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universal law of nations. Those who as sert that slavery exists in the States by f >rce of positive law can, if that assertion hs true, very easily settle the question by the production of the declared will of the supreme power of such States, embodied in the form of a legislative enactment; produce the evidence of that positive law in a legitimate and authentic form, to sus tain the truth of the assertion. Those who assert the affirmative of that proposi tion, are bound to furnisb the evidence of that positive law enacted by the States, or yield the point. They content themselves with relying on the loose declarations of judges in the slaveholding States; the mere obiter dictum of judges, (in cases in which the question we are discussing was not presented by the record for their con sideration and judgment.) as the evidence of positive law enacted by the supreme power in the State* declaring that slaves shall be property within the territorial lim its of the respective States. 1 he question very naturally presents it self, if those who assert that slaverv exists in the States by force of positive law, and that when the owner of slave property tikes it beyond the territorial limits of his State, his title to that property ceases and determines, why is it, that they desire to invoke the power of the Federal Government to exclude slave property from the Territories? Such an act would be entirely unnecessary, if the title of the cwner ceases and determines when lie pas ses with bis slave property beyond the lim its of the States where it is asserted his ti tle exists by force of positive law. The f ict that you desire to invoke the power of this Government to enact a law to exclude slave property from the common territory, furnishes strong evidence that you have not entire confidence in the position as sumed and asserted, that slavery exists in the States by force of positive law, and that the owner loses his title to his slave property by taking it beyond the limits of such States. I beg leave to call the attention of the House t<4 the history of the title of my con stituents to their slave property. What I shall say in regard to that title in Georgia, will be pqually applicable to the other siaveholding States, so far as the founda tion of that title is concerned. The colony of Georgia was originally settled as a free colony; that is to say, African slavery was prohibited from being introduced there by the charter granted to the trustees; it remained a free colony about fifteen years after its first settlement; the soil and cli mate was adapted to slave labor; the col onists desired to have it, but the home government refused to repeal the prohibi tion ; the result was, that the colony was about to come to nothing; the prohibition was taken off, and African slaves were al lowed to be brought into the colony ; some few were brought in from other slavehold ing colonies, but the most of them were brought in by those who were engaged in the African slave trade; and who they tcere. the past history of the country fur nishes abundant evidence. African slaves were brought into the coiony as property ; they were made property before they were brought there ; they were sold to our people as property, purchased by them as roperty, paid for by them as property, eld by them as property, precisely upon the same footing as they held every other species of property. Were those from whom my constituents originally purchased their slave property engaged in a lawful trade, in a trade recog nized as lawful by the universal law of na tions ? This question came before the Courts of Great Britain in the year 1S17. A French vessel called the Le Louis was engaged in the African slave trade, and was captured by a British cruiser. France at that time not having entered into treaty stipulations abolishing that trade, the ves sel was taken into a British port, and con demned by the vice admiralty court as lawful prize for being engaged in a trade forbidden by the universal law of nations, and therefore criminal by that law. From the judgment of the vice admiralty court an appeal was taken to the high court of admiralty of Great Britain. The appel late court reversed the judgment of the vice admiralty court, and held that the African slave trade was not unlawful by the uni versal law of nations, and was not criminal by that law, which recognized property in African slaves. The judgment of the high court of admiralty was delivered by Lord Stowell, better known as Sir Wiliam Scott, and I beg leave to read to the House a portion of that judgment. Speaking of the African slave trade, the learned Judge said; “Let me not be misunderstood or misrepresented as a professed apologist, when I state facts which no man can deny—that personal slavery arising out of forcible captivity i6 coeval with the earliest periods of the history of mankind—that it is found existing (and, a* appears, without animadversion) in tne ear lies: and most authentic records of the human race—that it is recognized by the codes of the most polished nations of antiquity—that under the light of Christianity itself, the possession of persons so acquired has been in every civilized country invested with the character of property, and secured as such by all the protections of law—that sol emn treaties have been framed, and national mon opolies eagerly sought to facilitate and extend the comatree in this assorted property—and all this, with all the sanctions of law, public and munici pal, and witnout any opposition, except the pro tests of a few private moralists, little heard and less attended to in every country till within these very few years in this particular country. What is the doctrine of our courts of law of nations rela tively to these nations which adhere to the practice of carrying on fne African slave trade ? Why that their practice is to be respected; that their slaves, if taken, are to be restored to them; and if sot taken in innocent mistake, to be restored with costs and damages. All this 6urely, upon the ground that such conduct on the part of any State is no departure from the law of nations. The noto rious fact is, that in the dominions of this country, and others, many thousands of .persons are held as Ural property, they and their posterity, upon no other original title than that which I am now called upon to pronounce a crime—every one of these instances attended with all the aggravations that appertains to the long continnation of crime, if crime it be; and yet protected by late with all the securities that can be given to property in its most respected form."