Newspaper Page Text
The Abbeville Chronicle
VOL. II.
p* )
CUBAN WAR IS REVIEWED.
Asks Congress For Authority to Take
Means to Terminate the Ex
isting’ Warfare Between
Spain and Cuba.
WASIIINGTON. April 11.—The presi
dent of the United States transmitted to
congress today the following message on
the Cuban situation and the Maine affair.
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES:
Obedient to that precept of the consti
tution which commands the president to
give from time to time to the congress
information of the state of union and to
recommend to their consideratien^nca:
tires as he shall judge necessary
pedient, It becomes my duty now tqad
dress your body with regard to the grave
crisis that has arisen in the relations of
the United States to Spain by reason of
the warfare that for more than three
years has raged in the neighboring island
of Cuba.
I do so because of the intimate connec
tion of the Cuban question with the state
of our own Union and the grave relation
to the course which it is now incumbent
upon the nation to adopt must needs bear
to the traditional policy of our govern
ment if it is to accord with the precepts
laid down by the founders of the republic
and religiously observed by succeeding ad
ministrations to the present day.
But One of Many.
$he present revolution is but the succes
sor of other similar insurrections which
have occurred in Cuba against the domin
ion of Spain, extending over a period of
nearly half a century, each of which,
during its progress has subjected the
United States to great effort and expense
in according its neutrality laws, caused
enormous losses to American trade and
commerce, caused circulation, annoyance
and disturbance among" our citizens and
by the exercise of cruel,- barbarous and
uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked
the sensibilities and offended the humane
sympathies of our people.
Since the present revolution began in
February, 1895, this country has see’n the
fertile domain at our threshold ravaged
by fire and sword in the course of a
struggle unequalled in the history of the
island and rarely paralleled as to the
number of combatants and the bitterness
of the contest by any revolution of mod
ern times where a dependent people,
striving to be free have been opposed by
.the power of the sovereign state.
Our people have Beheld a once
prosperous community reduced to
comparative want, its lucrative
commerce virtually paralysed, its
exceptional productiveness dimin
ished, its fields laid waste, its mills
in ruins and its people perishing 7>y
tens of thousands from hunger and
destitution.
We have found ourselves constarined, in
t'\e observance of that strict neutrality j
^Vhich our laws cnjoin, what the laws of
nations commands, to police our own wa
ters and watch our own seaports to pre
vent any unlawful act In aid of the Cu
bans; Gur trade has suffered; the capi
tal invested by our citizens in Cuba has
been largely lost, and the temper and
forbearance cf our .people (have been so
sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest
among our own citizens, which has Inevit
ably found its expression! from time to
time in the national legislature, so that
issues wholly external to our own body
politic engross attention and stand in the
way of that close devotion to domestic
advancement that becomes a self-contain
ed commonwealth whose primal maxim
has been the avoidance of all foreign en
tanglements. All this must needs awak
en, and has indeed, aroused the utmost
concern on the part of this government
as well during my predecessor’s term as
in my own.
Evils to Our Country.
In April, 1896, the evils from which our
country suffered through the Cuban war
became so onerous that my predecessor
made an effort to bring about peace
through the mediation of this government
in any way that might tend to an honor
,
able adjustment of the contest between
Spain and her revolted colony, on the
basis of some effective scheme of self
government for Cuba under the flag and
sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through
the refusal of the Spanish government
then in power to consider any form of
mediation or indeed of any plan of settle
ment which did not begin with the actual
submission of the insurgents to the moth
er country, and then only on such terms
as Spain herself might see fit to grant.
The war continued unabated.
The resistance of the insurgents was in
no wise diminished.
The efforts of Spain were increased by
the dispatches of fresh levies of Cuba
and by the addition to the hor rors of t ho
strife of a new and inhuman phase
precedented in the modern history of
ilized Christian peoples.
The policy of devastation and
centration inaugurated by the
tain general, Pando, Oct. 1,
in the province of Pinar del
was thence extended to embrace
of the island to which the
of the Spanish arms was able
reach by occupation or by
oi’crations.
