Newspaper Page Text
“Tilt's additional reason why I should I
stay. I distrust ail the tribe,” responded [
the ai l-tle-damp.”
The First Consul could not suppress n j
smile, and gently pushed his devoted fol
lower from the wall. Kapp left the room.
“ Well, what are you doing here, my
poor Bartolomeo?” enquired the First
of Piombo.
“To beg an asylum and assistance from i
you, it you arc a true Cor»ir;u>,” replied 1
Bartolomeo, in a hoarse and impatient]
tone.
“What mi-fort me can possibly have
vis y ou from the country—-you, who six :
Miths ago were the richest, the most —” :
j have killed all the Portas!” said Pi-j
ombo, with deeply modulated accents, and
drawing his blows together convulsively, i
The First Consul started back as if lie
had received a blow,
“Would you betray me,” said Bartolo-'
moo, casting a sombre glance at Bona-,
parte. “Remember, tin re are four more;
Piombos left at Corsica!"
Lucien took Ids countiymau’s arm, and,
shaking it slightly, whispered to him—|
Surely, you do not come licit to threaten '
my brothel ?”
Bonaparte gave a nod to Lucien, who
was instantly silent; then looking at Piom- [
bo, he said—
“ Why di I you kill the Portas?”
The Corsican’s eyes glared like a flash J
of lightning.
“ \\ e had made up our qunrrch, and a-!
greed to be tiiends through the mediation j
«>t the B irbantini. On the day but one
alter we had dined together, to drown all
animosities, I was forced to leave them at !
my house, ns business called me to Bastia. 1
In my absence, they set fire to my vine
yards at L ingone, murdered mv son Gre-|
gorio, and my daughter Ginevra and mv '
wife only escaped their hands, doubtless
because they had that very morning taken
the communion, and were under the protec
tion of the Virgin. When I returned, I
could no longer find my home. I search
ed for it, while 1 trod upon its smouldering
nshcd.”
Bartolomeo paused, and appeared to be
oppressed by the recollection of his sor
rows.
“ Suddenly I trod upon Gregorio’s bo
dy, and, by the light of the moon, 1 recog
nised him. O, said Ito my self, this is the
Porta’s work. 1 instantly made oil’ to the
mountains—c dlceted together some per
sons to whom 1 had done service—do you
nn lersland, B maparte ?—and we marched
to the vineyards of the Portas. We reach
ed the spot at nine o’clock in the morning,
and at ten they were .-.11 in the presence of
the God who made them. Giacomo pre-,
tends to say that Eliza I mini had saved a
child—the young Luigi; but I am sort I
tied him securely to his bed, before we set
fire to the house. To be brie l : I left the]
island with my wife and child, before I
could verify the report that Ltiiga was still
living.
Bonaparte stood motionless, looking at
Bartolomeo with curiosity, but without
surprise.
“ How many of them were they?” ask
ed Lucien.
“Seven,” replied Piombo. “ They once
persecuted you,” resumed he; but the ob
servation did not draw any expression of
animosity from the brothers.
“Ah! you are no longer Corsicans,” ’
said he, with a bitter and despairing smile.[
“Adieu! I once sheltered and protected
you,” he added reproachfully. “If it had
not been fur me, your mother would never
have reached Marseilles alive,” said he, '
turning to Bonaparte, who stood deep in
thought, resting his elbow on the mantel
piece <>f the chimney.
“ In very conscience, Piombo,” answer
ed Napoleon, “ I do notseehow I can hide
you under my wing; fori am the head of
the republic, and it is my duty to see that
its laws are executed.”
“Ah! ah!” said Bartolomeo.
“ But 1 can shut my eyes,” resumed the
Consul. “ The prejudice of the Vendetta
will long prevent the supremacy of the
laws in Corsica,” added he, speaking to
himself. “It must be eradicated, however,
at whatever cost.”
Bonaparte kept silence for a minute, and
Lucien made a sign to Piombo not to in
terrupt him. I
The Corsican shook his head disapprov
ingly. • I
“ Stay here,” said the Consul to Barto
meo, “ and we will not meddle with tiie af
fair. I will cause your estates to be pur
chased for you ; and at a fitting opportu
nity we will see what can be done for you.
But, no more of the vendetta. Remember
there are no mountains to fly to in Paris;
and if you handle yonrpoignard In re, you
cannot expect a mercy which 1 should not
dare to grant. Here every citizen is pro
tected by the laws, and no one takes jus
tice into his own hands.”
“ Very well,” said Bartolomeo, taking
Napoleon’s hand and grasping it; “we
are yours for life and death, and you can
dispose of every one who bears the name
of Piombo.”
St saying, the brow of the Corsican re
laxed its sternness, and he looked around
him with pleasure and complacency.
“ You arc not badly off here,” remark
ed he, smilingly, as if I e > Item Id like to
live there. “Itis a palace !”
" It depends upon yourself to be the
most welcome here, and to have a palace
of your own in Paris,” said Bonoparte,
measuring with his eyes the figure and pro
portions of his country man. “ I shall oft
en have occasion to look around me, to find
a devoted Piend on whom I can rely,”
A sob of transport burst from the ample
chest of Piombo. He held out his hand '
to the First Coihul and said—
“ There is still something of the Cord- I
can li ft io you.”
Bonaparte smiled, ns he silently examin
ed this man, who brought back to bi u, a?
it were, the breath of his native ground
of that island, where lie had been received ]
with so much enthusiasm on his return from '
Egypt, and which he was never again to
behold. He made a sign to his brother,
wlki took with him Bartolomeo di Piombo.
