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14
rayed against each other, one rifle in the
trench was worth five in front of it. — Cox's
Atlanta, page 129.
These remarks were made for the
purpose of arguing that the Confeder
ates behind breastworks were entitled
to no superfluity of glory for repulsing
less than five assailants to one defend
er of the works.* But how different
is the case when the Federals were in
the entrenchments and scarcely more
than their own numbers assaulted
them, and with inferior weapons, and
absolutely carried one strong line of
the works! By the reasoning of lead
ing Federal generals, to equalize the
forces the assailants should have been
at least 8,000 strong.
But the forts at Allatoona were bas
tioned work with ditches in front, and
were therefore exceptional as to their
strength, and were on the crest of a
mountain ridge, defensive alike on
either side. Concerning the strength
of this position from a military point
of view, Col. Tourtellotte says, after
describing what he did during the
night before the battle :
In this way I hoped to hold the rebels
till daylight, when we should have the full
advantage of our superior position.
He also adds :
Five companies of the 93d Illinois, I sent
out to hold a commanding point on the
road leading to Pumpkinvine creek.
(This was the outer line of works on
the west of the railroad.)
Further on he states that while the
battle was raging, at about nine
o’clock, he sent the 12th and 50th Ill
inois regiments across to the west side
of the railroad to reinforce Gen. Corse,
—leaving the 4th Minn. Infantry to con
tend against the troops advancing directly
upon us from the north. This from our
great advantage of position, wa were able to
do, and also to assist greatly the troops on
the west side of the railroad against rebels
charging on them from the north and north
west.
This exposed the Confederates to an
enfilading fire.
From these extracts from the report
of the commander of the garrison, who
from some weeks’ stay there had a
thorough knowledge of Allatoona, its
natural strength and its fortifications,
it will be seen that he considered it a
very strong position for defense.
Furthermore in front of at least the
outer line of works, west of the main
fort, (marked R on the map herewith)
which the Confederates stormed, oc
cupied by the 7th Illinois and 39th
lowa, reinforced by a portion of the 93d
Illinois, the second of which was almost
annihilated, there was, as already
shown, a most formidable abatis and
chevaux de frise in front of the works.
In General French’s official report of
the battle he says of this redoubt that
its approaches were “defended to a
great distance by abatis and, nearer the
works, by stockades and other .obstruc
tions,” and even so careful an officer as
General Cockrell calls it a “fort.”
These are also the works which the
Federal writers call “hastily construct
ed rifle pits.” They are described some
what in detail in the first part of this
article, and the letters of Messrs. Mc-
Daniel and Wilkes, herewith publish
ed show the appearance they present
ed more than two years after the battle.
All of this confirms the fact that obe
dience was given to General Sherman’s
orders, in June, from which we quote
as follows:
* General Sherman in a letter to General Hal
leck, June 27, 1864, said in a general way ; “The
facilities with which defensive works of timber
and earth are constructed give the party on the
defensive great advantage.’’
General O. O. Howard in reference to the same
engagement, goes even further than this and
says: “My experience is that a line of works
thorougly constructed, with the front well cover
ed with abatis and other entanglements, well
manned with infantry, whether with our own or
that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct
ASSAULT.
Order the brigade left at Allatoona to be
provided with tools, and to entrench both ends
of the pass very strong. —(Gen. Sherman to Gen.
Blair, June 1, 18G4.)
The following from the same author
ity is also interesting:
1 have been to Allatoona Pass, and find
it admirable for our purposes. * ® It now
becomes as useful to us as it was to the en
emy, being easily defended from either direction.
-(Gen. Sherman to Gen. Halleck, June 7, 1864.)
Finally, on this point, the writer is
informed by one who resided in the
neighborhood of Allatoona during 1864
that the Federal garrison was busy all
the summer and early fall, constructing
and strengthening these works. The
average reader will concede that from
the first part of June to the end of
September a great deal of effective
work could have been done by men
trained, as these Federal veterans were,
in building works for defense and pro
tection.
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INTERRUPTING THE SIGNALING.
It is strange that the Federal com
manders either make no mention at all
of this strong work, the stockades and
abatis in front of it, or merely refer to
it as “hastily constructed rifle pits,”
while the Confederate regimental and
brigade commanders, and General
French also, in their reports, made at
that period, speak of the strength of
the works and the difficulties in ap
proaching them ; and the testimony of
citizens of the vicinity is positive and
uniform that they were as herein de
scribed, and even at the present day,
not only the earthworks, but, in some
instances, the very chestnut timbers
remain as confirmatory evidence.
It is also quite noticeable that since
the Federal writershave admitted that
French’s force was materially less than
they first alleged, they now allude to
the main fortification where General
Corse was, as “a little redoubt,” where
as all of their reports of the battle de
signate it as a “fort”.
The fact that the Confederates im
pressed the Federals very decidedly
with the skill, energy and power of their
assault is proven by such quotations as
the following from the reports of the
battle:
G The enemy’s line of battle swept us back
likeio much chaff ® ® * threatening to en
gulf our little band without further ado.”
“Searsand Young® ■ made their assaults
in front and on the Hank with so much vigor
and in such force as to break Rowett’s line.”
“The fighting up to this time (about 11
a. m.) was of a most extraordinary char
acter. The broken pieces of the enemy en
abled them to fill every hollow and take
every advantage of the rough ground
surrounding the fort, filling every hole
and trench, seeking shelter behind every
stump and log that lay within musket range
THE KENNESAW GAZETTE.
of the fort. We received their fire from th e
north, south and west of the redoubt, com
pletely enfilading our ditches and rendering
it almost impracticable for a man to expose his
person about the parapet.”