The peasantry, including all
J-n the open, agricultural interior were
Driven Into garrison towns or
daces* held by the troops. The razing
r.ovemen't in the provinces of all kinds
’ere Inaugurated. Fielus were laid wasu
wellings unroofed and fired, mills de>
troyed and in short everything t'hat
ould desolate the land and render it un
it for human habitation or support “was
ondemned by order of one of the con
t nding parties and executed by mill the
p wers at their disposal.
Horrors of Concentration.
!y the time the present administration
tol IJv effect a year ago, reconcentration—
so called—had been made effective over
the better part of the four central or
we.-Iern provinces, Samta Clara, Matan
zasj Havana and Pinar del Rio. The ag
ricutural population to the est luxated
nun ser of 300,000 or more was herded
witl.n the -towns and their immediate
vici age, deprived families of support,
renGred destitute of shelter, left poorly
clad kind exposed to tlhe most unsanitary
conditions. The scarcity of food Increas
ed \ith devastation cf the populated
areaAand the destruction and want be
came misery and starvation.
Mon h by month the death rate increas
ed in in alarming ratio. By March, 1897,
accor ling to conservative estimates from
officii Spanish sources, the mortality
amon the reconcentradoes from starva
tion fid the diseases thereto incident, ex
oeedi 50 percentura of their total num
Tier. (Practical relief was accorded to the
dcstilite. The overburdened towns, al
ready suffering from the general dearth,
could give no aid. So-called "zones ot
civillz .tion" established within the ini
mediae area of effective military con
trol i :out the cities and fortified camps
prove illusory as a remedy tor the gut
tering The unfortunates, being for the
most art women and children with aged
and l;lpless men, enfeebled by disease
and h nger, could not have tilled the soil,
witho t tools, seed or shelter, for their
own s ippev* or for the supply of the
cities.
Rccfneentration adopted avowed
ly as war measure in order to cut
off the resources of the insurgents
worked its predistDied result. As I
said in my message cf last Decem
ber, it was not civilized warfare;
it was extermination. The only
peace it could beget was that of the
wilderness and the grave.
Meanwhile undergone th<j military situation In the
Island had a noticeable change.
The extraordinary activity that charac
terized the second year of the war, when
the insurgents invaded even the thitherto
unharmed fields of Pinar Del Rio and
carried havoc and destruction up to the
walls of the city of Havana itself, had re
lapse.; into a dogged struggle in the cen
tral end eastern provinces. The Spanish
arms regained a measure of control in
Pinar Del Rio and parts of Havana, but
under the existing conditions of the rural
countiV, without immediate improvement
of their productive situation. Even thus
partially restricted the revolutionists held
their own and their conquest and sub
mission, put forward by Spain as the es
sential and sole basis of peace, seemed us
far distant as at the outset.
Grave Problem of Duty.
In this state of affairs my administra
tion found itself confronted with the
grave problem of its duty. My message
of last December reviewed the situation
and narrated the steps taken with a view
to relieving its acuteness and opening the
way to some form of honorable settle
ment.
The assassination of the prime minis
ter, Canovas, led to a change of govern
ment In Spain. The former administra
tion pledged to subjugatloij without con
cession gave place to that of a more lib
eral party, committed long in advance to
a policy of reform involving the wider
principle of home rule for Cuba and
Puerto Rico.
Tho overtures t)f this government,
its new’ envoy, General Woodford,
and looking to an immediate and effect
ive amelioration of the conditions of the
island, although not accepted to the ex
tent of admitted mediation in any shape,
were met by assurances that home rule,
In an advanced phase, would be forth
with offered to Cuba, without waiting for
the war to end, and that more humane
methods should thenceforth prevail In the
of hostilities. Coincidentally with
these declarations, the new government
Spain continued and completed the pol
already begun by its predecessor, of
friendly regard for this nation
releasing American citizens held under
charge or another connected with the
so that by tly end of No
not a single person entitled in any
ABBEVILLE, GA.. THURSDAY APRIL 14. 1898.
y to our national protection,
i a Spanish prison.