Lucien ettqtiiretl with much kindness about
the state of the finances of the old friends j
of the family. Piombo took the minister '
of the interior to a window, ami pointed !
o it bis wife and Gim-vr i seated upon a j
heap of stones. He then said,
“We came here on toot fr mi l'o m in
Idueau, and are absolutely penniless.”
Lucien gave his purse to his ’<t»unjrv
■nan, and told him to come to his hoti4 -li
next morning, to consult upon
io secure his property. R rtohmu c, ff’lml
with hope and happiness, rejoined fiis will
and Ginevra.
That evening the exiles me
luge, bread, and the protection'll tfie.l'Trst
Consul.
I wowlj-tilllt
REMARKS GF MR. CAI.IIOW4, •„
In the Senate of the UnitedfStates, tlie
lx II authorizing an issue ol Treasury
Notes—September 19, 1837.
Mr. President—An extraordinary enurse
<»l events, with which all are too familiar to
need recital, has separated, in fact, the Go
vernment and the Bmks. What relation
-hall they bear hereafter ? Shall tin B ink
ngain be used as fiscal agents of the G >v
ernment ? Be the depositories of the pub
lic money? And, above all, shall their
• otes be considered and treated as money,
in the receipts and < xpemlitures of the Go
vernment ? This is the great and leading
question ; one of the first magnitude, ami full
of consequences. | hive given it my most
anxious and deliberate attention ; and have
conn to the conclusion, that we have reach- !
cd the period alien the interest both of the
Government and the Banks forbid a re
union. 1 now propose to off rmy reason
lor this conclusion. I shall do it with that
perfect frankness due to the subject, to the
country, ami the position 1 occupy. All 1
ask is, that I may he heard with caudorand
I fairness corresponding to tiie sincerity with
which I shall deliver my sentiments.
Those who support a re union of the
i Banks ami the Government, -have to over
! come a preliminary difficulty. They are
I now separated, by operation of law, and
I cannot be united, while the present state ot
; things continue, without repealing the law
| which has disjoined them. I ask, who is
, w filing to propose its repeal ? Is there any
■ one who, during the suspension of specie
• payments, would advocate their employ
ment ns the fiscal agents of the Go vernment,
i who would make them the depositories wl
the public revenue, or who would receive
and pay away their notes in the public decs?
I: there be none, then it results, that the
' separation must continue ‘or the present,
and that the re-union must be the wo k of
time, and depending on the contingency of
' the resumption of specie payments.
I B;H suppose this difficulty to be r-moved,
: and that the Bmks were regularly redeem
ing their notes, from what party in this bo
dy can the proposition come, or by which
can it he supported, fora re-u ion between
them and the Government ? Who, after
what has happened, can advocate the re
union o| the Government with the league of
State Banks? Can the opposition, who
tor years have been denouncing it as the
' most dangerous instrument ot power, and
■ efficient means of corrupting and controll
ing the Government and country? Can
. they, after the exact fulfilment of all their
' predictions of disastrous consequences from
the connexion, now turn round and support
that which they have so long and loudly
'condemned? We have heard much from
the opposite side ot untried experiments on
the currency. 1 concur in the justice of
the censure. Nothing can require to be
more delicately handled, it ought never
to be tampered with, nor touched, until it
becomes absolutely necessary. But if un
tried experiments justly deserve censure,
what condemnation would a repetition of
an experiment thaUias failed deserve? An
experiment that has so signally failed, both
in the opinion of supporters and opponents,
as to call down the denunciation of those
who tried it. Il to make the experiment was
. folly, the repetition would be madness. But
j if the opposition cannot support the tma-
I sure, how can it be expected to receive stip-
I port from the friends of ike Administration,
■ in whose h mds the experiment has so sig
nally failed, as to call down from them ex
ecrations deep and loud !
If, Mr. Presi. ent, there he any one point
’ fully established by experience and reason,
I hold it to be the utter incompetency of the
State Banks to furnish, of themselves, a
sound and stable currency. They may suc
ceed in prosperous times, but the first ad
j verse current necessarily throws them into
i utter confusion. Nor has any device been
i found to give them the requisite stren. th
i and stability, but a great central and con
trolling Bank, instituted nndt r the anthori
|ly of this Government. I go further. Il'
; we must continue our connexion with the
Banks—if we must receive and pay away
■ their notes as money, we not only have the
. right to regulate ami give uniformity and
; stability to them, but we are bound to do so,
and to use the most efficient means fur that
| purpose. The Constitution makes it our
: duty to lay and collect the taxes and duties
I uniformly throughout the Union ; to fulfil
which, we are bound to give the highest pos
sible equality of value throughout every
part of the country, to whatever medium it
may be called in ; and if that h» Bank notes,
to adopt the most ♦ ffective tneans of accom
plishing it, which experience has shown to
lie a Bank of the United State?. This has
been long my opinion. I entertained it in
181G,and repeated it in my place here on
the deposite question in 1834. The only
alternative, then is, disgui-e it as you niay
between a disconnexion and a Bank of the
United States. This is the real issue to
which all must come, and ought now to be
openly and fairly nu t.
