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s :/t /ac THE FEDERAL UNION. VOLUME 2—NO* If. MILLEDGEVILLE, OA. THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1831. m WHOLE NUMBER 68. lOHUTOKa EDITED BY j. G. POLHILL & J. A. CiTTHBI^HT. aUIliiL'LlIUIi D‘ ,i ’ r. T . pub-shed THIRTY DAYai at least. 1 Notice by Rxectdoy* and. Administrators for Debtors and Credi tors to render in their accounts, must be published SI A WEEKS. salts of Neemes by Executors and Administrators must be ad- vertiseJ-isfXTY DAYS before the day of sale. •Sales of jiersonal property (except neproes) of testate and intes- taiuc-ute^ hy Executors and Administrators, must be advertised FORTY DAYS. Applications by Executors, Administrators and Guardians teethe Ooiirtof unlinary for leave to sell Land, must be published FUCK. MONTHS. Applications hy Executors and Administrators for Letters Dismis- »ory, must be published SIX MONTHS. Applications Tor Foreclosure of Mortea?eson real estate must be advertised once a month for SIX MONTHS. Sales of real estate by Executors, Administrators and Guardians, Tnust be published SIXTY DAYS before the day of sale. These sales must be made at the court-house door between the hours of 10 in the morning and -4 in the afternoon. No sale from day to day is Valid, unless se expressed In the advertisement. Orders of Gourt of Ordinary, (accompanied with a copy of the tiond. or agreement) to maite titles to land, must be advertiscu -THREE MONTHS at least. Sheriff’s Sales under executions regularly granted by the courts, must be advertised THIRTY DAYS—under mortgage executions, SIXTY DAYS—Sales of perishable property under order of Court, yum be advertised, generally, TEN DAYS before the day of sale. AD orders for Advertisements will be punctually attended to. '•.'All letters directed to this Office, or the Editors, must be post paid, to entitle them to attention. OPINIONS OP THE VICE-PUESIDENT On Ihe relation of the States and the Genera! Government. IConununicated tor the "Pendleton Messenger.] Mr. Symmes—I must request you to permit me to use your columns, as the medium to make known my senti ments on the deeply important question, of the relation, which the Slates and General Government bear to each other, and which is, at tilts time, a subject of so much ag itation. It is one of the peculiarities of the station I occupy, that while it necessarily connects its incumbent, with ihe politics of the day, it affords him no opportunity officially to express his sentiments, except accidentally on an equal division of the body, over which he presides. He is thus exposed, as 1 have often experienced, to have his opin ions erroneously and variously represented. In ordinary cases, I conceive, the correct course to lie to remain silent, leaving to time and circumstances, the correction of mis representations; but there are occasions so vitally impor tant, that a regard both to duty and character would seem to forbid such a course; and such, 1 conceive, to be the present. The frequent allusions to my sentiments, will not permit me to doubt, that such also is the public conception, and that it claims the right to know, in rela tion to the question referred to, the opinions of those, who hold important official stations; while on my part, desir ing to receive neither unmerited praise, nor blame, I feel, I trust, the solicitude, which every honest and indepen dent man ought, that my sentiments should be truly known, whether they be such, as may be calculated to recommend them to public favour, or not. Entertaining these impressions, J have concluded, that it is my duty to make known my sentiments; and I have adopted the inode, which on reflection seemed to be the most simple, jand best calculated to effect the object in view. The question of the relation, which the States and G t acral Government bear to each other, is not one of re- - cent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two pai ties, as to what, this relation should be, whose different sentiments, c< nsrittitcd no small impedi ment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved, that the question had not terminated with the labours or the Convention. The great struggle, that preceded the political revolution of 1(301, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sus tained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky reso lutions, and the report to the Virginia Legislaiuie; and on the other, in the replies- ct the Legislai uie of Massa chusetts and some of the other states. ’1 hese resolutions and tiiis report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time, (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice M’Kean and concurred in by the whole bench,) contain, what 1 believe to be, the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them, in order to avoid the necessity of present ing my vie'us, with the reasons in support of them, in de- tad. As my object is simply to ft ate my opinions, I might pause with this reference to documents, that so fully and ably stale all of the points immediately connected with tins ck;cpiy important subject, but as there are many, who may not have the opportunity, or leisure to refer to them, and, as it is possible, however clear they ma> be. that different persons may place different interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, - and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily the doctrines, which I conceive they em brace. Their great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from ail of the people forming one aggregate jiolitical communi ty; that the Constitution of the United Slates is in fact a compact, to which each State is a party, in the charac ter already described; and that the several States or par ties, have a