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CAN A NEGRO HOLD OFFICE IN GEORGIA? ItrrUion and Opinion* of the .1 natter* of the Supreme Court of the State. The ease of Richard W. White, plain tift in error, against the State of Georgia on the relation ofWm. J. Clements, de fendant in error, comes before this Court on the following state of facts: AV'm. J. Clements applied to the Judge of the Superior Court of Chatham coun ty alleging thatat an election which had been held in that county for a Clerk of the Superior Court, he and Richard W. White were the sole candidates. That Richard W. White had got a majority of the votes, hut that he, Clements, had also got a good many votes, and that no other persons were running. The petition further stated that Richard W. White had been declared elected, and had been commissioned and was in the actual performance ofthe duties of the office, and that Richard W. White was a person of color, having one-eighth or more of African blood in his veins.— That therefore under the laws of Georgia he was ineligible to office, and further, that under the laws of Georgians White, the person having the majority of votes, was ineligible he (Clements) having re ceived the next highest number of votes was entitled to the position. He prayed the Court for leave to tile an informa tion for a quo warranto. To that peti tion of which White was notified he (White)filed a demurrer. Subsequently, however, he withdrew the demurrer to that petition, and the information is sued in the nameof the Stateof Georgia. The Court passed an order directing the Solicitor General for that Circuit to make out an information in the name ofthe State, reciting in effect the facts which had been recited in Clement’s petition, and calling upon White to show cause why a mandamus absolute should not issue against him, depriving him ofthe office and putting Clement’s in. White, at the proper time fixed by the information for answering, filed a demurrer to the information and at the same time filed an answer denying that he was a person of color, or that he had one-eighth or more of African blood in his veins. On this the Court summoned a jury for the purpose of trying the issue.— When the jury had been sworn, the de fendant below—the plaintiff here— called up his demurrer to the informa tion. It is stilted in the record that the plaintiff in the information made no objection to taking up the demurrer at that time, but consented; and the Court heard the motion as an independ ent motion before the case was sub- mitted to the jury. The Court decided that in the argument upon that motion --that demurrer—Clements, the movant in the general proceeding was entitled to open and conclude the argument — that the matter being before the jury the general rule which gives to the party moving in a demurrer the right to open and conclude did not apply. The Court heard the argument on the demurrer and overruled the demurrer. The case then went to the jury on the issue ot fact whether or not White had one-eighth or more of African blood in his veins. On the trial there were va rious questions made as to the testimo ny. One witness testified that the de fendant, White, was reputed in the neighborhood to be a colored person. Another witness testified that he, (the witness,) was a registrar, of voters; that when White registered he, the registrar, had affixed opposite White’s name the letter “C,” to denoto that lie was a per son of color; that he subsequently post ed the lists in a public place, and that they had remained there two or three weeks without any application having been made to him to have that letter "C” erased or changed. It did not ap pear,however, that there was any notice to White that this letter “ C” had been placed opposite to his name, nor did it appear that it was tho law or the prac tice that if he had applied to have it cor rected, that they would have corrected it; in other words that it was the part or the duty of the officer at all to make that entry. At least it has not so been made to appear to us. This evidence was objected to by the defence hut admitted by the Court. The Court also admitted as evidence the statement by a physician, an examin ing physician of an Insurance Compa ny, that at a previous time he had ex amined White and had pronounced him a mulatto. There was no testimony by the physician of what his opinion was at the time of the trial. The tes timony was that at some previous time he had examined him and was at that previous time, of opinion that he was a mulatto. In the further progress of the trial they proposed to introduce a copy of an application for a Life Insurance on the life of White in favor of his wife, which application purported to be signed by White. The application does not seem to have had a word in it as to whether White was a white man or black man, it gave no indication as to his color, but on the back of it there was an entry by a person who purported to be an exam ining physician, that White was a mu latto. The witness swore at first that he thought White signed the paper, but swore afterwards that he didn’t know whether White had signed it or wheth er his wife had signed it for him. Ob jection was made to this paper on three grounds; one, that it was a copy-paper, though it was proven that the original was in New York ; the other that there was no proof that the original had been executed; and third that in any event the paper amounted to nothing. Another witness, also a physician, swore that he was a practicing physician, and that he had studied the science of ethnolo gy ; that that science taught men the rules by which the race of man was ascertained, and this witness gave his opinion upon the point. The Court admitted his opin ion, that White was a person of color, as being the opinion of an expert. The case went to the jury on this testimony. There were some objections to the charge of the Court, which we, however, have not no ticed, because we didn’t think the point very material. The jury found for the plaintiff in the information. Thereupon the Court passed judgment, deposing White from his position as Clerk of the Superior Court, and declaring that Cle myut« was entitled to hold that office. 1 his case has been argued before us with a great deal of learning and ability. This court has agreed upon the judg ment which it will deliver in this case, but not upon the reasons upon which this judgment is founded. The court all agree that the judgment in the court below ought to be reversed; this court being unanimously of opinion that the court be low erred in various of its ruliugs on the trial anti on the question of the argument on the demurrer. A majority of the court, the Chief Jus tice and myself, agree in the judgment that the court below erred in overruling thedemurrer.it being our opiuion that under the Code of Georgia a person of color is eligible to office in Georgia. My brother Brown, however, and my self do not exactly agree upon the grounds upon which we base that judg ment. The statutes of the State of Georgia require that the court shall agree in the decision which it makes—the prin ciple upon which it puts the case which it decides, and as my brother Warner— whilst be agrees to tbe general judgment —put his opinion upon one set of grounds, and my brother the Chief Justice puts his upon another, while I put mine upon a third, we are unable to agree upon a state ment of the general principles upon which we put our judgment. Hence, under the statute, we shall each give a statement of the ground upon which we assent to the judgment of this court. I will, therefore, now read the grounds upon which the whole Court bases its de cision ; the ground upon which the ma jority of the Court basis its decision, and I shall also aunounce the principles upon which, I myself, hold that the Court be low erred. As this is a case of a good deal of public importance, involving not only the rights ofthe defendant, and this plaintiff in er ror, but of a very large poition of the peo ple of this State, and one in which there is a great deal of interest taken, I have re duced to writing, in detail, my opinion ; and I will preface the reading of the judg ment of the whole Court, and ofthe ma jority of the Court, with some written re maps—preferring to do that rather than make a parole introduction. Whatever may have been under the Constitution of the United States, the ab stract truth as to the political condition and status of the people of Georgia at the close of the late war, from the stand-point of a mere observer, it seems to me perfect ly conclusive that the several branches ot the present State Government are shut up to the doctrine that the Constitution and frame of civil government in existence in this State on the lstof January, 1861, with all its disabilities and restrictions, was to tally submerged in the great revolution which trom 1861 to 186-5 swept over the State. Early in June, 186-5, the Governor of 1860 was in prison at Washington, and there was not, in the whole State, a civil officer in the exercise of the functions of his office. The whole body lately acting had been chosen under the laws of the Confederate States, and the incumbeuts of 1860 had ail either died or resigned or renounced their positions as officers under the Constitu tion of the United States, by swearing fealty to the Confederacy aud repudiating the government of the union. The people of the State were, in tiie lan