But there are difficulties in the way of a
National Bank, no le-s formidable than a
re-connexion with the State Banks. It is
utterly irnprm ticable, at present, to estab
lish one. There is reason to believe that a
majority of the people of the United States
are deliberately and unalterably opposed to
it. At all events, there is a numerous, re
spectable, and powerful Party (I refer to the)
old State Rights Party,) who are, and ever]
have been, from the beginning of the Gov
ernment, opposed to the Bank; and whose
opinions, thus long and (irmly entertained,
ought at least to be so much respected as to
forbid the creation of one, without an amend
ment of the Constitution. To this must be
added, the insuperable difficulty, that the
Executive branch of the Govern’t is open
y opposed to it, and pledged to interpos*
his veto, on constitutional grounds, should
a hill pass to incorporate one. Far four
year;, at least, it will be impracticable to !
charter a Bank. What must be done in the
mean time? Shall the Treasury be re-or
ganized to perform the functions which havt
been recently discharged by the Banks, ot
siiall the State institutions be again em
oloycil, until a Bank can be created? In
die one case, we shall have (he so much vil
; hfied and denounced Sob-Treasury, as it
is called ; ami, in the other, dillicultics in
surmountable, would grow up against the
establishment ot a Bank. Let the Slate in
-titntions he once re-instated and re-united
to tile Government as their fiscal agents, and
they will be found the first and most -Iren
nous opponents of a National Bank, In
w hich they would be overshadowed and cur
tailed in their profits. 1 hold it certain that,
in prosperous times, w hen the State Batik
ire in full operation, it is impossible to es
tablish a National Bank. Its creation, then,
should the re-union with the State Banks
take place,will be postponed until some dis
aster, similar to the present, shall again be
fall the country. But it requires little <d
the spirit of prophecy to see that such ano
ther disaster w ould be the death of the whole
system. Already it has had two paralytic
strokes—the third would prove fatal.
But suppose these difficulties were over
come, I would still be opposed to the incor
poration of a B ink. So far from affording
the relief which many anticipate,it would be
the most disastrous measure that could bi
adopted. As great as is the calamity un
der w hich the country is suflering, it is no
thing to what would follow the creation of
-m h an institution, under exi-tirg circum
stances. In order to compel the State in
stitutions to pay specie, the Bank must have
a capital as great, or nearly asgreat, in pro
portion to the existing institutions, as the late
Bank had, when established, to those oftltat
day. This would give it an immense capi
tal, not much less than one hundred million
ol dollars, of w hich a large proportion, sax
twenty millions, must be specie. From what
source is it to be derived ? From the State
Banks ? It wo dd empty their vaults, and
leave them in the most helpless condition.
Fmm abroad, and England in particulai ?
It would re-produce that revulsive current,
which has lately covered the country with
desolation. Ihe tide is still running to Eu
rope, and if forced back by an artificial
cmirst, before the foreign debt is paid, can
not but be followed by the most disa-trou.-
con-cquences.
Bm suppose this difficulty overcome, and
the Bulk rc-establi-bed, I ask what would
be the eflects, under such circumstances?
Win re would it find room for business
commen-urate with its extended capital,
without crushing the State institutions, en
feebled by the withdrawal of their means,
in ord r to endite the instrument of their
oppression? A few of the more vigorous
might survive; but the far greater portion,
wi h their debtors, creditors, and stock
holders, would be involved in common ruin.
The Bank would, indeed, give a speci<
, currency, not by enabling the exi-ting in
stitutions to resume, but by destroying
them and taking their place.
1 ho-e who take a different view, and so
j fondly anticipate relief from a National
' Bank, are deceived by a supposed analogy
. between the present situation of the eoun
i try and that of 1816, when the late Bank
' was chartered, after the war with Great
I Britain. 1 was an actor in that scene, and
i may be permitted to speak in relation to it
with some little authority. Between the
two periods there is little or no analogy.
They stand almost fit contrast. In 181t5,
■ the Governuunt was a debtor to the Banks
—now it is a creditor: a difference of the
! greatest impoitance, as far as the present
I question is concerned. The Banks had
over-is-ued, it is truw, but their over-issues
■ were to the Gov< rnmetit —a solvent and
'aide debtor, whose credit, held by the
Banks in the shape of stock, was at par.
It was their excessive issues to the Govern
ment, on its stock, which mainly caused
thr suspension ; in proof of whit h, it is a
remarkab e fact, that the depreciation of
Bank paper under gold ami silver w as about
equal to the proportion whit h the Govern
ment stock ludd by the Banks hereto their
issues, it was this excess, that hung on
the market and tlepresscd the value of their
notes. Ihe solution is easy. The Banks
took the Government stock, pav able tn 12
years, ami issued their notes for the same,
payable on demand, in violation of the
plainest principles of banking. It follow
ed, ol course, that when their notes were
resented for payment, they had nothing
but Government stm kto meet them. But
I its stock was at par, and all the Banks had
' io do was to go into market with the stock
. they held and take up tl eir notes, and thus
' the excess, which hung upon the market
j and depressed their value, would have been
i withdrawn from tin illation, ami the resi
i due would have risen to par, or nearly par,
w ith gold and silver, when specie payments
might l>e easily resumed.
