Newspaper Page Text
.LVe SPEECH.
irate Slates, March 18, 1
B<te.
.ian of the Committee on
ned the correspondence
n and General Johnaton,
,hat it be printed,
returned the report of Gen.
-I return the Report of Gen
jmmeodation from the Com
itary Affairs that it be printed.
,ted by the committee to aay that
l .inundation \%>uld not have been
. the House not already ordered it to
.iahed. No action of the benate can
*eep the Report from the public, howev
desirable it might be. Indeed, having been
tent to both Houses in open session by the
President without any warning as to “its ten
dency to induce controversy” or cause “pro
jndice to the publio service,” as in the case of
Gen. Johnston’s Report, the damage was
already done—it damage should re
sult from its contents being made known.
The official report of the Secretary of War at
* .• jMjgiuning of this Congress contains an at
rack upon General Johnston, it was sent to us
by the President in open session, and pulished
by order ot Congress. Gen. Johnston’s Report,
which contained bis defence against this at
'ack, was asked tor promptly, but was with
eld tor months. It was finally sent to us in
cret session, with a protest against the publi
ion A report of the operations of the Army
Tennessee while under the command oi Gen.
and, is asked for, and we receive this paper
*en session as soon as it can be copied.
ord of wartiiug as to its character is giv
•
' of it is but a repetition of the charges
the late Secretary of War, and, if
re sustained, it is manifest that our
vsteis are not to be attributed to
wton’s removal, but to his ever
Appointed. It follows, too, that
be continued in his present
becomes necessary, therefore,
to the correctness of thesq
enate did not ask for a review
ston’s campaign, but for a
jrations of the army while un
id of Gen. Hood. Though un
belore us and the people, and
re it a fair and calm considera-
te review I shall refer to .the
Returns” on lile in the Adju
ctor Generai’s office, made and
Mason, A. A. G., and approved
ruston, anil not to those with the
and “corrected,” which I have
Ihe field returns on lile hero are,
duplCdtes of those with the ar
.re made up from the returns of
joffiiuauds. Not having the honor
onal acquaintance with Col. Falconer,
know what reliance is to be placed
corrections of ollieial documents. I do
w Col Mason and General Johnston, and I
.0 not beiieve either capable of making a
false or fraudulent return.
General Hood in his review, gives tho ef
fective total of General Johnston’s army ‘‘at
and near Dalton,” to be 70,000, on the lith ot
May, 1884. lheso returns appear to have been
made tri-monthly, on the Ist. 10th and 20th
of each month. The last official “tid'd return,”
previously to the Gib May, on file in .. the Ad
lutaut and Inspector General’s office, is of the
at of May. it shows his effective total to be
40,913 in'antry and artillery and 2,974 cavalry
amounting in all to 43,887. This return shows
however, that two brigades of ca\ airy, under
the command of Gimerai Johnston, were in
the rear recruiting their horses, the effective
total of which is not given. General Johnston,,
in bis report, estimates his cavalry at this time
at ”&bout4,ooo,’’ which would make the effect
ive total of these biigades 1,02 G, which added
to the 2,974 “at” Dalton, makes the 4,000.
Estimating his cavaliy at 4,000 it is obvious
that from the official returns he had hut 44-
sl3 effeative 1 total “at and near” Dalton on
the Ist May, the date of the last return before
the 7th of that month. The official reoords
show, then, that General Hood over esiimated
General Johuston’e foices at and near Dalton’
by 26,087 men.
If General Hood by the term ‘‘at or near
Stlton,” refers to tho forces after this date
ceived by General Johnston from General
Polk, he is again in error as to numbers. It
was not till the 4th of May that General Polk
was ordered to “move with Loring’s division
and other available force at your command, to
Rome, Georgia, and thence unite with General
Johnston.” On the Gth, the day on which
General Hood says this army ‘‘lay at and near
Dalton, waiting tho advance of the enemy,”
General Polk telegraphs to General Cooper
from Demopolis : “My troops are concentrat
ing and moving as directed.” On the 10th at
Rome, he telegraphs the President : “i he
first of Lorlug’s brigade unived and sent for
ward to Resaca ; the second just iu 5 the third
will arrive early to morrow morniug a 0
o French’s brigade was to leave lllue Moun
tain this morning. The others will follow in
succession ; Ferguson will be in supporting
distance day alter to-morrow ; Jackson's divi
sion in thirty-Bix hours alter. Vet General
Hood asserts that four- days before this, the
Army was ‘assembled’ at and near Dalton, and
’•Within the easy direction ot a single com
niander.” The last of these reinforcements
joined General Johnston at New Hope Church
the 20th May, neatly three weeks after they
were alleged to be ‘‘at aud near Dalton,” and
amounted to less than 19?600 men. If none
was lost by sickness, desertion, cr the casu
alties ot battle, which is not probably, Gen
eral Johnston had at New Hope about- sixty
four thousand men on the 2Gth May, iustead
of seventy thousand, at Da-ton, on the Gth.—
A difference of six thousand, is not very great
It is admitted, yet it shows General Hood to
be not quite accurate iu hi 6 estimates.
General Hood .asserts that General Johnston
lost twenty-two thousand seven hundred men
In his retreat, and offers to prove that by the
record. At New Hope he had about sixty
four thousand men. The field returns of the
19th July, the last made while tho army were
under his commaud, shows, at Atlanta : 40,-
$&6 infantry and artillery, aud 10,270 cavalry
—6o,s£2 —say 51,000. Deduct tins from 64,-
000, and it leaves 13,000 loss in artillery, in
fantry and cavalry, insfead ot 22,700. as al
leged by General Hood. General J.illusion
does not give the losses of his cavaliy ioi
want of reports. He had 4,000 at Dalton aud
received 4,000 (Polk’s) at Aduirsvilio, on the
17th May—B,ooo. At Atlanta he had 10,276,
showing that ho had recruited his cavalry
£ 276 over and above his losses. Leaving out
his udvalry, ho had at Atlanta, ltbk July,
40,666 infantry aud artillery. At New Hope
he had of ali arms*64,ooo. Ot .ihet>e, S.OOO
were cavalry, supposing it not to have in
creased recruiting up to that time. That
gives him 56,00 intantry and ifrtfllery. At
Atlanta he had, of these arms, 40,656, which
deduct from ths 56,000 and it shows his losses
to be, in infantry and artillery. 15,344.
Under repeated orders from tin War De
partment General Johnston had before tails
time sent off three regiments. Supposing them
to average two hundred effective total, they
would amount to six hundred each; deduct
th-t, amount from the 10,344 aud it leaves but
14,744 total loss iu killed, wounded, deserters,
straggler and prisoners e‘ his infantry and
arUtUry. From this amount deduct 10,000
Allied and wouuded, aud we have 4.744 lost
from all ether causes in these arms. But it
appears ffiat the cavalry had increased 2,276.