right to judge of- its infractions, and in cases of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not delegated, they have the right, in the last re tort, to use the language of the Virginia resolutions, “to interpose for asserting the progress of ike evil, endfor main taining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.” This right, of interposi tion, thus solemnly asrerted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may, state right, veto, nullification, or by any other name, I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain, as our Revolution itself, and deductions, as sim ple and demonstrative, as that of any political, or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recogni tion depends, the stability and safety of our political in stitutions. I am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doctrine Jiave always, now and formerly, regard it in a very dif ferent light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I {relieve such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be l> j recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep ^nd sincere attachment to our political institutions, and the union of the States. I never breathed an opposite sentiment; but on the contrary, I have eve. considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and next to these, I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has passed in the service of the Un ion, and whatever public reputation I have acquired, is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be^ my greatest political fault. Yv ith these strong feel ings of attachment, I have examined with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and so far from anarchical, or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be, the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Un ion itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved powers, ftnd which would vest in the General Government, (it matters not through what Department,) the right^f de- termii.g exclusively and finaily the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the Slates, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of c. federal Union. As strong as this langurge is, it is not Stronger, than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Government the final and ex clusive right to judge of its powers, is to make “its 4‘s- cretion and not the Constitution the measure of its powers;” and that “in all casts of compact between parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal rigid to judge for it self, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of redress.” Language cannot be more explicit; nor can higher authority be adduced. __ That different opinions are entertained oh tins subject, I consider, but as an additional evidence of the great di- yersity of the human intellect. Had not able, experien ced and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the high est respect, taken different views, I would have thought the rignt too clear to admit of doubt; but I an* taugh. by this, as well os hy many eimiiv instances, to tiea Will, deference opinions differing from my cwn. The er ror may possibly be with me; but, if so, I can only cay, ; hat lifer the most mature and conscientious examina tion, i have not been able to detect it. But with all pro- P* deference, I must think, that theirs is the error, who deny, what seems to be an essential attribute cf the con ceded sovereignty of the slates; and who attribute to the General Government a right utterly incompatible with v, ’hat all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted char acter; an error originating principally, as I must think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what constitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions. it has bren w ell said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that object cf a constitution is to restrain the government, as that oj laws is to restrain individuals.. The remark is correct, nor is it less true, where the Govern ment is vested in a majority, than where it is in a single or a few individuals; in a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the maxim, that the majority ought to govern, than I have, taken in its projier sense, subject to the restrictions impe ded by the Constitution and confined to subjects, in which every portion of the community have similar interests; but it is a great error to suppose, sis many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural & not a conven tional right; and, therefore, absolute and unlimited. By natm'e every individual has the right to govern himself; anil Governments, whether founded on majorities, or mi norities, must derive their right from the assent, express ed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such li mitations, as they may impose. ‘Where the interests are the same, that is where the laws that may benefit one, will benefi t all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place them under the control of the majority; but where they are dissimilar, so that the law, that may benefit one por tion, may be ruinous to another, it would be on the contrary unjust and absurd to subject them to its will; and such,I conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests. That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is im possible to doubt.—They are to be found in every coin- mu; ily, in a greater, or less degree, however small, or homogeneous; and they constitute, every where, the great difficulty of forming, and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is in fact, what mainly renders, a constitution indispensable; to overlook winch, in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to omit the principal' element, by which to determine its character.—Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suffrage alone would be a suffioit r.i guaranty. It is the conflict of op posing interests which renders it the most difficult work of man. Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of die community, as is the case in Eng land, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome and most oi the free states of ant.quity, the rational consti- tutional provision is, that each should be represented in die Government, as a separate estate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in or der to check their encroachments. In England, the con- stitution has assumed expressly this form; wliile in the governments of Sparta ar.d Rome the same thing was effected under different but not much less efficacious f >ruis. The perfection of their organization, in this par ticular, was that, which gave to die constitutions of these renowned states all of their celebrity, which secured their ' liberty for so many centuries, and raised (hem to so great a height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitu tional provision giving to the great and separate interests of the community the right of self protection, must ap pear to those who will duly reflect on die subject, not less essential to the preservation of liberty, than the right of suffrage itself. They in fact have a common object, to effect winch, the one is as necessary, as the other; to secure responsibility, dial is, that these who make and exe cute the laws should be accountable to those, on whom the lairs in reality operate; the only solid and durable foundation of liberty. If without the right of suffrage, our rulers would oppress us, so, without the right of self protection, the major, would equally oppress the minor interests oi the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter the feebler interests the victim of the stronger. Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate class es of society. We have wisely exploded all such dis tinctions; but wc are not, on that account, exempt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous condition of our country unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry and propuetion, but are not, therefore less necessary to be protected by an adequate constitutional provision, than where the distinct interests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, grea ter, as such separate ard dissimilar geographical interests, are more liable lo come into conflict, and more dangerous when in that state, than those of any other description; so much so, that ours is the first instance on record, where they have not formed in an extensive territory, separate and independent communities, or subjected the ichole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover ol‘ Lis country. So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could n» ; be fairly represented in a single government., organized so, as to give to each great and leading interest, a separate and distinct voice, as in the governments, to winch I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the government were divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geo graphically. Ore General Government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all of the powers sup posed to be.necessary to regulate the interests common to all of the States, leaving others subject to the separate control of the_States, being from their local and peculiar character, such, that they could not lie subject to the w ill of the majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injustice and oppression. It was thus, that the interests cf the whole were subjected, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were left under the controul of the Stares sepa rately, to whose custody only, they could be safely con fided.—This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all of the States are parties, cons» itutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphatically American, without example cr parallel. To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and the States as a whole, each in its pro{>er sphere sovereign and independent, each perfectly adap ted to their respective objects; the States acting separate ly, representing and protecting the local and peculiar in terests; acting jointly, through one General Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitution, representing and protecting the interests of the whole; and thus perfectingby an admirable, but sim ple arrangement, the great principle of representation and reponsibiiity, without which no government can be free, or just. To preserve this sacred distribution, as origin ally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb. is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which, the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability, our liberty depends. How is this to he effected? The question is new, when applied to our peculiar pe culiar political organization, where the separate and con flicting interests of society are represented by distinct, but connected Governments; but is in reality an old question under a new form, long since perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been separately represented in any Government.; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode, by which such political organization can be pre served; the mode adopted in England, and by all Gov ernments ancient and modem, blessed with Constitutions deserving to be called free; to give to each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, with a negative, or veto on the acts of the others, in order to protect against en croachments, the interests it particularly represents; a principle