Newspaper Page Text
Page 2
THE SPELMAN SPOTLIGHT
May 6, 1966
The SPELMAN SPOTLIGHT
FRIEDA E. WILLIAMSON, Editor-in-Chief
ANNA B. PORTER, Associate Editor
HENRIETTA TURNQUEST, PATRICIA KING,
Business Managers
NEWS EDITOR—Andrea Williams
FEATURE EDITORS — Cheryl Birchette, Melba Davis,
Brenda Greene, Melody McDowell
LITERARY EDITORS — Cynthia Smith, Patricia Collins,
Maggie Davis
CONTRIBUTING EDITOR — Juanita Price
PHOTOGRAPHER CARTOONIST
Janice Mills iadjUMfe. Margaret Mills
PRESS
EXCHANGE EDITOR — Carolyn Clark
TYPISTS — Carolyn Reynolds, Marjorie Rich, Marilyn
Wilson, Bonnie Bohannon
DR. RICHARD A. CARROLL, Faculty Advisor
A Mission for Our Time
In 1901 a group of 600 missionaries boarded the ship
“Thomas” bound for the Philippine Islands. These 600 Thom-
asites were to change the destiny of the Philippines — they
were to live and work with the people, to help them improve
their living conditions, and to help educate them. They were
the reason for the change in language from Spanish to Eng
lish. The Thomasites did then in the Philippines with work
and devotion what our government attempts to do today in
many under-developed countries with billions of dollars in
foreign aid.
The story of the Thomasite is one which Jack H. Vaughn,
Director of the Peace Corps, relates as an account of the first
Peace Corps mission before the official establishment of the
Peace Corps organization in 1961. As director of the Peace
Corps Mr. Vaughn’s job is like that of an executive salesman.
For, the whole organization depends on how well the Peace
Corps idea sells to potential volunteers.
Recently Mr. Vaughn sold his product at Agnes Scott
College as he delved into the philosophy upon which his or
ganization is based. From his detailed discourse it can be
gathered that the aim of this philosophy is virtually to create
a foreign policy whose proposed ends are the same as those
of the foreign policy which our government legislates, but
whose means are quite different from those of the govern
ment’s policy. The Peace Corps’ policy is one of which the
personality of John F. Kennedy is the prime example — a
policy which is vital, vibrant, living, rather than one which
merely exists. Many Latin Americans were illiterate and un
able to understand much of the political dogma that circulated
around them; but the warmth of J.F.K. seeped into their pores
just as the Thomasites seeped into the Filipinos with whom
they lived and worked.
Of the questions asked Mr. Vaughn indeed the most im
portant one was, “Can the Peace Corps type policy help us
now in Viet Nam?” The answer was, admittedly, “no.” For,
a Peace Corps mission in a war-tom country is impracticable.
This answer probably dealt an immediate blow to Peace Corps
supporters, especially those concerned (and who isn’t) over
the state of things in Viet Nam. What the many who are
caught up in emotionalism over Viet Nam are overlooking is
that equally as important as the problem in Viet Nam is the
problem of preventing potential Viet Nams from developing;
and the latter problem is precisely what the Peace Corps
ideology proposes to solve. For, other Viet Nams are await
ing us if the Peace Corps mission is not effective. Moreover,
for the Peace Corps to solve this problem is far easier than
it is for the military to solve the problem to which it is ad
dressed. It is easier to avert a war than to end one once it has
started. Those 600 Thomasites did more for peace than any
600 military could ever hope to do.
It is not really necessary to officially join the Peace Corps
in order to perform a Peace Corps type mission; and a Peace
Corps type mission does not necessarily involve international
relations. The mission could involve 600 Thomasites in the
Philippines, or it could involve you in your community. The
goals are the same — peace, freedom, and love of the type
that Tom, Huck, and Jim symbolize.
The Ghana Coup d’Etat
With the February 24 ouster of Ghana’s
president Kwane Nkrumah, the liquidation
of his Convention People’s Party and the
imprisonment of Nkrumah’s numerous sup
porters, the forces of world imperialism
eagerly chalked up a new victory in the
latest in a series of setbacks for the African
revolution.
Concomitant to the coup d’etat, G. Men-
nen Williams, ex-Assistant Secretary of State
for Africa, announced at a news conference
that “good” and favorable “relations” could
readily exist between the United States and
the military regime. Although the State De
partment subsequently announced that it
was “still to early to comment on the ques
tion of recognition,” The New York Times
stated, on February 25, that Washington was
rapidly moving in the direction of recogni
tion “with deliberate speed scarcely con
cealing its pleasure.”
