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without being forcibly struck with the anolo-
py'in the causes which led to their separa
tion, and those which now threaten us with a
similar calamity. With the establishment of
the central power in the King, commenced a
system of taxation, which, under King Solo
mon, was greatly increased, to defray the ex
pense of renting the temple, of enlarging and
embellishing Jerusalem, the scat of the cen
tral government, and the other profuse ex
penditures of hi? magnificent reign. Increas
ed taxation was followed by its natural conse
quences—discontent c^d complaint; which
before his death began to excite resistance.
On the succession of his son, Rehoboam, the
10 tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a
reduction of the taxes; the temple bein» fin
ished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem
completed, and the money which had been
raised for that purpose being no longer re
quired, or, in other words, the debt being
paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties
—a repeal of the tariff. The demand was
taken under consideration, and after consul
ting the bid men, the counsellors of ’98, who
advised a reduction, he then took the opinion
of the younger politicians, who had since
grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their
fathers; he hearkened unto their counsel, and
refused to make the reduction, and the seces
sion of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, fol
lowed. The tribes ofJudah and Benjamin,
which had received the disbursements, alone
remained to the house cf David.
But, to return to the point immediately un
der consideration. He knew that it was not
only the opinion of a large majority of our
country, but it might be said to be the opin
ion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a
perfect government of a majority, acting
through a representative body, without check
or limitation in its power; yet if we may
test this theory by experience and reason, we
will find that, so far from being perfect, the
necessary tendency of all governments based
upon the will of an absolute majority, with
out constitutional check or limitation of pow
er, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and
despotism, and this, whether the will of the
majority be expressed directly through an
assembly of the people themselves, or by
their representatives. I know (said Mr. C.)
that in venturing this assertion I utter that
which is unpopular, both within and without
these walls; but, where truth and liberty are
concerned such considerations should not be
regarded. He would place the decision of
this point on the fact, that no government of
the kind, among the many attempts which
had been made, had ever endured for a single
generation; but, on the contrary, had invari
ably experienced the fate which ho had as
signed to them. Let a single instance be
pointed out, and he would surrrender his opin
ion. But if we had not the aid of experience
to direct our judgment, reason itself would be
a certain . guide.' The view which considers
the community as a unit, and all its parts as
having asimilar interest, is radically erroneous.
However small the community may be, and
however homogeneous its interests, the mo
ment that government is put into operation,
as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to
make appropriations, the different portions of
community must, of necessity, bear different
and opposing relations in reference to the
action of the government. There must inev
itably spring up two interests; a direction
and a stockholder interest; an interest profi
ting by the action of the government, and in
terested in increasing its powers and action;
and another at whose expense the political
machine is kept in motion. He knew how
difficult it was to communicate distinct ideas
on such a subject, through the medium of gen
eral .propositions, without a particular illustra
tion ; and in order that he might be distinctly
understood, though at the hazard of being te
dious, he would illustrate the important princi
ple which he had ventured to advance by ex
amples.
Let us then suppose a small community of
five persons, separated from the rest of the
world; and to make the example strong, let
us suppose them all to be engaged in the same
pursuit,and to be of equal wealth. Let us fur
ther suppose, that they determine to govern
the community by the will of a majority; and
to make the cose as strong as possible, let us
suppose that the majority, in order to meet
the expense of the government, lay an equal
tax, say of $100 on each individual of this
little community. Their treasury would con.
tain five hundred dollars. They are a ma
jority; and they, by supposition, have con
tributed three hundred as their portion, and
the other two, (the minority) two hundred.—
The three have the right to make the appro
priation as they may think proper. The ques-
fom is how would the principle of the abso
lute and unchecked majority operate, under
these circumstances, in this litte community ?