—id Dodson's Admiralty Report, pp. 250- l-'8. In Dadrazo vt. Willis, 5th Eng. Com. Law Reports, page 315, the same doctrine is fully recognized by the Court of King’s Bench. Bayly, J., in delivering his judg ment in that ease, said, speaking of the African slave trade: “It is true that if this were a trade contrary to the law of nations, a foreigner could cot maintain this action. But it is not; and, as a Spaniard can not be considered as bound by the acts of the Brit ish Legislature prohibiting this trade, it would be unjust to deprive him of a remedy for the wrong which he has sustained. He had a legal property in the slaves of which he has, by the defendant's aet. been deprived.” Best, J., after citing several authorities, liya: “It is clear, from these autaorities, that the slave trade is not condemned by ‘.he general law of na tions.” In the ease of the Antelope, reported in 10th Wheaton, page 121, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of the legality of the slave trade, 6ays: “Both Europe and America embarked in it, and tor nearly two centuries it was carried on without opposition and without censure. A jurist could **hat a practice thus supported was illegal, and that those engaged in it might be punished ♦•thv personally, or by deprivation of property.” Bat I have ".till higher authority in favor of the legality of the African slave-trade —and that is the Federal Constition. The African slave trade was not only recognized as lawful by that Constitution, but it ex pressly stipulates for its continuance for twenty years, and provides that each slave who might be imported into the States should be taxed not exceeding ten dollars per head. Mr. Giddings. Will the gentleman per mit me to propound a question to him ? Mr. Warner. Oh yes, certainly. Mr. Giddings. I would inquire whether the gentleman holds that those American Christians, who were captured and held to slavery, and who were transferred from owner to owner, by the Algerines, in the latter part of the last and the first part of the present century, were property ? Mr. Warner. 1 am not discussiug the question of Algerine slavery—I am dis cussing the question of African slavery, as recognized by the Constitution. Mr. Giddings. Does the gentleman ac knowledge that those Americans, captured and held by the Algerines, were properly ? Mr. Warner. I do not make any such admission, nor is it necessary that I should do so, for the purposes of my argument. Mr. Gi<jdings. That is what I want an answer to. Mr. Warner. I have not referred to the Americans who were captured by the Al gerines. I am discussing the question of African slavery as it exists in the United States. Mr. Giddings. Africans can be held by Americans as slave property. Mr. Warner. They were recognized as property by the universal law of nations before, and at the time of tlie adoption of the Constitution, and are now held as pro perty under the sanction and guarantee of that instrument. Mr. Giddings. Are Americans property when held by Africans as slaves? Mr. Warner. I do not recollect at this time such a state of things as the gentle man from Ohio supposes. Mr. Giddings. 1 commend the gentle man to the history of the country. Mr. Warner. I will not allow the gen tleman to make a case, for me to discuss. I am discussing questions which arise under the laws and Constitution of this country ; and in return for his admonitory counsel, would heartily commend him to the Con stitution of his country, and the obligations which it imposes. Mr. Chairman, when interrupted by the gentleman from Ohio, I was endeavoring to demonstrate that property in slaves was recognized by the universal law of nations before, and long since the adoption of fhe Constitution; and that my constituents originally purchased their slave property from those who were engaged in a lawful trade, and recognized to be lawful by the- universal law of nations, and that their ti tle to their slave property is based upon that universal law of nations, as it existed before, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and not upon any positive law of the State. I am not ignorant, sir, that long since the adoption of the Constitution, and long since the title of my constituents to their slave property accrued, the United States, and most of the independent nations of the world, have entered into treaty stipula tions, abolishing the African slave trade; but those treaty stipulations were not in tended, and could not have the effect, to divest rights to slave property which had accrued and vested prior thereto, and which were recognized by the Constitu tion as lawful and valid. After the Re volution, as we all know, the colonies be came independent States. The State of Georgia had as perfect and complete ju risdiction over all persons and property within her territorial limits, as any Sov ereign State or nation on the face of the earth; she owed allegiance to no other power or Government. The commission issued by that State to her delegates to frame the Federal Constitution states her true character at that time. That com mission is headed with these memorable words: “The State of Georgia, by tire grace of God, free, sovereign, and indepen dent." Now, sir, let us inquire whRt rights the people of that independent State had, in relation to taking their slave property into any foreign territory, and to have that property protected there by the universal law of nations before and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? I maintain, sir, that a citizen of Geor gia had, according to the fundamental principles of international law, the un doubted right to take his slave property into any other foreign Territory where the introduction of such property was not pro hibited by some positive law operative in that foreign Territory, declaring it to be against the policy, or prejudicial to tire in terests of the Government having jurisdic tion over that Territory; and to have such property protected in that foreign Terri tory. It is the undoubted right of -every independent sovereign State or nation to declare by positive law, that the introduc tion of slave or any other property into the territory of such State or nation, shall be against its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. My position is, that, in the ab sence of any such declaration as to what shall be its policy, or prejudicial to its in tercets in regard to the introduction of slave property, a citizen of the indepen dent State of Georgia had the unquestion ed right to take his slave property into foreign territory, violating no law of that foreign territory, and would he entitled to have that property protected there. Let us see what are the fundamental princi ples of international law regulating the uestion. Huberus, in discussing the con- ict of laws between independent States and nations, in book first, section the second, thus states the rule: “Every nation from comity states that the laws of eactfnatioa of force within its own territorial limits, ought to be in force in all other nations, without injury to tkeir respective powers and rights.” This great fundamental principle of in ternational law has been fully recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, as applicable to’ the States of this