“Officers® ® all that were tilled or wound
ed in the fort, met their fate while trying to
get the men to expose themselves above, the parapet.
“The enemy kept up a constant and intense
fire, gradually closing around us,and rapid
ly filling our little fort with the dead or
dying- ’ .
The above are all from General
Corse’s report.
“I took possession of the rifle pit in
front of the fort, facing west towards
the White House, where the enemy was
seen thickest, the rille pits then being
thinly manned, as the troops of other
commands who occupied them were fast
seeking shelter inside the fort, leaving
the ditch almost empty,”— Capt. Koehler,
commanding 12th Illinois regiment.
“I drew off the regiment and inarched
at double quick off to the left of the hill
and under lire of artillery and musketry
which I never have seen equalled. ’’ * *
“I had quickly formed the regiment in
front of the fort next to the railroad,
some occupying a position to the left of
the fort, ■which they took and held under
the most destructive fire of artillery and
musketry that has ever in my.opinion
been witnessed during this present rebel
lion.”— Col. Hanna, 50th Illinois.
These extracts would seem to indicate
that, the Confederates were proving
themselves to be very fine marksmen,
and experts in rapid and effective prac
tice.
Others might be added; but these
are sufficient to show the Federal im
pression at that time of the mettle of the
troops whom the Federals claim to have
driven off in confusion.
Some extracts from the Confederate
reports, however, will emphasize the
same idea, and also serve to show how
close up to the main fort they pressed
their lines:
“So rugged and abrupt were the hills
that the troops could not be got in posi
tion until about 9 a. m. when I sent a
summons to surrender. * * * No re
ply being sent to me, the order was giv
en for the assault by directing the ad
vance of Cockrell’s brigade. Emerging
from the woods and passing over a long
distance of abatis, formed of felled tim
ber, and under a severe fire of musketry
and artillery, nobly did it press forward,
followed by the gallant Texans. The
enemy’s outer line and one redoubt soon
fell. Resting to gather strength and sur
vey the work before them, again they
rushed forward in column, and in mur
derous hand-to-hand conflict that left
the ditches filled with the dead did they
become masters of the second redoubt.
The third ami main redoubt, now filled
by those driven from the captured works
on the west side of the railroad, was fur
ther crowded by those that were driven
out from the captured works on the east
side of the road by the attack made by
General Sears. They had to cross the
deep cut through which our artillery
poured a steady and deadly tire.” — Gen
eral French' s lieport.
(What General French terms the
first “redoubt” was a ditch down the
hill on the northwest, but the second
redoubt was a strong bastioned work,
with ditch, across the ridge, and well
protected by formidable abatis and
sharpened stockades- He was mis
taken, however, about the Fed
erals having been driven out of
the works on the east side of the ridge.
The force which the Confederates saw
double quicking across the railroad cut
from the east side to the west was a
portion (the 12th and 50th Illinois
regiments) of Tourtellotte’s command
which in obedience to orders he sent
across the railroad to Corse.)
“I ordered my regiment forward, *
* They moved into the enemy’s works
where they had a hand-to-hand encount
er with sword, bayonet, butt of muskets,
rocks, etc., killing a good many and
capturing 25 or 30 prisoners and the
enemy’s entrenchments ; thence the regi
ment moved forward to within 20 yards
of the foe’s last and strong fort, where
they remained, contending with the
enemy until withdrawn by order of Ma
jor-General French, when they fell back
in good order.”— lieport of Major E. 11.
Hampton, Com'dg, 2Dth North Carolina.
“We captured some prisoners, killed
quite a number of the enemy, having
them to light until we mounted their
works. * * * We then took position,
some in the ditches and some in ad
vance of the ditches, wherever they
could get protection, and sharpshot the
batteries and men to the best advantage
possible. The light continued from 10
a, m. until 1.30 p. in., when we were or
dered to withdraw in small squads,
which order was obeyed.”— Report of
Major J. 11. Mcßeynolds, Com'dg, tilth Tex
as.
“We moved forward to within 20 steps
of the first works of the enemy and
formed again, having our lines broken
by the brush and fallen timber which
covered the ground. At this point we
were ordered to charge the second line
of breastworks of the enemy. * * *
We moved forward with a yell and car
ried the works in front of us in less than
live minutes, driving the enemy out of
their entrenchments with the butts of
our guns and rocks, as we did not have
any bayonets, pursuing them to within
twenty steps of their last and only work.
We then occupied some buildings about
twenty-live or forty steps from the
enemy, and commenced sharpshooting
the enemy in the fort for over two hours,
when we received orders to withdraw,
which we dul in good order.”— Report of
Col. A. Harris, Comd'g, 14th Texas.
It is therefore with no degree of
chagrin that the Confederates can
leave it to the intelligent people of the
United States, and all unbiased read
ers to say whether their fight at Alla
toona was not one creditable to them
in every sense of the word.
***
It is proper, now, after having
stated the facts pertaining to the forces
actually engaged in the battle of Alla
toona to consider thecauses that led to
that conflict.
And here comes what, to the writer, is
the part of the task of telling the story
of this battle in its completeness, that
he is most reluctant to enter upon.
Zealous in his love for the South, her
institutions and her deserved glory,
he would gladly see every one who
fought for her go down to posterity
crowned with the laurels of honor and
unselfish fame. He is sorry that such
cannot be the record.
The main question with Hood after
he had taken a position on the flank
of Sherman was that of provisions,
and no alternative was left after that,
than to leave the road for Sherman
open to move south, and for him to
fall back to Alabama for provisions for
his army.
But he says in his book, “Advance
and Retreat,” written after the war,
