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About The Abbeville chronicle. (Abbeville, Ga.) 1896-1953 | View Entire Issue (April 14, 1898)
The Abbeville Chronicle VOL. II. p* ) CUBAN WAR IS REVIEWED. Asks Congress For Authority to Take Means to Terminate the Ex isting’ Warfare Between Spain and Cuba. WASIIINGTON. April 11.—The presi dent of the United States transmitted to congress today the following message on the Cuban situation and the Maine affair. TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: Obedient to that precept of the consti tution which commands the president to give from time to time to the congress information of the state of union and to recommend to their consideratien^nca: tires as he shall judge necessary pedient, It becomes my duty now tqad dress your body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba. I do so because of the intimate connec tion of the Cuban question with the state of our own Union and the grave relation to the course which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy of our govern ment if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the republic and religiously observed by succeeding ad ministrations to the present day. But One of Many. $he present revolution is but the succes sor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the domin ion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in according its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused circulation, annoyance and disturbance among" our citizens and by the exercise of cruel,- barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people. Since the present revolution began in February, 1895, this country has see’n the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequalled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as to the number of combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of mod ern times where a dependent people, striving to be free have been opposed by .the power of the sovereign state. Our people have Beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralysed, its exceptional productiveness dimin ished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins and its people perishing 7>y tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constarined, in t'\e observance of that strict neutrality j ^Vhich our laws cnjoin, what the laws of nations commands, to police our own wa ters and watch our own seaports to pre vent any unlawful act In aid of the Cu bans; Gur trade has suffered; the capi tal invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance cf our .people (have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens, which has Inevit ably found its expression! from time to time in the national legislature, so that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-contain ed commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign en tanglements. All this must needs awak en, and has indeed, aroused the utmost concern on the part of this government as well during my predecessor’s term as in my own. Evils to Our Country. In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about peace through the mediation of this government in any way that might tend to an honor , able adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish government then in power to consider any form of mediation or indeed of any plan of settle ment which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the moth er country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished. The efforts of Spain were increased by the dispatches of fresh levies of Cuba and by the addition to the hor rors of t ho strife of a new and inhuman phase precedented in the modern history of ilized Christian peoples. The policy of devastation and centration inaugurated by the tain general, Pando, Oct. 1, in the province of Pinar del was thence extended to embrace of the island to which the of the Spanish arms was able reach by occupation or by oi’crations. The peasantry, including all J-n the open, agricultural interior were Driven Into garrison towns or daces* held by the troops. The razing r.ovemen't in the provinces of all kinds ’ere Inaugurated. Fielus were laid wasu wellings unroofed and fired, mills de> troyed and in short everything t'hat ould desolate the land and render it un it for human habitation or support “was ondemned by order of one of the con t nding parties and executed by mill the p wers at their disposal. Horrors of Concentration. !y the time the present administration tol IJv effect a year ago, reconcentration— so called—had been made effective over the better part of the four central or we.-Iern provinces, Samta Clara, Matan zasj Havana and Pinar del Rio. The ag ricutural population to the est luxated nun ser of 300,000 or more was herded witl.n the -towns and their immediate vici age, deprived families of support, renGred destitute of shelter, left poorly clad kind exposed to tlhe most unsanitary conditions. The scarcity of food Increas ed \ith devastation cf the populated areaAand the destruction and want be came misery and starvation. Mon h by month the death rate increas ed in in alarming ratio. By March, 1897, accor ling to conservative estimates from officii Spanish sources, the mortality amon the reconcentradoes from starva tion fid the diseases thereto incident, ex oeedi 50 percentura of their total num Tier. (Practical relief was accorded to the dcstilite. The overburdened towns, al ready suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called "zones ot civillz .tion" established within the ini mediae area of effective military con trol i :out the cities and fortified camps prove illusory as a remedy tor the gut tering The unfortunates, being for the most art women and children with aged and l;lpless men, enfeebled by disease and h nger, could not have tilled the soil, witho t tools, seed or shelter, for their own s ippev* or for the supply of the cities. Rccfneentration adopted avowed ly as war measure in order to cut off the resources of the insurgents worked its predistDied result. As I said in my message cf last Decem ber, it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave. Meanwhile undergone th<j military situation In the Island had a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that charac terized the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the thitherto unharmed fields of Pinar Del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had re lapse.; into a dogged struggle in the cen tral end eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar Del Rio and parts of Havana, but under the existing conditions of the rural countiV, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted the revolutionists held their own and their conquest and sub mission, put forward by Spain as the es sential and sole basis of peace, seemed us far distant as at the outset. Grave Problem of Duty. In this state of affairs my administra tion found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to some form of honorable settle ment. The assassination of the prime minis ter, Canovas, led to a change of govern ment In Spain. The former administra tion pledged to subjugatloij without con cession gave place to that of a more lib eral party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico. Tho overtures t)f this government, its new’ envoy, General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effect ive amelioration of the conditions of the island, although not accepted to the ex tent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, In an advanced phase, would be forth with offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail In the of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new government Spain continued and completed the pol already begun by its predecessor, of friendly regard for this nation releasing American citizens held under charge or another connected with the so that by tly end of No not a single person entitled in any ABBEVILLE, GA.. THURSDAY APRIL 14. 