which all of our Constitutions recognize in the distribution of power among their respective Depart ments, as essential to maintain the independence of each, but which to all, who will duly reflect on the subject, must appear, far more essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental distribution of powers be tween the States and General Government. So essen tial is the principle that to witlihold the right from either, where tlie sovereign power is divided, is in fact to annu the division itself, and to consolidate in the one, left in th> exclusive possession of the right, all of the powers of the government; for it is not possible to distingush, practi not finally to resist, the will of a dominant majority. But it is useless to multiply arguments. Here it pos sible that reason could settle a question where the pas- callv, between a government having all power, pad one j sirns and interest of men are concerned, the point would having tie right to take what powers it pleacea Ncr have been If ng sinc§ settled 1 dots it in the least vary the principle, whether the distri bution of power between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized, but connected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, wliile the necessity is greater in cur case, as the danger of con flict is greater, where the interests of a society are divid ed geograpliically, than in any other, as lias already been shewn. These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible; and I am at a loss lo understand how any one, who lias'ioa- turely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who has read history or studied the principles cf free govern ments to any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact, that in every free stale, there are those, who look more to the necessity of maintaining power, than guarding against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary, to explain the con trariety of opinions, among the intelligent, where fhe Ab stract consideration of the subject, wbuld seem scarcely to admit of a. doubf. If such be the tfue cause, L must think the fear of weakening the government too much, in thjs case^ to be in a great measure unfour3%d, or, at least that the danger is .much less from that, than the opposite side. I do not deny that a .power, of so high a nature, may be abused by q State; but, when I reflect, that die States unanimously called the general government into existence with all of its powers, which they freely sur- rended on their part, under the conviction that their com mon peace, safety and prosperity required it; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the recollec tion cf common suffering and a common Iriumph in the Croat and splendid achievement ofiheir independence; & that the strongest feelings .of our nature, and among them, the love of national power and distinction, are on the side of the Union; it does st em to me, that the fear, which would strip the States of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependent corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peacea ble prof.ee!ion of those interests, which they reserved un der their own peculiar guardianship, when they created the General Government, is unnatural and unreasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system, cannot be trusted to preserve it, w hat power can? Bo fur from extreme danger, I hold, that there never was a free state, in which this great conserrati^j princi ple, indispensable in all, was ever so safely lodged. In others, when the co-estates, representing the dissimilar and conflicting interests of the community came into con tact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or force. N ot so in ours. Should the General Government, and a State come into conflict, wc have a higher remedy; the power which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all obits authority, and can en large, contract, or abolish its pow er, at its pleasure, may be invoked. The States them selves may be appealed to, three- fourths of which, in fact, forma power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, ar.d whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent then of the power is, that a Stata acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the Constitutional compact, may compel the Government, created by that compact, to sub mit a question touching its infraction, to the parties, who created it; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazzardous, and, I must add, fatal project of giving to the General Govern ment the sole and final right of interpreting the Constitu tion, thereby reversing the whole system, making that instrument the creature of its will, instead of a rule of ac tion impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating in fact the authority which imposed it, and from which the government itself derives its existence. That such would be the result, were the right in ques tion vested in the Legislative, or Executive branch of the Government, is conceded by all. No one has been so hardy, as to assert, that Congress, or'the President ought to have the right, or to deny, that if vested finally and ex clusively in either, the consequences which I have stated would not necessarially follow ; but its advocates have been reconciled to the doctrine, on the supposition, that there is one Department of the General Government, which, from its peculiar organization, affords an inde pendent. tribunal through which the Government may ex ercise the high authority, which is the subject of conside ration, with perfect safety to all. I yield, I trust, to few, in my attachment to the Judici ary Department. I am fully sensible of its importance and would maintain it to the fullest extent in its Consti tutional powers and independence ; but it is impossible for me, to believe,!hat it was ever intended by the Con stitution, that it should exercise the |lower in question, or that it is competent to do so, and if it were that it would be a safe depository of *Le power. Its powers are judicial and net political, ar.d are ex pressly confined by the Constitution “to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the Jaws cf the Unit eel States and the-treaties made or which .ff'ail be made, under its authority;” and which I have high authority in asserting, excludes political questions, and comprehends those only, where there are parties amena ble to the process of the Court.