Deductthis from the 4,744. aad his .osses in
kllk ' d and wounded,
amount to but 2,468.
We have then a loss by desertion and strag
gling and prisoners of only some 2.500 from
the ‘digging and retreating' p ulicy . Tue ffi?
xnorahzation ot the army could not have been
as great as General Hood supposes or it
losses from these causes would have been
greater. The “working by night and travei
lliut by day’ would seem, too, Uot lo . •
very bad policy where the army has confidence
In its leader.
General Hood asserts that a retreating armv
most lose more by straggling and desertion if
it does not fight, than ii would in killed and
wounded it it does. He attempts to show this
by what he regards well established principles
and not by figures. Napier differs train Gen!
Hood on tnis joint. In discussing the .losses
of Massens from the Terries Vedras, he says :
“It is unquestionable that a retreating aimy
• should fight as little as possible. ”
General Hood also insets that the army at
Atlanta was greatly demoralized by the loss of
ot men and officers, and by constant falliu
back. Ido not recollect any general officer, |
except Gen. Polk, who was killed whilst John
ston was in command; there may have been
others, but certainly not many. What were
this losses in general officers from Atlanta to
Nashville? His march’from Jonesboro’ to the
Tennessee line was a retreat, and from Nash -
ville to Tupelo ; yet he lost by desertion but
300, and left the army in fine spirits. The de
moralization of Johnston's army cannot l>e ac
counted for on tliia theory. Bat was it de
moralized? It fought well when he first wrok
command. His disasters around Atlanta are
not attributed by him to a want of spirit in
the meu, but to incompetency in the officers.
He could not have his orders executed. I in
cline to the opinion that he is mistaken as
much as to his facts as he is in his theory.
Gen. Hood insinuates that Gen. Johnston
attempts to dodge an acknowledgment of
hie losses by “excluding the idea of prisoners,
and charges that his official returns show more
than 7,OUU under the head of ‘absent without
leave.' This is a very grave charge against an
officer and a gentleman. Gen. Hood should
kuow that the usual, if not only, mode of sta
ting the loss of prisoners, is a marginal note
opposite the column of ‘absent without leave.
It can never be other than an approximate esti
mate ; for no General;can know how many of
his ‘absent without leave,’ after a battle, have
gone voluntarily to the enemy, and how many
have been captured, Gen. Hood should know
also that the absent and prisoners of an army
are continually on its rolls from time to time,
as the ‘Field Returns’ are made out, without
reference to a change of commanders, aud that
it is very possible, therefore, that a part, or
dVen the whole, of the 7,000 prisoners may have
been lost when the army was under the com
mand of Gen. Bragg. The route at Mission
ary Bridge had occurred before General John
ston took command. This is a matter, how
ever, which especially concerns General Hood.
The field return of the 10th of July shows a
loss of not quite 7,000 prisoners (6,994.) - Op
po3ite Gen Hood’s corps is this note : 238 01-
ficers and 4,507 men, prisoners of war, are re
ported among the ‘absent without leave’”—
This shows that, out of not quite 7,000 prison
ers of war nearly 5,000 (4,835) were captured
lrom his corps. He knows whether they were
lost by him under Johnston, or by someone
else under Bragg. For the accuracy of the
statement, he, and nbt Johnston, is responsi
ble. The return of the army is only aco"solid.v
tion of the returns of the corps commanders.
But if there were 7,000 prisoners taken du
ring the retreat from Dalton, hew does he ac
count for the fact shown by the official returns
that General Johnston had, at Atlanta, on the
10th July, leaving out his killed and wounded,
within 2,501 J meu of the number put uuder his
command previously ? How cau ibis excess ot
loss in prisoners over his total loss (except, in
killed and wounded) je explained? Upon no
other hypothesis than that ids army increased
by recruiting more rapidly than it decreased
by straggling and loss of prisoners The
morale ot the army then, could not have been
very bad —at least not as bad as it is supposed
by Gen. Hood to ha/e been. Nor could the
people of the territory which Gen. Johnston
was abandoning, have lost all confidence iu
him. It must have been from them that his
recruits were gathered.
It i3 alleged that at Dalton ‘the enemy was
but iitt.e superior in numbers, none in organi
zation and discipline, and inferior in spirit and
confidence.’ The army which is described as
‘inferior in spirit and confidence’ to Johnston’s
was the one which had lately routed it at Mis
sionary Ridge, under Bragg. An'army flushed
with victory is not usually wanting in ‘spirit
and confidence.’ Did the presence of John
ston cause them to doubt their future success ?
What infused ‘spirit and confidence’ in the
army of Tennessee ? Was it the consciousness
that it, at last, had a commander who, careless
of his own blood, was careful of that of his
men, who knew when to take them under fire
aud how to bring them out, and whose thor
ough soldiership would save them from ever
being uselessly slaughtered by being led to
battle, except when some good purpose was to
be accomplished or some brilliant victory
achieved ? If the ‘discipline and organization’
of the army were as perfect as described, who
produced it ? For four months it had been
uuder the control of Johnston. What evi
dence has Gen. Hood to sustain his asser
tion that at Dalton the enemy was but little
superior to us iu numbers ? He relies upon
Sherman’s statement that he was as strong at
Atlanta as when the campaign opened. His
army at Missionary Ridge was estimated at
80,000. He was afterwards reinforced by the
army from Knoxville and the troops from
North Alabama, besides others. Our scoilts
reported that he had been reinforced with at
least 30,000 men. General Sherman told Gen
erat.Govan, or said in his presence, that he
commenced the campaign with 110 000. 1 ha/e
never heard it estimated at less than 90,000 in
fautry and artillery. In July, General Wneel
.er estimated it at between 65 and 70,000. —
The Northern papers about that time, admitted
his losses to bo 45,000. His cavalry was esii
mated by General Wheeler at not less than
15,000. Johnston, in the meantime, under or
ders of the War department, sent off two brig
ades and received one.
Gen. Hood charges that Gen. Johnston did
not intend to hold Atlanta. As evidence o*f
this, he says that no officer or soldier believed
it, and that Gen. Johuston had thrown up no
entrenchments in front of his lines opposite
Peachtree Creek. If Gen. Johnston intended
as he says he did, to strike the head of bhor
man's columns, as soon as they appeared across
Peachtree Creek, and before they were en
trenched, or had time even to deploy into line
of battle, what use had he for fiehl works ?