While these negotiations were in
gress, the Increasing destruction of
unfortunate reconcentrados and
alarming mortality among them
earnest attention. The success
had attended the limited measure of
lief extended to the suffering
citizens among them by the Judicious
penditure through the consular
of the money appropriated expressly
their succor by the joint resolution ap
proved May 24, 1S07, prompted the hu
mane extension of a similar scheme of
aid to the great body of sufferers. A
suggestion to this end was acquiesced in
by the Spanish authorities.
On the 24th of December last, I caused
to be issued an appeal to the people, in
viting contributions in money or in kind
for the succor of the starving sufferers
in Cuba, following this on the 8th of Jan
uary by a similar public announcement
of the formation of a central Cuban re
lief committee with headquarters In New
York city, composed of three members
representing the American National Red
Cross and tho religious and business ele
ments of the community.
American Charity.
The efforts of that committee have been
untiring and accomplished much.
Arrangements for free transportation
to Havana have greatly aided the charit
able work. The president of the Ameri
can Red Cross and representatives of
other contributory organizations have
generously visited Cuba and co-operated
with the consul general and the local au
thorities to make effective distribution of
the relief collected through the efforts
of the central committee. Nearly $200,000
in money and supplies have already
reached the sufferers and more is forth
coming. The supplies are admitted duty
free and transportation to the interior
lias been arranged so that the relief, at
first necessarily confined to Havana and
the larger cities, is now extended through
most if not all the towns where suffering
exists. Thousands of lives have already
been saved. The necessity for a change
In the condition of the reconcontrados Is
recognized by the Spanish government.
Within a fc-w days the orders of General
Weyler have been revoked; the reconcen
trados arc, it is said, to be permitted to
return to their homes and aided to re
sume their self-supporting pursuits ot
peace; public works have been ordered to
give them employment and a sum of $090,
000 has been appropriated for their re
lief.
The war in Cuba is of such nature that
short of subjugation or extermination a
final military victory for either side seems
impracticable. The alternative lies In
the physical exhaustion of the one or of
the other party or perhaps of both—€L con
dition which in effect ended the ten years
war by the truce of Zanjon.
The prospect of ^uch a protection
and conclusion of the present strife
Is a contingency hardly to be con
templated with equanimity by the
civilized world and least of all by
the United States, affected and in
jured as we are, deeply and inti
mately by its very existence.
Realizing this it appeared to be my duty
in a spirit of true friendliness no less to
Spain than to the Cubans who have so
much to lose by the prolongation of the
struggle, to bring about an immediate
termination of the war. To this end I
submitted, on the 20th ultimo, as a re
sult of much presentation and correspon
dence through the United States minister
at Madrid, propositions to tho Spanish
government looking to an armistice until
October first for the negotiations of peace
with the good offices of the president. In
addition, I asked the immediate revoca
tion of the order to reconcentration, so
as to permit the people to return to their
farms and the needy to be relieved with
provisions and supplies from the United
States, co-operating with tho Spanish
authorities so as to afford full relief.
The Reply of Spain.
The reply of tlhe Spanish cabinet was
received on the night of the 31st ultimo.
It offers, as the means to bring
about peace in Cuba, to confide the
preparation thereof to the insular
parliament inasmuch as the con
currence of that body would be nec
essary to reach a final result, it be
ing, however, understood that the
powers reserved by the constitution
to the central government are not
lessened or diminished.
1 As the Cuban parliament does not meet
until the 4th of May next, the Spanish
government would not object for its part
to accept at once a suspension of hostili
ties if asked for by the insurgents, from
the general in chief, to whom it would
pertain in such case, to determine the
duration and conditions of? the armistice.
The proposition's submitted by General
Woodford and the reply of the Spanish
government were both In the form of brief
memoranda, and the texts of which are
before mo, and are substantially In the
language above given.
