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every thiug valuable--fArtf our /tilings are
insulted, the public arm paralysed, ami tut pub
lic stunned, by Che dastardly and incessant cry
of PEiCFJ What, fellow citizens, rausv
t*tf live opinion wineh they entertain of you?
Can any man be so stupid as uot to perceive
that it la an appeal to your fears, to your ava
rice, anti to all the baser passions winch ac
tuate tbe human heart? That it is approach
mg you in the manner in which aio.ie those
puny politicians who buz about you, and
thicken the political atmosphere, sav you are
accessible, through your fears and your pock
ets? Can any American citizen be so profli
gate as not to spurn indignantly the base libel
upon his character? * v
‘Suffer yourselves not to be deceived by the
pfCtence, that because Great B itain has
been forced by her subjects to make a quali
fied repeal ol her orders, our government
ought to abandon her ground. That ground
was taken to resist two great and “crying
grievances, the destruction of our commerce,
and the impressment of our seamen. The
latter is the most important, in proportion as
we prefer the liberty and lives of our citizens
to their property. Distrust, therefore, the
man who could advi.se your government at
any time, and more especially at this time —
when your brave sailors are exciting the ad
miration, and farcing the respect of an as
tonished world, when their deeds of heroic
valor make old Ocean smile at the humilia
tion of her ancient tyrant -at such a time,
we say again, mirk the min who would
Countenance government in COMMUTING
OUR. SAILOR’S RIGHTS FOR THE
SAFETY OF OUR MERCHANT’S
GOODS,
From the Washington Globe.
JEALOUSLY, INGRATITUDE, AND
TREACHERY OF GENERAL HARRISON.
The instance of cruel injustice committed
by Harrison in throwing the pall of his report
over ttie name of C >l. John Miller, who led,
what Harrison and his friends now call the
most brilliant sortie in our military annals,
Was noticed in a recent number of our paper.
Harrison, but a few days before, had quar
relled with Col. Miller, and his yet unppeas
ed resentment was supposed by Col. Miller
and bis friends to have induced the General
to omit, in the first recital of the names of the
ga[tanl officers who performed the glorious
achievement, that of the leader of the hope
to whose personal courage and skilful and ju
dicious conduct of the action left entirely to
his discretion, its success is attributable.
But the case of deliberate perfi ly, to which
we would now invite attention, blighting the
Isarels won by a stripling in his army, no
temporary excitement can be even supposed
to lend the slightest mitigation. Cold selfish
uess, enduring for twenty-six years, charac
terizes the yet unrepaired wrong. The in
jured officer was one who had volunteered
belore he had reached manhood, to serve
Harrison in his Tippecanoe campaign, On
the bloody night of the surprise, lie acted as
the aid of Boyd, the Commander of the fourth
regiment; and all know and admit that to the
admirable skill and firmness with which this
body of men were made like a rampart to
cover the camp, and the broken militia, Har
rison and his army owe their deliverance from
total destruction. The same young hero,
whose voice and bearing, amidst the darkness
and dismay of Tippecanoe, inspired with in
vincible courage the veterans to whom he
bore the orders of their Colonel, was conspic
uous again in that glorious sortie at Fort
Meigs, which gave some light to the day
which the butchery or captivity of the whole
c <rps of Kentuckians under C<>l. Dudley had
closed with disaster. Under Miller, he led a
company of forty men to the assault of the
batteries, which were carried. And there he
left his whole command, but fourteen men,
who alone survived to return with him to the
fort. But his greatest service was that at
Sandusky; and it was for this that the Gen
eral requited him with that artfully practised
wrong, which, from the noble nature of the
injured party, and the insidious hypoer sy of
his cunning adversary, has, up this hour, been
shrouded in mystery. It is our purpose now
to dissipate the obscurity, by aulhen ic and
long suppressed documents.
It is proper to give a brief view of the stale
of things, out of which the secret history
which we propose to open up, grew, that the
partiality known and the concealed facts may
shed their light on each other.
The reader should look to the map, and
take a comprehensive view (with a knowl
edge of the designs of both sides) of the scene
of action of the whole campaign, which the
victory obtained liv Croghan at Sandusky
ho gloriously opened, and wh : ch the battle
fought by Col. Johnson on the Thames as
brilliantly closed.
Armstrong, the Secretary of War, had
over-ruled Harrison’s idea of carrying the in
vasion of Canada around the head of the
lakes. His plan was to obtaid command of
the lake by a naval victory, and carry our
army into Canada by transports built for the
purpose. The fleet to contend for the mas
tery with the English, was prepared near
Erie, under Ferry. The transports were
built by Jesup, at Cleveland, and Harrison,
whose duty it was to cover, with his force,
these preparations, look post at Seneca. The
Jake bends like a bow into Ohio, from E-ie,
in Pennsylvania, to Sandusky bay. Sandus
ky is at the western end of the arch—Erie at
the eastern extremity—Cleveland is a point
on the arch between the two. The British
force wis on the opposite side of the lake
from Sandusky bay. Harrison, with his ar
my, was at a considerale di iance fom the
bav, up the Sandusky river—Croghan at the
post of Lower Sandusky, being about nine
miles nearer the b iy. The object of the Brit
ish was to destroy the preparations for inva
sion on the lake shores, and opea the whole
mveep of its arch in Ohio to the depredations
of the Indians supported bv the British fleet
and sustained by the land forces as a rallying
point in their incursions. To relieve himself
from Harrison’s force, which he did not doubt
would be employed to cover Cleveland, Proc
tor made a feint of besieging Fort Meigs a
second time. This, he supposed, would
withdraw Harrison from Seneca westward,
to succor Fort Meigs, and leave his designs
upon the boats and stores at Cleveland, and
the flret at Erie, unobstructed. Harrison
did not march to the relief of Fort Meigs.
Proctor then came down the bay to Sandus
ky, in the prosecution of his real object.
Harrison no sooner heard of his approach,
tlvati he ordered Croghan to burn his fort and
retreat, aud he had ail his own provisions
and preparations lor the Canada campaign
piled for a conflagration, and a retreat into
the interior as soon as Croghm joined him.