They would have been in his way if erected ;
and his men would have been uselessly fa
tigued in constructing them. Not having been
present I cannot speak of the opinion of the
army. But, admitting the'fact, I submit that
the opinion of the army is not ahvays evidenoe
of the intentions of the general. Is it not pos
oible, too, that General Hood may have mistak
en his own opinion tor that of the army. The
evidence that Gen. Johnston did intend to hold
the place is given in his report. In addition,
it may be added that he held New Hope for a
fortnight, and only left because the enemy left
their entrenchments confronting it—moving to
the railroad and to the rear. He then held a
position in front of Kenmsaw for a month and
left that, at last because, by extending his en
trenchments, Shcrmau had got nearer to At
lanta by several miles than we were. In all
the fightiDg we had been successful, and that
in positions frequently prepared tor defence in
a few hours, la it probable, then that Gen
Joliustou would not have attempted to hold a
place fortified already to his hand under the
direction of the Engineer Bureau, and previ
ously inspected by Major General Gilfrier, the
chietengineer of our army? Why had he
been strengthening it from the sth July, with
all the labor he could command, if he did not
intend to defend it. in the event of his failing
to crush the enemy at Peactitree Creek ? Wkj
was be strengthening it at the very moment
of his removal f If the position was as weak as
described by Gen. Hood why aid Sherman not
attempt to carry it by assault ?
The place in my judgment, could have been
taken neither by assault or investment. What
are the facts ? Gen Sherman first seized the
Augusta road and held it for six weeks to no
purpose. To seize the Macon road he had to
let go that to Augusta, which could have
supplied our army. In making that movement
he exposed his flank to attack, which blunder
was not taken advantage of. H.j movement
was concealed by a curtain of cavalry, and was
probably not known to Gen Hood in time A
large portion of his cavalry under Wheeler
was in Sherman's rear, operating on his Hue
of communications. Toavofdauy such contre
temps. Gen Johnston kept his cavalry in hand
to watch the movement of the enemy and
avoid being out flanked- But Ido not propose
to discuss Gen Hood's campaign, which he
says, was without fault. My purpose is simply
to correct errorsinto which iu my judgment,
he has fallen as to Getj Johnston’s, and to do
this Gen Hood has rendered it necesssary to
consider somewhat the operations around
Atlanta. If he did, as he supposes, reaily
commit no blunder, he is probably the only
general, living or dead—who can claim such
good fortune. Napier says, ‘‘The greatest mas
ters of the art may err ; he who wars walks in a
mist, through which the keeuest ayes cannot
always discern the right path.” Turenue
exclaims, ”Speak to me of a general who has
made no mistakes ia war and you speak of one
who has seldom made war.”
Gen Hood charges as, a fault th» Genyal
.1 > mdoned territory which he ought
to a_!-iid-d. Similar objections were
made oy the King of Spain to Sonlt’d plan of
the campaign of faleve a, to whiob the Duke
of Dalmatia replied : ‘‘Under present circum
stances, we cannot avoid the sacrifice* of some
territory. 0 * This will not be distressing
as it may appear, because the moment we
have beaten and dispersed the enemy’s masses
we - hall reoover all onr ground” • • “I
conceive it impossible to finish this war by
det effluents It is large masses only, the
strong -nst that you can form, tjiat will suc
ceed ” *
Had all the scattered foices in Mississippi
ana Alabama been concentrated upon Sher
man’s rear when he was 140 miles in the inter
rior and his communications been throughly
cat,’ what to day would have been our condi
tion ? ‘‘All our ground recovered,” Sherman’s
army destroyed, and Johnston’s ready to raise
the seige of Richmond or cross the Ohio.
Again, it is alledged that the mountainous
country of Northern Georgia offered great ad
pantages which were abandoned. Napier says:
“Here it may be well to notice an error rela
tive to the strength of mountain defiles, com
mon enough even amengst men who, with Borne
experience, have taken a contracted view of
their profession From sucVpereona it is usual to
near of narrow passes in which the greatest
multitudes may be reaist“d. Now without
stopping to pro >e that local strength is nothing
if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we
may be certain that there are few poitions so
difficu t as to reader superior numbers of no
avail. Where one man can climb, another can,
and a good aud numerous infantry crowning
the acclivities on the right and left of a disput
ed pass will soon ffijlige the defenders to re
treat or to fight upron equ and terms If this
takes place at any point ot an extended trout
of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Moreua,
the dangerous consequences to tte whole of the
beate nurmy areobviojs Honoe such passes
should only be considered as fixed points around
which an army should operate freely in defence
of more expanded positions, for defiles are
doors, ion ko>s of which are tho summits of
ihe hiiis around them. A bridge is a defile,
yet tro>ps arc postednot in tho middle, but be
bind bridges to defend the passage.”
Peachtree Cie< k offered every advantage
which and ‘op rivers and mountain passes could
afford It was impassible for iny army, ex
cept at a few p liuts. Johuston expected to
fail upon the heads of the enemy's columns as
ibey issued from these crossings and ciuoh
them before they could form From General
floo i’s report of bis own operations Jt seems
they were allowed time not only to form, but
entrench before they were attacked.
What is called General Johnst >n’s djfenslve
policy is severely crittsiaed. Fewer men are
lost by fighling than by retreating, &o. Ges
eral Hood does not seem to consider sufficient
ly the worth of an army, nor the consequences
which fyilow the destruction of one Napo
leon said hat the very first duty which a Ura
eral o«ed to his country was to preserve his
army. Af er the battles of Ocana and Albade
Torrnas. Iu # which Ariezaga 10-)t his army,
iio was defended upon the ground that the
campaign was undertaken by the direction of
his government. Napier repudiates! such de
fence lie says : Ariezaga obeyed the or
dors of is government! No General is bound
to obey ordon; (at least without remonstrance)
which involves the safety of his army; so Ihat
he should saeritteo everything but victoiy, and
many great commanders have sacrificed oven
victory rather ih m appear to undervalue this
vital piincipie o*oo
“Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co
operate in Mbs shop, and violent campaign. He
remained a quiet Spectator of events at the
most i-.ifioai period of ! .he war; and yet, on
paper, the Spanish project promised well.”
* * “ this man, so cautious, so conscious
of the enemy’s supeuority, was laying the
foundation/}! measures that finally carried him
triumphant 1 hrough the Peninsula war. False
(hen are t- ,e opinions of those who, asserting
that Napoieon might, have been driven over
the Ebro iu 1808 9, blame Sir John Meore’s
conduct. Such reasons would as certainly have
charged the rui lof pain on Sir Arthur Wel
lesley, if, at this period, the chances of war
bad sent him to his grave. But in all times
the wise aud brave man’s toil has been the
sport of fools !”
The complaint against General Johnston can
not be thatrhe wr uld not fight, for he fought
almost everyday, killing and wounding 45,-
000 of the enemy, and- losing 10,000 himself.