Confederacy, in the Bank of Augusta vs: Earle, 13th Peters, 589. Mr. Chief Jus tice Taney, in delivering the opinion of •the court in that case, states the rule in these words: “In the silence of any positive rule affirming, or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice, presume the tacit adoption 1 of them by their own Government, unless they are repugnant of its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation which is .administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning by which all other principles of municipal law are'ascertained and guided.” I have the authority of Mr. Webster upon this point, who, in his correspon dence with Lord Ashburton, demanding satisfaction for slaves from the British Government, which had been taken into one of the Bahama Islands, and set free by the authorities of that place. He com bated the idea that a man’s title to his ■ slave property has no extra territorial operation, in the following strong and.em phatic language. After referring to local law in respect to marriages, he continues: “Did any one ever imagine, fhat local law acted upon such marriages to annilulinte their obliga tions, if the party should visit a country in which marriages must be celebrated in another form? It may be said, in auch instances, personal rela tions are founded in contract, and, therefore, ought to be respected; but that the relation of master and slave is founded in contract, and therefore is to b< respected only by the taw of the place which recog nizes it. Whoever so reasons encounters the authority of the whole body ot' law from Grotius down, because there are numerous instances in which the law itself presumes, or implies contracts; and prominent among these instances is the very relation which we are now considering, aud which relation is holden to draw after it mutuality of ob ligation.”—Correspondence of the Creole case. Senate document, Twenty Seventh Congress, vol. I, p. lilt. Mr. Nathan Dane, whose authority I know will not be questioned in the free States, in the sixth volume of Dane’s Abridgement, p. 430, speaking of the law of nations, savs: “In the United States, as in England, the law of nations is adopted in its full extent by the com mon law, and is held to be a part of the law of tin land.” In Madrazo vs: Willis, (5th Eng. Com ! Law Rep., 313,) these fundamental prin ciples of international law were practical ly applied to slave property by the cour of King’s Bench in Great Britain, in the year 1820. The question arose upon th< following state of facts: A Spanish sub ject being engaged in the African slave trade (Spain not having entered into treat} stipulations abolishing that trade) am’ purchased three hundred slaves on -th« coast of Africa, and had them on boari his vessel on her return voyage, when sh< was captured by a British cruiser, an< taken into one of the ports of Great Brit ain, where the slaves, by the law of tha? kingdom, became free. The Spaniard brought his action of trover in the court: of Great Britain against the captain of the British cruiser to recover the value of hit vessel and stores, and the value of his thm hundred slaves. On the trial before tin Lord Chief Justice, he doubted whether, in a British court, the plaintiff could main tain his action for the value of his three hundred slaves, and directed the. jury t< find the damages separately; so much fo the vessel and stores, and so much fo the three hundred slaves—the latter con stituting much the largest item. On the question being submitted to s full bench of judges, they were unanimous ly of the opinion that the plaintiff was en titled to recover the full value of his thre* hundred slaves, as well as the value of hi vessel, and stores, and awarded judgment therefor; recognizing the validity of tin Spaniard’s title to his slave property which was good by the laws of his nation, in a British court. The slaves were no taken by the Spaniard into the kingdom o Great Britain, in violation of her laws, bu were seized upon the great highway o • nations, upon the empire of the seas, upoi common ground, where the Spaniard hac as much right to be with his property as the Englishman; and the principle would have applied with equal force if the slaves had been seized upon common territory, the joint property of Great Britain and Spain. The same principle is applicable to the common territory of the Union, which is common ground, being the joint property of all the States, where the citi zen of Georgia has as much right to be with his slave property as the citizen oi Ohio has to be there with his property— neither violating any law of that territory by going into it with their property.— When the citizen of an independent State, who has a title to his property good and valid by the laws of that State—and I have shown that slaves were recognized as property by the universal law of nations, and that the law of nations was a part of the common law—goes into foreign terri tory with that property, violating no law of that territory, these great fundamental principles of international law go with him; they are above him and around him; he inhales them in the very atmosphere which he breathes; they protect his per son and his property; he cannot escape their binding influence unless, indeed, be goes beyond the pale of civilization, and there the principles of international law cease to operate Mr. Sandidge. Allow me to recall to the mind of the gentleman from Georgia a case precisely in point, to establish that which he is trying to establish before the committee. It is this: 1 noticed it in the newspa pers 6ome time last year. A gen tleman from Brazil went to Prussia, carry ing with him a slave. It was there at tempted to deprive him of the services of that slave; and the highest tribunal of that country decided—according to the argu ment of the gentleman from Georgia—that his owner was entitled to him; that the matter should be decided according to the laws of the country from which the party came, and that he should have the right to held his shave, and to carry him with him from the country at his pleasure. The gentleman from Georgia may have seen a notice of the case. Mr. Warner. I do not recollect having seen it, but I have no doubt that that is the correct principle; I have no doubt that it Is in ccmsonance with the universal law of nations—-with the great principles of in ternational law. It existed in this count ry,-and was a part of the law of the land at the time the State of Georgia and the other States entered into the constitution al compact. I have endeavored to estab lish the proposition, that before and at the time oF the adoption of the Constitution the citizens of the independent State of Georgia had the right, according to the well-established principles of international law, (which constituted a part of the law of the land.) to take their slave property into any foreign territory where its intro duction was not prohi: ited, and