Proctor would tlius have obtained, from the
fears of Harrison, whtt his feint on For:
Meigs was intended to effect, by provoking
his valor, had not Croghan’s courage disip
pointed Proctor and saved Harrison. Arm
strong, then Secretary, thus sums up, in his
notices of the war, the conduct of Harrison at
this point of time:
•‘Hjving on the 39th, sufficiently assured
himself with regard to the number and equip
ment of Proctor’s force, and suspecting that
this formidable array might be directed a
gain3t his own entrenched camp at Seneca:
he at once determined ‘to eoiieat and destroy
his surplus stores, abandon his present posi
tion and mike good a retreat to Upper San
dujky’— leaving to Lire late that might await
them, the settlements on the southern shore
of the Lake; the boats buiit and stores col
lected at CieveUnd; and Perry’s fleet, then
fitting out and nearly ready for service, at
Presque Isle. Bui though willing and pre
pared to make these sacrifices, he could not
but perceive that a mere presumption ofdno
srer to his .own catnp. would not jus'ily the
abandonment of Gr)ghan?s detachment, with
out some effort on bis part, to extend to it
the eventual security he sought for himself.
On this point, however, the General’s sense
ol doty was soon satisfied; forgetting alike
die admonition contained in his first order to
Croghau. snot to hazard a retreat in the face
(f an Indian investment” and the fact, now
perfectly known to himself that such invest
ment did exist; he despatched to that officer a
second order, for “an immediate retreatat
all hazards ; indicating the route by which he
was to make it, but taking no step to cover,
or otherwise sustain the movement. And, as
it the task thus imposed was not in itself suf
licenlly perilous, he farther prescribed, that
the garrison, instead of employ ng all pos
sible means to mask (he operation, should be
gin “by setting Jire to their stores and bar
racks,” and thus virtually announce their in
tention to the surrounding enemy.
“Fortunately, the great disposer of the
events of this world, not unlrequently con
verts evil into good, and folly into wisdom.
On the present occasion, we have seen, that
by the first order given to Croghan, lie was
assigned to the defence of a post, which, in
the Generai’s opinion, “ could not be saved,”
and at tbe same time, forbidden to retreat, in
the face of an Indian investment; and that by
a second, he was ordered to abandon this un
tenable post, and make good a retreat of nine
miles , th ough a continuous forest filled with
savages, without aid or support of any kind.”
The circumstances connected with Crogh
aii’s refusal to obey the order to burn and re
treat, are told for the first time truly in his let
ter, which we now publish. The result is
forcibly told by the Secretary, Armstrong,
in the following passage:
l lri making this selection, the young and
gallant Croghan did not hesitate; and to the
demand of a surrender, enforced by the usu
al menace of indiscriminate slaughter in case
if refusal, lie answered substantially, that the
defence of his post was a point of honor, which
could only be satisfied by an actual experi
ment of the relative force and fortune of his
antagonist and himself.
‘While this negotiation was in progress,
Proctor was employed in lan ling his artillery
and giving it a position in aid of his gun-boats;
from which, on the delivery of Croghan’s an
swer, a heavy fire was opened and continued
on the fort, with little if any intermission du
ring the night. At daybreak, a second bat
tery of thr e six pounders was established
within two hundred and fifty yards of the
pickets; and about four o’clock, p. m. it was
found that the whole fire of the British can
non, was concenlraled on the northwest cor
ner of the fort—a circumstance, sufficiently
indicating the point and species of attack
meditated upon it. Major Croghan, accord
ingly, hastened to employ such means as he
possessed to strengthen the menaced angle,
and had barely executed his purpose, when
the enemy (covering himself with smoke) was
seen rapidly advancing, and hut a few paces
distant from the pickets. A general and well
directed fire of musketry from the garrison,
which immediately followed this discovery,
had the effect of checking his progress and
considerably disturbing his order; but the
latter being speedily restored, the movement
was resumed, and the ditch reached and occu
pied bv the head of the column. It was at
this arbitral moment, ihat Croghan’s single
piece of artillery, charged with grape-shot,
and so placed as to enfilade the assailants,
opened its fire, and with such effect, that in a
fetv minutes, the combat was virtually ended
and tbe battle won. Most of the enemy who
entered the ditch, were killed or wounded;
and such of them as were less advanced and
able to fly, sought shelter in the neigboring
woods—carrying with them no disposition to
renew the attack, and strongly impressing
their Indian allies with their own panic.—
Proctor now saw, that all attempts to rally
the fugitives were hopeless, and that to avoid
3 greater calamity,* his most prudent course
would be, to rc-embark what could be col
lected of his force, red and white, and return
immediately to Malden.”
We now come to tiie unpublished history
connected with this event. It will explain
why the results of this victory were carefully
kept out of view at the time —-why Croghan
consented to have his motives for disobeying
his orders misrepresented, and Harrison’s
conduct in giving ihem vindicated—and why
Hariison so perseveringly falsified (he truth
of history in the accounts given by him of
this particular transaction, in the two works
prepa ed under his own eye; the first pub
lished by M'Af’ec, the second by Dawson.
In biinging forward Colonel Croghan’s let
ters upon this subjeci, it is proper to stale
(hat they were given to us by a gentleman
of high standing in Ohio, who, without any
communication with Colonel Croghan upon
the subject, submitted them to us for the
press. The fact that tiiese letters were called
lor by a committee of gentlemen at Wheeling,
the friends of Harrison—that Colonel Croghan
expressed his willingness to give them to the
public by referring the committee to General
Harrison for ihe correspondence—that this
committee, after having had time to commu
nicate with General Harrison, published a
letter as Croghan’s which the late correspon
dence between Harrison and Croghan shows
was not his, but one which his self-sacrificing
patriotism permitted Harrison to shape, to
suit tbe exigencies of the time at which it was
published—that Hairisou’w aid, Colonel Todd,
now conducting a press notoriously set up as
the immediate organ of Harrison, declared,
in reference to the call by the committee for
the correspondence in regard to the contested
question of the defence ot Fort Stephenson,
that there was no ‘such contested question ’ —
‘that history and Col. Croghan ’ own letter at
the day, have placed the subject beyond the ne
cessity of further elucidation ’■—ail these facts,
connected with the consideration that ifwhat
is said in behalf of Harrison in regard to the
ca I! of his own friends for the correspondence,
be true, the correspondence itself must be
j laise, render it proper, in justice to the parties
and to the public, that ihe issue made by Col
onel Todd’s declaration should be tested.