This they were unwilling to do, Thev
were profiling every way by drawing in
terest on the stock, by discounting on it as
capital, and bv its continued rise in the
market. It became necessary to compel
them to surrender these advantages. Two
methods presented themselves—one a bank
rupt law, and the other a National Bank. I
■ was opposed to the former then, as I am
now. I regarded it as a harsh, ttneonstitu
tional measure—opposed to the rights of
I the States. If they have not surrendered
; the right to incorporate Banks, as is conce
ded, its exercise cannot be controlled bv
the action <4 this Government, which ha«.
no power but what is expressly grained,
and no authority to control the States in
the exercise of their reserved powe rs. L
remained to resort to a National Bank, ns
the means of compulsion. It proved es-
Jectual. Specie payments w ere restored ;
hut, even with this striking advantage, it
was followed by great pressure in 1818, ’l9
land ’2O, as all who are old enough to re
member that period must recollect. Su< h,
in fact, must ever be the consequence of re
sumption, w hen forced iindi r the most fa
vorable circiirnsjrtnces ; and such, accor
dingly, it proved, even in England, with
all her resources, and with all the <notion
‘he used in restoring a specie circulation,
•fter the long suspension of 1797. What,
'hen, would be its t fleets in the present con
dition of the country, when the Govern
ment is a creditor, instead of a debtor ?
when there are so many newly created
Banks, without established credit? when
he over-issues are so gnat, and when so
large a portion of the debtors are nut in n
S 'I'N » 4 111) () rU N ION
condition to be coerced ? As great as i
du’ tide of disaster vvlti. h is passing ovt i
djy laud, it would be as nothing to wha
follow, were a Nati I B ink to I
established as tb e means of coercing spi ci
payments. °
I am bound to speak without reserve nr
this important p.-jm. My opinion, the, .
is, that if it shoid 1 be determined to con:
pel tlie restoration of specie payment- In
the aeeney <,f R mks, there is but one way’;
but to that 1 have insuperable objections. I
mean the adoption of the Peitn-v Jv.iisi;
Bank of the United St.ues as the ii-< -.d :1
gent ol the Government. It is already ii.
iperation, an I sustained by great resoiuu -
es and pow- rful connexions, noth at home
and abroad. Through its agency, specie
payments might undoubtedly be restored,
and that w itb (ar less disaster than through
a newly created Bank; but not without se
vere pressure. 1 cannot, however, vote
for such a measure. I cannot agree io give
a preference, and such advantages, to a
Bank, of one of the members of this con
fefleracy over the other-—a Bank, depen
dant on the will o( a State, and subject to
its influence and control. I cannot consent
to confer such favors <m the stockholders,
many of whom, if Junior is to be trusted,
are foreign capitalists, and wiihout claim
on the bounty ol the Government. But,
if all these and many other objections were
overcome, there is still one which 1 cannot
surmount.
Tnere lias been, its we all Lm.w, n t.mi
fli.t between one of the departments of the
government and that institution, in which,
in mv opinion, the department was the as
sailant ; but I cannot consent, after what
lias occurred, to give to tlu- Bank a tri
umph over the Government, for such its a
doption as the fiscal agent of the Govern
ment would necessarily be considered. It
would degrade the Government in the eyes
of onr citizens and of the world, and go
far to make that Bank the Government it-
S,l f-
But, if all these difliunities were over
come, there are others, to me, wholly insur
mountable. 1 belong to the State Rights
Party, w Inch, at all times, from the begin
ning of the Government to this day, has
been opposed to such an institution, as un
constitutional, inexpedient, and dangerous.
They have ever t readed ti e union of the
pol tical ami mowed power, and the central
action of the Government to which it so
strongly tends; and, at all times, have
strenuously resist'd their junction. Time
and experience hive confirmed the truth of
their principles ; and this, above all other
period-, is the one a' which it would be most
dangerous to depart from them. Acting
on them, I have never given my counte
nance or support, to a National Bank,
' but tinder a compulsion which I felt to be
i imperious, and never without an open de
l claration of my opinion as unfavorable to a
Bank.
! In supporting tie Bank of 181 G, I open
l ly declared, that, as a question de novo, I
| would be decidedly against the Bank, and
■ would be the last to give it mv support. I
■ also stated, that, in supporting the Bank
then, I yielded to the necessity of the case,
I growing out of the tin n existing and long
i established connexion between the Goveru
j metit and he hanking sv stem. I took the
i ground, even at that early period, that so
- long as the connexion existed ; so long as
the Government received and paid away
Bank notes as money, they were bound
to regulate their value, ami had no alter
native but the establishment of a National
Bank.
I found the connexion in existence and
established before mv lime, and over which
II could have no control. 1 yielded to the
necessi'v, in order to correct the di-ordered.
stale of the currency , which had fallen ex
clusively under the control of the Stales. 1
yielded towhat I could not reverse, just as
any member of the Senate now would, who
might believe, that Louisiana was uncon
stitutionally admitted int-> the Union, but
w lio would, nevertheless, fee] compelled to
vote to extend the laws to that State, as
one of its members, on the ground, that its
admission was an act, whether constitution
al or unconstitutional, which he could nut
re ver<e.
In 1834, 1 acted in conformity to the
same principle, in proposing the renewal
of the Bank Charter, for a short period.
My object, as expressly avowed, was to use
the Bank to break the connexion between
j the Government and the banking system
'gradually, in order to avert the catastro
| phe w hich lias now befallen us, and which
I then < learly perceived. But the connex
i ion, which I believed to he irrevTsible in
; 181 G, lias now been broken by operation
of law. It is now an open question. I feel
■ myself free, for the first time, to choose my
course on this important subject, and in op
posing a Bank, 1 act in conformity io prin
ciples which 1 have entertained ever since
I have fuliy investigated the subject.
But my opposition to a re-union w ith the
Banks, is not confined to objections limited
to a National, or State Banks. It goes be
yond, and comprehends others of a more
general nature, relating to the currency,
which, to me. are decisive. lam of the
impres-ion, that tbe connexion has a most
pernicious influence over Bink currency;
that it tends to disturb that stabi iiv and
uniformity of value, which is essential to a
sound currency ; and is among the leading
causes of that tendency to expansion and
contrac'tion, which experience has shown,
is incident to Bank notes as a currency.