to have it protected there. I have endeavored to show what were the fundamental rights of the people of that State to their slave property, before and at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. The next question to be considered is, whether that State has delegated the pow er in the Constitution to this Government to deprive her of those fundamental rights? Has she delegated the power in the Con stitution to this Government to deprive her of the fundamental right which she had, as an independent State, to take her slave property into the common territory of the Union, there being no law in that terri tory which would be violated hy -doing so? It is contended that this Government has that power by the clause which de clares that— “Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory or other property belonging to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” The grant of power in this clause is in regard to the territory as property. Con gress has power to dispose of it as proper ty, as well as any other property belonging to the United States; may make “all need ful rules and regulations respecting the territory” considered as property, hut who can believe that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitntion to delegate those great inherent rights of property which I have been discussing to-day by this clause of the Constitution? But'sup pose we are mistaken in this, view of it, an I that it was intended by this clause to delegate the powCrlo the Federal Govern- ment.to -deprive the people of the States of the right to control their property, when the latter portion of the clause forbids you to exercise it so as to prejudice the claim of any particular State, and to exclude slave property would be not only to pre judice the claims of one State, but the claims of fifteen States of this Union; for the common territory being the joint prop erty of all the States, the slaveholding States claim an equal right to enjoy it with their property; and if you exercise the power to exclude them with their proper ty, vou prejudice their claims to that ex tent, which yon are forbid to do. The principles of equality are indelibly stamped on the face of the Constitution. There is one clause in the Constitution which declares that— “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” This principle applies with much strong er force when applied to the common ter ritory, which is the joint property of all the States. Surely the citizens of each State ought, upon principle, to be entitled to the same privileges and immunities in the common territory of all the States as they would in the States. No, sir, the framers of the Constitution never con templated for one moment that they had delegated the power in this clause Jo Con gress to deprive them of those great funda mental rights which belonged to them in respect to their property; but, on the con trary, the. delegates from the southern States refused ;to enter into the compact until it was expressly stipulated that if their slave property should escape and get into the free States, they should be surrendered up. The ordinance of 1787 has sometimes be relied on as conferring the power on Congress to exclude slavery from the Ter ritories, but it will be recollected that ordinance was adopted prior to the forma tion of the Constitution. That was a com pact between sovereign States, having the undoubted right to make it, and five free States have been formed out of the Northwest Territory ceded by Virginia, which, but for that generous cession, would have been slave territory. The rights secured by the Constitution are wholly independent of that ordinance, and have no necessary connection with it.— Those great fundamental rights which I have been discussing belonged to the peo ple of the States before and at the time of the adoption of the Constitntion. They entered into, and constituted an essential element of their slave property, part and parcel of it; and, not having delegated them in the Constitution, they have them now; and it is by virtue of those preexist ing rights which are, solemnly guarantied by the Constitution, that my constituents claim to be entitled to take their slave property into the common territory, and to have it protected there. The States are the original source of power: the Federal Government has no power except that which has been delegated to it by the States in the Constitution; and the States have now, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, in New York rs: Miln, 11 Peters, p. 138— “The same undeniable and unlimited jurisdic tion over all persons and things within their ter ritorial limits as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States.” But. sir, independent of their legal right, my constituents have the equitable right to take their slave property into the com mon territory of the Union. That terri tory is the joint property of all the States, siaveholding as well as non-slaveholding. There are but two ways in which property can honestly be acquired in this country the one is by labor and industry; the other by inheritance or bequest. A citizen of Georgia by his labor and industry acquires capital-money—a citizen of Ohio by his labor and industry does the same thing; the citizen of Georgia vests the proceeds of his labor in slave property, the citizen of Ohio vests his in merchandise, or stock, or in whatever he may choose to invest. They both desire to emigrate to the com mon territory with the common proceeds of their labor; and we will suppose that this Government shall, hy an usurpation of authority, pass a law excluding slave property from that territory. The citizen of Georgia and the citizen of Ohio meet upon the border of that territory. The citizen of Ohio is told that he can pass into that common territory with the proceeds of his labor and industry and enjoy it; but the citizen of Georgia is told, that he can not go into that common territory and en joy the benefit of his labor and industry “Why,” he inquires, “have not I obtain ed my property as honestly and fairly as the citizen of Ohio who has just gone in; and am 1 not as much entitled to enjoy the benefit of that common territory as lie is?” “Certainly you are, but your prop erty is of a different species, and, therefore you must keep out.” Is that equality, oi justice, between citizens entitled to equal privileges, and equal rights, under a com mon Government? Can any Government that shall pursue such a course of policy maintain the confidence of the people? But sir, we have been told by those who advocate this line of -policy that they do not desire to interfere with slavery in the States where it exists; and yet it is their intention to prevent the extension of slavery, by excluding it from the common territory—to surround the slave States “with a cordon of free territory, and com pel slavery, like a serpent, to sting itself to death!” Now it matters but’little with me, whether