We do not publish what purports to be the
replies of Harrison, in tbe copies which we
j have in our hands, because the history referr
jed to by Col. Todd, as true, is condemned, in
! the ietters purporting to be Harrison’s, as er
ironeous. Harrison must therefore deny the
j authenticity of these letters, or the authority
of his friend, Coi. Todd, to make the state
ment on his behalf.
We shall await, then, some intimation on
tiie part of General Harrison or his friends,
touching this subject—some recognition of the
letters imputed to him, coupled with au ex
pression of a willingness that they may meet
the ‘thepublic eye.’ In thai contingency we
shall with alaciity present them in the co
lumas of the Globe, in their proper connec
tion.
From the contents of Cos!. Crogban's letters,
it will be perceived that not a tact stated by
him is controverted. It was alone upon the
admission of the truth of his statements that
the mode of correcting tiie original misrepre
sentations w'as referred to the decision of mu
tual friends.
*A fear that Harrison would quit his camp
at Seneca, and pounce upon him in his then
crippled state. It is worthy of notice, that of
these two commanders, (always the terror of
each other,) one was now actually flying from
his supposed pursuer; while the other waited
only the arrival ofCroghan at Seneca, to be
gin a camp conflagration, and fight to fort
Meigs,
Qol Croghan s letters to Gen. Harrison.
Red Hook, Ist July , ISIS.
Sts—Could I calculate on seeing you with
in any reasonable tip.- \ ibis leltei would not
be written;, but a-s there is no prospect of ,i
this, I deem it, therelbre, most proper in this ,!
way to state to you with candor, that reports,'*
or rather statements, have been made to me!
of such a nature, and from sources so fiisect
and apparently so authentic, as to cause me’
to hesitate in the language I should bear to- j
wards you; and which will, unless positively |
denied *bv you, cal! from me such contradic- I
lion a3 would be extremely unpleasant tome,
and perhaps, mortifying to you.
It is stated that you revised and corrected
the work entitled ‘War in the West,’ (of
which M'Afee is the ostensible author.) pre
paratory to its going to press, thus giving your
sanction and authority to the publication of
a statement in relation to the delence of Low
er Sandusky, most positively incorrect, and
which you at the time knew to be in direct
contradiction of the language which you held
m the Camp of Seneca during the bombard
ment of Sandusky by the enemy. ‘General
Harrison,’ says the author, ‘discovering from
the fire of the enemy that he had nothing but
light artillery, which could make no impres
sion on the works, felt no apprehension for
the safety of tohe garrison, well knowing ihat
a breach could not be effected, and that
without forming a breach, every attempt at
escalade could be successfully repelled by the
garrison,’ or words to this amount —a state
ment as void of truth as possible, as you very
well know, recollecting as you must your un
easiness, during the whole continuance of the
cannonade, for the safety of the garrison, and
which more than once wrung from you Ibis
strong language of censure of my conduct: ‘I
wash my hands of it—the blood he on his
own head’—language which you had no right
to use, and which would have damned my
reputation as an officer, had I fallen on that
occasion.
I am informed that very lately, at a dinner
in Philadelphia, when the subject of the de
fence of Sandusky was biought up, you ex
pressed yourself in substance thus: The offi
cers and soldiers of that garrison are not so
deserving of distinction for its defence as it is
general y thought: to the blindness and folly
of the enemy, more than to any extraordinary
exertions or skill of theirs, is to be ascribed his
defeat and their safety; it is true they did
very well, but not better than any other like
number of troops from my army would have
done, &c. thus continuing on in such an ex
position of the affair, as made me, says my
informant and others at the table,express an
aston shment that the merits of the defence
of Sandusky had been so far overrated,
and that the commanding officer had received
for such service such applause. Did such
conversation ever take place? or have you
ever expressed yourself in such manner of
the defence of Sandusky, as to induce the be
lief in any one that its garrison received
warmer plaudits than it was deserving of?
And in asking this, may I at the same time
require of you an equally candid denial or ad
mission of the statement ot vour having re
v.sed the work of which M‘Afee is the osten
sible author? if it is made to appear from
your answer that my informants have report
ed falsely, they shall know it to their confusion
and cost; but if on the other hand there is an
affirmation on your part of the truth of their
statement, I will immediately take it upon my
self to correct the false impression you may
have created. I will be m New York until
the Ist of October next, to which place I beg
that your answer may be directed.
I have the honor to be, your obedient ser
vant,
G. CROGHAN.
To Gen. W. H. Harrison,
Cincinatli, Ohio.
JS'ew York , -slug. IS, 1818.
Dear Sir—The language ol my letter, al
though warm, was but the expression of my
leelings at the time; lor 1 had then scarce a
doubt of your hostility towards me, by such
an extraordinary chain of coincident ciicuni
stances were the reports in proof thereof
brought before me. With every desire to ad
dress you as from the long friendship that lias
existed between us you had a right to expect,
I was unable to express myself as I wished,
for at each attempt at more a dispassionate
manner, I became yet more warm at the idea
of having so mistaken your character. Nor
will you be surprised at this, when informed
of the manner in which it was produced. In
the first piace, I was never satisfied wilhyour
report of the affair of Sandusky. You eulo
gized individual gallantry alone, without an
attempt at placing the facts before the Gov
ernment in the important light they merited—
thus doing an injury to myself and to others
concerned; however this neglect I found an
excuse for at the time; the exasperated slate
of public feeling, unjustly directed against
yourself, rendering it more proper, (or a time
at least, such lacl* should be withheld as
would tend the further to increase the repu
tation of the affair. Secondly. When I heard,
for more than two years, officers declare that
you were inimical to me, (at the same lime
giving instances in proof,) a book appeared
in Kentucky, highly corroborative of these
declarations, for in this book (on which it is
said you had passed your approbation whilst
yet in manuscript) a statement is given of the
affair of Sandusky, calculated most completely
to lesson its reputation in the opinion of the
public. Lastly. When in a degree exasper
ated at the false coloring given to the affair
of Sandusky in ihe book above referred to,
while revolving in my mind a conjecture of
the real slate of your feelings towards me, I
accidentally met with a stranger who recited
to me a conversation he had recently held
with you, that places the fact of your hostility
beyond a question. The conversation here
alluded to was expressed at length in my last
letter, and to it I might have added another
fact which had its place in the chain of con
nection that you presented to this stranger—
M‘A fee’s History; and I may say vouched for
its correctness, as it was given to him after
he had avowed his intention of writing an ac
count ol the war. I might here relate many
other facts of like importance in this chain of
singular coincidents; but I deem it will readily
appear from those I have already stated, that
I was slow to believe you capable of improper
feeling, and that the warmth of which you
complain was the consequence of unwilling
ness on my part to trouble you with a recital
of the various reports I had heard, until at
last they assumed so positive a character as
to impress me with almost an entire convic
tion of their truth.