It is that he did not stake the cause of his
country toi a single cast of the dice. That he
would not risk all on the issue of a single bat
tle When urged by the Portuguese Regency
to a like course in 1810, Lord Wellington re
plied : “I have little doubt of final success,
but I have fought a sufficient number of bat
tles to know that the result of any is not cer
tain. even with the best arrangements.” He
persisted in his defensive policy aud saved
Portugal from subjugation When he had de
termined to abandon Spain and retreat through
Portugal to Lisbon, he was urged to relieve the
garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, containing 5,000
men. Napier says, “This was a trying mo
ment. He had in a manner pledged himself,
his army was close at hand, the garrison brave
and distressed, aud the governor honorably
fulfilled h's part. To permit such a place to
fall without a stroke would boa grievous dis
aster and a more grievous dishonor to the
British arms ; the troops desired the enter
prise ; the h[laniards demanded it as a proof
of g I faith; the Portuguese, to keep the
war away from t.ieir own country; finally,
policy seemed t > call for this effort; lest the
world might deem the promised defence of
Portugal a heartless and hollov T boast. Lord
Wellington refused to venture even a brigade,
and thus proved himself a great, commander,
and of a steadfast mind. It was not a single
campaign but a terrible war that be had un
dertaken “What would even
a momentary success have availed? Five
thousand meu brought • ff from Cindad Rodri
go would have ill supplied the ten or twelve
ilioui.ind troops lost in the battle, and the
temporary relief of the fortress would have
been a poor compensation ior the loss of Por
tugal. * * *
“Massens, sagacious and well understanding
his business. only desired that the attempt
should ee made He hold back his troops,
appeared careless, and, in his preclmnatious,
taunted the Euglish General that he was
afraid ; that the sails were Happing on the
ships prepared to carry him away, that he was
a man, who, insensible to military honor, per
mitted his ally s towns to fall without risking
a shot to save them or to redeem his plighted
word But all this subtlety failed. Lord Wel
lington was unmoved aud abided his own time.
“It thou area great general, Marius, oome
down anti fight ! If thou art u great general,
Silo, make me oome down and fight ”
Gen. McCook, U SA, told several of our
officers, made prisoners by him, but rescued
by Wheeler, that Sherman said, on hearing
he change of commanders 01 our army; that
heretofore the tignting had been as Johnston
j. leased, but that hmeafterfft would be as ho
pleased. 1 mention this not iu disparage
m. ut ot Geneiui Hood. The removal of John
was an order to Gen. Hood to adopt the
i.liom-ive poiicy aud deliver battle whenever
the enemy appeared It is to be regretted
that Gen Hood has permitted himself to be
come the advocate of that policy for whioh he
was in no way responsible.
History is always repeating itself. . The
Portuguese Government in 1810 became ‘‘im
paiient’’ of Wellington’s delays. Fortunately
for the country over which they ruled, he was
not under their control. In a din patch of 7th
September, he 6ays : “It appears that the gov
ernment have lately discovered that we are all
wrong, that they have become impatient for
the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of
the central junta, called out for a battle and
early success. It I had had thejrower I would
havs prevented the Spanish armies from at
tending to that call,” (alluding to Ariasaga's
campaign ;) “and if I had, the cause would
now have been safe ; and having the power
now in my hands, I will not lose the only
chance which remains of saving the cause, by
paying the emaliesl attention to the sense
less suggestions of the Portuguese Govern
ment.- ’
It was in this campaing that Wellington es
tablished, beyond ail question, his reputation
hi a soldier, and that by declining battle he
destroyed the army of Massena and saved
Portugal. For s adopting a similar policy John
ston was removed from big command The
result shows the wisdom of the General and
the folly of the administration. He was cover
ed with disgrace, but aow wears the robe of
honor in which popular approve
him. He was superseded .by orde'
President, and be has been
mand bv Gen. Lee. The President v
seded him has himself been superset.
ths effort to destroy Johuston the Pi,
saved Sherman from destruction.
What good to the cause was expected to 1
suit from this attack ? Is it intended again to
remove him if the public mind cun be prepar
ed for such an event ? is it desired that the
soldieis under him shall have their iaiih in
him shaken 7 To avoid either of th.se re
suits I have felt It my duty to say what 1
have. I have txamiaed carefully the oor
respmdenc* between the ljvecative D*par'-
ment aad Gen Johnston during that eventful
campaign, seat to the Senate, and now ordered
to be published, and the “field returns,”
which show the j-trength of the army
From the evidence before me 1 think that
Gen. Hood has tailed to make out his case.—
Others must judge as to the correctness of my
conclusions.
As to Gen Hood’s defence of himself against
Gen. Johnston’s supposed strictures on him, I
have nothing to say. He could have embodi
ed it, I think, with propriety, In his report, if
he preferred to do so, though it would have
possibly been more regular and more in ac
cordance with the usage of the service had be
sent it as a supplement to his original Report,
through his superior 1 fficer. Gen. Johuston
could 1 hen have made the correction, if in er
ror ; if not, he- would have been afforded the
opportunity of making such comments as he
might think prdper. . *
Tna Batils of Uoluubbs The Macon Tele
graph gives the annexed account of the battle
of Columbus :
We have authentic information of the battle
in front of Columbus on Saturday afternoon
and night, aud the capture of the city
At lour o’clock on that morning the Yankee
force, embracing six thousand mounted iufau
try aad cavalry, with two pieces »f light artil
lery, passed through Opelika, withaut scarcely
making a halt. Taking the Columbus road,
their advance reached onr picket line, about
two miles from the city, about two o'clock;
a few musket shots drove them back, when
they immediately advanced in force, but came
up very cautiously. Skiimishing with the ad
vanoed videttes and pickets commenced at
lour, and continued at,irregular intervals, until
night, when the battle opened luriouslv along
the whole line.
All accounts agree that the citizen soldiery of
Columbus, as well as tbe regulars troops,
• ought with a heioism worthy of the fame ot
veterans of this, or any other war. The eue
my advanced in heavy lines of battle upon
various points upon our works, and were met
with a witheiiug, deadly fire, whicty sent them
back. At last they, at 9 o’clock, concentrated
everything upon a weak point on our right,
and made a turioas charge, aud even that was
repulsed except a small squad of cavalry,
wh ch succeeded iu getting through the line.
The line was immediately repaired.
This squad of cavalry rode immediately to,
aud took possession of the remaining bridge
the other two having been previously burned.
Gen. Cobb win on the field command mg in per
son and nobly did his duty. This cavalry rode
in ten steps of his headquarters, and bad a con
versation with him, but the night being in
tensely dark, he failed to recognize them.
Wh m they gaiuod the bridge they quietly
took every cue piisoners who came up. At
last the General became concerned about the
return of several couriers whom he hud dis
patched to tbe city, ami who should have boeu
hack sometime before. He therefore sent a
member of his staff to the bridge, who was al
so taKeu aud disarmed, but ma le his escape
to this side aud gave the foregoing particu
lars.
What dispositions were made of our forces
after that aie not precisely known, but it is
supposed that they drew off both up and down
the river.
The enemy entered the town at half past
nine o’dock.
No trains belonging to any railroad ou this
side were captured. The Opelika road lost
five engiues aud several cars, in consequence
of tfaeir guage l eing narrow. We lost few
stores, as nearly everything of ooueequence
had been removed.