guage of the President, without civil gov ernment of auy kind—in auarchy. The State, as a State of the Federal Union, still existed, but without auy frame of civil government, regulating, restraining and directing the exercise of its functions. From that time until the present State Government went into operation, the government of the State was with more or less completeness in the hands of the military authorities of the United States, aud the entire ancient civil polity of the State was totally ignored. Directly in the teeth of the oid Constitution, the people of color were recognized as freemen, and as entitled to equal, legal aud political rights with the whites. The Convention of 1867 met under the laws of the United States, and was elected aud composed iu total dis regard of all the provisions and presump tions, qualifications, disqualifications aud distinctions of the old organization. The black people participated in its election and its composition, on equal terms, in theory at least, with the white, aud nothing can to my mind be plainer than that,by the whole theory then acted upon, they were recognized as forming an integral partof the sovereign people,then assembled in convention to form for their common benefit a constitution and frame of civil government. Such being the facts of the case, it ap pears to me that this court, deriving its whole authority from the constitution then framed, aud sworn to support it, is, from tiie very nature of the case, absolute ly prohibited from recognizing as then or now, in force, either the Constitution of 1860 or 1865, or any of the legal or political disabilities or distinctions among the peo ple, dependent upon them or either of them. The convention met under the laws of the United States, to form a constitution for a people without civil government. It had nothing to repeal, uotbing to modify, uotbing to grant. None of the old Constitutions of the State, were at the time in operation—the Convention met under entirely new ideas and new pre sumptions. It represented anew people —a people among whom slavery had ceased, and among whom black people as well as white were recognized as forming part of the political society, aud entitled to equal participation in its rights, privi leges aud immunities. It is not necessary, for the purposes of tliis argument, that this theory shall be proven to have been a legal one under the Constitution of the United States. It is sufficient to state, that it is true as a fact, aud that the present State Government, is based upon it. If, when the Convention met in Decem ber, 1867, the ancieut Constitution of the State, or any of its legal or political disa bilities or disqualifying distinctions upon persons of color were of force, then the Convention was itself illegal, the present State Government is illegal, tiiis Court is illegal? His Honor, the Chief Justice, has his proper place in the Executive Chair, my respected associate and myself are private citizens, the plaintiff iu error is a slave, aud the whole political history of the State since the imprisonment of Governor Brown lu June, 1865, a gigantic illegality. I am aware that a very large class of our most intelligent people, so, at this mo ment, honestly, believe: to them this ar gument is not directed: but it seems to me, that to a Judge holding bis office un der tiie present State government, forming an essential part of its machinery, these views must be of overwhelming force. If he assumes the power to decide at all, he must, it seems to me, base his judgment upon principles which do not, if adopted in his own case, utterly subvert his own authority. I make these remarks with the greatest deference to the integrity and to the sound legal aceumen of my associates. Honest men see things in different lights, and it is as presumptuous as it is uncharitable, for one man to set up his convictions as the necessary guide of the conscience of another. These are my convictions, and as a matter of course, I must act upon them, aud accordingly, under the rules prescribed by the Statute; lauuounce, as the general principles, controliug my judgmeut in this case, the following : By the whole court. First. The statement of a registrar of voters that he had marked a registered person’s name with a “C” to denote that he was colored aud had posted his lists for some time in a public place, and that no application had been made to have the said “C” erased, is no evidence that the person is a colored person, it not being shown that the person knew of the entry, and that it was the subject of correction.’ Second. Although a copy of a paper proven to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court is good secondary evidence of its contents, yet it must be shown that the original was duly executed. 3d. An application for a life insurance, though signed by the applicant, upon tbe back of which was an entry by the exam ining physician that the applicant was a mulatto, is no evidence unless it be proven that the person sigued the paper after the eu try on it was made l»y the pby'siciau aud with the knowledge of theeutry and with intent to adopt it, or that he used the pa per after the entry was made with a knowl edge that such entry was there. 4th. The statement by an examining physieiau, that he had at a certain timeex amined a person and had then been of the opiuion that the person was a mulatto, is not evidence. If the physician is an ex pert he must give his present opinion, aud if not he must state the facts upon which he bases his opiuion. Whether or not one is a person of color, that is, has African blood in his veins, is matter of opinion, aud a witness may give bis opinion if he states the facts upon which it is based. But whether the fact that he has one eighth or more of such blood, be matter of opinion or not—Query ? sth. One who testifies that he has stud ied the science of ethnology may give his opinion as an expert on the question of race. Its weight is for the jury. Pedigree, relationship aud race may be proven by evidence of reputation among those who know the person whose pedigree or race is in question. The whole Court agree upon those prop ositions. The majority of the Court agree upon this proposition. \Y here a quo warranto was issued charging that a person holding an office was ineligible, when chosen, cause of bis having in his veins one-eighth or more of African blood, and there was a demurrer to the information as well as an answer denying tbe fact, upon which deuial there was an issue and a trial before the jury: Held that by the Code of Geor gia, a person having oue eighth of more of African blood in his veins is not ineligible to office in this State, aud it was error in the Court to overrule the demurrer and to charge the jury that if the plaintiff proved the defendant to have one-eighth or more of African blood he was ineligible to office in this State. DECISION OF COURT AS RENDERED BY JUS TICE M’CAW Whilst I agree that the Code of Georgia —the law of Georgia, as separate from the Constitution—does make persons of color eleigible to office, my opinion is that eligi bility is guaranteed by the Constitution of the State, and I announce these proposi tions as the general principles upon»which my opinion is based: Ist. The Constitution of Georgia known as the Constitution of 1868 is anew Con- , stitutiou, made by, and formed for, a peo- J pie who at the time were, by the facts o the case, and by the laws of the United ! States, without any legal civil government; : aud as the people of Georgia, without re gard to past political distinctions, and with out regard distinctions of color, participa ted on equal terms in the election for the Convention, and iu its composition and de liberations, as well as iu the final ratifica tion of the Constitution it framed—in the construction of that Constition, and in the investigation of what rights it guarantees or denies, such distinctions are equally to be ignored. 2d. The rights of the people of this State, white aud black, are not granted to them by the Constitution thereof. The object and effect of that instrument is not to give, but to restrain, deny, regulate and guarantee rights ; and ail persons recog nized by that Constitution as citizens of tbe State have equal legal and political rights, except as otherwise expressly de clared. 3d. It is the settled and uniform sense of the word “citizen,” when used in refer ence to the citizens of the separate States of the United States, and to their rights as such citizeus, that it describes a person entitled to every right, legal and political, epjoyed by any person in that State, un less there be some express exception, made by positive law, covering tbe particular person, or class of persons, whose rights are in question. 4tb. Words used in a statute, or Consti tution, have their ordinary signification, unless they be words of art, when they have the sense placed upon them by those skilled iu the art, or unless their meaning be defined aud fixed by law—in which latter case the legal meaning must pre vail. sth. By the 1648th and 1649th sections of Irwin’s Revised Code, it is expressly de clared that among the rights of citizens is the right to hold office, and that all citi zeus are entitled to exercise all their rights assuch, unlessexpressly prohibited by law; and as tiie Constitution of 1868 expressly adopted said Code as tiie law of the State, when that Constitution uses tbe word "citizen,” it uses it in tiie sense put upon it by the express definition of the Code it adopted. 