I may offer these particulars in excuse for
the tone and language of my letter; but they
do not cause me the iess to regret having be
trayed such warmth. You had a right to ex
pect other treatment; and I do not hesitate to
say that I have wronged your friendship.
Your letter bears with it all the satisfaction
that you cou:d give, or that I can ask. You
have denied, in emphatic terms, the truth ol
the statements that li3ve been made to me,
and of course siand acquitted of every charge
of improper feelings towards me. The sub
ject, 1 hope, may stand at rest forever, at
least so far as relates to yourself. Should a
second edition of M A fee’s book be published,
I will offer to the publisher an impartial detail
of facts iu relation to the affair of Sandusky,
as a duty which I owe to those brave men
who are injured in the statement now before
tbe world; but, in whatever I may say, no.
personal allusions shall be made to yourself,
if they can be avoided. Although Ino long
er harbor a thought of your having ever will
fully injured us, of your having at any time
stated auv thing with a view to detract from
the merits of the defence of Sandusky, I am
very iar, at the same time, from placing, as I
used to do, the strongest reliance on the ac
tivity of your friendship for me. I once
thought you anxious to seek an occasion to
speak in praise ofipy services, I since find fay ‘
nitaj*e, and that ypyr Las gryie
so far as toeause you to pElsmun uritfef vouf I
‘eyes a work containing an iouorieet account!
of an affair on whieh my reputation as a sol- j
dier greatly depended, when it was fully in
vour power to have given the necessary cor I
rections- Feeling, as I do, that I have striven
| a great deal in your behalt, and aware that
i vow were conscious of my having at one time
rendered you a very signal service, lain sur
prised, perhaps mortified, that you should
have neglected the very favorable opportunity
that was offered to you of acknowledging
the obligation, by generously publishing to
the world a full account of every transaction
in relation to the defence of Sandusky. Such
a course would not have left me among tfce
number of those who have given proof of
mere personal courage, but would have rank
ed me on the roll ol those who have rendered
their country signal services, while it would
have exalted you as one superior to a-li selfish
considerations, more anxious to render justice
to others than to claim it for yourself. 1 have
been educated in the belief that candor was
a virtue; I therefore address you in its utmost
sincerity. Ido not wish to hurt your ieelings,
hut to show you what my own are. I har
bor not against you the most remote resent
ment. lam as willing now as I have ever
been to speak in your favor, nor will !■ ever
neglect an opportunity nf doing justice to your
military worth and services.
1 am, very respectfully, yours,
G. CROGHAN.
Gen. Harrison, Cincinnati.
JYeio Orleans May 21, 1826. |
Sir—l unwillinglingly renew our rorres- j
pondence, which 1 had‘thought had finally j
closed with my letter of the 18th Aug’t, 1818, |
and that I do so will, be received as an evi- j
deuce that my leelings towards you are at !
least hoi hostile. You will call to mind the
particulars of our recent correspondence at
Washington City, and cannot therefore be
surprised at my entering, without circumlocu
tion, upon the subjeci which then occupied
us. Strict justice has never been done to the
brave men who served with me at Lower
Sandusky, and I require it for them at your
hands. It would be needless for me to point
out in what particular they have suffered; to
you, at least, it should be enough to be re
ferred to M‘Afee’s History of the War in the
W est, and your own biography, recently pub
lished in Cincinnatti. What is said in either
of these books, calculated to place the trans
action at Lower Sandusky in a higher point
of view before the world than is claimed for
the most insignificant affairs of that day?—
Your answer must be that of every other rea
der—nothing. I ask no more for myself,
General Harison, than I have a right to claim j
lor every soldier who served under me. But |
might I not ask lor more at your hands? If
you have one spark of grateful recollection,
von will answer, yes—more, much more.—
DiJ I not sacrifice myself to save you? Did
I not, at a moment when the excitement
against you throughout the whole State of
Ghio, amounting to general clamor, when
there was almost mutiny in vour very camp
at Seneca, do every thing that you and your
friends required of me as necessary to rein
state you in the good opinion of the people
and of the army? The success of our army
required thatyou, the general-in-chief, should
have the confidence of all; and to insure that,
I signed addresses, without reading them,
because I was told that it was necessary;
wrote letters approving throughout your con
duct, and subject to your corrections, without
asking what they might be, because I was
assured hv members of your family that you
yourself believed that on my expressions in
relation to you much depended. But of what
I did for you, enough—of what von have
done lor me there is nothing to he told.—
You have personally pledged yourself to cor
rect any false impressions that may been ,
created by the publication of the two works
above mentioned; in a word, to speak of all
things in relation to the transactions in San
dusky ss they deserve.
We are told in M'Afee’s History, ‘ Gener
al Hari ison, discovering from the fire of the
enemy, that he had nothing but light artille
ry, which could make no impression upon the
work, felt not a moment alarmed for tiie
safety of the garrison, well knowing that a
breach could not be affected, and that with
out effecting a breach every attempt ot es
Cnlade would be successfully repelled.” —
General Harrison, is this the fact?—
Did you not, during the whole of the bom
bardment of thirty-six hours, evince more
emotion than could have been induced by a
belief that the garrison was not endangered?