We lost very few men killed and wounded,
as they were well protected by breastworks
The enemy lost twenty times as many as we
did. Every man iu the city, able to bear
arms, was on the r' old and fought with the no
blest heroism Had the fight taken place in
daylight we would certainly have won a vic
tory.
The forces of the enemy numbered about
five thousand.
Northern Account or the Occupation of
Pbtsbsbukq.—A correspondent of the New
York Tribune, writing from Petersburg uuder
date of April 2, gives the annexed account,of
the occupation of that city :
The array of the Union has been iu and out
of Petersburg this morning, merely making a
flying visit. The rebels commenced evacuating
last night at 10 o’clock, and by 2 o’clock this
morning were across the river ; having burned
about a million worth of tobacco, the South
side railroad depot and the bridge across the
Appomattox. Our troops charged the inner
liue of works at daylight, capturing a picket
Due and several hundred men.
The troops on entering the city behaved most
admirably, not more than half of the stores
were entered by them, and these mostly con
tained tobacoo, cigars, liquors, etc. The Pro
vost guards soon arrived aud established order.
The Mayor of the city met the troops as they
entered, and handed to the officer commanding,
a communication, offering the surrender of the
city.
Protection was promised oe the part of the
troops, and the citizens had no cause of com
plaint, for certainly there is no instance on re -
cord, where our army after lying so long in
front of a p'ace of so much importance, and
losing so many men in the efforts to capture
it, entered actingly with less disorder, and do
ing leae harm to property than in this case.
The citizens did not Bhow themselves during
the first port of the day, and after discovering
that our men were orderly and well disposed,
with no disposition to disturb or annoy any
one, they began to make their appearance at
the doors and win lows of their houses ; and
later in the day many expressing their joy
quietly that the Confederate army had gone
aud hoping the tear would soon be over. For
more than a month the rebel troops have been
rec eiving less rations than ever before, only
just enough being brought to last from day to
day. Citizens say that they suffered much,
but it will do to take such stories with a good
deal of allowance.
The rebels managed to get away with ait
excepting one or two old coluiu
ffiad, and a few heavy mortars, which they
could not transport readily. A large numbor
of men deserted and hid in town till ou* troops
entered, when they made their appeasrance,.
and were t*keu into custody.
ihe city presents a clean and rcspoctaole
appearance. Many houses in the lower part
of tho town have been badly injured by shot
and shell thrown from our batteries last Bum
mer.
Macon aud B&dxswick Railroad. — W e have
had placed on our table the Bixlb Annual Re
port of the president and other officials of the
above named road for the fiscal year ending
February Ist, 1866, by which it appears that
the gross earnings of the road have been $269,-
624,44, and the expenses $216,048,88, leaving
as net profits $53,480,56. The capital stock of
the company $809,575. During the year
the company has bought and paid for 1,600
acres pine land at a cost of $40,000, on which
they have erected a steam saw-mill, at a cost of
something over SII,OOO ; and a lot for a depot
in Macon at a cost of $20,000
The great importance of this road to Macon
and through Macon to the State, is evidenoed
by the fact that though running as yet but a
short distance, it transported during the past
year 85,524 bushels corn, 11,000 bushels peas,
87,233 pofinds lard, 37,500 pounds wool, 300,-
000 pounds fodder, 34,739 bushels charcoal,
12,318 cords wood, and 1,162,000 feet of lum
ber, besides wheat, meal, oats, rye, potatoes,
etc., in considerable quantities. —Macon Tele
graph.
The first infantry which marched into Rich
mond was Gen. Wei tael’s command—compos
ed entirely of negroes.
of Rich.. - in" - . _ -1 mg
ami acros ..<*tox. to Hatcher's Run
about five Du,on S-‘Uth of Petersburg; making a
line of nor L-ss than forty miles in long*ti
the Northern portion. §r extreme left, some
what attenu ted; but the .-southern or right
wing, equal in strength to the centre. To de
fend this long line General Lee had about
68 000 effective men *
General Grant-’s original force tvas compu
ted to number 160.000 men ; to these were ad
ded between the 30th of March and the night
of assault, 20.000 ot Sheridan’s troops, and
35,000 of Sherman’s, making a reinforcement
of 65,000 and giving him a total of 215,000
men, or three times the number General Lee
had
From the rolling of the cars, the rattling of
wagon and artilleiy wheels, and the yells of
the enemy for several days preceding the
grand assault, it was appaieut the enemy con
templated a movemeut, in great strength,
against some portion of the line, and it was
quite satisfactorily surmised what portion it
would be, which was made as strong as the
available force would permit, without weaken
ing the other portions (o too great a degree.
At two o’clock on the morning of Saturday,
Ist of April, the enemy advanced to the assault
in seven lines of battle; the first line being
armed with axes, to cut awav the abattis aud
other obstructions of wood. The enemy is re
ported to have undoubtedly been usder the
influences ot Fquor, and perfectly insensible
to the carnage which ensued. As soon as they
were discovered our forces opened upon them;
and as an axman fell another wasVeadyTo take
his place. Exposed as they were, to a point
blank and enfilading five, the destruction of
bifewas indeed fearful This assault was final
ly repulsed, and the enemy retired to reform
and renew the assaults. Ou Saturday three
more assaults were made, all of which were re
pulsed with terrible slaughter. Hi-avy skir
skirmishing was kept up during the intervals in
tho diytime and throughout the night. There
was also during the night, some heavy artil
lery tiring.
About daylight on Sunday morning, the
2d, the enemy renewed the attack by another
assault, still maintaining, so far as our inform
ant could see or learn, the seven lines of
troops. All ot these were repulsed,, except
the last, with uuDrecedented slaughter -the
mass of men, sojdensely crowded enfiladed by
a brisk and heavy artillery as well as musket
ry fire. But at two o’clock, with fresh L oops
in ovei whelming numbers, after a struggle of
unprecedented obstinacy of thirty-six hours
duration, the enemy succeeded in carrying
our works, and breaking our lines, about one
mile in width, and about the same distance
east of Petersourg Gen. A P Hill command
ed our right, with Gen. Gordon’s corps rest
ing on his left. The whole brunt of this great
battle was borne by these two corps; the heav
iest part of the fighting being borne by Gen.
Hill's left, and Gon. Gordon’s right. General
Hill was killed, it is supposed after the breach
was made, General Mcßea and Lt Col. Pe
gram, the most accomplished artillerist in the
service, wore killed. One of our generals was
drowned iu an attempt to cross the Appomat
tox.
The loss of the enemy in this, the fiercest
and bloodiest of tho battles of the war, is esti
mated by General Leo at from 40.000. to 60 000
iu killed and wouuded, and ours at from 12,000
to 15,000. But few prisoners were captured-on
either side
As soon as the lines were broken, General
Lee sent word to Richmond that unless it was
restored by sunset bet should uncover $e
capital, aud that preparations for a complete
evacuation must begin As nearly all govern
ment stores had already been removed, in con
templation of an early evacuation, comparative
little government property was left; so not
much remained either to remove or destroy.