6th, Article Ist aud section 2d of the Constitution of 1868 expressly declares that all persous born in tiie United States, or naturalized therein, resident in this State, are citizeus of this State, and as the Code adopted by the convention, in ex press terms, declares that among the rights of citizens is the right to bold office, a colored person born in the United States and resident iu this State, is, by that section of the Constitution, guaran teed eligibibility to office, except when otherwise prohibited. 7th. Nor would the repeal of those sec tions of the code, or their alteration, de prive a colored person of the right thus guaranteed. Since it is a settled rule that it is not in the power of the Legislature to divest a right or change a constitutional guarantee by altering the legal meaning of the word by which that guarantee was made. Bth. The right to vote involves the right to be voted for, unless otherwise expressly provided, since it is not to be presumed without an express enactment that the principalis ofless dignity or rights than the agent. 9th. Tliere being in the Constitution of 1868 various special disqualifications of electors for particular offices, aud four sep arate sections detailing disqualifications for any office, aud a black skin not being mentioned as one of these disqualifica tions, under the rule that the expression, etc., of one tiling is the exclusion of oth ers, persons of color, electors, are not dis qualified from holding office. 10th. There never has been in this State, at auy period of its history, any denial iu terms of the right, to vote or to hold office, to colored persons as such. By the old law, they were eitherslaves or free persons of color, and these rights were denied them by declaring that they were not, aud could not be citizens of tiie State, and when Ar ticle Ist, Section 2d of the Constitution of 1868, recognized them as citizens, the right to vote and to hold office, except as other wise provided by the Constiiutiou, was, ex vi termini, also guaranteed to them. 11th. Ineligibility to office involves not only the denial to the person claiming the place the right to be chosen, but, what is of far greater moment, the right of the se lectiug power to choose ; aud to make out a case of ineligibility tbere must be such a state of affairs as established not only the want of power to be chosen, but a denial of power in the selecting power to choose. 12th. The people of a State, iu their col lective capacity, have every right a politi cal society can have, except such as they have conferred upon the United States, or on some department of the State Govern ment, or have expressly denied to them selves by their Constitution; and as the right to select a public officer is a political right, the people of that branch of the Government clothed by the Constitution, with the power to choose, may select whomsoever it will, unless the right to choose a particular person or class of per sons, is expressly taken away by the Con stitution. OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE BROWN. The view which I take of the rights of the parties litigant in this case, under the Code of Georgia, renders it unnecessary for me to enter into an investigation of the question—whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or the Second Section of the First Article of the Constitution of Georgia, which in substance is identical with the Fourteenth Amendment, confers upon colored citizens the right to hold office. If the respondent in this case ac quires the right by grant found in either of the said Constitutions, or in the Code of this State, it is sufficient for all the purposes of the case at bar, and entitles him to a reversal of the judgment of the Court below, which was adverse to his right. The third paragraph of the 9th Article of the Constitution of this State adopts, in subordination to theConstitutiou of the United States, and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, and in subor dination to the said Constitution of this State, the “body of laws known as the Code of Georgia, and the acts amendatory hereof, which said Code and acts are em bodied in the printed book known as Irwin’s Code,” “except so much of the said several statutes, Code and laws as may be inconsistent with tbe supreme law herein recognized.” The Code, Section 1646. classifies natu ral persons into four classes: Ist. citizens, 2d. residents, 3d. aliens, 4th. persons of color. Section 46 of the Code declares that, All white persons born in tbis State, or in any other State of this Union, who are or may become residents of this State, with the intention of remaining herein ; all white persons naturalized under the laws of the United States, and who are, or maybe come, residents of this State, with the in tention of remaining herein ; all persons who have obtained a right to citizenship under former laws, and all children, wherever born, whose father was a citizen of this State at the time of the birth of such children ;or in case of posthumous children at the time of his death, are held and deemed citizens of this State. By the Code the distinction is therefore clearly drawn between citizens who are white persons aud persons of color. In other words, none are citizens under the “printed book known as Irwin’s Code” but white persons. Having speci fied the class of persons who are citizens, the Code proceeds, in Section 1648, to de fine some of the rights of eitizens, as fol lows : “Among the rights of citizens are the enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, private property aud the disposition thereof, the elective franchise, the right to hold office, to appeal to the Courts, to testify as a witness, to perform any civil function, and to keep and bear arms ” Section 1649 declares that u All citizens are entitled to exercise all their rights as such unless specially prohibited by Jaw.” Section 1650 prohibits females from ex ercising the elective franchise, or holding civil office. Section 1651 prohibits minors from the exercise of civil functions, till they are of legal age. Sections 1652 and 1653 prohibits certain criminals, and persons non compos mentis, from exercising certain rights of citizens. Article 3, chapter 1, title 1, part 2, of tbe Code defines the rights of the 4th class of natural persons, designated as persons of color ; giving them tbe right to make con tracts ; sue aud be sued, give evidence, in herit, purchase and sell property ; and to have marital rights, security of persons, estate, <stc., embracing the usual civil rights of citizens, but does not confer citi zenship. Thus the Code stood prior to its adoption by the new Constitution. As already shown, it was adopted, in subordination to the constitution, and must yield to the fundamental law, when ever in conflict with it. In so far as the code had conferred rights on] the colored ace there is no conflict and no repeal. The constitution took away no right then pos sessed by them under the code, but it en larged their rights as defined in the code, by conferring upon them the right of citi GEORGIA JOURNAL AND MESSENGER. zensbip. It transferred them from the 4th class of natural persons, under the above classification, who were denied citi zenship by the code, to the Ist class, as citizens. The 46th Section of the Code limited cit izenship to white persons. The Constitu tion struck out the word white, aud made all persons born or naturalized in the United States, aud resident in this State, citizens, without regard to race or color. It so amended Section 46 of tbe Code.as greatly to enlarge the class of citizens. But it repealed no part of nection 1648, which defines the rights of citizens. It did not undertake to define the rights of a citizen. It left that to the Legisla ture, subject to such guarantees as are con tained in the Constitution itself, wbicli the Legislature cannot take away. It de clares expressly, that no law shall be made, or enforced, which shall "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or of this State.” It is not necessary to the decision of this case to inquire, what are the “privileges and im munities” of a citizeu ? which are guar anteed by tbe 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and by the Constitution of this State. Whatever they may be, 1 bey are protected against all abridgement by legislation. This is the full extent of tbe Coustitutional guarantee. All rights of the citizen, not embraced within these terms, if they do not embrace all, are subject to the control of the Legis lature. Whether the "privileges and immuni ties” of lhe citizen embrace political rights, including the right to hold office, I need not now inquire. If they do-,-tfoil right is guaranteed alike by the Constitu tion of the United States, and the Consti tution of Georgja; and is beyond the con trol of legislation. If not, that right is subject to the control of the Legislature as tbe popular voice may dictate; and iu that case the Legislature would have pow er to grant or restrict it at pleasure, in case of white persons as well as of persons of color. The Constitution of Georgia has gone as far as the Fourteenth Amendment has gone, but no further. An authoritative construction of the Fourteenth Araend mend by the Supreme Court of the United States upon this point, would be equally binding as a construction of the