On the morning of the 3rd of
February, Mr. Davis received dis
patches of the day before, announc
ing that our Commissioners
not be allowed to go tcrWashington,
but would meet Messrs. Lincoln and
Seward at Hampton Hoads. I spent
much of that morning with Mr. Da
vis at his house, and can never for
get it. The whole subject, from its
beginning up to that moment, was
gone over. He had not trammeled
the Commissioners with any written
instructions. He only interchanged
views with them, in conversation,
leaving them a broad discretion in
the light of the circumstances as
they would best understand them
when they should reach Washing
ton. He thought it would be advis-
able, as far as possible, to receive
rather than make propositions. They
might avoid allusions to re-nnion
and independence, and agree to pre
liminary terms of an armistice, to
be perfected by another commis
sion, even though they might see
that Mr. Lincoln, in agreeing to the
armistice, was doing so under the
belief that it would result in re-un
ion. But they would know better
how to talk and act when they
reached Washington, and took a
survey of the situation, and he trust
ed with entire confidence in their
ability and discretion.
The main idea of this conversa
tion, as repeated to me, by Mr. Da
vis, is most strikingly confirmed by
"Mr; - JiQeclnhimself. In his mes
sage to Congress} giving ih flfefcflllßi*
of the conference, he uses this lan
guage :
“On my part the whole substance
of the instructions to the Secretary
of State, hereinbefore recited, was
stated and insisted upon, and noth
ing was said inconsistent therewith;
while, by the other party, it was not
said that in any event or on any
condition they ever would consent
to re-union; and yet they equally
omitted to declare that they never would
so consent. They seemed to desire a
postponement of that question and
the adoption of some other course
first, which, as some of them seemed:
to argue., might or might not lead to re
union, etc.
It was evident to Mr. Davis, in
the interview of the 3rd, that Mr.
Lincoln had changed his min'd since
he wrote the letter of the 18th, de
livered by Mr. Blair. The refusal
to let our Commissioners go to
Washington, the refusal to let them
see anybody but himself and Sew
ard, and their hesitation in letting
them go anywhere to see anybody,
all showed that Mr. Lincoln had
changed his mind. What had
changed him ? Had Mr. Blair and
the papers carried news to Mr. Lin
coln of the separate State move*
rnent in Georgia, of the divisions
among our leaders, of the probable
counter revolution by the States, of
the continued desertions from our
armies, of which Lee himself had
complained, and of the consequent
early disintegration of the Confed
eracy ? Had Sherman informed
him of movements in Georgia for a
State Convention to get rid of him
self (Davis) as commander of the ar
my? Whatever was the cause of the
change in Mr. Lincoln, he (Mr. Da
vis) was now satisfied the commis
sion would accomplish nothing.
Seward was wily and treacherous;
and would allow nothing to be done.
Our only chance now was to realize
that we had but one enemy, and
that enemy meant our subjugation