a man takes my property outright, or restricts me in the enjoyment of it, so as to render it of but little or no value to me. It is gn interference with my rights in either case; the interference is one of degree only. Any restraint upon the use and enjoyment of my property in as full and ample manner as I might other wise do, bnt for the restriction, is an inter ference with it. There is not a slavehold er in this House or out of it, but who knows perfectly well that, whenever slave ry is confied within certain specified limits, its future existence is doomed; it is only a question of time as to its final destruction. You may take any single slaveholding county in the southern States, in which the great staples of cotton and sugar are culti vated to any extent, and confine the present slave population within the limits of that county. Such is the rapid, natural increase of the slaves, and the rapid, ex haustion of the soil in the cultivation of those crops, (which add sc much to the commercial wealth of the country,) that in a few years it would be impossible to sup port them within the limits of such county. Both master and slave would be starved out; and what would be the practical effect in one county, the same result would hap pen to all the slaveholding States. Slave ry cannot be confined within certain speci fied limits without producing the destruc tion of both master and slave; it requires fresh lauds, plenty of wood and water, not only for the comfort and happiness of the slave, but for the benefit of the owner. We understand perfectly well the practical effect of the proposed restriction upon our rights, and to what extent it interferes with slavery in the States; and we also under stand the object and purpose of that inter ference. If the slaveholding States should ever be so regardlesss of their rights and their honor as co-equal States, to be willing to submit to this proposed restric tion for the sake of harmony and peace, they could not do it. There is a great overruling, practical necessity which would prevent it. They ought not to submit to it upon principle, if they could, and could not if they would. It is in view of these things, sir, that the people of Georgia have assembled in con vention, and solemnly resolved that if Congress shall pass a law excluding them from the common territory with their slave property, they will disrupt the ties that bind them to the Union. This position has not been taken by way of threat or menace. Georgia never threatens, but Georgia always acts, whenever it is neces sary and proper for her to act for the pro tection of her constitutional rights and the rights of her people. She will not act hastily or rashly, but not the less firmly on that account. She intends to place her self right in the face of the world, in regard to this question. She has delegated me, in conjunction with my abler and more ex perienced colleagues, to make known her rights here, and to proclaim them to the American people. She desires to main tain those rights within the Constitution, and for that purpose invokes the support of the country, in order that those rights may'be respected and observed. I have endeavored to present those rights to the consideration of this House to-day, in good temper, and as becomes the Represent ative of one of the old thirteen States of this Confederacy. I concur in the sentiment uttered by the senior member from Ohio, [Mr. Giddings,] that we should discuss principles here; and 1 will add, after we have discussed them, we should regulate our conduct by them, not on ly here, but everywhere. My constitutents have no desire to force their institutions upon those who do not like them; all they ask is to be unmolested in the enjoymeut of those rights which were gaurantied to them by the Constitution, not to be re cognized as superior, nor as inferior, but simply as equals in this Confedera cy- But it has been said here, that the South acted in bad faith in consenting to the re peal of the Missouri compromise. What is the history of that compromise? That act was forced upon the South by the aggtessive policy of the North. The Louisiana Territory was slave territory, and Missouri was formed out of that terri tory; the North resisted her admission in to the Union, because slavery was recog nized by her constitution; and, for the sake of peace and harmony, the South consent ed to the line of 36° 30', north of which slavery should be excluded. The term cor/tpiomise necessarily implies a surrendef of legal rights for the purpose of settlement —a waiver of constitutional rights for that object; no more was ever intended by that act. The South always maintained that it was unconstitutional; but acquiesced in it solely upon the principle of compromise, with the understanding that it was to be applied to all the territory of the Union; and it was so applied at that time. Mis souri was admitted as a slave State. Iowa, formed out of the Louisana Territory, which was|originally slave territory, has been admitted as a free State. But how did the North regard this sacred compromise at the time, and since? On the 6th of March, 1820, the act was passed, authorizing the people of Mis souri Territory to form a State constitution by the eighth section of which act slavery was excluded north of 36°30'. On the 2d of March, 1821, the house of Represen tatives passed a resolution providing for the admission of Missouri into the Union, by the proclamation of the President, upon certain conditions to be performed by the Legislature of that State, when nearly the whole Indy of northern Representatives voted against the resolution for her admis sion; and yet they now pretend to say, that they have sacredly kept that sacred compact, when it was repudiated by their votes during the same session at which it was passed; and the contemporaneous his tory of that period shows that this same, compromise, now so sacred in the estima tion of many northern politicos, was con demned and denounced by the entire North. The next territory that was acquired was Texas, which was also slave territory. The compromise line was extended through that territory, the North appropriat ing all the slave territory north of 56° 30' to freedom, as she did from the shtve terri tory of Louisiana. The South, acting upon the understanding that the com promise line was to be applied to all the territory of the Union, carried out that un derstanding in good faith in regard to the slave territory of Texas. The next territory which was acquired was from Mexico; that was free territory. The South was still willing to abide the compromise line; and extend it through to the Pacific; but the North refused—will ing to abide it so long as slave territory could be appropriated to freedom, but when that compromise line was to inure to the benefit of the South, its binding obliga tion was denied and repudiated' Then it was that the South became released from all obligation to abide by that com