Did you not, in the extremity of your ap
prehensions, more than once cry out, ‘The
blood be on his own head I wash my hands
of it.’ And was there one man of all vour
camp at. Seneca (the gallant Wood excepted)
who believed that, without the most desper
ate resistance, the garrison could prevail a
gainst the attacks of the enemy? Answer
these queries, and fairly. I demand it ofyou
as a right. If the statement in M'Afee’s
book be correct, then where is the merit of
the defence of Sandusky? State candidly die
facts without eulogium on any of us; for each
one who served there would be judged by
his works. Tell to the world that, when you
fell back on Seneca, leaving, as a garrison tor
Sandusky, but one hundred and fifty men, the
works of the piace were measurably defence
less—that the pickets which connected the
block-houses were so loosely planted, that the
efforts of a single man could pull many of
them up —that there was nr* ditch about the
work, nor any outward defence to oppose to
an assailing force—that but lew entrenching
tools were left behind, and those unwillingly
—and to all this, that there was spared to us
scarce 40 rounds of musket cartridges per man
without a single prepared cartridge or one
ounce of powder for the only piece of artillery
in the place. Then state tiie appearance of
the defences, on vour coming down immedi
ately after the defeat and fight of the enemy.
The brave men who toiled there during ten
days and nights to put themselves in a pos
ture of defence, are as much entitled to cre
dit for it, as they are deserving of praise for
their gallantry after the coming of the enemy.
Having enlarged on these points as far as
may be due to the truth, I would then have
you speak of every other circumstance in re
lation to the affair of Sandusky (Loth anteri
or and subsequent) calculated to place it in its
proper light. 1 have been told it already oc
cupies its proper light—ihat every thing in
relation to it is well understood and duly ap
preciated. Can you join in any expressions
of this kind? Surely you cannot; for you
know too well what was done on ihat frontier,
and how much immediately around Sandusky
that has never come to light. If my services
have been duly appreciated, then truly have!
been resting too contentedly upon what I
have done; lor no public expression, convey
ing an assurance of the greatest sense in which
my services are held,has ever yet reached me.
You may say thai I received a sword from
the ladies of Chilicolhe, and that I was also
breveted by the President : for the first, I feel
as a soidier ought to feel for a gift which
he should prize as his life; as for the latter, I
regard it as a thing of no value, and n<t to he
considered, for brevets had been dealt out by
the dozen, and often times to those who had
never seen the enemy. My name was onre
before Congress ibr a vote of thanks, audit
was rejected as unworthy an expression of its
approbation. When f was thus so flatteringly
passed upon, was Congress, in your opinion,
informed of ail I had done in the Northwest?
You will say not. And when, at a very re- j
cent period, too, I was compelled by my ne
cessities to ask a place, and an important one, j
and found difficulties and vexations whenii
had expected every ?hinir the reverse, had i
not a ty believe that my claims to pro
4etence were considered but of the same rank
with those of every other applicant for office?
The world knows that there was a repulse of
die enemy at Lower Sandusky, but vvhati'ur
tH\r does it know calculated to enhance it
above the most trivial affairs of the war?—
, Does it know that i disobeyed your orders to
abandon the place, and that this disobedience
| saved \your army from a precipitate retreat,
land perhaps the whole frontier from the in
cursions df a savage foe? A council of your
‘ general and field officers decided upon the
I propriety of falling back upon Upper Sandus
kv; every arrangement was made for a pre
cipitate retreat, and the sigual of departure
| was to be given at the moment of my joining.
I I care not. Your order was d.'sobeved, and
iyou were thus saved from the ‘of a re
trograde step. The consequences of the re
pute of the enemy at Lower Sandusky were,
as you have known, more important than
can be conceived by those unacquainted with
the topography ot the section of country under
view, and the position of the opposing forces.
How you would have fared had I been cap
tured, you can best conjecture; at all events,
it did appear that, at the time, you believed
the enemy mote than a match for you. And
what would been the consequences of your
defeat. A smoking frontier of more than five
hundred miles in extent. What, saved the
boats and immense stores concentrated at
Cleveland under the direction of Major, now
General Jessup? What also prevented a
combined attack of land and naval forces
upon the fleet ol Commodore Perry, at
I i.rie, at a time when its destruction must
I have been certain? My disobedience of your
j orders—my subsequent defeat and repulse of
i the enemy at Sandusky. Gen. Proctor, on
• leaving Detroit in Juiy, 1813, had no other
‘object in view than the destruction of the
fleet of Commodore Perry at Erie, and of the
military stores and boats at Cieaveiand. He
blockaded Fort Meigs merely as cover to his
real intentions and to afford him an opportuni
ty of ascertaining what reinforements were
marching out, that he might be assured of
the safety of Detroit during his absence. Sa
tisOed of this, he leit Fort Meigs with a force
of at least 3,000 men (Irdians included) in
furtherance of the grand objects of the expe
dion. On reaching the point of crossing, at
the entrance ol Sandusky bar, his Indian force
refused to go further on the lake, without
first taking the scalps and plunder at Fort
Sandusky. Gen. Proctor, from his own writ
ten statement (now in your hands,) unwilling
ly indulged them. An attack was made—it
j sailed—and with heavy loss. The Indians
; deserted to a man, and thus an expedition, o
| riginaliy well planned, and fraught with dcad
i ly consequences to our cause, was completely
| deleated by a I’oice of 150 men, of whom no-
I thing was eqpecled, and for whom nothing
luriiier in praise has been offered than was
extracted from M‘Afee’s History of the War
in the West
Respectfully, G. CROGHAN.
Gen. W. H. Harrison,
Cincinnatti, Ohio.
New Orleans , Bth August, 1525.
Dear Sir—You will allow me to express
surprise that no answer has been returned
to my letter of the 241 h May last; not even an
acknowledgment of us receipt. That I wrote
you was at your own request. I had there
fore every reason to flatter myself with a be
lief that I should hear from you without loss
of time. I am tuliy decided upon having all
the facts in relation to the transactions at
Lo7,er Sandusky placed before the world;
and will, therefore, unless something satisfac
tory he shortly obtained from you, publish the
letters which have passed between us, that it
may be at once seen of what I complain, and
with how much caiwe. This is not offered
as a threat—far from it—but to show you
that I am in earnest, and that I may be forced
by you to have recourse to a most disagrees
hie altercation. Yours,
G. CROGHAN.
To Gen. )Vm. H. Harrison ,
Cincinnati , Ohio.
Nw Oi leans, Sept. 22, 1525.