Washington’s failure to release a state
ment immediately in support of the generals
was essentially “for fear of giving grounds
for suspicion and for what were regarded as
inevitable charges that the United States was
involved in the coup.”
The Times added, however, that “the
timetable may now be speeded up in view
of Nkrumah’s threat in Peking today to re
turn to Ghana soon to reassert his authority
as head of the government.”
Nkrumah’s firm threat to reassert his
authority was not taken lightly in Accra. By
February 21 martial law was established in
the streets, and armed forces were deployed
in strategic areas. Supporters of Nkrumah
were captured, and imprisoned or murdered.
But it was also apparent that many seg
ments of the Ghanian population took the
ouster in stride, and some sections were
strong supporters of it, particularly the tra
ditional chiefs whose tremendous powers be
fore independence had been stripped away
by the Nkrumah government.
Apparently, a certain amount of apathy
was the direct response to the increasing
centralization of Nkrumah’s rule and its iso
lation from the aspirations and immediate
goals of the masses since independence in
1957.
In March 1959, Nkrumah arbitrarily
took control over the appointment of senior
civil officials and appeal judges and em
powered himself as paramount and sole
judge on security matters. A censorship bill
in 1960 silenced the final opposition news
paper and in 1962, a Detention Act invested
Nkrumah with power to imprison opposition
party members without trial by jury. The
Convention People’s Party was made the
sole legal party and its top leadership group
was installed in all major governmental posts.
While these popular developments were
taking place, Nkrumah built an elaborate
and intense cult of personality, erecting stat
ues of himself in all areas of the country,
and accompanied by official adulation and
acclamation from the press. Likewise, Nkru
mah called himself “Our Great Leader and
Redeemer” and “The Great Builder and
Projector of the African Personality.”
Although Nkrumah made many progres
sive changes, including the development of
one of the largest and most intensive educa
tional systems in Africa and the construc
tion of modem housing for the workers,
much more money was lavished on fantastic
schemes to develop the country industrially
in combination with profiteering Western in
vestors. The multi-million dollar Volta River
dam which was completed in 1964 and par
tially financed by the Ghanian government,
had as its main purpose the supply of power
to the privately-owned aluminum reduction
plant in Tema. This plant was constructed
by the Volta Aluminum Company, 90%
owned by the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemi
cal Corporation. The project invariably
ceded to Western investment capital direct
control of Ghana’s valuable bauxite deposits.
Concomitantly, Ghana remained heavily
dependent on its cocoa production, which
accounted for about 60% of its export in
come in 1963. A drastic reduction in the
price of cocoa since 1957-58 has therefore
left Ghana with completely inadequate funds
with which to purchase needed foreign
products.
Nkrumah’s initial response to the impend
ing financial crisis was to seek huge foreign
loans, both from the Soviet bloc and Western
nations. Facing failure in this respect, Nkru
mah responded by requesting the masses to
support an “austerity” program, aimed at
decreasing or discontinuing the purchase of
imported food items upon which much of
the populace depended.
The result was an inflation in which lo
cal food prices in some parts of the country
rose 400% between March 1963 and De
cember 1964.
But belt-tightening, internal lack of de
mocracy, and demogogery are not the types
of things that spur the actions of imperialist
powers. Their hatred for Nkrumah, the eco
nomic strangulation of the country which
they imposed, and their support for his
ouster, stem essentially from Nkrumah’s bla
tant criticism of Imperialism, from his
friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union
and China, and his unbending support of
a united Africa. Even while accepting im
perialist aid and sponsoring foreign invest
ments, Nkrumah had been a consistent critic
of the United Nations’ intervention in the
Congo; he opposed the war in Viet Nam;
and most recently, he blatantly decried Bri
tain’s failure to prevent the emergence of a
white-supremacist state in Rhodesia. In this
connection, Nkrumah announced two months
ago plans to establish a separate “people’s
militia” which could be used against Ian
Smith’s Rhodesian regime.
What next in Africa?
Juanita Price
f-^ortraitd bu
y ^rtar^ro
Portraits
Pencil & Charcoal—$2.50 • Color Pastel—$10.00
Oil Portraits—$35.00 up
Also
Still-Lifes . . . Scenes . . . Reproductions and Abstracts for Your Home
Home Phone — 758-7301 Home Address—136 Laurel Ave., S.W.
Studio—10V2 Raymond St., S.W.