They are, in my oninion, at best, without
the ri quisite qualities to constitute a cur
rency, even when unconnected with the
Government; and are doubly disqualified,
by reason of that connexion, which siihji els
them to sudd< n expansions and contrac
tions, and exposes them to fatal catastro
phes, such as tbe present.
I will explain my views. A bank note circu
lates not merely on account of the credit of the
institution by w hich it is issued, but because Go
vernment receives it like gold and silver in all
its dues, and thus adds its own credit to that of
the Bank. It, in fact, virtually endorses on the
note of every specie paying Bank, “receivable
liy the Government in its dues.” To under
stand how greatly this adds to the circulation of
bark notes, vve must remember that Govern
ment is the gr'-at money dealer of the country,
and the holder of immense public domains,and
that it has the power of creating a demand a
gainst every citizen as high as it pleases, in the
shape of a tax, or duty, which can be discharg
ed, as the law now is, only liv bank notes or
gold and silver. This, of course, cannot but
add grr atlv to tiie credit of bank notes, and
contribute titiicli to their circulation, though it
may be difficult to dctermitie with any pre< i
• ion to what extent. Il ceitainly is verv gri n
[•or why is it that an individual of the first cr< -
lii, whose respoiisibilitv is so indisputable tic •
is friend of equal credit endorses his note tn
I lolbing, should put liis name w'ill bis friend’:
xdng tlit-ir join: credii, iotu a Batik, and tak
nit the notes of the Bank, which is, in fact,ln.
■tie < n ilit ot the B ink itself, and pay .’ix | i
cm discouiii between the credii of i.ini eif'atu
his friend and that of the Bank? The kuovl'i
and established credit of the Bank i:iay lie ,>.■
reason, lint there is another and powerful mte :
the G iveriun -iit treats tin; credit of the Ban!
as gold and silver, in all its tiansactiims, !lhl
docs not treat the credit of individuals in th.
same .manner. To test tbe truth, let us reverse
the case, and suppose the Government to trem
the pmit credit of the individuals as n.otiev
and not the credit of the Ban.s; and is it no’
obvious that, instead of borrowing from the
Bank, and paying six per cent discount, tin
IJan.s would be glad io borrow from them m.
the same terms? From this we mav perceive
the powerful influence which bank circulation
derives from the connexion with t„e credit ol
the Government.
It follows, as a necessary consequence, that
to the extent of this influence, tbe issues ofthi
Banks expand and contract with the expansion
laud contraction of the fiscal action of the Go
vernment ; wiili the increase of its duties, tax
es, income and expenditure; with tbe depo
sites m its vaults, acting as additional capita),
and die amount of bank notes withdrawn, in
consequence, from circulation; all of which
must directly affect the amount of their issues
aii f bus’..s!-w, ;md bank currency, and .a
course, partake of all those vibrations to which
the fiscal action of tlu, Government is necessa
rily exposed, and, when gieat and sudden,
must expose the system to catastrophes such as
we now witness. In fact, a more suitable in
stance cannot lie selected to illustrate the truth
ot what I assert, than the present, as I shall
proceed to show.
j l'o understand the causes which have led to
i the present state of things, we must go back to
,lhe /ear 1824 when the tariff system triumph
ed m ( ongress—a system which imposed du
ties not for ibe purpose of revenue, but to en
courage the industry of one portion of the
L uton at the expense of the other.' This was
followed up by the act of 1526, which con u
, mated the system. It raised the duties so ex
i travagamly, that out of an annual importation
,of smy-fom millions, thirty-two passed into
Hhr rreasury ; that is, Government took one
• hall for the liberty of introducing the other.
Countless millions were thus poured into tin'
I 1 reasur.v, beyond the wants of the Govern-
■ ment, which became in time the cause of the
I most extravagant expenditures. This vast in
| crease of receipts and expenditures, was fol
lowed by a corresponding expansion of the bn-
| smess of the Banks. They had to discount and
I issue freely, to enable the merchants to pav
I thuir duty bonds, as wolf as to meet the vastly
. increased expenditures of the Government.
; Another effect followed the act of 1828, which
' gave a still farther expansion to the action of
| the Banks, and which is worthv of notice. It
turned the exchange with England in favor of
this country. That portion of the proceeds of
our exports, which, in consequence of the high
duties, could no longer return with profit, in the
usual articles which we had been in the habit
of receiving principally from that country in !
exchange fin our exports, returned in gold and
j silver, in ord. r to purchase similar articles at
| the north. This was the first cause which gave
| that western direction to the precious metals,
the revulsive return of which has been follow
ed by so many disasters. With the exchange
in our fiver, and consequently no demand for
gold and silver abroad, and the vast demand for
money attendant on an increase of the reve
nue, almost every restraint was removed on the
discounts and issues of the Banks, especially
in the northern section of the Union, where
these causes principally operated. With their
increase, wagesand prices of < veiy description
rose in proportion, followed of course by an in
creasing demand op the Banks for further is
sues. This is the true cause of that expansion
‘ of the currency, which began about the cotn-
Imencement of the late Administration; but
wnich was erroneously chaiged liv it to the
Bank of tiie I uited States. It rose out of the
; action of the Government.