* Nor is its incompcten- cv less clear, than its want of Constitutional authority.— There may lie many and the most dangerous infractions on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by ail, the court, as a Judicial tribunal, cannot from its nature take cognizance point; and the reason applies equally to all others, where Congress perverts a power, from an object intended, to one not intended, tlie most insiducus and dangerous of all the in fractions; and which mey be extended to idl of its poicers, more especially to the taxing and appropriating. But, sup posing it competent to take cognizance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objection still re mains,"that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in question. It is an universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to protect, can safely lie confided only to those interested in protecting, or their responsible agents, a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs.— The danger in our system is, that the General Govern ment. which represents the interest of tlie whole, may en croach upon the States, which represent the peculiar and local interest, or that, the latter may encroach on the for mer. In examiniog tliis point, we ought not to forget, that the Government through all of its Departments, ju dicial, as well as others, is administered by delegated and responsible agents; and that the power which really controls ultimately all the movements is not in the agents but those who elect or appoint them. To understand then its real character, and what w r ould be the action of tlie sys tem m any supposable case, we must raise our view from the mere agents, to this high controling power which fi nally impels every movement of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a ma jority, compounded of the majority of the States, t alien as corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the States estimated in federal numbers. These united con stitute the real and final power, which impels and directs the movements of the General Government. The ma jority of the States, elect the majority of the Senate ; of the people of tlie States, that of the House of Represen tatives ; the two united, the President; and the Presi dent and a majority of the Senate appoint tlie Judges j a majority ofwhoin, and a majority of the Senate and the House with the President, really exercise ail of the powers of the Government, with the exception of the cases where the constitution requires a greater number than a majority. The Judges are, in fact, as truly the Judicial Representatives of this united majority, as the majority of Congress itself; or the President, is its legist lative, or executive representative; and to confide the power to the Judiciary to determine finally and conclu sively, what powers are delegated, and what 'reserved, would be in reality to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in various ways; and, of course, to subject, (against the fundamental principle of our system, and all sound po litic « reasoning.) the reserved powers of die States, with all oi the local and peculiar, interests, they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority; against which, he protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which die Judges hold their office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary the case. Its highest possible effect Wrould be to retard and forever, by the Stare of Vir ginia. The report ofher Legislature, to which 1 li^ve al ready referred, has really, in my opirian, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, it says “it ha? been objected” (to the right bf a State to interpose for the protection ofher reserved rights) “that the Judi cial authority's to lie regarded, as tlie sole expositor of the Constitution; on this objection it might be observed, first, that diere may be instances of usurped powers, which the foims of the Constitution couM never draw within tlie control of tlie Judicial department; secondly, that if the decision of the Judiciary be raised above the sovereign parties to the ..constitution, die decisions of the other departments, notoarried by the forms of t|M consti tution before die Judiciarjj must be equally aughorative and final with the decision of that Department. But die proper answer to ttaxtbjection is, diat die resolution of , the General Assembly relates to those great and extraor- dinaryjAges^ in which all of the forms of die Constitution may prove ineffectual rfgainst infractions dangerous to the essential -rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes, that dangerous powers not delegated, may not (#ily Jse usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the Judicial" Department may also exercise, or sanction dangerous powers beyond tlie gi ant of the Con stitution, and consequently that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge, whcdier the com pact has been dangerously violated, must extend to viola tions by one delegated authority, as w ell as by another— by the Judiciary, as well by the Executive or Legisla tive.” Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected, that if one party has the right to judge of infractions of the constitution, so has the other, and that consequently in cases of contested jxrwers be tween a State and the General Government, each would have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or compacts, and that of course, it would come to be a mere question of force. The error is in the assumption, that the General Government is a party to the Constitution al Compact. The States, as has been shewn, formed the compact, acting as sovereign and independent Communi ties. The General Government is but its creature; and though in reality a government with all the rights and authority w hich belong to any other government within the orb of its powers, It is, nevertheless, a government emanating from a compact between sovereigns, and par taking in its nature and object, cf the character of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer tlie interests in winch all are jointly concerned, but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power, than if it did not exist. To deny this would be to deny the most in contestable facts, and the clearest conclusions; while to acknowledge its truth is to destroy utterly the objection, that the appeal would be to force, in the case supposed. For if each party has a right to judge, then under our sys tem of government, the final cognizance of a question of contested power w ould be in the states, and not in tlie general government. It would be the duty of the latter, as in ail similar cases of a contest between one or more of tlie principals as a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves. Such are tlie plain dictates of reason and analogy both. On no sound principle can the agents have a right to final cogni zance, as against the principals, much less to use force against them, to maintain their construction of their pow ers. Such a right would be most monstrous ; and lias never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases. That the doctrine is applicable to the case of contested power between the Slates and the General Government, we have the authority not only of reason and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already inferred to.— Mr. Jefferson, at a late period of his life, after long ex perience and mature reflection, says, “With respect to our state and federal governments, I do not think their relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former subordinate to tlie latter. Tliis is not the case. They are co-ordinate departments of one sim ple and integral whole. But you may ask, if the two de partments should claim each the same subject of power, where is tlie umpire to decide between them ? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both par ties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground ; but if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a con vention of the states must be called, to ascribe the doubt ful power to that department which they may think best.” It is thus that our Constitution by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode of malting them, lias by a simple contrivance, with its characteristic wisdom, provided a power which in the last resort, supercedes effectually the necessity, and even the pretext forforce; a power to which none can fairly ob ject ; with which the interests of all are safe; which can at least as may be necessary to illustrate tlie opinions which I have already advanced. Anxious, however, to intrude aslitile as possible; and with that view, will, as far as may l e consistent with my object, avoid all de bar ea We topics. ‘Whatever diversity of opinion may exist, in relation- to the principle, or the effect on the productive industry of the country, cf the present, or any other Tariff of protec tion, there are certain political consequences flowing from the present* which none candoubt^uid oll/nust de plore. - It would ‘ be in vain to attempt unRmceaq thm it has divided die country into two great geographical divis ions, and arrayedthem against each oilier, in opinion at least, if not int^reL also, on some of the most vital of po litical subjects; ott itattnance, its commerce, and its in dustry; subjects calculated, above oil others, in time cf peaUfrt* produce excitement, and in relation to which, the Tariff hda placed tlie sections in question in deep and dangerous oonflief. If there be any point on which die 41 Was going to say Southern section, but to avoid, ac fur as possible, die painful feelings such discussions are cal culated to excite, I shall say) weaker of the two sections is unanimous, it is that its prosperity depends, in a ereat measure, on free trade, light taxes, economical, and, as far as possible, equal disbursements of the public revenue, and an unshackled industry, leaving them to pursue whatever may appear most advantageous to dieir inter ests. From the Potomac to the Mississippi, there are ft w indeed, however divided on other points, who would nof, if dependent on their volition and if they regarded die in terest of their particular section only, rurn ve from com merce and industry every shackle, reduce the ltverae to the lowest point that the wants of the government fairly required, and restrict the appropriations to the most mod erate scale, consistent with the peace, the security, ar.d the engagements of the public; and who do not believe that the opposite system is calculated to throw on them an unequal burthen, to repress their prosperity, and to encroach on their enjoyment. On all these deeply important measures, the opposite, opinion prevails, if not with equal unanimity, with at least a greatly preponderating majority, in the other and stron ger section; so much so, that no two distinct nations ever entertained more opposite views of policy than these (wo sections do, on all the important points to w hich I have referred. Nor is it less certain that this unhappy con flict, flowing directly from the Tariff’, has extended itself to the halls of legislation, and has converted the delibera tions of Congress into an annual struggle betw een the two sections; the stronger to maintain and increase the superiority it has already acquired, and the dther to throw off, or diminish its burdens; a struggle in whidi all the noble and generous feelings of patriotism are gradual ly subsiding into sectional ami selfish af tacTuirf-nls.