Our forces blew up the arsenal, sunk all the
gunboats and other craft in the river. The
large number ot prisoners which had been at
Richmond had fortuuately been exchanged.
Tho portion of the city from Seventh to Eigh
teenth streets, between Cary and Canal, was
burnt, and all the government tobacco was
destroyed.
President Davis aud his Oibiuet—excepting
_Gen. Breckinridge, who remained and went to
'the field the next morning—left Richmond at
eight o’clock on Sunday rii^ht; Gen. Lee
leisurely withdrew his troops <m Monday, the
enemy entering the city on Monday afternoon
at 3 o’clock
Although Gen. Lee withdrew hi forces from
the city aud North of it, he made no great
haste to draw off the remainder of his army
but rather reformed on his ri/ht, but some
what iu the rear of his original position. On
Monday afternoon, Gen. Fitzhugh Leo engag
ed and whipped the enemy near Petersburg,
but was wounded and fell into the hauds of the
enemy
THIS fcUUtISftDER OF MEN. JLBB'N AKMV
THE CORRESPONDENCE.
Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S.
Aimies :
I received your note on picket line this morn
iug, whither I had come to meet you, and as
certain definitely what terms were embraced
in your proposition of yesterday, with reference
to the surrender of this army. I now request
an interview in accordance with the order con
tained in your note of yesterday for that pur
pose . Very respectfully, your ob’t serv’t,
R. E Lee.
To Gen. R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate
StateßArmy :
Youi note of this day is this moment receiv
ed, 11.50 AM. I propose the following
terms : Rolls of all officers and men be made
in duplicate. One copy to be retained by an
officer designated by mo, the other retained by
one you may designate. Officers to give their
individual parole not to take up arms against
the United States until properly exchanged
Eaon Commader or Regimental Commander to
sigu for his men. AU arms, artillery, public
property to be stored or purk-.d, aDd turned
over to an officer designated. This will not
embrace side arms of officers and private horses
or baggage. This done, each man and officer
will bo allowed to return to their homes, not to
be disturbed by the United States authorities
so long as they observe their paroles and the
laws in force where they may reside.
Signed U. 8. Grant.
Hkadq’rs Army Nothern Virginia, i
Apiil 9, 1865. j
To Oeu (1 rant :
I have received your letter of this date, con
taining the terms of the surrender oi the Army
of Nortnern Virginia as proposed by you. As
they are the same as substantially propo; -d iu
your tetter of the 81b instant, they are accept
ed. I will proceed to designate the proper offi
ce! s to carry the stipulations into effect.
Respectfully, &c.,
R. E. Lee.
The Assailants of Gov. Bkown.— The Co
lumbus Sun, in noticing the unjust and malig
nant assaults upon Gov. Brown, made by the
administration leaders and press in this State
and elsewhere, remarks thus :
Why this attack upon Governor Brown ?
Does the record not show that Georgia, in men,
in money and in all the attributes of a great
■State, the.Empire State, has responded to ev
ery call with a zeal equal to any of her sisters,
while her soldiers stand to-day a living monu
ment of her greatness. Gov. Brown may have
erred in many particulars, iu the position he is
in it would be strange ifhehadnot. We
think he has, but, if so, it has been on the side
©f the right of the States and the people. This
war was inaugurated not to create a military
despetism,—not that the chains of a despot
should ma&acle the limbs of a free people, but
for liberty, independence and the rights of the
States. UnderetandiDg.thie, Gov. Brown has
defended those principles, and has never, under
the pe-a of military necessity, proven recreant
to the great trust reposed in him by the people
of his State. If he has committed blunders by
sticking too close to the great principles of civ
il liberty, he has erred on the side of right,
If this»is a war for freedom, do not let ua de
stroy .every vestige by-giving into the hands of
agents that power which will never be re
turned.
• hi m sra v \ v%Aii
, the Sava : a.iu U< pubiicauot the sth inst',
Qua tiie anuexed :
t
KVGL'I.ATISO NEGIiO MnKALS.
Alexander Curly (colored) vs. Beu Mallettc
(coiored).—Ttfe defendant was charged witlv
keeping a disorderly hous-' and living with iwo
WCmen, one supposed to be iris awful wile,
and tbe other not. The court ruled that the
superfluous female be immediately sent away
from the homo of Benjamin, aud that that in
dividual abstain troui Mormon custom iu ba
vaunah.
A TRIAL For TRKABOX.
The United States vs. John Ryan. This was
a charge brought against John Ryan f t trea
son. In, this, that he, the said Ryan, had sent
his negroes into the Confederacy and hired
’them <>ut to one Major Tilton, of Augusta, as
teamsters. Johu Washington, one ot the es
caped slaves, stated that he belonged to Mr.
Ryan, aud with six other colored persons
weie sent to Augusta previous to the arrival of
the Federal army iu Savannah. He and and not
go of his own accord, hut was sent off by Mr.
Ryan. He and the others left the city wu Sun
day, and the army arrived on Wednesday.—
Mr. Ryan did not-hire him out, but a Mr.
Daily, in the employment of Mr. R did.—
Witness rau away ou Sunday and came to this
city. None ot the colored people had been
sent away since the Federal army had arrived
in the city.
Upon cross examination, said he went out.
against bjs will Mr. R. said they must go.
Old George, another of the party, testified
that Mr. Ryan sent his daughter-in taw out of
the city with the negroes before the Federal
army arrived. Geoige testified that he had
been sick a' fortnight iu the country before
this event transpire^.
At this stage of the evidence, a person in
court asked the Judge to institute au inquiry
into the death ot a Aegro who had died iu Mi.
Ryim’s yard, but the Court took no notice of
the suggestion.
Toliver Carter, (colored,) said that Mr. Ryan
had sent for him on Monday, and said that Mr
D tily wauled a man to go to Augusta with him
to take care of his family. Mr Ryan request
ed Toliver to see Lilke Carson and make ar -
rangements to accompany th« patty . Witness
saw Carson, who said they would leave the city
at 10 o’clock ou Monday. Toliver remaikid that
he would not go, and remained in the. e ty un
til the Federal army arrived. He had never
spoken to Mr Ryuu or Mr. Carson upon the
subject since.
Stephen, (colored). I was a drayman Mr.
Ryan came to Jehu and Albert, and asked tho
boys if they wanted to go to Augusta, and they
all said yes. Mr. R. said —now boys, if you
don’t want to go, you can remain here, and
they all expressed a desire to go. Mr. R , said
whatever you inako you can retain, and if you
do not like it you cau return home, and l will
take care of you.
Effie, colored,) said it was left optional with
them to go or remain; that they could do as
they pleased. They were not compelled to go
by Mr. ltyan Mr Ryan’s man asked.witness to go
to Augusta,but told all icf remain on the place if
they thought proper Upon crots-exinnina
tion, she said Mr Ryan was a good master.