Constitu tion of the State of Georgia, which is in the same words. Georgia has complied’ fully with the terms dictated by Congress iu tbe forma tion of her Constitution. She has stopped nothing short, and gone nothing beyoud. The highest judicial tribunal of tbe Union will no doubt finally settle the meaning of tbe terms "privileges aud immunities” of the citizen, which legislation cannot abridge; and tbe people of Georgia, as well as those of all tbe other States, must conform to, and in good faith abide by and carry out, the decision. All the rights of alt tiie citizeus of every State, which are included in the phrase "privileges and immunities,” are protected against legis lative abridgement by tbe fundamental law of the Union. Those not so embraced, unless included within some other consti tutional guarantee, are subject to legisla tive action. The same rights which the Fourteentli Amendment to the Constitu tion of the United States confers upon aud guarantees to a colored citizen of Ohio, are conferred upon and guaranteed to every colored citizen of Georgia by the same amendment, and by tbe Constitu tion of this State, made in conformity to the reconstruction acts of Congress. W hatever may or may not be the privi leges and immunities guaranteed to the colored race, by the Constitution of the United States, and of this State; it can not be questioned that both Constitutions make them citizens. Aud I think it very clear that the Code of Georgia upon which air ne I base this opinion, which is bind ing upon all her inhabitants while of force, confers upon all her citizens tbe right to hold office, unless they are pro hibited by some provision found iu the Code itself. I find no such prohibition in tiie Code, affecting the rights of this re spondent. I am, therefore, ofthe opinion that the judgment of the court below is erroneous, and I concur in the judgment of reversal. Warner, J., dissenting. The defendant is a color, having, as the record states; one-eighth of negro or African blood iu his veins, who claims to be lawfully entitled lo hold and exercise tbe duties of the office of Clerk of the Superior Court of Chatham county, aud tiie question presented for our consideration aud judgment, is whether a person of color, of tbe description men tioned iu the record, is legally entitled to hold office in this State, under the Con stitution aud laws thereof? Tiie Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of tiie United States declares that, "All persons born or naturalized in tbe United States and subject to tbe juris diction thereof, are citizeus of the United States, and tbe State wherein they reside. No State shall make or euforce any law which shall abridge tbe privileges or im munities of citizens of the United States.” Tbe Constitution of this State declares that, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, aud resident in this State, are hereby declared citizens of this State, and no laws shall be made or en forced which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or of this State.” From the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, aud the adoption and ratification of the Constitution of this State, in 1868, the defendant became, (not withstanding his color and African blood,) a citizen of the United States, and of this State, and is entitled to have all the priv llges or immunities of a citizen. Does the fact that the defendant was made a citizen of the State with all the privileges or immunities of acitizeu there of, confer upon him the legal right to hold office iu this State as such citizen? When we take into consideration the definition aud object of creating an office, and bv what authority it is conferred upon a citf zen, the distinction between the privileges aud immunities of a citizen as such, and hi 9 right to hold office, will be at once ap parent. It will be seen that the privileges and immunities of a citizen as such, i9one thing, and that his legal right to hold office as such citizen under the authority of the State, is another and quite a differ ent question. What is an office? “An office,” says Bacon, “is a right to exercise a public function,or employment,and to take the fees and emoluments belonging to it. Au officer is oue who is lawfully invested with an office. It issaid that the word ojffici um principally implies a duty, and in the next place the chargeof such duty; and that it is a rule, that where one man hath to do with another’s attairs against his will, and without his leave, that this is an office, and he who is in It is an officer. By the ancient common law, officers ought to be honest men, legal and sage, et qui melius sciant et possint offi&ui illi intendtre: and this says my Lord (Joke, was the pol icy of prudent antiquity, that officers did even give grace to the place, and uot the place only to grace the officer.” 7th Ba con’s Ab. 279—title offices and officers. Blackstone says the King, in England, is the fountain of honor and of office and the reason given is that the law supposes, that no one can be so good a judge of an officers merits, and services, as the King who employs him. “ From the same principal also arises the prerogative of creating and disposing of offices; for honors aud offices are in their nature convertible and synonymous. All officers under the Crown carry in the eye of the law an honor along with them; because they imply a superiority of parts’ and abilities, being supposed to be always filled with those that are most able to ex ecute them.” Ist B 1 Com. 271, 2. Offi ces (says Blackstone) are a right to exer cise a public or private employment and to take the fees aud emoluments thereunto belonging, aud are also iccorporeal hera dilaments. 2d 81. Com. 36. All citizens of the State, whether white or colored, male or female, minors or adults, idiots or lunatics, are eutitled to have all the privi leges aud immunities of citizens, but it does not follow that all of these different classes of citizens are entitied to hold office under the public authority of the State, because the privileges and immunU, ties of citizens are secured to them. The State iu this country, as the Crown in England, is the fountain of honor and of office, and she who desires to employ any class of her citizens in her service is the best judge of their fituess and qualifica tions therefor. An officer of the State, as we have shown, “ hath to do with anoth er’s affaire against his will and without his leave.” and snch officer must have the authority of the State to perform these public duties against the will of the citi zen and without his leave. This authority must be conferred upon the citizen by some public law of the State, from that class of her citizens which, in her judg ment, will best promote tbe general wel fare of the State. Tbe right to have and enjoy the privileges aud immunities of a citizen of the State does not confer upon him the right to serve the State in any official capacity, until that right is ex pressly granted to him by law. Mr. Justice Curtis in his dissenting opin ion in the case of Dred Scott vs. Sanford (19th Howard’s Rep. 5 and 3) says: “So iu all the States, numerous persons, though citizens, canuot .vote, or canuot hold office, either on account of their age, or sex, or the want of the necessary legal qualifications.” Corfield vs. Corvell 4th Washington C. C. Rep. 3 aud 1 to the same point. The defendant, therefore,cannot legally claim any right to hold office, either under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this State, which make him a citizen, and guarantee unto him the privileges or immunities of a citizeu ; for he may well have and enjoy all the privileges aud immunities of a citizen, in the State, without holding any office, or exercising auy public or official duty uuder the authority of tiie State. The privileges and immunities of a citizeu of the State do not confer tiie legal right to hold office under the public authority of the State, and receive the emoluments thereof. Does the public law of the State, recognized and adopted by the Constitu tion of IS6B, (known as Irwiu’s Code,) confer upon the defendant the legal right to hold office iu this State? Ttie Code took effect, as the public law of this State, on the first day of January, 1863. By the 46th section thereof, it is declared, “All white persons horn in this State, or iu any other State of this Union, who are or may become residents of this State, with the intentiou of remaining herein , all white persons naturalized under the laws of tiie United Slates, aud who are or may become residents of this State, with tiie intention of remaining herein ; all per sons who have obtained aright to citizen ship uuder former laws, aud all children wherever born, whose father was a citizen of this State at the time of tiie birth of such children, or in case of posthumous children at tbe time of his death, are held and deemed citizens of this State. Per sons having one-eighth or more of negro or African blood in their veins are not ‘white persons in the meaning of this Code.’ ” The 1646th section declares that "Natural persons are distinguished accord ing to their rights and status into—lst, citizens; 2d, residents, not citizens; 3d, aliens; 4th, persons of color. The per sous to whom belong the rights of citizen ship, aud the mode of acquiring and losing the same, have been specified jn a former article, (referring to article 46,* be fore cited.) Among the rights of citizens are the enjoyment of personal security of personal liberty, private property, and the disposition thereof; the elective franchise, the right to hold office, to appeal to the Courts, to testify as a witness, to perform any civil functions, and to keep and bear arms. All citizens are entitled to exercise all these rights, as sfleh, unless specially prohibited bv law.” Sections 1647, 1648, 1649. 1650, 1651, 1652, 1653, of the Code. It will be remembered that at the time of the adoption of the Code, in 1863, the defendant was not a citizen of this State, aud was not recognized by the Code as a citizen thereof. By the 1646 section, the status of tiie defendant is defined lo be that of a person of color, and not that of a citizen. The Revised Code, adopted by the Constitution of 1868, includes the Act of 1866, which declares that "All negroes, mulattoes. mustizoes aud their descend ants, having one-eighth of negro or Afri can blood in their veins, shall be known, in this State, as persous of color,” and es pecially defines their legal rights, but the light to hold office is not one of them. Revised Code,(Section 1661. It is true that since the adoption of tiie Code, tiie defendant has been made a citi zen, but all the legal rights conferred up on citizens by the Code, were conferred upon that class of persons only, who were declared and recognized by the Code, as citizens of the State at the time of its adoption when the Code declares. that§it shall be the right of a citizen to hold of fice, such right is coufiued to that class of persons who were recognized and declared therein, to be citizeus of the Slate, aud not to any other class of persous, who might thereafter become citizeus. So where the Code declares, that "All citizens are entitled to exercise all their rights as such, uuless prohibited by law,” it is ap plicable to that class of persons only, who were declared to be citizeus of the State at that time, and not to any other class of persous who might thereafter be majte citizens of tLe Slate: such as Chine Te, Africans, or persous of color. The truth is, that the public will of the State has never been expressed by any Legislative enactments in favor of tbe right of color ed citizens to hold office in this State siuce they became citizens thereof. Although these several classes of persons might be made citizens of the State, with the privi leges and immunities of citizens, still, they could not legally hold office under the authority of the State uutil that right shall be conferred upon them by some public law of the State, subsequent to the time at which they became citizens, so as to include them in its provisions. The public will ;of the State, as to the legal right of that class of her citizens to hold office, has never been affirmatively expressed; but on the contrary, when the proposition was distinctly made in the Convention, which formed the present Constitution, to confer the right upon colored citizens to hold office iu this State, it was voted down by a large majority. See Journal of Convention, page 312. So far as there has been any expression of the public will of the State as to the legal right of that class of citizens, known as colored citizens, and siuce they became such, to hold office in this State, it is against that right now claimed by the de fendant. The insurmountable obstacle in the way of the defendant claiming a legal right to hold office in this State under the provisions of the Code, is the fact, that he was not a citizen of the State at the time of its adoption. The class of persons to which he belongs were not recognized by it as citizens, and, therefore, he is not in cluded in any of its provisions which con fer the right to hold office upon the class of citizens specified in the Code. The Code makes no provision whatever for colored citizens to hold office in this State ; all its provisions apply exclusively to white citizens, and to no other class of cit izens. The Convention which framed the present State Constitution and declared persons of color to be citizens, could have conferred the right upon them to hold office, but declined to do so by a very de cided vote of that body, and went before the people claiming its ratification, upon the ground that colored citizens were not entitled to hold office under it. and there can be no doubt that the people of the State voted for its ratification at the ballot box with that understanding. But now it is contended that the de fendant, though a colored person, is made a citizen of the State and of the United States, and that no enabling Act has ever been passed to allow a naturalized citizen to hold office in this State, when he pos sessed the other requisite qualifications prescribed by law; that the defendant, having been made a citizen of the State, is entitled to hold office in the same manner as a naturalized citizen could do. The re ply is, that naturalized citizens were white persons, and as such, had a common law right to hold office, a right founded upon immemorial usage and custom, which has existed so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. The 1644th section of the Code simply affirms the common law, as to the right of a white citizen to hold office in this State. No such common law right,' however, c«n be claimed in this State, in favor of persons oi color, to hold office. They have but recently become entitled to citizen ship, and have never held office in this State. In 1848, in the case of Cooper and Worsham, vs. the Mayor and Aldermen of the city of Savannah. (4th Geo. Rep., 72,) it was unanimously held and decided by this Court, that free persons of color were not entitled to hold any civil office in this State. The naturalized white citizen can claim his common law right to hold office in this State. The colored citizen cannot claim any such common law right, for the reason that he has never exercised and enjoyed it, and that constitutes the difference between the legal right of a naturalized white citizen to hold office in this State, and a person of color, w'ho has recently been made a citizen “since the adoption of the Code, and, who is not embraced within its provisions. The one can claim his common law right to hold office in the State, the other cannot, and until the State shall declare, by some leg islative enactment that it is her will, and desire, that her colored citizens shall hold office under her authority, they cannot claim the legal right to do so—for we must not forget that the State is the fountain and parent of office, and may confer or re fuse to confer the right to hold office, up on any class of her citizens she may think proper and expedient. When anew class of persons are intro duced into the body politic of the State and made citizens thereof who cannot claim a common law right, to hold office therein, it is incumbent on them to show, affirmatively, that such right has been conferred upon them by some public law of the State since they were made citizens thereof, to entitle them to have and enjoy such right. In other words, they must show the public law of the State, enacted since they became citizens thereof, which confers the legal right claimed before they can demand the judgment of the Court, in favor of such legal right. All male white citizens of the State, whether native born ot naturalized citi zeuß (having the necessary legal qualifica tions,) have a common law right h> hold office in this State; and in order to deprive them of that common law right, a prohib itory statute is necessary. A naturalized citizen had a common law right to hold theolficeof President of the Uuited States; hence, the prohibition iu tbe Constitution of tbe United States. But as colored citi zens of the State who have reeeutly been made such, cannot claim a com mon law right to hold office iu the State, as uo prohibitory statute is nec essary to deprive them of a light which they never had under the common or statute law of the State when, therefore, it is said that colored citizens have the right to hold office in the State, unless specially prohibited by law, it must be shown, affirmatively, that they had pre viously enjoyed that right. If they cannot show their right to hold office iu the State, either under the common law, the Con stitution, or statutes of the State the fact, that they are not specially prohibited from exercisiug a right which they never had, amounts to uothiug, so far as investing them with the right to hold office is con cerned. When, and where, and by what public law of the State was the legal right to Lold office therein conferred ou the col ored citizens thereof? If this question cannot be answered in the affirmative, and the legal authority under which the r ght is claimed cannot be shown, then t .e argument, that inasmuch as there is -no special prohibition in the law against the right of colored citizens to 1o and office, falls to the ground. If there was no existing legal right to bold office to be prohibited, the fact that is no pro hibition does not confer such legal right. There was no legal necessity to prohibit that which did not exist. It Is not the business or duty of Courts to make the laws, but simply to expound and enforce existing laws, which have been prescribed by the supreme power of the State. After the most careful exami nation of this question, I am clearly of the opinion that there is no existing law of this State which confers the right upon tlie colored citizens there to hold office therein; and, consequently, that the de fendant lias no legal right to hold and ex ercise the duties of the office which lie claims under her authority; and that the judgment of ttie C ourt below overruling ttie demurrer should be affirmed. LEGAL ADVERTISEMENTS. 