* N or has the effect of this dangerous conflict ended here. Tfc has not only divided the two sections on the important point already stated, but on the tteepeVand more danger ous questions, the constitutionality of a protective Tariff, and tlie general principles and theory of the Conttitutioii itself; the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority, giving a construction to the instrument, which the other believes would convert the General government into a consolidated, irresponsible government, with the total destruction of liberty; and the weaker seeing no hope cf relief with such assumption of powers, turning its eye to the reserved sovereignty of the states, as the only refuge from oppression. I shall not extend these remarks, as I might, by shewing that while the effect of the system cf protection was rapidly alienating one section, it w as not less rapidly, by its necessary operation, distracting and corrupting the other; and betw een the two, subjecting the administration to violent and sudden changes, totally inconsistent with all stability and feisdom in the manage ment of the affairs of the nation, of which we already see fearful symptoms. Nor do I‘ deem it necessity to en quire whether this unhappy conflict grows out of true, frr mistaken views of interest on either, or bot h sides. Re garded in either light, it ought to admonish us of the ex treme danger to which our system is exposed, ar.d the great moderation anffwisdom necessary to preserve it. If it comes from mistaken views, if the interests of the two sections as affected by the Tariff, be realiy the same, and the system instead of acting unequally, in reality diffu ses equal blessings, and imposes equal burdens on every part, it ought to teach us how liable those, who ore dif ferently situated, and who view their interests under dif ferent aspects, are to come to. different conclusions; even when their interests are strictly the same; and tonse- quentl] r , with what extreme caution any system of policy ought to be adopted, and with what a spirit of modera tion pursued, in a country of such groat extent and diver sity as ours. But if on the contrary, *the conflict springs really, from contrariety cf interests, if the burden be on one side, and the benefit on the other, then are we taught a lesson not less important, how little regard we have for the interests cf others, while in pursuit of our own, or at least, how apt we are to consider our ov’n interest, the interest of all others; and of course how great the danger Jot and from memory. mode, by freeing the compact from every defect and uncer tainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual, and at the same time consistent with what are the rela tions and acknowledged powers of ute two great depart- nit nts'of our government. It gives a beauty and secu rity peculiar to our system, which if duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations; but if not, our splendid anticipation of the future will prove but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, T he Tariff' itself is a strong case in and the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the states, or on the unrestsained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice and violence, and force must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that where the majority rides, the minority is the subject; and that if we should absurdly attribute to the former, the exclu sive right of construing the constitution, there would be in lad bet’-teen the sovereign and subject, under such a governmfY»,'no constitution; or at least nothing deserv ing the hame, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an instrument; How the States are to exercise this high power of in terposition, which constitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot be delegated without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from a. federal into a consolidated government, is a question, that the states only, are competent to determine. *Tiie arguments which prove that they possess the power, equally prove, that they are in the language of Jefferson “fee rightful Judges of the mode and measure of redress.” But tlie spirit of forbearance, as well as the nature of the right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of dangerous infractions of the Constitution ; and then only in the last resort, when all reasonable hope of relief, from the ordinary action of die government, has failed; when if the right to interpose did not exist, the alternative w ould be submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by foice on the other. That our sys tem should afford, in such extreme cases, an intermediate point between these dire alternatives, by which the go vernment may be brought to a pause, and thereby an in terval obtained to compromise differences, or, if impracti cable, be compelled to submit tlie question to constitu tional adjustment, through an appeal io the states them selves, is an evidence of its high wisdom; an element^ not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength; not of anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety.— Its general recognition would of itself in a great measure, 1/ not altogether, supercede the necessity of its exercise, by im pressing on the movements of the government, that modera tion and justice so essential to harmony and peace, in a coun try of Such vast extent, and diversity of interests as mars; and would if controversy should come, turn the resentment of the aggrieved, from the system to those who had abused its powers, (a point all important,J and cause them to seek redress, not in revolution cr overthrow, but in reformation. It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute where the al ternative tpmud be force, tending to prevent, and if that fails, lo correct peaceably, the. aberrations to which all political sys tems tare liable, and which, if permitted to accuntulate, with out correction, must.finally end in a general catastrophe. I have now said what 1 intended, in reference to the ab stract question of the relation of the states to the general government, and would here conclude, did I not believe that a mere general statenwt of an abstract question, without including that which may have caused its agita tion, would be considered b)rmany imperfect, and unsat isfactory. Feeling that such would be justly the case, I am compelled reluctantly, to touch on the Tariff, fo fat, • I refer to the authority of Chief Justice Marshall in the cere of ibnatiism RoUtons. I have pot be4nabM leaver Ml the speech definitely close all controversies in the only effectual j in a country of such acknowledged diversity of interovts, , . of the oppression of the feebler by the stronger interest, and in consequence of it, of rh** most fatal sectional c-.r- flicts. But which ever may be the rau.-e, the rea., or supposed diversity of interest, i: cannot doubted, that the political consequences of the prohibitory system, be. its effects in r«ther respects, beneficial, or nU.rwise. are really such, as I have stated; nor can if be d< >;ib(ed, that a conflict between the great sections on questions so vi tally important, indicates a cor« ao n cf the country, so distempered and dangerous, as to demand the most seri ous and prompt attention. It is only, when we come to consider of the remedy, that, under the aspect, I am view ing the subject, there can be, among the informed, and considerate, any di versity of opinion. Those, who have not duly reflected on its dangerous and inveterate character, suppose that the disease «vilt cure itself; that events ought to be left to take their < wu course; ar.d that experience, in a short time, will prove, that the interest of the whole community, is the same, iu reference to the Tariff, or; at least, whatever diversity * there may how be, time will assimilate. Such lia* been ^ their language from the begmnA^W^vpffeftunat^ tfie*' progress of events has been the reverse. The coutury is now more divided than in 1634, and then, more than in 1816. The majority may have increased, but ihe op posite sides are beyond dispute more determined and ex» cited, than at any preceding period. Formerly the sys tem was resisted mainly, as inexpedient; but now, as un constitutional, unequal, unjust and oppressive. The re lief was sought exclusively hem the- QyiamtaQwvem- ment; but now, many drivea to despair, are raising their eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the States, as the on ly refuge. If we turn from the past, and present, to the future, we shall find nothing to lessen, but much to ag gravate the danger. The increasing embarrassment, and distress of the staple States, the growing conviction, from experience, that they are caused by the prohibitory sys tem principally, anil that, under its continued operation, their preser* pursuits must become profitless, and that their great and peculiar agricultural capital, cannot be diverted from its ancient and hereditary channels, with out ruinous, losses, all concur to increase, instead of dis pelling the gloom; that hangs over the luture. In fact, to those who wili duly reflect on the subject, the hone, that the disease will cure itself) must appear perfectly illusory. The question is in reality one between the exporting and non-exporting interests of the country. there no experts, there would be no Tariff. It would be perfectly On the contrary, so long as there are States, which raise the great agricultural staples, with the view of obtaining their supplies, and which must depend, cm the general market of the world, for their sales, the con. flict must remain, if the systeljMduHdd. continue, and the disease become more and more inveterate. Their inter est, and that of those, who by h’gh duties would confine the purchase of their supplies to "the home market, mutt from the nature of things in reference to the Tariff, be in conflict. Till, then, we cease to raise the great staples cotton, rice and tobacco, for the general market, and till we can find some other profitable investment for the im mense amount of capital and labour now employed in their production, the present unhappy and dangerous conflict cannot terminate, unless with tlieproliibitcry sys tem itself. In the meantime, while idly waiting for itarterminatiro, through its own action, the progress of events, in anoth er quarter, is rapidly bringing the contest, to an immed:- *The system if continued, must end. not only In suhjretiny tie jr., rfUMry and property of the weaker section to the control of tics stronger, but in proscription and political disfranchisement. L\ must finally control elections and appointments to officer * writ as sets of legislation, to the groat increase of the frolic as of »-<-■ mostly, and of the fatal tendency tea tessplgte aUoasifeakssweett the section*.