Here the evidence closed, and Mr Ryan ad
dressed the Court with much feeling. He as
sorted that he had never been a hi itant Beces
sionisl, but had conducted himself as a peace
able and urdevly citizen. He bad done no act
agalnstthe autnority of the United States,
Ilis character was well known In the city and
could be vouched for by some of the most res
pectable men in the community. The assei
tion that he had been a member of various
clubs, and had persecuted "Union men, was a
falsehood. Mr Ryan continued in this strain
for some time. At one period ot his remarks the
audience applauded, when the Judge ordered
one of his orderlies to arrest a man and hold him
in custody for disturbing the Court, after whi h
the Judge decided that the charge was so im
portant and of such a grave nature, that he
would send it up to the Military Commandant
for further investigation.
TRYING TO GET DAMAGES ON ACCOUN T OF PERSECU
TION FOR UNIONISM.
Wm. J. Hunt vs. John Ryan—This was an
actio.; brought upon a claim for amount t f
cost of fixtures paid out by plaintiff in fitting
out a barber simp on Bryan street Amount
claimed SI,BOO The testimony in the case ap
pears to be as follows: The plaintiff leased
the house for the purpose of using it as a bar
ber thop, upon which he expended the sum of
SI,BOO. Oa account of his Union sentiments
during tiie existence of Vigilance Committees
and Rattlesnake Clubs about Savannah, he was
induted through fear, molestation or some other
cause, to abandon his business and seek a home
elsewhere. Mr Isaac D. Laßoclie at one time
bargained the fixtures and lease to another
party, who, failing to pay for them, the con
tract was made null aud void and tiie proper
ty remained as it was iormeriy. Finally Mr.
Ryun got possession and holds the effects of
Hunt still in the same house, which is being
used for tho same purpose now.
Ryan sets up no claim to the effects of Hunt,
except that he (Hunt) owes defendant about
five months’ rent for use of the tenement, up
on the payment of which sum Ryan is witling
to give up all claim to the fixtures. The lease
of the house, which was for five years, expired
some time since, which neither Hunt nor his
agent, if he had any at the time, attempted to
renew. Tho court appointed a boiud of ap
praisers to determine the value of the fixtures
belonging to plaintiff, aud will render a deci
sion hereafter.
FilOM LOUISIANA.
The New Orleans Times of March 19, pub
lishes the following intelligence from lied
rivy:
A gentleman who has just arrived here from
Red river informs us of the existence of muJl
demoralization among the Confederate troops
stationed in the vicinity of Alexander The
number of deserters is large, and many deser
ters who have been caught have b- en shot af
ter trial by court martial. Buckner offered to
pardon aU who returned before the first of
February, but after that date they must suffer
(he penalty of death if caught.
Our informant represents that there are
eight or ten thousand Confederate troops in
lhe neighborhood of Alexander. There is a
garrison at Fort De Hussy, the works of wbic h
lottifications are undergoing repairs and
;ti engthening.
He says that the Confederate military offi
cers on the Re 1 river are deep in trade with
New Orleaus, ‘sending down cotton lor goods,
me third of which are clearly contraband of
war, and expiessly forbidden in the trade
reflations. They receive for their cotton
large quantities of whiskey, medical store.-,
and so many cotton cards that they have glut
ted the maiket.
A British subject, by the name of Lawellen,
sent two or thiee weeks ago, $5,000 worth of
supplies, de fined for the R. <i river. Being
contraband m'icles, they were seiz and at Mor
ganza ; but weie after*aids released by Older,
and taken to the house of the Confederate
Captain, Catlett, on the Bayou Forche, and
there peddled out to the men of Catlett’s com
mand, and others.
A steamer with a clearance from Shreveport
for New Orleans, having on board 600 bales
of cotton, was lately sent back from Morganza
This species of trade is not confined to Red
River. We are told that the steamer Ralph is
now at Washington on the Courtableau, load
ing with cotton for New Orleans. AtSimsport
there is a Confederate Custom which
collects toll on the staple as it goes out.
The Confederates have been making whole
sale seizures about Alexandria, and among
the victims was Montfort Wells, brother of
Gov. Wells, who was robbed of his whole crop
.of sugar amounting to 156 hogsheads.. The
Alexandria Democrat contained a communica
tion from Mr. Wells protesting against the
outrage and the manner in which the seizure
was made.
The property of J.- P. Benjamin and John
Slidell in New Orleans had been condemned in
the United States District Court, as forfeit to
the United States.
Lincoln has issued a proclamation ordering
that whereas hostile Indians, within the limits
of the United States, have been furnished with
armies and munitions of war by persons dwell
ing in foreign territory, all such shall be ar
rested and tried by court martial at the nearest
military post.
ki: ■ ■
The Baffin ’l4 -
auncxed uccoup . • . at G
Web urn iv . ffi..
DU Golinoot'o • v. . .. ian ,ii, ~, lt
dan aud Sc- ~u . 1, i
place The;} ... *
intoi: geut \<. ■/.' ~u. m ut dunk 1
they rave / =•• 100 tIUU As * . : i :I <-. tim Fed - J
'erais < rtered Gc •>. ■ Is were Btu out &
-end or it rm 1 / ~|C ; , , : p j 0 \Vrdue,-«i.it I
■
I
in the town, mil only one ci’ z n, Mr liichao I
Washington, had bera vequt . let to give up , . I
residence. Mr. \\ v mi 0 -.v as used as ffi. I
quarters and bdih lu tcisas hnspi *!*, |
the po ;r had b-e-n I'urnished with ratios ; |
and some of the botsei eisywa had bran 1
nii-hcd with Cette; sug .r, te;r, &o Bat, Uv>
persons bad left tue town and those wh - 1
maint d were quietly att'en<:;is> to their In:
ness. One mm, u-• ct-i-sii-i . h .cl gone
ward totukiAi.o c -h of a ra 1 -nee, !.««./:
would not let bra do it. Tit.- oa-ui had i,
been required of am no.
♦ Within a very shun time ader, er.?
Goldsboro, the red.- had errand thivr :
of works around iio: town an/ now the p
is strongly fortified, they avo running c .
Nowbem and Win..region and gettingsu-m.
in immense qn i-.vius
The people 01 - >c county of Wayna,«oni
of Goldsboro', i .vo Issi ' badly at ihe
of the Federate and «n t.. my instances arc :
very destitue erudition, the houses of J
Collier and W. K Lane are said to have I
burn!
We 1 nil from other sou ices that. Sherma
supplying all who apply with to and, ami
many poison.- vu live ten and twelve iu:»
this side of ofG-i'd bout go there for ra*
Sherman is reel u‘ting atui rao:g Wring him.
ad it is tffoii ht ite will move' vuo-i prob. -
in tho direct; r» -t i «:».!•-irb. vmy soon
TiiK “ i” APE ? lit.