Dear Sir —l ours of the 31st August was
received this morning. Let your expose of
the Sandusky affair be as it may, my letters
of the 24th May and sth ult. cannot be with
drawn; to do so, were to admit their state
ments are incorrect. Should the publica
tion of Dawson’s supplement be satisfactory,
1 will of course proceed no further in the
matte:; in truth, will be satisfied with much
loss than is asked lor in my letter of the 24ih
May; lor I care not that the world should
know how far 1 lent myself to serve the pub
lic, and to save you. My letter of the 24th
May was not written for the public eye, else
it had been differently worded; it was for
yourself alone, and intended to operate up
on your feelings of generosity, which, in re
lation to myself, had been dormant for twelve
years, greallv to my injury, and it ivas, there
fore, shat I placed helbre you, in tlie strong
est language of which I was capable, those
facts which seemed best calculated to operate
upon the feelings I was desirous of calling
into action. My letter of the Bth August,
which you have determined on construing in
to a threat of the most offensive character,
was written with no olher view than the one
expressed, to prove to you that I was in earn
est; for I had every reason to believe that
without an occasional Lint of the kind, you
might, in your forgetfulness, let slip a third
opportunity for rendering justice t those who
fought at Sanduskv.
Yours, G. CROGHAN.
To Gen. Wji. H. Harrison,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
Neu> Orleans, Dec. 20, 1825.
, Dear Sir—l did not immediately answer
1 your letter of the 24th October, because there
appears no call lor haste, and moreover I
have been, since its receipt, occasionally un
well, and occupied more than usually in the
business of my office. I willingly accede to
the proposition made by you for referring the
maiter between us to some of our mutual
friends, and will abide by their decision, pro
vided no condradiction be given by you to
the statements contained in the letters which
I shall offer in evidence. I thus reserve to
myself the right of a rejoinder, if it is neces
sary. A correct copy of our correspondence
will be immediately forwarded to General
Jesup, to be laid before the Board.
Respectfully yours,
G. CROGHAN.
To Gen. W. H. Harrison,
Washington City.
From the IVashir.gton City Gl be.
HARRISON AND CROGHAN.
The injustice and ingratitude of Habeuox toCno
ghan, is displayed by the following facts, which are
gathered from the statements of ihe letters
not contrauicted by the former, and ‘sirciimstances
which have bes-n gradually revealed by the officers who
were apprized oi the whole truth.
It appears that the officers, after the defeat of the
British and Indians by Ckoghapt, conscious that by
impairing ihe confidence of die country in the Gen
eral, (whom it was not supposed the Government
would cashier,) the ardent hope of being reinforced
by volunteers, arid enabled to invade Canada, might
be di--a|.>|iointed, agreed to cover over the transaction
for the time. The officers with Harrison were deep
ly interested in this course; for a council of general
and held officers hat concurred with Harrison in the
necessity of failing back on Upper Sandusky, leaving
to their fate ihe transports buiit at Cleveland byjE
srp, and all the immense stores and preparations to
invade Canada, concentrated there, to certain des
truction, as well as the naval preparations es Perry,
winch could not have been defended forun instant
against an attack by Proctor’s force at sra and
land. Crogjun, who had conquered the enemy
with an hundred and fifty men. (from whom Harri
son had determined to fly with 2,000, and abandon
every thing upon which tha projected campaign against
Canada depended,) consented, w ith a devoted patrio
tism, equalled only by his heroism tbata l that cor-
to d* him honor might he auppressed for the
time, lest it wicu'j dostroy ail’ ccuSdcnce :a the cr.
mander, and so d<4eatthe enterprise.
in compliance, then, with ihe necessity under which j
HaßrisoN’j panic had placed hire, every thing tfalcu- :
iated to show the importance of the exploit of Giro- •
ohan, and the vveukries of the conduct of the Gener- |
al in regard to it, v.as carefully concealed in hi 9 report i
and the certificate statement issued—and downright ;
misrepresentation was added in the former, where .
suppression was not sufficient to cover the most dis
graceful part of the General’s lailure.
The General suppresses in his report the following j
fact.-:
That he had declared that the fort “could not be
saved
Tnat he had orderej *'an immediate retreat at all
hazards.” “that the fort should be stripped of Us stores,
and promptly abantioned on the approach of the enemy:” j
‘1 nat lie had piled up his own provisions and equi- ,
page for conflagration, preparatory to a precipitate re- ,
treat, for which tie had obtained the sanction of (lie
general and tick! officers around him:
That the refusal of Croghan to obey his older had
-alone arrested the execution of the design:
That he sent f*r Croou an, and brought him to his j
camp, and restored him 10 the command only under j
such conditional and equivocal orders to n aimain iho .
post, as would r:d the (jenerai of ail responsibility for j
us failure:
That the squadron of horse which aeled as the es- |
cort in bringing Crogh.an from the General’s pre- j
sence.cut its way through ihe whole body of Indians, J
by whom the fort was invested, and thus ascertained
that in the open wood with which the place was sur
rounded, the cavalry could act with greatest effect, and j
.Mihout danger, drive the Indians before them, aim j
open the way to succor; the Indians did not, ana have j
never been able to, withstand an attack of cavalry on
ground where it can aci:
That notwithstanding the successful experiment of
the squadron of horse in driving the Indians in a few :
minutes’ skirmish, the Genera! - did nothing to support j
the gallant Crogh.an and his companions dura;.’ \u \
investment of two cays:
That w hile thus, duiing the continuance of the con
flict, declining to take the slimiest responsibility on
himself in the effort to support the fort, fie openly, in
the presence of ihose by whom he was surrounded,
attempted ,to throw, in advance, the responsibility of
the apprehended disaster upou Croghan, bv again
and again exclaiming, “the blood be upon his own head
—/ w ish my hands of it:”
That although the enemy’ remained seven or eight
hours after iheir defeat, Harrison who was witlnn J
an hour’s gallop of them, did not follow up the blow i
which spread panic through tiie rank3 of both British
and Indians, “butp.o use his own words in his report)
as soon as I was informed that the enemy were ritnat
mg, I set out with the dragoons to endeavor to overtake
them, leaving General AT Arthur and corps tofol
• low with all ihe infantry (about 7co) that could be spar
ed from the protection of the stores, [query, Ihe siores
piled up for burning?] and the sick at this plac*. I
found it impossible to come up with them!! ”
The result of this brilliant and heroic achievement
to the country, are also kept out of view. The cam
paign would have been ended on our side by the des
truction of the boats and stores at Cleveland, wi:h the
preparations of Perry; and the contemplated flight of
; Harrison would have left the whole frontier open to
the enemy. . The victory of Croghan not only aver
ted this, blit it preserved the means of carrying the vol
unteers under Governor Shelby and Johnson to the
opposite shores, and gave the latter the glory of van
; (pushing, with his single regiment, the Bri’rsh and Jn
, dtan force; taking six hundred British reg’ulats, and
marching them back to Harrison’s line—killing and
scattering the Indian host which were sheltered in the
swamp.