1898. y to our national protection, i a Spanish prison. While these negotiations were in gress, the Increasing destruction of unfortunate reconcentrados and alarming mortality among them earnest attention. The success had attended the limited measure of lief extended to the suffering citizens among them by the Judicious penditure through the consular of the money appropriated expressly their succor by the joint resolution ap proved May 24, 1S07, prompted the hu mane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to the people, in viting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of Jan uary by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban re lief committee with headquarters In New York city, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and tho religious and business ele ments of the community. American Charity. The efforts of that committee have been untiring and accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Havana have greatly aided the charit able work. The president of the Ameri can Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-operated with the consul general and the local au thorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies have already reached the sufferers and more is forth coming. The supplies are admitted duty free and transportation to the interior lias been arranged so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most if not all the towns where suffering exists. Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change In the condition of the reconcontrados Is recognized by the Spanish government. Within a fc-w days the orders of General Weyler have been revoked; the reconcen trados arc, it is said, to be permitted to return to their homes and aided to re sume their self-supporting pursuits ot peace; public works have been ordered to give them employment and a sum of $090, 000 has been appropriated for their re lief. The war in Cuba is of such nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies In the physical exhaustion of the one or of the other party or perhaps of both—€L con dition which in effect ended the ten years war by the truce of Zanjon. The prospect of ^uch a protection and conclusion of the present strife Is a contingency hardly to be con templated with equanimity by the civilized world and least of all by the United States, affected and in jured as we are, deeply and inti mately by its very existence. Realizing this it appeared to be my duty in a spirit of true friendliness no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on the 20th ultimo, as a re sult of much presentation and correspon dence through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to tho Spanish government looking to an armistice until October first for the negotiations of peace with the good offices of the president. In addition, I asked the immediate revoca tion of the order to reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with tho Spanish authorities so as to afford full relief. The Reply of Spain. The reply of tlhe Spanish cabinet was received on the night of the 31st ultimo. It offers, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular parliament inasmuch as the con currence of that body would be nec essary to reach a final result, it be ing, however, understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government are not lessened or diminished. 1 As the Cuban parliament does not meet until the 4th of May next, the Spanish government would not object for its part to accept at once a suspension of hostili ties if asked for by the insurgents, from the general in chief, to whom it would pertain in such case, to determine the duration and conditions of? the armistice. The proposition's submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish government were both In the form of brief memoranda, and the texts of which are before mo, and are substantially In the language above given. Tho action of the Cuban parliament in the matter of "preparing” peace and tho manner of its doing so are not explained in the .Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford’s preliminary reports of preliminary discussions, preceding tho rtnal conference. It is understood Spanish government stands ready to the Insular government full power to gotla'te peace with the Insurgents, or directly or Indirectly It does not pear. With this last overture In the rectlon of peace and Its disappointing re ceptlon by Spain, the executive was brought to the cud of his effort. His last Mcssase. Tn my annual message of December last I said: "Of the untried measures these remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independ ence of Cuba; neutral Intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compro mise between the contestants and inter vention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot bo thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal ag gression.” Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives in the light of President Grant’s measured words, uttered In 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel hostilities in Cuba, he reached tho con clusion that the recognition of the inde pendence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible; and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I comment especially upon the latter as pect of the question, pointing out the in conveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence, which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence of effective offices in the territory of hos tilities. Nothing has since occurred to change my view on this regard, and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belliger ence is published, could, of itself, and unattended by other action, ac complish nothing toward the one end for which we labor—the in stant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island. Turning to the question of recognizing at this time tho independence of the pres ent insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up In President Jackson’s message to con gress December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. * « >« < * I said in my message of December last: "It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of bel ligerency in its favor.” The same requirements must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while on the other hand the Influences and consequences of the strug gle upon the internal policy of the rec ognizing state, which form important fac tors where the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable factors when the real question is whether the community claiming rec ognition or is not independent beyond per adventure. Nor from the standpoint of exi>e ricnce do I think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obliga tions towards the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or dis approval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When It shall appear here after that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, For Armed Intervention. As a matter of fact in the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such gov ernment can he promptly and readily re cognized, and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation ad justed. There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a national compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one party or the other. As to the first, It is not to be forgotten that during the last few months, the re lation of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention In many ways, each note of Itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific re- | BU j t just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of nil our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish do .