promise, and was remitted to her original constitutional rights in respect to the com mon territory. It has been said that the South received the benefit of the admission of Missouri into the Union as a slave State. The reply is, that Iowa has been admitted into the Union as a free State, with this marked difference, however, that Missouri was orignally slave territory, and Iowa, which was originally slave territory, is now a free State. The South has gained nothing, and lost the State oflowa as slave territory. The impartial historian will be at no loss to discover who it was that first repudiated the Missouri compromise in Tespect to the common territory of the Union. After the Missouri compromise had been repudiated by the North in regard to the territory acquired from Mexico, the South voted for the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which contains the true principles of non-inter-, vention by Congress with the question of’ slavery as it exists in the United States, in regard to the common territory of the Union—the true principles of the Con stitution, which recognize the equal rights of the people of all the States to the en joyment of that common Territory. That act ought to bp maintained, not only be cause it is right, just, and equal in its E revisions to the people of all the States, ut because it will have the effect to sup press agitation by demagogues, botk North and South, of the question of slavery.— To use a common expression, it will take the wind out of the sails of that class of politicians in both sections, who will be then unable to navigate in still waters.— In the South that class of men claim to be the exclusive friends of slave institutions, and ask for a seat in Congress to protect that particular interest exclusively. In the North that class of men claim tlie stip- port of the people, because they are the exclusive opponents of the slavery aggres sions of the South, as they are pleased to represent themselves; and the result is, when they meet here the country is kept in a continual excitement, the legitimate business of the country neglected, that they make political capital for themselves at home, in order to obtain place and power. I do not intend to be understood, sir, as saying that there are any of that class of men here now from either section of the country; the present company, you know, sir, is always excepted. I am only speaking of what might happen, and probably will happen, if this question of slavery agita tion be not withdrawn from this Hall, and referred to the people of the Territories, where it legitimately belongs, and where the Kansas-Nebraska act refers it. It is, sir, for maintaining the salutary provisions of this act, so essential for the peace and best interests of this great country, as well as the obligations imposed on him by the Constitution, that the President of the United States has been denounced as a doughface. Far better is it for him, sir, as a man, and for his reputation as an officer, that he should be denounced as a dough face, in maintaining the integrity of the Constitution of his country, than that he should have given occasion to have been denounced as a perjured traitor to that Constitution which he had solemnly sworn to support and maintain in all its sacred provisions. From the Richmond Enquirer. Fillmore’s Services to the South. clamorous and consistent abolitionist. Tna • Letter was a deliberate exposition of *,i s principle! on the relations of slavery; and, in his nuhiin * duet, he adhered with lidclity to the that platform. In every controversy affectiSlV* interests ot the South which agitated th,> ^ . during Fillmore’s service in Congress, he esnm?.^ the cause of abolitionism with the utmost his feebie and negative nature. al °* Now, this ugly'and stuhbom fact sorely es Fillmore’s friends in the South. Therm!,!**' take to escape its consequences, and to redeol" the character of their candidate by an incest, , and elaborate panegyric, on his Patriotism in th 9 Presidency. AH at once, they say, and by som® miraculous agency, he was cleansed of the original corruption of his nature, was converted from h: lifp-lono* rnnvlftinnc rtf tko C.. _ • . . and infan illustrated life-long convictions of the injustice and infamy of negro slavery, and has henceforth illustrated „ Late Elections—Democratic Prospects. We took occasion a few days since, to notice with some satisfaction, the result of the late North ern elections. They indicate that the tide of aboli tionism, which flowed so portentously soon after the passage of the Kansas Bill, is now on the ebb. They indicate that the Northern Democracy, par tially paralysed fora while, is rapidly recovering its strength—preparing itself for a great triumph over the enemies of the Constitution and the Union, and the presidential contest of next fall. The Journal of Commerce received this morning, has the following paragraph bearing on this sub ject: . The Prospect.—The immense gains of the Demo crats in our large cities and towns, and in those States where elections have been held this Spring, although opposed by a combination of the Know Nothings, Republicans and Abolitionists, show very clearly which way the wind blows. A year ago. in each of the States alluded to, viz: New Hampshire Island and Connecticut, the Demo crats were defeated by an overwhelming majority. This year the combination against them has been more extensive aud complete than before, yet in each case they press very closely upon the heels of their opponents. Until last year, there had been an Abolition or Free Soil party, which neither sided with the Democrats nor with the Whigs. But at the late elections, they have fraternized lovingly with the opponents of Democracy; and the consequence is, that although the Democrats, in each of tlie States mentioned, polled a vote nearly, if not quite unprecedented, they are still slightly in a minority. But they now see the full strength of the enemy, and the amount of work to be done. All that remains is, to do it. And the opportunity is near. ^ But further. Not only is the Democracy of the North recovering its lost strength. There is something more to be said: Judging from the tone of its presses and the resointions of its public meet ings, it is daily becoming sounder in its senti ments. Its organs are taking bolder and higher ground in opposition to anti-slavery fanaticism. The Free Soilers, whom a mistaken policy in form er years tolerated, have either deserted, or been driven out of its ranks. Their places are being supplied with Conservative Clay Webster Union loving Whigs. The N. Y. Post and its Van Bu- ren Abolition clique, have sought admission into the Black Republican camp, and the Democracy is now free from their treacherous presence. The consequence is, that the Democracy of the North, as imperitive as their brethren of the South, de manded of the Cincinnati Convention a distinct and emphatic approval of the Nebraska bill, with