The Bank, in increasing its business, acted
in obedience to the condition of things at the
time, and in conformity with the Banks gene
rally in the same section. It was at tins junc
ture that the late Administration came into
power—a juncture remarkable in many res-•
peels, but more especially ii, relation to the
[question of the currency. ’ Most of the causes]
i which have since terminated in the complete ]
■ prostration of the Banl s, and the commercial,
I prosperity of the country, were in full activity, i
Another cause, about that time, (I do not re- '
I member the precise date,) began to produce I
powerful effects. 1 refer to the last renewal of
the charter of the Bank of England. It was
renewed for ten years, and, among other pro
visions, contained one making the notes of that
Banka legal tender in all cases except between
[the bank and its creditors. The effect was to
dispense still further with the useof th- pre-
I cions metals in that great commercial country,
[which, of course, caused them to flow out in
[every direction through the various channels of
its commerce. A large portion took their di
rection hitherward, and served still further to
increase the current Which, from causes alrea
dy enumerated, was flowing in this direction ;
and which still further incieased the force of the
returning current, on the turn of the tide.
The Ad-ministration did not comprehend the
difficulties and dangers which surrounded it.
Instead of perceiving the true reason of the ex
pansion of the currency, and adopting-the mea
sures necessary to arrest it, they attributed it
to the Bank of the United States, and made it
the cause or pretext of waging war on that in
still tion. Among the first acts of hostility,the
deposites Were removed, and transferred to so- I
lected State Banks; the effect of which, in
stead of resisting the tendency to expansion,
was to throw oil’the only restraint that field the
banking institutions of the country in check;
and of course gave to the swelling tide, which
was destined to desolate the country, a power
ful impulse. Banks sprung up in every direc- [
tion ; discounts and issues increased almost
without limitation ; and an immense surplus re
venue accumulated in the Deposite Banks,
which, after the payment of the public debt,the
most < xtravagant appropriations could not ex
haust, and which acted as additional banking
capital. Tbe value of money daily deprecia
ted—prices rose—and then commenced those
unbounded speculations, particularly in public
lands, which was transferred, bv millions of
acres, from the public to the speculators, for
worthless bank notes, till at length the swelling
flood was checked, and the revulsive current
burst its barriers, and overspread and desolated
the land.
The first check came from the Bank of En
gland, wh'i-.h, alarmed at ttie loss of its pre
cious metals, refused todiscount American bills, I
in order to prevent a further decrease of its |
cash means, and cause a return of those which |
it had lost. Then followed the execution of 1
the deposite act, which, instead of a remedi.il
measure, as it might have been made if propor-
Iv executed, was made the instrument id weak
ening the Banks at till? point of pressure, espe
cially in the great metropolis of the Union,
where so large a portion of the surplus revenue
was accumulated. And, finally, the Freasuty
nkr, which still further weakened those
Banks, by withdrawing their cash means to le
invested in public In nils in the West.
Ii is olien easy to p'rexent whit cannot be
remedied, which the present instance strongh
illustrates. If the Administration hid formeu
a true conception <1 tbe danger in lime, wl ai
has since happened might have then been easily
averted, 'i i,'- neat approach of the expirati n
<d the ciiartei of the United States Banks, would
hat e allot tied ample means of stay ing the deso
lation, il it had been timelv and properly used.
1 . saw it then, and purposed io renew the i hal
ter, tor a limited p< riod, with .such modifica
tions as would have effectually resisted ti e in
creasiiij expansion of’thc currency; and at tin
same time, <>raduii!ly and finally, wear out fie
connexion betvyecn the Bank and the Govern
ment. l'o use i'»e expression ( then used, “to
uubank the Banks'” to let down the system
easily, and so to efibc’ the separation between
the Bank and the (Jovei.’itn nt, as to avoid the
possi. ility of that shock which J then saw, was
inevitable without some such remedy. Tin
moment was eminently propit. ins. The pre
cious metals were flowing in on us from even
quarter, and the vigorous measures i purposed
to adopt in the renewal of the charter, would
have effeetiiallj arrested the increase of G 'tiks
and checked the ex'ess of their discounts and
issues; solhat the accumulating mass of gold
and silver, instead of being converted into bank
capital and swelling the tideot paper < ircnl.-ition,
would have been substituted in the place ol
ba,ik notes, as a permment and wdiolesome ad
dition to the currency of the country.
But neither the Administration nor the Op
, position sustained._me. imd the. orecious oiutoc
tunny passed unseized. I then clear')’ saw' the
coming calamity was inevitable, and it has nei
ther arrived sooner, nor is it greater, than what
I anticipated.
Such are he leading causes which have pro
duced the present disordered state of the cur
rency. There are others of a minor character,
connected with the general condition of the
commercial world, and the operations of the
Executive branch of the Government, but which,
of themsi Ives, would liave pr-duced but little
effect. To repeat the causes in a few words,
tbe vast increase which the tariffs of 1824 and
’2B gave to tbe fiscal action of the Government,
I combined with Jie causes I have enitnieaaied,
: gave the first impulse to the expansion of the
j currency. These, in turn,gave that extraordi
nary impulse to overtrading and speculation
■ (they are effects and not causes) which has
finally terminated in the present calamity. It
may thus be ultimately tract d to the connexion
between the Banks .nd the Government; and
it is not a little remarkable ti at the suspension
of specie patrne ts in 1816, in this country,
and that of 1797, in Gieat Britain, were pro
duced by like causes.