8188 COUNTY. MARSHAL’S SALE. WILT, be sold ou tbe first Tuesday in July next, the following properly : I.ots a and 4, block 29. and lot 7, block 51. Levied on as the property of W. H. Moughon, to satisfy bis city taxes for 1807 and 1888. J. B. CUMING, Jnnel-w4t _ Marshal. CT EORGIA—bIBB UOUNTY.— Whereas, Patrick H. T Carroll, administrator of the estate of Elizabeth and William D. Tucker, deceased, applies to me for letters of dismissi in : These are therefore to cite and admonish all and singular the kyidred and creditors of said deceased to lie and appear at my office on or before the first Monday in June, 1809, to show cause, if any they have, why letters should not be granted. Given under my hand officially, del2-m6t* C. T. WARD, Ordinary. CRAWFOKI) COUNTY. Crawford County Sheriff’s Sales. the SHERIFF’S SALES OK CRAWFORD 1 County will hereafter be published in the Journal and Messenger, Macon, Ga. This No vember 21, 1808. ANDREW' J. PRESTON, nv24-d«ftw-tf Sheri 11 CRAWFORD SHERIFF'S SALE. IXTJ LL be sold before tbe Court House door in TV the town of Knoxville, on the first Tuesday in July next, lots of Land numbers 239, 211,206, 179, 180, 172, 149, 181 and 238, lying in the Seventh District of originally Houston, now Crawford County, or so much thereof as will satisfy a tax fi fa due for the year 1868, viz : Crawford County vs. Brown, Lany & Cos. Tax due, $59; tax fi fa, 50 cents ; levy and advertising fee. / evy made by- Adam H. Hortanan, Constable, and returned to me, this June 4, 1869. JAMES N. MATHEWS, june7-tds Deputy Sheriff, * Gs EORGIA —CKA WFORI) COUNTY—Whereas, T Allen R.Davis,adrninlstraloron theestateof Solomon W. Davis, deceased, applies for letters of dismission from said administration: These are therefore to cite and admonish all persons Interested to be and appear at my office within the time prescribed by law, and show cause, if any they have, why said letters dismlssory should not he granted' the applicant. Given under my hand and official signature, February 20th, 1869. JAMES J. RAY, 1 eb24-6m—pi $7 . Ordinary. 4 1 EOKOIA—CKAWIOKD COUN l'Y.— loall wuoin it n-* may concern—Whereas, Lewis O. Chapman, ad ministrator upon the estate of Giles M. Chapman, late of said county, deceased, applies for letters of di-nns sion from toe administration of said estate : There fore, the kindred and creditors of said deceased, are hereby cited and admonished to tile their objeciions, if any they have, in my office in terms of the law. Otherwise, letters dismissory will be granted the ap plicant at the August term next of the Court of Ordi nary for said county- Given under my hand and official signature, this Jan uary 6th, 1869- JAMES J. RAY, ja!B 6m Ordinary. CR A W FOR I) HH ERI FF’H HALE. WILL be sold before the Court House door in the town of Knoxville, Crawford County, on tbe first Tuesday In July next, lo sos Land numbers 51, 83, 78, 45, and 35 acres of lot number 46, and 100 acres of lot number 79, containing, in the aggregate, nine hundred and forty five (915) acres, more or less, to satisfy a tax fi fa. Levied on as the property of C. A. Hawkins. Said tax due for the year 1867. The said lands lying in the Seventh District of originally Houston, now Crawford county. Tax $128; fi fa 50 cents. This May 28, 1869. A. J. PReSTON, Junel-tds She-iff. HOUSTON COUNTY. 77T NOTICE. A LL persons indebted to tne .-state of William l\. G. Gordon, deceased, of Houston county, are hereby notified to come forward and settle the same immediately; and all persons having claims against the estate will bring them for ward and prove them according to law. JAS. W. HARDISON, MARI HA GORDON, Administrator and Admlnlsiralrlx ma6w4od of Wm G. Gordon, dec'd ADMINISTRATOR’S SAUK. YU he sold on the first, Tuesday in Angnst TT next, oefore the Court House door In the town oi ferry, and county of Houston, Georgia, to the highest bidder, lot of I,and number one hundred and seventy-eight, (17S) and wrst half of lot number two hundred and seven, (2071 In the Tenth (10th) District of said county of Houston. Sold as Die property of the late Williams. Moore, under an order ol the Court of Ordinary of said county. Terms of sale cash. June 1,1869. AMILY MOORE, Administratrix de bonis non of jnneo tds Wm. 8. Moore, deceased. houstonsheriff’^sale: WILL be sold before the Court House door In the town of Perry, in said county, on the first Tuesday In July next, two Mules, one a dark bay and the other a mouse-colored mule, (Brute and Polly), levied on tosatisfv atl fa from Bibb Superior Court ir favor of 8.8. Dunlap vs. Y oung Johnson. Property pointed oat by E. W Jackson. Also, at the same time and place will be sold one-hall ()-£) interest In a bay Mule. Levied on as the property of J. M. Tooiney, to satisfy an at tachment from Houston Superior Court In favor of simmons A Stripling vs. said .1. M. Toornev Property pointed out by J. H. Hose. May3l. JNO. R. COOK. jnne3-tds__ Sheriff. Georgia —Houston county-—Whereas, wm D. Pierce has applied for permanent letters of administration on estate of Arthur Watson, late of Houston County, deceased : These are, therefore, to cite all persons interested to be and appear at my office on or before the first Monday in July next, to show cnnse, ifany. why the app ieation should not he granted Given under my hand and official signature of office, this 12th May, 1869. malß-30.1 ' W.T. SWIFT, O. H. C.*3 / 1 EOKGIA—HOUSTON COUN J Y . —Notice is hereoy Vj given to all persons having demands againts Wat kins Laidler, late of said county, deceased, to present them to us properly made out, within the time pre scribed by Gw, so as to show their character and amount. And all persons indebted to said deceased are hereby required to make immediate payment May 15,1869. MARGARET A. LAIDLER, JOHN H. La IDLER. ma!B-Aod Executrix and Executor. r IE tKGI A—HOUSTON COUNTY-Whereas, Edwin " 7 Greene, Administrator of James Parker, deceased, represents to the Court, in his petition duly filed and entered on record, that he has fullv admim-tered -aid James Parker’s estate : This is, therefore, to cite and admonish all persons concerned, kindred and creditors, to show cause, if any they can, why said administrator should not be discharged from his ad ministration and receive letters of dismission on the first Monday in September, 18%. Tnis May 15, 18% _malß-m6m W. T. SWIFT, 0. H. C. Georgia—Houston <_• :> i, wr,erSa»7 v r:"J Bazemore, adminisirrator of C.J. Uazemore, de ceased, respectfully showeth that he has fully dis chirged his duties as such, and now asks to be dis-- missed : These are therefore to cite ail persons inter ested to be and appear at my office on or before the first Monday in July next, to show cause, if any they have, why tne request should not be granted. Given under my hand and official signature, this 21st Decem ber, 1868. W. T. SWIFT, dc2B-mtd —pfsß o. H. C. GIEORGIA— HOUSTON COUNTY.—George iTuO- I lam, Sr., and John C. Rumph, administrators of Mis- Euphronia C. Rumph, lately deceased, having applied for dismission from said trust: These are therefore to cite and admonish all persons interested to oe and appear at my office on or before the first Monday in July, 18%, and show cause, if any they have, why said letters dismissorv should not be granted said applicants. Given under my hand and official signature, this December 4th, 18%. dc2B mid—pf #8 W. T SWIFT, O. H. C. GEORGIA-HOL'STON CO UN iY— ordinary >s Office for said County—Whereas. Patrick H Carroll, administrator de boms non cum testa menu annexo of James Vinson, deceased peti tions the undersigned for letters of dismission from said trust: Tnese are therefore to cite and admonish all persons interested to be and appear at my office on or before the Ist Monday in Sep tember next, to show cause, If any they have, why said letters of dismissron should not lie granted. Given nndermy official signature, this 28th February, 1869. W. T. SWIFT. mr2-td—pf *8 O. H. C. CT EORGIA—HOUSTON COUNTY.—Forasmuch “as t Ezekiel H. Ezell, Guardian of Penelope M Holme-, minor orphan of Wm. H. Holmes, late of sal 1 county, deceased, ha.- petitiened the Court for leave to resign his said trust, and having suggested the name of John W. Clarke as a suitable person willing to accept said trust and comply with the pro visions of law in such cases : These are, therefore to cite the said John W. Clarke, and ali others of kin to said ward, or otherwise interested, to appear at the next July Term of this Court, to show cause, if any exists, why said Ezekiel H. Ezell should, not be al lowed to resign his said trust, and said John W. Clarke be appointed in his stead. Given under my official signature, this May 15.18%. mal»-m6in W. TANARUS, SWIFT, O. H, C. i t K i^. K WA—HOO»TON( COUNTY- Whereas, VA David J. I ermiuier. Administrator Naomln * e H?. lDte L’ i* 1 ® Houston county, deceased, has petitioned this Court for Letters of DismtH&ion troin said estate. These are, therefore, t > cite all persons Interested to be and appear at my office on, or betore the first Monday iu September next, te show cause. If any, why the petition should not be granted. Given under mv hand and offi cial signature of office this, 21st May, 1869 W. T. SWIFT, O. H. C. may2s-m6m _ / A BORGIA—HOUSTON COUNTY.