Tho action of the Cuban parliament in
the matter of "preparing” peace and tho
manner of its doing so are not explained
in the .Spanish memorandum; but from
General Woodford’s preliminary reports
of preliminary discussions, preceding tho
rtnal conference. It is understood
Spanish government stands ready to
the Insular government full power to
gotla'te peace with the Insurgents,
or directly or Indirectly It does not
pear. With this last overture In the
rectlon of peace and Its disappointing re
ceptlon by Spain, the executive was
brought to the cud of his effort.
His last Mcssase.
Tn my annual message of December last
I said:
"Of the untried measures these remain
only: Recognition of the insurgents as
belligerents; recognition of the independ
ence of Cuba; neutral Intervention to end
the war by imposing a rational compro
mise between the contestants and inter
vention in favor of one or the other party.
I speak not of forcible annexation, for
that cannot bo thought of. That, by our
code of morality, would be criminal ag
gression.”
Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives
in the light of President Grant’s measured
words, uttered In 1875, when after seven
years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel
hostilities in Cuba, he reached tho con
clusion that the recognition of the inde
pendence of Cuba was impracticable and
indefensible; and that the recognition of
belligerence was not warranted by the
facts according to the tests of public law.
I comment especially upon the latter as
pect of the question, pointing out the in
conveniences and positive dangers of a
recognition of belligerence, which, while
adding to the already onerous burdens of
neutrality within our own jurisdiction,
could not in any way extend our influence
of effective offices in the territory of hos
tilities.
Nothing has since occurred to
change my view on this regard, and
I recognize as fully now as then
that the issuance of a proclamation
of neutrality, by which process the
so-called recognition of belliger
ence is published, could, of itself,
and unattended by other action, ac
complish nothing toward the one
end for which we labor—the in
stant pacification of Cuba and the
cessation of the misery that afflicts
the island.
Turning to the question of recognizing
at this time tho independence of the pres
ent insurgent government in Cuba, we
find safe precedents in our history from
an early day. They are well summed up
In President Jackson’s message to con
gress December 21, 1836, on the subject of
the recognition of the independence of
Texas. * « >« < *
I said in my message of December last:
"It is to be seriously considered whether
the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood which
alone can demand the recognition of bel
ligerency in its favor.”
The same requirements must certainly
be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence
is in question, for no less positive test
can be applied to the greater act than to
the lesser; while on the other hand the
Influences and consequences of the strug
gle upon the internal policy of the rec
ognizing state, which form important fac
tors where the recognition of belligerency
is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly
eliminable factors when the real question
is whether the community claiming rec
ognition or is not independent beyond per
adventure.
Nor from the standpoint of exi>e
ricnce do I think it would be wise
or prudent for this government to
recognize at the present time the
independence of the so-called
Cuban republic. Such recognition
is not necessary in order to enable
the United States to intervene and
pacify the island. To commit this
country now to the recognition of
any particular government in Cuba
might subject us to embarrassing
conditions of international obliga
tions towards the organization so
recognized.
In case of intervention our conduct
would be subject to the approval or dis
approval of such government. We would
be required to submit to its direction and
to assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally. When It shall appear here
after that there is within the island a
government capable of performing the
duties and discharging the functions of
a separate nation,
For Armed Intervention.
As a matter of fact in the proper forms
and attributes of nationality, such gov
ernment can he promptly and readily re
cognized, and the relations and interests
of the United States with such nation ad
justed.
There remain the alternative forms of
intervention to end the war, either as an
impartial neutral by imposing a national
compromise between the contestants, or
as the active ally of the one party or the
other.