1 here is another reason against the union of
the Government and the Banks, intimately con- ]
nected w’ith that under consideration, which 1 '
shall next proceed to state. It gives a prefer- I
ence to one portion of citizens over another,
that is neither fair, equal, nor consistent with
the spirit of our institutions. j
1 hat the connexion between the Bank and '
the Government, the receiving and paying a- [
way their notes as cash, and the useof tiie pub
lic money from the time of the collection to the '
disbursement, is the source of immense profit ;
to toe Banks, cannot be questioned, ft is im- [
possil le, as 1 have said, to ascertain with any
precision to what extent their issues and circu
lation depend upon it, but it certainly constitutes '
a large proportion. A single illustration may
throw light upon this point. Suppose the Gov- j
ernment were to take up the veriest beggar in
tiie street, and enter into a contract with him I
that nothing should be received in payment of]
its dues, or for the sales of its public lands in
future, except gold and silver and his promisso
ry notes, and that he should have the use of the
public funds from the time of their collection
until their disbursement. Can any one estimate
the wealth which such a contract would confer?
His notes would circulate far and wide, over
the whole extent of tbe Union; would lie the
medium through which the exchanges of the
country would be performed; and his ample
and extended credit would give him a control
over all the banking institutions and monied
transactions of the community'. The posses
sion of an hundred millions would not give a
control more effectual. I ask, would it be fair,
would it be equal, would it be consistent with
the spirit of our institutions, to confer such ad
vantages on any individual ? And if not on one,
w ould it he, it conferred on any l umber? And
if not, why should it be conferred on any cor
porate body of individuals? How can they
possibly be entitled to benefits so vast, which
all must acknowledge could not be justly con- ,
terred on any number of unincorporated indi
viduals.
J state not those views with any intention of
bringing down odium on banking institutions. :
I have no unkind feeling towards them whatev- '
er. I do not hold them responsible for the pre- I
sent state of things. It has grown up gradual
ly, without either the Banks or the community
perceiving the consequences which have fol
lowed the connexion between them. My ob
ject is to state facts as they exist, that the truth
may be seen in time by all. This is an age of
investigation. The public mind is broadly a
w ake upon this all important subject. It affects
the interests and condition of the whole com
munity, and will be investigated to the bottom.
Nothing will be left unexplored, and it is for the
interest of both the banks and of the commu
nity, that the evils incident to the connexion,
should lie fully understood in time, and the con
nexion be gradually terminate d, before such
convulsions shall follow as to sweep away the
whole system, with its advantages as well as its
disadvantages.
But it is not only between citizen and citizen,
that the connexion is unfair and unequal. It is
as much to between one portion of the countrx
and another. TheSconnexion of the Govern
ment with the Banks, w hether ii bo with a com
bination of State B inks or with a National In
stilutitiiiion, w ill necessarily centralize the ac
tion of the system at the principal point of col
lection and disbursement, and at which the
mother bank, or the head of the leag e of St; to
Batiks, must be located. From that point, the
whole system, through the connexion with the
Government, will be enabled to control the ex
hauges both at home and abroad; and with it
the commerce, foreign and domestic, including
exports and imports.
After what has been said, these points will
require hut little illustration. A single on<
will be sufficient ; and 1 will take, as in the
former instance, that of an individual.
Suppose then, the Government, at tbe com
mencement of its operation, had selected an in
dividual merchant, at any one point in th,
Union, say New York, and had connected,.
with him, as it has with the B, in ß s ( , '
him the use of the PJ-Mie fi-.ffis ‘.torn the time o'
then-collectmn mud their disbursement, and ol
roce.vmg and aw , lV) itl all its
lions, notlui'.jr b ut |,j s p lon ,j ssol .y notes, excep
L r o < and s/tver. Is it not manifest that a deci
si’.e control would be given to the port when
I.e rest cd, over all the others; that his pro
missory notes would circulate every wlien
through all the ramifications of commerce ; tha
'hey would regulate exchanges ; that they wool
be the medium of paving duty bonds; and tha
they would attract tbe imports and exports i
the country to the port wlwre such extraordin;
tv facilities were a fib idea ? If such void
clearly be the effects in tfie case supposed, it is
equally dear that the cunct ntiation of the cur
icticy ai the same point, thiotigii the coimexion
of the Government wiih the Banks, would have
equal, il not greater eflects; and that, whether
one general bank should be used as an agent,
oi a league of luniks, which should have their
centre there, 'l’o other ports of the country,
the trilling' advantages wiiich a branch or de
posite b ink would give, in the safe keeping of
the public revenue, would be as nothing, com
paied to the loss’ s caused to their commerce
by centralizing the monied action of the coun
try at a remote point. Other gentlemen can
•speak for their own sections; 1 can speak, with
cotifi line, of that which 1 have the honor in
part to represent, '['he entire staple Slates, I
ieel a deep conviction, banks and all, would, in
(lie end be great gainers by the disseverance,
whatever might be tbe temporary inconveni
ence" if there be any other section, in which
the effects will be different, it would be but to
confirm the views which I have presented.
As connected with this, there is a point well
desersing consideration. The Union between
l.a k and G ivernment is not only a main source
of tiiat dangerous expansion and contraction in
the banking system, which I have already illus
trated, but is also otte of the principal causes of
that powerful and almost irresistib.e tendency
to the increase of Banks, which even its friend*
see and deplore. I dwelt on this point on a
loimer occasion, (on Mt. Webster’s motion to
i renew the Bank charier in 1.833,) and will not
repeat what I then said. But, in addition to
the causes then enumerated, there are many
others very powerful, and among others-the one
un.ler conskferatioi 1 . They all may be stemmed-'
up in one general cause. Wc have made bank--
ing too profitable ; far, very far, too profitable F
and.l may add. influeutial. One of the most
ample sources of this profit and influence inay
be traced, as I have shown, to the connexion'
wiih the Government ; and is,of course, among
the prominent causes of the strong and inces--
sant tendency of the system to increa :?, « hich»
even its friends see must finally overwhelm es- •
ther the banks ortho institutions of the country.