It was not to have been expected that Harrison
should have mentioned any circumstances tending to
his own shame. The ungrateful wrong complained
of by Croghan, consists in the deliberate preparation
of a false history to make it appear that he (Ramson)
had no reason, at the crisis of Croghan’s gallant con
flict, to apprehend the fall of the ford; that therefore lie
had not a motive to make an exertion to support it
and that Croghan deserves no great credit for main
taining it. All this he accomplished by a very brief
conime ton vvhat is reduced to a very trivial affair, as
treated by him historically.
“General Harrison, discovering from the ffre of the
enemy that he had nothing but light artillery, which
could make no impression upon the work. Jilt not a mo
ment alarmed for the saf.ty of the garrison, well know
ing that a breach could not be effected, and that witheue
effecting a breach, every attempt at csculadt, could br
successfully rcpellid.” f
The injustice and ingratitude of this falsification o
history were deeply felt and resented bv Croghan. in
his first letter, and it is apparent from his*second letter
that Harrison admitted the wrong and agreed to re
pair it. The nobleness of Croglian’s nature shows it
self in the readiness with which he is soothed bv
promise of redress. But it was a false pro:>. ise; aiid,
having accomplished its purpose, in satisfying Croghan
wth “hope deferred ” Harrison, years afterwards re
newed the experiment of repeating the falsehood, m a
biography prepared under hi- own eye and dircc ion,
by Mr. Dawson. Tins called forth another and r.
fiercer demand for redress fiom Croghan, from which
Harrison—it is apparent from the Lee of Crogi-an’s
replies to him—by new promises and concession*,
again delivered himself bv t*‘e artifice, of submiit.i.” to
the arbitration ot friends the mode in which the admit
ted wrong should he redressed. The arbitration never
took place, and the manner in which Harrison eluded
it is another example of the triumph of ft-!fish cunnit).<-
over a noble nature. Os this we shaiLsptak whenever
(if ever) Hariison allows his share of ihe correspond
ence to be exhibited to “thepublic <yc.”
The injustice and ingratitude of Harrison arc ap
parent in the details to which we have pointed. Jits
treachery lurks in ihe mode in which he has treated
- the call of i,is Wheeling committee. They have pub
lished (doubtless directiy or indirectly under Harri
son’s instruction) the letter published in 1613, and
shaped by Harrison himself to suit the purpose of
concealing the true state of facts, the very suspicion of
which had greatly impaired his standing with the
public. This letter Croghan asserts, in his late cor
respondence, was prepared for Harrison, and suffered
to undergo his corrections, without knowing what they
were, and the latter does not deny it. fie ; uve m
fact a carte blanche to Harrison to say wnat he plaas
ed in his, Croghan’s name, to save himself; and now
these misrepresentations of Harrison’s own pen are
brought up to sustain fabricated historical statements
to Croghan’s disadvantage, even after Harrison has
admitted, in writing, these statements to be erroneous,
and promised to correct them. Os the papers now
brought forward to vouch the historical misstatements,
Croghan thus speaks in his correspondence with Har
rison:
“Did I not literally sacrifice myself so save you?
Did I not, at a moment when the excitement against
you throughout the who!* State of Ohio, amounting to
tftnerai clamor, when there was almost mutiny m your
vary camp at Seneca, do every thing that you and
your friends required of me as necessary to reinstate
you in the good opinion of the people and of the army? j
The success of < u army required th t you, the grn
eral in-chief, should have the confidencc’of all: and to
insure that, I signed addresses, without reading thetr,
because 1 was told that it was necessary; wrote letters
approving throughout your conduct, and subject to
your corrections, without asking what they n.ijii be,
because I was assured bv members of your family that
you yourself believed that on my expressoins in rela
tion to you much depended. But of what I did for
you, enough—of what, you have done for me, there is
nothing to be told. You have personalty pledged
yourself to correct any false impressions that may
have been creaied hy the publication of the two works
above mentioned; in a word, to speak of all things in
relation to the transactions in Sandusky as they di
serve.”
Harrison wil 1 not say that one syllable of this is
controverted in his reply to Croghan; and vet his or
gan at Cincinnati brings up as true, the history he
admits to be false, and promises to correct—and 1 is
committee republish the disowned papers to prove, the
falsified history! This we consider treachery to the
friendship which sacrificed so much to save him. and
it casts a shadow back to tha scenes at Sandusky in
1813, that gives them the blackest complexion.
GEORGIA STATE bOTTEEY,
CLASS No. 35.
To be drawn on Saturday, September 5,1840.
Capitals, $40,000, sls 000, $5.<X 0. $3,000, $3,500,
82 297, and 50 of SI,OOO. 59 at gc.lo, Ac, Tickets
$lO, shares in proportion.
CLASS No. 35.
To be drawn on Saturday, September 12-
Capitals $’20,000, SIO,OOO. $5,000, SI,OOO. $2,050
a*d 100 of SI,OOO, 16 of SSOO, &e. Tickets $lO,
shares in proportion.
CLASS No. S7.
To he drawn on Saturday, September }3
Capitals $30.00 , $lO 000, $4,000, $3 000, S2XOO.
and 100 of $l,O 0, 50 of ssbo, Sec. Tickets $lO,
shares in proportion.
CLASS No. 33.
To bo drawn on Saturday. September 26,.
Capitals $40,000, $12X09, $8 009. $5/ 00. $3 000.
82 500 $2,000, and 20 of SI,IXO. 50 0 f SSOO, 50 cf
S4OO. &c. 1 ickets $lO, shares in proportion.
For tale either by the package or sin-le Ticket by
J. H. ANDREWS’, As*t
„ Ca'umbua, Georgia.
VV here all Orders for Tickets should be sent.
August 29 jg
JAMES ?J, MITCHELL,
attosnev at law.