-Thlrty days VJT alter date I shall apply to the Court of Ordi nary of said county for leave to sell the lands be longing to theestateof Floyd Sawyer, late ol this county, deceased. June 1,1869. WM. BRUNSON, junes 3kl Administrator. EORGIA—HOUSTON COUN TV. Whereas, Alfred Hoy makes application for letters ol administration ou the estate o( Reddick Buze more. late of Houston County, deceased: These are, therefore, to cite all persons Interested to be find appear at my office on or betore the first Monday in July next, to show cause, If any, whi ttle application should not he grauted. Given under my hand and seal of office, this 18th May, 1869. W. T. SWIFT, O. H. C. ina22-30d GEORGIA —HOUSTON COUNTY.—Notice is herebn given to all person- having demands again-1 John G. Woodard, late of said county, deceased, to present them to me properly made out, within the time pre scribed by law, so as to show their character and amount. And all persons indebted to said deceased are hereby required to make muni .bate payment. May IS, 1869. ASA WOODARD, malß-40d Administrator. MACON COUNTY. and 1 EORGIA —MACON COUNTY.— WhareM, . a l T leb F. Hill, administrator on the estate or l . J. Bryan, late ot said county, deceased, applies tome for letters ot dismission from said admin istration: This is therefore to cite and admonish all persons concerned to be and appear ut my office on or betore the first Monday In July next, uud show cause, if any they have, why said let ters dismlssory should not be granted. Given under uiy hand and official signature. Decembei 22.1868. JNO. L. PARKER, dc24-m6t—pf $7 Ordinary. M.M )N SUPERIOR COURT, M ARCH ADJOURNED TERM, 1809. John F. Williams) Rule ni. si, vs. k to John Kelly. j Forech se Mortgage. IT appearing to the Court by the petition of Jolm K. Williams that on the seventh day ol November, In the year eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, the defendant made and delivered to plaintiff his promissory note, hearing date the day and year aloresaid, whereby tbe and« tendaut promised, on or before tlie first day of January, 1869, to pay to the plaiutifi oue hundred dollars for value received, and that afterwards, on the day and year first aforesaid, the defendant moi t gaged to plaint iff 5o acres of land on the northeast corner of lot No. i3O. In the 2d District ol Macon County, the better to secure the payment ol said note; and it further appearing that said note re maii.s due ami unpaid, it is therefore Ordered, That the said defendant do pay inio this Court, ou or before the first day of the next term thereof, the principal and Interest and cost due ou said note, or show <ause to the contrary, if any hecan; and that upon tlie failure ol tlie defendant to do so. the equity of redemption iu aud to said mortgaged premises be lorever there after barred and foreclosed ; aud It is further Ordered, That a copy of this order he published In the Georgia Journal and Messenger once a month for four months, previous to the next term of this Court. PHIL. COOK, . Petitioners’ Attorney. A true extract from the minutes of Macon su perior Court. JNO. M. GREER. April 20th, 1869. Deputy Clerk. an2l mil MACON SUPERIOR COURT. MARCH ADJOURNED TERM, 18G9, Mlttie Wise 4 vs. y Libel for Divorce. Robert Wise.) IT apfft-arlng to tlie Court by tlie return of tlie Sheriff that the defendant is not to he found, it Is therefore ordered by the Court that service be perfected by publication In the Journal and Messenger iu terms of the law. PHIL COOK, Attorney for Libellant. A true extract from the minutes of Macon Su perior Court, April 20tli, 18®). JNO. M. GREEK, ap2l-lam4m Deputy Clerk. Georgia— macon count y.—two - months after date application will he made to the Ordinary of Macon county for leave to sell a part of the real estate of Win. T. Brantley, late of said county, deceased, for the benefit of the heirs and treditorsof said estate. m * LUCY A. BRANTLEY, Adm’rx. - may 29 60d • V q macon superior court, *ia/u¥i • ADJOURNED TERM, 18G9. . John M. Greer. Administrator | of David L. Wicker, deceased, Bill to Marshal VS. Assets, Francis Lennard, Wm. W. Injunction, etc. McLendon, et al. IT appearing to the Court that Thomas F. Tar rant, in right of his wife, Lou F. Tarrant, and Henry Coon, two of the defendants in the above bill, reside without the Htate of Georgia, it is therefore ordered by tlie Court that service lie per fected upon the defendants by th- publication of this order for four months next before the next term of this Court iu ttie Journal and Messenger, published In the city of Macon, In said State. ROBINSON A ROBINSON, Complainants' Solicitors. A true extract from the minutes of Macon Su perior Court, this the 20th day ot April, 1869. JNO, M. GREER, ap2l-m4t Deputy Clerk. GEORGIA— MACON COUNTY —Where .s, Fran els D. Scarlett, administrator ou the estate of i Frvnklin P. Holcomb, dec’tl, applies for letters of dismission from thesalfl adm.nlstrai'oD : Tins is therefore to cite and admonish all persons con cerned to be and appear at my office by ttie Hist Monday in September next, to sliaw cause, il any they have, why said letters of dismission should not be granted as prayed for. Given un der my hand and official signature, March 1, 1869. JNO. L. PARKER, ms3-td—pf $7 Ordinary. 4"A EORGIA MACON COUNTY.“~Whereas, YX Lucy Halliburton, administratrix on ttie es tate of David Halliburton, deceased, applies to me for letters ot dismission from said adminis tration: This is therelore lo cite amt admonish all persons Interested to be and appear at my office on or before the first Monday in July next, and show cause, if any they have, why said let ters dlotnissory should not be granted to said at> piicant. Given under my hand and official sig nature, December 22,1868. . ... JNO - L ■ PARKER, dc-f.piflt pfs, Ordinary. ( GEORGIA—MACON COUfl'l Y— w hereas. j„.,. ‘ J Causey. Administrator on the estate of Charles M. Dinkins, deceased, applying for dis mission from said trust: This is, therefore, to cite and admonish all persons interested to lie and appear at my office on or before the first Monday iu August next, and show cause, it any they have, why letters of dismission should not be granted to said applicant. Given under my hand and official signature, April 20,1809. JNO. L. PARKER, ap27-mGm Ordinary. /" t BORGIA—MACON COUNTY—Whereas J*s»e“B, \JT Barfield, executor of the estate of Je-si- Hatfield deceased, applies for letters of dismission from his said trust, he having settled up the estate of his tes tator in lull with the legatees: This is therefore to cite all persons concerned to be and appear at uiy office on or before the first Monday in August nextjto show cause, if any they have, why le.teis of dismis sion should not be granted as prayed for. Givenhin iler my hand and official signature, ibis April 22, is% ap23-3m JNO, L. PARKER, Ordinary Gi EOKGIA—M Act IN < OUNTY—Whereas, /no. f. Y M. Harrell, administrator on the estate of P. A. Waddell, deceased, applies for letters of dismission from said adrninislration : These are therefore to cite a'l and sirgular, the part es interested, to be and ap pear at my office on or before the first Monday in August next, and show cause, if any they have, why saiil letters of dismission should’ not lie granted. Given under my hand and official s gnsture, January 28th.' 1869. JNu. L. PARKER, ja29-m6t—pfs7 Ordinary. TELFAIR COUNTY. TELFAIR SHERIFF’S SALES. Y\ J be sold before tlie Court House door, In *v the town of Jacksonville, Telfair county, within the legal hours of sale, on the FIKHT TUESDAY in July next, the following property, I Aits of I-and, Nos. 4,6, 7,8, 49 60, 52, S3, and one halt of No 8, and ail of No. 2, known as tbe place whereon Henry L. Wells now lives—ail lying in the town of Jacksonville. Levied upon under a fi. fa. In favor of M. N. Mcßae, administrator vs. W.T. Wells; property pointed out by plaintiff. Also, at the same time and place, will be sold tbe following property, 10-wit: Lot No. 182, con taining 202)4 acres, and 130 acres of Lot No. 309 lying on the southeast of the Shaw road—all in’ the Bth district of Telfair county. This Mav 29 1869- JOHN LARKEY.Sheriff. ’ rnay2s-tds TELFAIR BHERI FF’S SALE. \\[ ILL be sold before the Court House door in TT the town of Jacksonville, within the hgal hours of sale, on the first Tuesday iu July next the following lots of land, 10-wit: Number 197, In the Seventh District, number 179 in tbe Kighlb District, number 291. In the Thirteenth District—all In the county of Telfair—to satisfy a fi la. in favor of John McLean, obtained in Coflee County Superior Court, against Archibald Mc- Lean, Executor on the estate of Frank Mcßae, deceased. Property pointed out by A. McLean, Executor. May 24,1869. ma3l-tds JNO. LARKEY, Sheriff. TWIGGS COUNT Y. TWIGGS SHERIFF’S BALES. YU ILL be sold before the Court House door. In T ? the town of Jeffersonville, oouutv on the first Tuesday in July next, between the legal hours ol sale, one lot of Land, with some ordinary buildings thereon, lying and being in he County of Twiggs and 23 1 distiict ther-of being lot No. 54—tut better known as the old Vicker’s Place. Tbe same now being in the pos session of J. B. Prescott. Levied on to satisfy a Superior Court fi. fa. in favor of M. H. Trapt vs. Thos. H. Holliday, principal, and Haywood Thompson security. Hold as property of sa-d Holliday. Property pointed out by plaintiff sat torney. JNO. RENFRO, Deputy Sheriff of Twiggs co. mayZS-tds Georg u-twiggs countY^YTiTp. mc Wil liams, administrator on tne estate ofJa obW Collins, having petitioned to lie diseha-ged from -aid administration; all persons who are concerned are required, within thq,time fixed bv law. to -how cause, if any they have, why said A. B. 11.I 1 . McWilliams should not be discharged, according to the prayer of his pe tition. Given under my hand, this 11th dav of Jan uary, 18%. WM. S. KELf.Y, j a-'l-brn—pf $7 Ordinary. f1 EG RGIA-T WIG GS CO UN T Y.