V, ith a view to check its growth they have pro
posed to limit the number of banks and the a
mount of banking capital by an amendment of
the Constitution ; but it is obvious that the ef
fects of such an amendment, if it were practica
ble, would but increase the profits and influence
of bank capita); and that, final]’, it would just
ly produce such indignation on the part of the
rest ot the community against such unequal ad
vantages, that in the end, after a long and vio
lent struggle, the overthrow of the entire system
would follow. To obviate this difficulty, it has
been proposed to add a limitation upon the a
mouut of tl eir business ; tbe effects of which
would lie, the accommodation of favorites to
the exclusion of the rest of tiie community,
which would be no less fatal to the system.
There can be, in fact, but one safe and consis
tent remedy ; the rendering banking, as a busi
ness, less profitable and influential ; and the
first and decisive step toward this, is a dissever
ance between the Banks and the Government.
To this may be added, some effectual limitation
on the denomination of the notes to be issued,
which would operate in a similar manner.
I passed over other and important objections
to the connexion ; the corrupting influence and
the spirit of speculation which it spreads far and
wide over the land. Who has not seen and de
plored the vast and corrupting influence brought
to bear upon the Legislatures to obtain charters
and nii-ans necessary to-participate in the pro
fits of the institutions. This gives a control to
the government, which grants such favors, of a
most extensive and pernicious character; ail of
which must continue to spread and increase, if
tbe connection should continue, until the wlioia
community must become one contaminated and
corrupted mass.
1 iiere is another, and a final reason, which I
shall assign against the re-umon with the Banks.
We have reached a new era with regard to these
institutions. He who would judge of the future
by the past, in reference to them, will be whol
ly mistaken. The year 1833 marks the com
mencement of this era. I'bat extraordinary man,
who had the power ol imprinting his own feel
ings on the community, then c mmenced his
hostile attacks, wkicli Lave left such effects be
hind, that the war tnen commenced against the
Batiks, I clearly see, will not terminate, unless
there be a separation bc\ween them and the Go
vernnit nt, until one or the other triumphs—till
the Government becomes the Bank er tbe Bank
the Government. In resisting their union, I act
as the friend of both. 1 have, as 1 have said,
no unkind feeling toward the Banks. I am
n -iiliera bank man, nor an anti-bank man. I
h ive had little connexion with them. Manv of
mv best friends, for whom I have the highest
esteem, have a deep interest in their prosperi
ty, and, as fat as friendship or personal attach
ment extends, my inclination would be stronglv
in their favor. But I stand up here as the re
presentative of no particular interest. I look to
the whole, and to the future, as well as the pre
sent; and 1 shall steadily pursuethat course
which, under the most enlarged view, I believe
to be my duty. In 1834 I saw the present cri
sis. lin vain raised a warning voice, and en
deavored to avert it. I now see, with equal
certainty, one far more portentous. If this
struggle is to go on—if the Banks will insist up
on a re-union with the Government against the
sense of a large and influential portion of the
community, and, above all, if they should suc
ceed in effecting it, a reflux flood will inevitably
sweep away the whole system. A deep popu
lar excitement is never without some reason, and
ought ever to be treated with respect; and it is
the part of wisdom to look timelv into the cause,
and correct it before the excitement shall be
come so great as to demolish the object, with
all its good and evil, against which it is directed.
The only safe course for both Government
and banks, is to remain, as they are, separated,
each in the use of their own credit and in the
management of their own affaits. The less the
control and influence of the one over the other,
the better. Confined to their legitimate sphere,
that of affording temporary credit to commer
cial and business men, hank notes would furnish
a sale ahd convenient circulation in the range
ol the circle of commerce and business, within
which the Bat.ks may be respectively situated,
exi nipt almost entirely fr< m those fluctuations
and convulsions to which they arc now so expo
sed ; or if they should occasionally be subject
to them, the evil would be local and temporary,
leaving undisturbed the action of the Govern
ment and tbe genera] currency of the country,
on the stability of which the prosperity and
safety of the community so much depend,
I have now stated my obi ? r.’ lotls t 0 thc
union of the Government and the Bank’s. If
t.icy are well fe.- nded . if thc Sta te Banks are
I p ll - 8 ' ' <s ‘ nccnl P < l< ‘iX igents ;if a Bank of
le “'.ited Statss be impracticable, or if prae
'‘.able, would, at this time, be the destruction
of a large portion of the existing Banks, and of
renewed and severe pecuniaiy distress; if jf
would be against the settled conviction of an old
ind powerful party, whose opposition time can
■tot abate; if the Union of Government and
Hanks adds to the ut.fitness of tlwir notes for
ticulation, and bo unjust and unequal between
•mzen and citizen, and one portion of the union
md anotlmr; and, finally, if it would excite an
■ mplactiLle and obstinate war, which could nn
v terminate in the overthrow of the bankimj
‘vstvm or the ihstitutions of the country; it
hen remains that the only alternative waiild bo
-ermanentlv to separate the two, and to recog.
•e tl e rreasury so as to enable it to perform
">se duties wh'cb have heretofore been per
ami d I y the Barks, as its fiscal agents. This
proposal reorganization has beep c-ttlfeda.Sub-