THE firm of Bull Si Mitchell, having he.-n dis
solved by mutual agreement, owing” to the re
moval of Major J. L. Hull to Columbus Georgia. The
undersigned will continue to practice law in all the
counties of the Chattahoochee Circuit, and in Bar
hour county, Alabama. Office at Lumpkin Stewart
county. 1 ’ au
_ “ REFERENCES:
Columbus—Muj. J. L. Bull, Col. H. Holt Col
qnitt. Echols & Jeter. Fosier & Howard ’
Lumpkin—Messrs. McCuller & Perr
Florence—S. W. Btnneufc Cos. J *
August 1. 1840. o 4 4t
subscribers having connected thcrnselvesi
c *- , th ® Puttee of LAW, will attend all the
County Courts of the Chattahoochee Circuit, and the
adjoining counties of Alabama. Office in Mclntosh
Row, immediately over Allen & Young’s” Store.
T ~ ALFRED IVERSON,
June .4. !9;f J, M. GUERRY
SENTINEL & HERALD,
-CoCIIMBOS, AUGUST 20. 13-10.
11 Tail Institution is one of the mom deadly hash iff
existing against the principles and form of oi.: Consti
tution. l'he notion is, at this time, so strong and united
in its sentiments, that it cannot be shaken at this mo
ment. Hut suppose a series of untoward everts shm.td
occur, sufficient to bring into doubt the competency of a
Republican Government to meet a crisis oj great han
ger, or to unhinge the confidence of the people in the
public,,functionaries; an institution like this penetrating
by its branches every part of the union, acting by con -
maud and in phalanx, may in a critical moment, upset
the government. I derm no government safe, which is
under the vassalage of any self constituted authorities
or any other authority than that of the nation, or its reg
ular functionaries. hat an obstruction could wt this
Rank of the United States, with all its branch bantu
be in time of wav ? It might dictate In us the peace we
\ should accept, or withdraw its aid. Ought we then to
\ give further growth to an institution so powerful, to
hostile ? —Thomas Jefferson.
i DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN TICKET.
FOE PRESIDENT,
MARTIN VAN BUREN.
FOR VICE-PRESIDENT,
JOHN FOttSYTH.
FOR ELECTORS OF PRE SIDE XT AND
VICE-PRESIDENT.
WILLIAM B. BULLOCH, cf Chatham.
JOHN BATF,S, of Mmrav.
Mil.NT’.lt ECHOLS, es Walton.
bAMLT.I. BE A LL. of Wilkinson.
WILLIAM I;. WOFFORD, of Habersham.
JOHN ROBINSON, of Jasoer.
SAMUEL GROVES, of Mad-on.
THOMAS WGOTTEN, of Whites
SEABORN JONES, of Mm.cc.cee
EDWARD HARDEN, of Cla.k.
JAMaS ANDERSON, of Burke,
FOR CONGRESS.
ROBERT W. POOLER,
D. C. CAMPBELL,
A. IVERSON,
JUNIUS RILI.YKR.
JOSIAH S. PAT TERSON,
JOHN 11. LUMPKIN,
E. J. BLACK,
| WALTER T. COLQUITT,
I M. A. COOPER.
1
j ‘
The Democratic Republican par
tv of Muscogee have organized the
j column to bear up and maintain the
j principles es Jefferson, a strict con
struction of the federal constitution,
ino monopolies, equal rights anil
equal burthens, and have placet! at
the head of the column, to repre
sent the county in the Senate,
Col. ALEX. M‘BOUGALD.
For Representatives.
| TIIOS. LIVINGSTON, Esq.
Til OS. W. V/ ATS ON, Esq.
Col. JOHN L. LEWIS,
HENRY L. HENNING, Esn.
The Democrtic party of Stewart
have placed at the head off their
ticket mat ‘.veil tried soldier, and
faithful Representative, for the Sen
ate,
Capt. GREEN IL HALL.
House of Representatives.
TUGS. J. ST ELL,
TOMLINSON FORT.
garland statu am, E S q*.
Messrs. HALL, IU SE A CO.
have opened their new lit ith Fire
proof Wan house, and are ready for
ihe reception of produce. The se
curity that will he afforded to the
planter, the merchant, and ni! that
may confide to then, their business is
a great inducement in tin ir favor.
We can safely say, that property
wii! he as secure with them as in
any building in the United States.
As to the proprietors, we have tho
pleasure of a persona! acquaintance
with each oi them, and cart recom
mend them as in every way qualifi
ed to serve the public.
Harrison and Croghan. —ln to
day’s sheet will ho found the letters
of the latter in reference to the in
justice done him by the former with
regard to the glorious defence of
Lower Sandusky when invested by
tlie Indian and English army under
Proctor. The commentaries of the
Globe are appended. We have
nothing to add, except that Harri
son’s military talents and candor
and justice arc on a par with the
principles and truth and patriotism
of the federal whig presses and fed
eral whig leaders. Community of
feelings gives birth to friendship,
and confers durability on it.
To the communication of Colonel
John L. Lewis, in today’s paper, we
invite the attention of our readers-,
not as an. elaborate production or
effort at elocution, but specimen of
the manner in which a powerful
mind, aided by truth, grasps its
J subject, anti dissects it to the hone.
! YYc are at a loss to decide which
j merit the greater measure of abhor
! tence the political sextons at Macon*
I who buried the Constitution six feet
! under ground, and, as if that act
j were not sufficiently indicative of
I their enmity, capped the stake,
i which they call a liberty-pole, with
ia a empty cider-barrel, by way of
{derision, or the degraded and heart-
I less and prostituted apologists who,
j without blushing, pretepd to. cou
j vert the desecration of the great
charter of cur freedom into u rilo
lot patriotism and veneration. Cir
cumstances indicate approximation
to a crisis, that wo implore the
Great Author of Light and Life to
forefeud.
The Enquirer men have promised
to give Colonel Lewis a hearing, ii
he respond* and to their caii in relation
to tlie inhumation of tho constitution
at Macon. Ho has complied; and
jit is now to be proven whether they
(dare, even in a solitary ins 1 a nee,
fulfil their promise, and so redeem
their word in a case that inay be
politically adverse to their guar
dians wishes. A tew days will de
termine.
TITE ENQUIRER AND COL. BONNER.
The Columbus Enqusrei ha- c.on
-1 descended to notice us once more