- Whereas, Jas VT H. Averett, minor ot said county, is without a guardian, the letters ol guardian-hip of the person and property of said Jauses H. Averett having been revoked from Robert F. Averett, who has been acting as Ms guardian, and the said Robert K. Averett removed, for waste and mismanagement, from tils office ; This is, there fore, to cite and admonish all persons concerned lo be and appear at my office within the time prescribed by law. to show cause why the guard ianship of the said James H. Averett should not be devolved upon tne Clerk of the Superior Court, as provided by law In such cases. Given under mv band and official signature, this May 31st, 1869. WM. 8. KELLY, Jnnt2-80d Ordinary. ! y^FOROIA—TWIGGH COUNTY—John H. Den ®°n having applied to be appointed guardian or the persons and property of Joel J. Denson and John B. Denson, minors under fourteen F***? °< age, tesidents of said county, minor children of one John M. Denson, late of said county deceased : This i« to cite all persons eon- ? n iLV P l e i‘ r at ttie tfcrm o f the Court U, , be fie and next mtt *r th e expiration of thirty days from the first publication of this DC m C ?’ *how cause, If any they can, why “‘4 - ‘f )hn H Denson should not be Intrusted t i’«v l T^ l^ r r lanß h lp of the persons and prop erty of Joel J. Denson and John B. Denson Wlt nes®—my official signature, this June 12. 18% IWM. 8. KELLY, Jttnel6-30d Ordinary, /iKOKGi A— TWIGGs - - I < * eor **‘ ®*>d Kenedy fSni>s’ N ’ r V edy Bollard, late - Boll kr(J, without a guardian W m£' a .? l L ,1*1?' s! the guardianship of a" 1 moved without the iiJ*?, 1 1 ■nln„ nt jr J . « fore atl person, « the * > 1 shed to be and appear w. l “ re ''lter .*' 7*' time presort tied bviaw . uy <*• . “L -d 1 guardianship of the -an." Bullard should not dev. i * « 1 r-. t superior Court, Is pruyfikY!" “ J Given under rny hami n > q this May 31st. 1869 UAnd *£'l 'v' June2-30d M. s K; • * 3 YT concern Wh-rc, ■ 1 -1 . *' upon the estate of i ‘ m for letter- of distn . n'2\ £3 said estate: thereto that ~ h« M- <3 tneir object ons, if any ,h. * od ai ; terms of the law. otherwise 7. h,t *. ir ’ granted the applicant »i th. , t '“ r " and Court of Ordinary of-• s ' ' > hand and official signature' Ul -7- ■. - ’ » ja?l-6m— pf*7 ' c? JAMES GLOVI , DaniolW. Shine, g, ce»rej j COLUMBU3L REDWINp Legate sand Cred i- rs , V ’ 11 D. W. Shine, decea.-. j ‘ ' kl i I 1 appearing m the Court .. 1 wife, Mary J. ne* ai .1 1 , ~— legatees of -sid D. w sh 1* Sr «a» » . ,' c Florida, and are in»*r ste l ' i tor. aud are defendants * It is tiierclire, on fendants, Jones and ‘ r '»er.-d - Shine appear » ( the next " : held on m - fourth M,,n.t»r , ni ‘• '• h answer, plead or lemur to .1 • . of said bill be perfected on « 1 : l lication oi this ord. r r-n.-e NUI in the Jocixti am. M*sß«»,-. n .° U the city of Macon, l.eore.. i Court "•IPa, Before Uy the Court: A true copy of th» ‘ , '‘ i< ’i , or fori- Twi-.-gs Superior Don't 1 ! r " n '* Hpl4-m4.ii ‘Pl'Skll, ■ | ' * " °'SK ••teou) rof ti . F>(o th- n hoT> 1 r ' « . • * y tembrr j ' ° n V « my hand officially t ; .. : f) ’* * fehl 8-tim—|.f •: *K k Ye; ! r / 1 KUKGI '-I A i UI . , * 1 estate of lhe ..-h ;-.- . j, 11 . - county, dereased is .. 1 . 1 therefoie. tocite'in i • r,s »- 1 lcreated to l>e «n,i ! time prescrilHil }.L ‘. " ■- - administration -u» , ■) upon the Clerk ot • i,..' V” U ‘ i ; -1 r; •' * vltled by law in cases o, ‘ r Given under iov i ,- , tilts May 3ls|, im!9. “ ‘ * 111111 »*rUt w s M Jon *'l-3 *d Wq a K ( ; Gli'.u—' TUl.i -C, Nn , YJI concern- Wii- ,j tile estate of iMuiei Massey kl , l,n . Uske. ceastd. app'ies for Ini, , „) i■" ' editorship of said o-tat. i creditors of said decea- i ” *■ ] monished to fi,« th. ir and . BBT office, in terms of the a* ’[**• missorv will ls> gr j j’,. •; "- .-. t«nn. next, of the c.-uri «f ' r *’ Given under my hau l olli ■ -.'!>", rv " *:■ * ja3l-6m—pf $7 Wi|V" K .Vi*? Uar ? *'4 upson cor.viv^ administkatkixYsu 4 Wf 1 LL be sold lit (tic Court H I ton, Upson c..,tnty, on n, f ~ . ' •Inly next, tor o.iisii, the s..mi, W e,." Os 1.11.1 unmber 211, iii ih. |j.( t H nally Houston, n<.w Upson eotmiv fifty acres, more .>r less, t„.i, of J ohu Barker, deceased. Ma- j? ® 1 * 110121-1.1 H AU.A I / KG lA—Ul’s.iN cut \ j y _. ' J ter .late a .plication », ' (Xiurt of Ordinary ol Said connh :■ thirty-acres of land, more or ... . the estate of Thomas Nelson B 1869 • 'out r * ■ _uia2l_;iw A. lin|ii |si r-i., ■... WILCOX CMI Si'. I AD MINI "TJ; ATOJ(> jjii; fl w Abbeville, Wilcox miun. tl . t£ ' B first Tuesday in July next | Mtrty belonging to lhe estat.-.ii |. k \ .Udxc.l : Five (5) acres of Lm ■ a.-rcs in lot nnmi.: ’* I ol original :y Iry > . : » \. » and 150 acres in lot number 23 n. is trict of originally Irwin, t:n\i JB together with the House Ur.. » \| L-fJ* Bowen’s Mills Terms mad. k . sale. May 14, 1869, KLIAs malß-tds Ailinaug^B < ’id *i:<.i a— wi! i and Jane Kean.-y, a Itcarey, and -ccased, apply ... m-f. r .-. sion 'rum said admini-ti':.’ .-. cite and admonish nil p.•• appear at mv i.ffi.'i* mi il BB show cause," if any they csn.» not i)« granted. Liven under n v tv ; office, this 3d dsv of be.-cm Per, dcl6-m6i—pffT I». c. MANN *:^^B Cl EORGIA WILuu.X I"' * David ('ason, ad in 11. ■ Willis- Uason, deceased, v I I up lor let (era of .1 Ism ■" • of tlie esi ite of said >|. ••■ a-.-l i-... - fore to cite nod adnn i. to In' -lid hp|>< ar al mv offi ew: allov.ci t; , law, and sl.ow m lmvi , why said lei 'ers sli u.l-l : • applicant. Given undir my ' an-: r signature, tills January Mli,"w Kgf 11. c. mavs^B fel)2l-6m—pf $7 B LIBEL FOR DIVORCE APR lb TERM SUPERIOR <" . COUNTY—Thomas W. bill- v- .-I, appearing to the Court by die retur:, 1 I that the Defendant doe- not re-I T in 1 Dooly, and it further appealing that 1 • -I not reside in this State It Attorney, ordered that aerv ce l«e jn-rb cation in the Journal and Me—eager,up published in Macon Georgia. IK A. till Libelant 1 ) 9 The above is a true extract from tbe M < Court. 1 i. ap3o-w6m Clerk Supe NOTICE TO HUM WILD LAND |)ERHONS owning Wild Iju I -1 districts of old Wilkin-on co ' fair, Pulaski, Laurens and M • . find it to their inlerc-t to - the undersigned, who. lor a sruab '•* ' sired,make examination of lac.- report as to value, etc. Special attention given to the 1 . . 1 ing of lands on commission. References—George 11. Hazt Maco and Brunswick Kalin Rev. J. W. Burke, Macon, Ga. WALTER I M ma2o-d<few)m. Jacksonv ;. > SCIENCE OF HEAUi EVERY MAN HIS OWN PHY* $ ' &M* ®*/ y§ * if* f i \§M • 'iuM HOLLOWAY’S I’H‘ HOLLOWAY’S OINTME 1 ' I>IS<)HDKR.SOF T/IFyi'iMA'.H. Ill) II ELF r|’llE STOMACH Istliegreal L fioencea Ihe health • ... .. abused, or debilitated by exc—f. - leastve breath, and pnycca na nral consequence-. Ail)-*! the source of beailachex. i/.h-UJ •' , vous complaints, aii'i urn Lr ver be<x>nues arid 1 : orders, pains in the aid*, ch pathise Ly costive ness, diatr.vr *■ -.- The principal action ol li.e* _• t.l sch, and tbe Liver, Lungs, re participate in their recupc* ti vo oti ration. ERYSIPELAS ASD n Are two of the most cornu , ' , - _ t - * orders prevalent on tiiis coot Ointment is especially opera-’Uli is first to eradlcah: Uw • complete the cure. BAD LEGS, OLD SORBS. • Gases of many years' stare-'— . g nacrousiy relust and to yield to**: treatment, have invariably, - ■ applications of this powerfu. ERUPTIONS O. V , I Arising from a bad state oi *■“, I diseases are eradicated, a U J “ •, . parent surface regained by t‘- . B * Os this Ointment. It -urpa-- metics and other toilet I disirei rashes and other face. .ri/US FEMALE COHI . - Whether In the young "t - | at the dawn of womahtio - these tonic medicines 1 ence that a marked iruj ro\e‘j tible in the health of the Pf;-' '“j. vegetable preparation, tnej ;• e , jt f remedy for all classesol r-ar tlon of health and station ‘ JV a FILES ABO V.iier ’g Every form and lea' ire 1 ‘ 1 stubborn disorders Is erao- •;, tlrely by the use of this tattoos should precede).- r ing qualities will be founu Invariable. i*h»PiJ‘ : '*T Both the Oineinent aD<l lae* h V In the following case-; 1 Hands, Chilblain-, ris-n-a- - Legs, sprains. Tetter* of all kinks, Mercuiiu I- “., - atism. Ringworm, -• ; Diseases, Sweile»l G.ar • w r Breasts, Sore Heaos, » en all kinds. tAVTIOS'- .-A I None are genuine . - rs I way, Njcw YokK and to 0 ; iD as a water-mark in every TANARUS" J rectlons around each rsr- 1e ... _,y be plainly seen by ho. .; n* v «o I A handsome reward Ml ‘ ' "V’ r *. J dering such intprrß*Uon tection of any party or P a ( |J , - alo e Y medlcines, or vending lne 1 to be spnrioas. rv of U «**Sold at themanulfc. s> ,4 way, 80 Maiden i-ane. •- stiectable Druggists an** throughout the civilized '- ***Tl.ere is considerani larger sizes. , , h . N. B. Direct ons a In eveiy disorder are amae-i a .•.Dealers in mv we ”’i' eK.. ' r l.< have Show Cards, circular*' jj pense, by ng Tb^ llo .> i " en Lane, New York. n For sale by aug4-ly