A MOT 1 .; i non COLOXKLI.AMAIft.
■f'ou lint 1. G . . Apia! 12, 1860.
Mil. Editor a w w-.uls oufy ;n rep-',
Cap? MeDoliirs i. \ via ! 10. hir ... 1 lm\
no disposition to •• dy c.-iuhets with him, ai .
she is htli.'liod m • a quietly ,-i (her; -
ges made anvl pr-. ven on b.m, ami desires r
refev the. quest;..n of our 1 - cccive charm r.
to the putii c, i shall crrtaiiily interpose r
objection
The chief point in controversy was, the 1
ing cause to. his patriotic devotion to the
teres•:« of his country, and tho enforcomen 1 -
her laws. law- ed i wis the failure to r
tairi a permit to ship cotton him -If He iff
admits that in order "to develop tho plan.-
Col. Lamar and r- iy,” he and a make appli;
tion t-o be permitted to ship cotton ou tk.
steamer. . .
Wuen I call vour reader’s attention to ii
fact (sea McDutVs firs; letter) that I die
tinctly asserted t-> him, au I to the citternr <d 1
Hawkinsviile, Hr 1 the cotton wu oi :. oi j
rect’.y to the Y .okras, tor ex •ff..ngo for; i|
iron, etc, by Gen. toobfi’s permission, •»:
wili not be at. a toe-- to as.dgn the true m» ■'
for the applie di -i As *•- In.- b-> t.tlu.t •
acquainted with Iron wilf he slow to bei>
that he ever tamely submitted u> and uunciali-. >
from any itia 1, I c ite 011'y remind him 1!
what I did say was raid to him publicly, aim
that the language el - C. razing lmT condtic
admitted ol no u; ra.-.mi ruction. It ins iir-ou
ry is again at IffuD, to would bo ns well for ldi:
to consult wi-'h u-rae' mends, less oblivion
than himseit, who and him eo well iu refer
enco to tho application of his. to be permitted
to ship ids cotton. This T the last notice i
shall take of any commuriieavion coming from
him through sh- 1 uvs tnipers
Very respt.cUu’iy,
C. A. L. Lamar,
Daring Assault V-cut 11 o'clock las’
night, someone cam’' up to Col. G \V. L; ’.
gate and called to kn-w i( lie was in Tin
Colonel went to h. door and wished to know
who desired to m.c him. Ihe man gave h .
name as Lieut. Sul- l w mted to see ii
Colonel on some private bin iuess. FheCoh
not recognizing the name or voice, told ti
'mail if he wished-to f-ra lum he must eotn<* ;
Tbe man objected ■•.<•' coming in. us Irabu
ness was of a strictly pi*rate nature ; but tt
Colonel assu’i’-g is> :< i > ; nocouid not see iffm
out of the house in csi-i.e- m.
After the Colonel h ;d .i, wed him, be said,
•‘now you torn: seen me, I would like ior you
to step ou with me tor what l have to say to
you is private. ” The Colonel then followed
him out .towanfs gate, and when ti
reached it, the Lie.uteitv.i* sin.l to a compau
ien, “toil -the iieiite>.aDt 10 bring up that pon •
ot men anu we will enow him bow to disobi
orders.” Col. Lee, imug armed, defied tin 1
and their posse, wheiei.pon one ot the inti,
made a strike at him with a slung, shot, and
stiuck him in the back. The Coionel was
stunned somewhat by the blow but not sulli
cieut to lose his presence oi mind the two
assassins attempted to run c ff as soon as the
blow was made, but site -Colonel commenced
firing on them and succeeded in striking one
of them in the region of tiie spine. Tho other
made his escape,
. The Coionel then procured a posse of men
and made a search for the a.-sa-sins. The
wounded one was found where he trad crawled
up to the Cos one”,3 g 1 e -and was braging to
be taken in. The Coionel hid him c .rrird iu
the house and Dr. D’Aivigoy was cat led in.
The Dr. thinks he wiii die to-uay: t
Nothing yet has transpired to throw light
upon the iaoiive that prompted the assa-sina
tion.
It would be well for people who are called
upon late at night to hnitr.te the Colonel’s ex
ample of cauiiouHics.-, Atlanta Register ipril
15.
FiiANKiits Counit. —Annexed is nn extract
from the grand jury presoirtment of Franklin,
county Superor «>urt :
We ItMvt; to call the allenlion oi the
proper milifaiy authorities to tbo conduct of a
squad of cavalry, under «lre "OinmafPi ol Sergt.
McCartee, w o, as we are informed, belong to
Ratcliff's company, oi Gen Reynolds’ staff. —
This squad'of ( , v- j in our town during
the silting oi ibis -n, • i <>. U mrt of said county,
anil commuted a». ur* binu. : murder,as we
are informed, upon a soldier pausing through
salt, county j»be ion; lug to the niiny of Teonesr*
see. A dem in I was made upon'Sergt. McCar
tee by the civil uUmrit es for ihe murd rers,
and he not only : ; i-..-d'to deliver them up,
but ufichi i .ok to jo ;U!y the act and set
up miiiii.iy i.u.y. . .- u)-.rente over Aha civil
law, and inch a nice- of toe Sheriff and the
civil authoiu i !,i« men and rode off.
We hope ia.ii Goa. Reynolds aud Gen.
Cobb, or wh'-ev«.r 0;..y of those
murderers, will cans. u.« m robe delivered up
to the proper authorr .-, that the ends of .jus
tice may b« aceomplit-urd If r quads of cav
alry i s4r . ag Ui.ougo out county are to be al
lowed . i comm. ihe in ,si brutal acts of niur
der nod c Miie.s, without being i.able or
subject to the civii laws of the country, and to
be the judges of the offense com milted, as
Sergt McCartee teemed to contend that he
was and should be in this case, we have fough*
this war to but little purpose. If we are to be
subjeCt-d to a military despotism, the sooner
we know i> the better. We the relore hope
the proper authorities will have this matter
fully investigated, and the offender or offenders
in the case brought tojin-uce, on a proper m
vestigation of”th»i inaLu i‘, which Serge.* McGar
tee teiused to submit to,
Fight in Gordon Counts'. —On Saturday,
Aprii. ;l'st, sense five hundred negroes and
Yankees advanced from Dalton to /Spring
place, robbing the cit zensand arresting many.
During the night Major Tom Folk Edmundaon
with seven men charged the camp, and the
next day attacked them twice. On Monday
Major E. renewed his attacks with one hun
dred men, aud routed the invaders. Unhappi
ly he was killed iu the charge, as was also
Fresley Seay.
M ijor Edffinndson has rendered himself very
conspicuous in reednt partisan operations in
Northern Georgia.
Five girls employed iff th.e spool-cotton
factory at Portsmouth, N. 1 I , have been arrest
ed apd liijed for stealing cotton. About three
thousand pounds of cotton have been stolen
rom the factory withia a short time,