a full repudiation of the isms of the day. Of course the struggle next fall will be a severe one. The Black Republicans lately exulting in the belief that a victory was within their grasp, will not yield without a tremendous conflict. Yet, they will be defeated. The South has but to stand firm:—to rally in solid phalanx, her fifteen States in support of the Constitution and the Union, and patriotism will gloriously triumph. From the Richmond Enquirer. The Enow Nothings of the South. That any man with the least pretension to poli tical information can concede to Fillmore the re motest chance of election to the presidency is a proposition that we utterly deny and repudiate. Why, the party which affects to support him is split into so many factions that nobody can as certain its identity. The bulk of the knout noth ing organization is under the control of black re publicans; and they are in open rebellion against Fillmore—not so much because they distrust his opinions on slavery as because of the desperate condition of his fortunes. It is barely possible that he may carry a single northern State. in the South the prospect is even more cheer less in the eyes of Fillmore’s followers. They cannot count with any certainty on the support of the whigs, to whose alliance they are indebted for their partial success in the South. Their own party is rapidly melting away by defection, and tumbling to pieces under the heavy blows of its own members. The terror of its discipline is now derided, and its organization has lostall its strength and consistency since the public have had a glimpse of its workings. Its ticket is a palpable antithesis. Between an inveterate whig of the federal school and a democrat who owes all his consequeuce to a personal and political subser viency to Andrew Jackson there can be no identi ty of opinion or of interest. If Donelson's prin ciples of public policy are just, then Fillmore is the arch-enemy of the country. If Fillmore is a sound politician, then Donelson should be hanged as a traitor. To say nothing of other measures, Fillmore and Donelsou are in antagonism on the tariff, and distribution, internal improvement, and sub-treasury—all of which are living and active issues before the country. Whigs support Fill more because he takes tlie whig view of these ques tions. Will they put Donelson in a position where he may succeed to the presidency, and re verse the policy of his predecessor on every great measure of public economy? 'i he idea is absurd. Whig know nothings will not support Donelson; democratic know nothings will not support Fill more. A house divided against itself cannot stand. In the next presidential contest the know nothing party will sustain the most inglorious de feat. Every one foresees the result. Why, then, in a contest which involves the dear est interests of the South, will persons professing friendship to the South deliberately throw away strength that may be essential to its safety? Or, rather, why will they aid and abet the common enemy by a diversion which, if it have any effect, must neutralize the patriotic resistance of the de mocracy? Is it possible that with the blind ven geance, if not with the strength of the giant, they would involve friend and foe in indiscriminate ruin? Is the desire to defeat the democracy so strong with the know nothing party that they would accomplish their purpose by the sacrifice of the South? Is party dearer to him than country? Their conduct is intelligible on no other supposi tion. They are not so stupid that they cannot foresee the disastrous results of their policy, if, in' deed, it have any other result than thefrown ig nominious defeat. But what to them is the sal vation of the South if it be accomplished by per petuating the ascendency of hated democracy? No! better for them that slavery and the South he sunk into fathomless perdition, if" they can only join hands with black republicans, and with sav age yell dance in drunken revelry over the pros trate body of the democratic party. h:s conduct all the virtues of a pure and w, sa patriot. It is xn no envious spirit of detraction but solely out of regard for the truth of history that we propose a bnet inquiry into the propriety of such extravagant eulogy of the.“pattern Prexi dent. * When the country was in a state of excessive agitation and alarm, and it was thought by some very good people that tlie enactment of the famous compromise measures was essential to the of the Union, Millard Filimore was Vice Presi dent of the United States, and in virtue of this high office possessed considerable influence in tlm Senate, especially over the conduct of Northern Whigs. Is there any contemporaneous proof that in this moment of extreme danger to the Union and of utmost need in the South, Fillmore moved a finger in support of the Fugitive Sfavo Law? The fact that not a single Whig Senator from the North voted for the measure, affords conclusive evidence that its success was in no measure due to Fillmore’s favor. But did the bill receive even the passive approval of his own judgment? That it did not we have the testiony of his own public and deliberate declaration. Iu 1854, Fillmore made an excursion to Kentucky, and in Louisviiie delivered himself of a speech, in which he under took to narrate the circumstances of his succes! sion to the Presidency. Here is a choice extract; “In Texas and New Mexico, a civil war threat ened. Texas made preparations to take posses sion of a portion of New Mexico. He felt it his duty to maintain the laws of his country. One of the laws required that the people of the Territory Holloway's Medicines.—We are not in the habit generally of noticing the thousand and one medi cines of the day; but when a really meritorious one is before the public, we think it doe to ihe af flicted that the fact should be made known. We have used Holloway’s Pills and Ointment in cases of humors, bruises, and scalds, with beneficial ef fect, and there are cases within our knowledge of extraordinary cures performed in diseases of long standing. Psofessor Holloway’s Ointment and Pills are among the few preparations which perform all the cures for which they are recommended. We are satisfied that for purifyng the blood, regu- of New Mexico should be protected. As a means of protecting, he immediately ordered a portion of the army and munitions of war to the frontier of Tee- as to do duty there. The army teas put in motion and then, and not till then, did Congress act upon the subject. F Texas and New Mexico acquiesced in tho action of Congress. Mr. Filimore spoke of tho adoption of tlie compromise measures of 1850 es pecially of the fugitive slave law. This late, he said, had some provisions in it to which lit had objec tions. He regretted the necessity of its being passed at all; but the constitution required the giving up of fugitive slaves, and it was not for him to decide whether this was a compact; he had sworn to maintain it, and he