As to the first, It is not to be forgotten
that during the last few months, the re
lation of the United States has virtually
been one of friendly intervention In many
ways, each note of Itself conclusive, but
all tending to the exertion of a potential
influence toward an ultimate pacific re-
| BU j t just and honorable to all interests
concerned. The spirit of nil our acts
hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish
do .„ lre for pei ,„ B and pI . osperU y Cuba
_
untarnished by differences between the
United States and Spain and unstained
by the blood or Amcrlcttn t . Uizt , ns
Xhe f orcib i e intervention of tho
_ Uaited S
*' 1 * 08 na a “cutral, to stop
tlle wnr ttcc ° r <Hue to the large die
tates of humanity and following
many historical precedents where
neighboring states have interfered
to check the hopeless sacrifices of
life by internecine conflicts beyond
their .. , borders, is Justifiable on ra
tional grounds. It involves, how
ever, hostile constraixit upon both
the parties to the contest, as well
as to enforce a truce as to guide * the mu
eventual settlement.
The grounds for such intervention may
be briefly summarized as follows:
First—In the cause of humanity, and
to put an end to the barbarities, blood
shed, starvation and horrible miseries
now existing there, and which the parties
to the conflict are either unable or unwil
ling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer
to say this is all in another country, be
longing to another nation, and is there
fore none of our business. It is especially
our duty, for it is right at our doors.
Second—We owe it to our citizens in
Cuba to afford that protection and in
demnity for life and property which no
government there can or will afford, and
to that end to terminate the conditions
that deprive them of legal protection.
Third—The right to intervene may ho
justified by the very serious Injury to the
commerce, trade and business of our peo
ple and by the wanton destruction of
property and devastation or the Island.
Fourth, and which is of the utmost im
portanee for the present condition of af
fairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our
peace, and entails upon this government
enormous expense. With such a conflict
waged for years In un island so near us
and with which our people have such
trade and business relations—when tho
lives and liberty of our citizens are in
constant danger and their property de
stroyed and themselves ruined—where our
trading vessels are liable to seizure and
are seized at our very door by warships
of a foreign nation, the expedition^ of
fiilibustering that we are powerless to re
press altogether and the irritating ques
tions and entanglements thus arising—
all these and others that I need not men
tion, with the resulting strained relations,
are a constant menace to our peace and
compel us to keep on a semi-war footing
with a nation with which we are at peace.
The Maine Matter.
These elements of danger and disorder
pointed out have been strikingly illustrat
ed by a tragic event which has deeply
justly moved the American people. 1 have
already transmitted to congress the re
port of the naval court of inquiry on the
destruction of the battleship Maine in tHe
harbor of Havana during the night of the
15th of February. The destruction of that
noble vessel lias filled the national heart
with inexpressible horror. Two hundred
and fifty-eight sailors and marines and
two officers of our navy, reposing in the
fancied security of a friendly harbor,
have been hurled to death, grief and want
brought to their homes and sorrow to the
nation.
The naval court of inquiry, wiho, It is
needless to say, commands the unqualified
confidence of the government, was unani
mous in its conclusion that the destruc
tion of the Maine was caused by an exte
rior explosion, that of a submarine mine.
It did not assume to place the responsi
bility. That remains to bo fixed.
In any event the destruction of
the Maine hy whatever exterior
cause, is a patent and impressive
proof of a state of things in Cuba
that is intolerable. That eondition
is thus shown to he such that the
Spanish government cannot assure
safety and security to a vessel of
the American navy in the harbor of
Havana on a mission of peace and
rightfully there.
Further referring in this connection to I
recent diplomatic correspondence, a dis
patch from our minister to Spain, of the
26th ultimo, contained the statement that
the Spanish minister for foreign affairs
assured him positively that Spain will do
all that the highest honor and justice re
quire in the matter of the Maine. The
reply above referred of the 31st ultimo
also contained an expression of the readi
ness of Spain to submit to arbitration all
the differences which can arise in this
matter which is subsequently explained
by the note of the Spanish minister at
Washington of the 10th instant as fol
lows :
"As to the question/ of fact which
springs from the diversity of views be
tween the report of the American and
Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the
fact be ascertained by an impartial in
vestigation by experts whose decision
Spain accepts in advance.”
To this I have made no reply.