„ lre for pei ,„ B and pI . osperU y Cuba _ untarnished by differences between the United States and Spain and unstained by the blood or Amcrlcttn t . Uizt , ns Xhe f orcib i e intervention of tho _ Uaited S *' 1 * 08 na a “cutral, to stop tlle wnr ttcc ° r <Hue to the large die tates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their .. , borders, is Justifiable on ra tional grounds. It involves, how ever, hostile constraixit upon both the parties to the contest, as well as to enforce a truce as to guide * the mu eventual settlement. The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows: First—In the cause of humanity, and to put an end to the barbarities, blood shed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwil ling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, be longing to another nation, and is there fore none of our business. It is especially our duty, for it is right at our doors. Second—We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford that protection and in demnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection. Third—The right to intervene may ho justified by the very serious Injury to the commerce, trade and business of our peo ple and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation or the Island. Fourth, and which is of the utmost im portanee for the present condition of af fairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this government enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years In un island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations—when tho lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property de stroyed and themselves ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expedition^ of fiilibustering that we are powerless to re press altogether and the irritating ques tions and entanglements thus arising— all these and others that I need not men tion, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace. The Maine Matter. These elements of danger and disorder pointed out have been strikingly illustrat ed by a tragic event which has deeply justly moved the American people. 1 have already transmitted to congress the re port of the naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in tHe harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel lias filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation. The naval court of inquiry, wiho, It is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the government, was unani mous in its conclusion that the destruc tion of the Maine was caused by an exte rior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsi bility. That remains to bo fixed. In any event the destruction of the Maine hy whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That eondition is thus shown to he such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there. Further referring in this connection to I recent diplomatic correspondence, a dis patch from our minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice re quire in the matter of the Maine. The reply above referred of the 31st ultimo also contained an expression of the readi ness of Spain to submit to arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th instant as fol lows : "As to the question/ of fact which springs from the diversity of views be tween the report of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the fact be ascertained by an impartial in vestigation by experts whose decision Spain accepts in advance.” To this I have made no reply. President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the contest as it then ap peared and its hopeless and apparent in- NO. 13. definite prolongation, said; "In such event I am of the opinion that other nations w111 bo compelled to assume the responsl hlllty which devolves upon them and to seriously consider the only remaining 'censures possible, mediation and Inter vontlon, owing, perhaps, to the largo ex of water w Pnrating the island from the peninsula, the contending parties ap pear to have wlth|n themselves no de posltory of common confidence to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement haVC ,holr 8way and to as8ume th « P'"‘ of peacemaker.’' In thls vlew> in the earlier days of the contest, the good offices of the United States as mediator were tendered In good faith, without any selfish purposes In the lnterMt of humanlty and s ,„eere friendship for both parties, but were at the tlme declined by Spain with the de l * laration ' nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. „ No indication . has been received , that , in , the _ opinion . . of . Spain „ , that . time has been reached. And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the United States and other nations. “Each party seems quite culpable of working groat Injury and damage to the other, and know well all the relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace In the island, but they seem Inca pable of reaching any adjustment and both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall pos sess and control the island to the exclu sion of the other. Under tho circum stances tho agency of others, either by , mediation or by intervention seems to bo the only alternative which must, sooner or later be Invoked for tho termination of the strife.” Cleveland's Reference. In the last annual message of my im mediate predecessor during the pending struggle, it was said: "When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has be come manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purpose of its rightful existence and when a hopeless struggle for Its re-establish ment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sac rifice of human life and tho utter destruc tion of the very subject matter of tho conflict, a situation will he presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by obli gations which we can hardly hesitate to. recognize and discharge.” In my annual message to congress, De cember last, speaking on this question, I said: "The near future will demonstrate whether the Indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will rematak to be taken. When that lime comes that action will be determined In tlhe lime of indisputable right and duty. It will bo faced, without misgiving or hesitancy in tiie light of the obligation this govern ment owes to It, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity. "Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only hy up right and patriotic considerations, moved neither by 'passion nor selfishness, the government will oontinue its 'watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none cf its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace -which shall be honor able and enduring. If It shall hereafter appear to be a duty Imposed by our obli gations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to Intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support iand approval of the civilized world.” The long trial has proved that •the ob ject for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The lire of insurrec tion may flame or may smoulder with, varying seasons* but it has not been, and it Is plain that it cannot be, extinguished by present methods. The only hope of re lief and regp&c from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba, In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests winch give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop. Asks for Authority. In view of these facts and of these conditions I ask congress to author ize and empower the president to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities be tween the government of Spain and the people o 4 J Cuba and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of main taining order and observing its in ternational obligations, ensuring peace and tranquility and the se curity of its citizeus, as well as our own, and to use the military and (Continued On Fourth Page.)