would do so to his last hour. When the bill came to him from the two houses, in tlie midst of hurry and confusion and difficul ties; he examined it, and a doubt came up in his mind whether it was not unconstitutional, as denying the right of habeas corpus to the fugitive slave, lie. referred the question to our accomplished Kentucky lawyer, his Attorney General, who gave his opin ion that the law was not a violation of the consti tution; and thereupon, said Mr. Fillmore, I gave my signature to the bill.” Mark the language in which Fillmore defines his relations to the Fugitive Slave Bill: it em braces “provisions to which he had objections;” he “regretted the necessity for passing it at all; - ' “a doubt came upon his mind whether it was un constitutional, as denying the right of habeas corpus to the fugitive sl^ve;” he referred the ques tion “to the Attorney General, who gave his opin ion that the faw was not a violation of the con stitution, and thereupon,” (in the sense of where fore, implying logical sequence,) said Mr. Fill more, “I gave my signature to the bill.” Js there one word in these sentences that implies approval of the fugitive slave law? On the contrary does not the langnage clearly express a reluctant and constrained acquiescence in a measure, against which his judgment aud his feelings revolted, and for the passage of which he took care to relieve himself of all odium by shifting the responsibility upon the shoulders of the Attorney General!— There is no hearty commendation of the law as an act of justice to the South, and no rebuke ofthe abolitionists for their opposition to it. But more than this: the first official act of President Fillrilore was to give the foremost place in this cabinet to Daniel Webster, who was notoriously opposed to the Fugitive Slave bill, and who declared, in a subsequent speech at Buffalo, that it would not have received his vote, if he had remained in the Senate, without an amendment securing jury trial to the negro in the State in which he was captur ed. In tne speech from which we take the above extract, Mr. Fillmore declared that there was per fect-unity of opinion between himself and the mem bers of his cabinet. But he was present when Webster made the declaration, and would have protested if he had not approved the sentiment.— Indeed, it was notorious at the time, (such was Donelson’s language in the Union,) that the elo quent and expert Secretary of State was put for ward to represent his chief and the entire Ad ministration. That Fillmore did not support the fugitive slave bill before its passage, is proved by his own subse quent declaration that he objected to its provis ions, and that he entertained a doubt of its constitu tionality until the Attorney General relieved his con science. His judgment was not determined in re gard to the measure until he become President and was assured by the competent officer that it did not violate the Constitution. In the face of this statement, the most impudent partisan of Fill more cannot claim that he is entitled to praise for the enactment of the law for the recapture of fu gitive slaves. His own language attests the re luctance with which he gave the executive sanc tion to the bill; but his private judgment and per sonal feelings were overcome by a pledge to his party, that lie would not veto any measure which did not involve a palpable violation of the Consti tution. By constraint of the same pledge, arid in vii toe of the same principle of opposition to tha exercise of the Executive veto, Mr. Fillmore could not negative a bill for the repeal of the fugitive slave Jaw or the reestablishment of the Missouri restriction. The fugitive slave law was the fulfilment of an obvious obligation of the Constitntion. The hopes of the Union hung upon its success. Yet Fill more moved not a finger, uttered not a word, m its support. When, after an arduous struggle and with the aid of Democratic votes alone, it fought its way through Congress, and was pres ented to the President for signature, Fillmore hesi tated, raised objections, entertained doubts, and at last gave it the Executive sanction with an air of constraint and strong repugnance. And for this pitiful and ungracious service, the South must enter into bonds of perpetual obligation. The South will not affect the hypocrisy of gratitude to the man who doles out its rights in niggard meas ure and with such reluctant air. Whatever scruple of conscience Fillmore might have had against the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Law, its excution wa3 his clear and impera tive duty. And, if in the discharge of this duty be had displayed the least zeal or energy, he might have compensated the South for the reluc tance with which he yielded to its firet demam • Unfortunately for himself, and for the interests o the South, the languor with which he enforce was quite equal to the disgust with which he sign ed the bill for the recapture of fugitive slaves. Everybody will recollect the case of Crafts- * was the first attempt to execute the law; and it was of the utmost consequence that the efficiency the measure should be so signally established as bear down all opposition, and prevent any tut attempt at resistance. A gentleman from Georg sent an agent in search of two slaves. Crafts wife, who were living in Boston. They wt found without difficulty, and might have captured and secured if any effort had be® 1 *®' to enforce tlie law. The Marshal refused his duty. -The slaves paraded the streets, d'“ the authorities, and at last, in open day, embar on a steamer for Europe. They took up their 6 joum in London, were caressed by the aboimi aristocracy of England, and allowed to lDS Southern ladies with impunity. Great was rejoicing of the Abolitionists over this result, they had a right to celebrate their victory, v a signal triumph. From that day the f u ^ 1 slave law became a dead letter for all practica p their sacri- poses. ., The South were enraged and humiliated by defeat. Then they discovered that they had ■ ficed honor as well as substantial interest* i shadow. Their indignition should be * against the guilty object. It was Millard Fi who suffered an abolition mob to defy and P upon the law for the recapture of fugitivs With any adequate demonstration of force, might have been executed, the majesty ot g ment vindicated and the rights of the ft ,)U __ taiued, by the capture ana return ofthe * . er . It was at least due to the South that the ous Marshall should be dismissed; but Film ^ tained him in office, and is thus an acco P his crime. another Boston has since been the scene of Jn violent resistence to the fugitive-slave i»_ of this last instance, the undisciplined iro P“ r t ^ 8 the mob were reinforced by alt the energx j —fuiitMM was lnbniteiy lating the stomach, and curing liver and billiona state government. The resistence was complaints, no better remedy can be foend.—Ban-1 m0M > desperate, hot Franklin Pierce was far Damttrat.