President Grant, in 1875, after discussing
the phases of the contest as it then ap
peared and its hopeless and apparent in-
NO. 13.
definite prolongation, said; "In such event
I am of the opinion that other nations
w111 bo compelled to assume the responsl
hlllty which devolves upon them and to
seriously consider the only remaining
'censures possible, mediation and Inter
vontlon, owing, perhaps, to the largo ex
of water w Pnrating the island from
the peninsula, the contending parties ap
pear to have wlth|n themselves no de
posltory of common confidence to suggest
wisdom when passion and excitement
haVC ,holr 8way and to as8ume th « P'"‘
of peacemaker.’'
In thls vlew> in the earlier days of the
contest, the good offices of the United
States as mediator were tendered In good
faith, without any selfish purposes In the
lnterMt of humanlty and s ,„eere
friendship for both parties, but were at
the tlme declined by Spain with the de
l * laration ' nevertheless, that at a future
time they would be indispensable.
„ No indication . has been received ,
that , in , the _ opinion . . of . Spain „ , that .
time has been reached. And yet the
strife continues with all its dread
horrors and all its injuries to the
interests of the United States and
other nations.
“Each party seems quite culpable of
working groat Injury and damage to the
other, and know well all the relations and
interests dependent on the existence of
peace In the island, but they seem Inca
pable of reaching any adjustment and
both have thus far failed of achieving
any success whereby one party shall pos
sess and control the island to the exclu
sion of the other. Under tho circum
stances tho agency of others, either by ,
mediation or by intervention seems to bo
the only alternative which must, sooner
or later be Invoked for tho termination
of the strife.”
Cleveland's Reference.
In the last annual message of my im
mediate predecessor during the pending
struggle, it was said:
"When the inability of Spain to deal
successfully with the insurrection has be
come manifest and it is demonstrated that
her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all
purpose of its rightful existence and when
a hopeless struggle for Its re-establish
ment has degenerated into a strife which
means nothing more than the useless sac
rifice of human life and tho utter destruc
tion of the very subject matter of tho
conflict, a situation will he presented in
which our obligations to the sovereignty
of Spain will be superseded by obli
gations which we can hardly hesitate to.
recognize and discharge.”
In my annual message to congress, De
cember last, speaking on this question, I
said:
"The near future will demonstrate
whether the Indispensable condition of a
righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans
and to Spain as well as equitable to all
our interests so intimately involved in the
welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained.
If not, the exigency of further and other
action by the United States will rematak
to be taken. When that lime comes that
action will be determined In tlhe lime of
indisputable right and duty. It will bo
faced, without misgiving or hesitancy in
tiie light of the obligation this govern
ment owes to It, to the people who
have confided to it the protection of their
interests and honor, and to humanity.
"Sure of the right, keeping free from all
offense ourselves, actuated only hy up
right and patriotic considerations, moved
neither by 'passion nor selfishness, the
government will oontinue its 'watchful
care over the rights and property of
American citizens, and will abate none
cf its efforts to bring about by peaceful
agencies a peace -which shall be honor
able and enduring. If It shall hereafter
appear to be a duty Imposed by our obli
gations to ourselves, to civilization and
humanity to Intervene with force, it shall
be without fault on our part and only
because the necessity for such action will
be so clear as to command the support
iand approval of the civilized world.”
The long trial has proved that •the ob
ject for which Spain has waged the war
cannot be attained. The lire of insurrec
tion may flame or may smoulder with,
varying seasons* but it has not been, and
it Is plain that it cannot be, extinguished
by present methods. The only hope of re
lief and regp&c from a condition which
can no longer be endured is the enforced
pacification of Cuba, In the name of
humanity, in the name of civilization, in
behalf of endangered American interests
winch give us the right and the duty to
speak and to act, the war in Cuba must
stop.
Asks for Authority.
In view of these facts and of these
conditions I ask congress to author
ize and empower the president to
take measures to secure a full and
final termination of hostilities be
tween the government of Spain and
the people o 4 J Cuba and to secure in
the island the establishment of a
stable government capable of main
taining order and observing its in
ternational obligations, ensuring
peace and tranquility and the se
curity of its citizeus, as well as our
own, and to use the military and
(Continued On Fourth Page.)