If the three be governed by a sense of justice
—if they should appropriate the money to
the objects for which it was raised, the Com
mon and equal benefit of the five, then the
object of the association would be fairly and
honestly effected, and each would have
common interest in the government. But,
should the majority pursue an opposite course;
should they appropriate the money in a man
ner to benefit their own particular interest,
without regard to the interest of t?« two, (and
they will so act, unless there be-some effi
cient check, he who best knows human na-
ture will least doubt,) who does not sec that
the three and the two would have directly op
posite interests, in reference to the action of
the government 1 The three who contribute
to the common treasury but three hundred
dollars, could, in fact, by appropriating the
five hundred to their own use, convert the
action of the government, into the means of
making money? and, of consequence, would
have a direct interest in increasing the taxes.
They put in three hundred and take out five;
that is, they take back to themselves alt that
they had put in; and in addition, that which
.wasput in by their.associates; or, in other
words, taking taxation and appropriation to
gether, they have gained, and their associates
have lost, two hundred dollars by the fiscal
action of the government. And opposite in-
terests in reference to the action of the gov
ernment, is thus created between them, the
one having an interest in favour and the other
an interest against the taxes; the one to in
crease, and the other to decrease the taxes;
the one to retain the ’taxes when the money is
no longer wanted,and the other to repeal them’
when the objects for which they were levied
have bccnexccuted.
Let us now suppose this community of five
to be raised to twenty-four individuals, to be
governed in like manner by the will of a ma
jority; it is obvious that the same principle
would divide them into two interests—into'fc
majority and a minority, thirteen against ele
ven, or In some other proportion; and that
all the consequences, which he had shown to
be applicable to the small community of five,
would be equally applicable to the greater—
the cause not depending upon the number,
but resulting necessarily from the action of
the government itself. Let us .now suppose
that, instead of governing themselves directly
in an assembly .of the whole, without the in
tervention of agents:, they should adopt the
representative principle; and that, instead of
being governed by c. majority of themselves,
they should be governed by a majority of their
representatives. It is obvious that the oper
ation of the system would not be affected by
the change, the representatives being respon
sible to those who choose them, will conform
to the will of their constituents, and would
act as they would' clo, were they present,
and acliug for themselves; and the same
conflict of interest which we have shown
would exist in one case, would equally exist
in the other. In either case, the inevitable
result would be a system of hostile legislation
on the part of the majority, or the stronger
iutcrcst, against the minority, or the weaker
interest; the object of which, on the part of
the former, would he to exact as much as
'possible from the latter, which would neces
sarily be resisted by all the means in their
power. Warfare, by legislation, would thus
lie commenced between the two parties, with
the same object, and not less hostile than that
which is carried on by distinct and rival ra
tions—the only distinction would be in the
instruments and the -mode. Enactments, in
the one case, would supply what could only
be effected by arms in the other; and the in
evitable operation would be to engender
the most hostile feelings between the parties,
which would merge every feeling of patriotism
that feeling which embraces the whole, and
substitute iu its place the most violent party
attachment; and, instead of having one com
mon centre of attachment, around which the
affections of the community might rally, there
would, in fact, be two—the interests of the
majority, to which those who constitute that
majority would be more attached, than., they
would be to the whole, and that of the minori
ty, to which they in l ike manner would also
be more attached than to the interests of the
whole. Faction would thus take the place of
patriotism, and, with the loss of patriotism,
corruption must necessarily follow; and in
its train, anarchy; and, finally, despotism,
or tiio establishment of absolute power in a
single individual, as a means of arresting the
conflict of hostile interests, on the principle
that it is better to submit to the will of a sin
gle individual, who, by his being made lord
and master of the whole community, would
have an equal interest in the protection of all
the parts.
Let us next suppose that, in order to avert
the calamitous train of consequences, this
little community should adopt a written con
stitution with limitations restricting the will of
the majority, in order to protect the minority
against the oppressions which he had shown
would necessarily result without such restric
tions. It is obvious that the case would not
be in the slightest degree varied, if the ma
jority be left in possession of the right of judg
ing exclusively of the extent of its powers
without any right on the part of the minority
to enforce the restrictions imposed by the con
stitution on the will of the majority. The
point is almost too clear for illustration.—
Nothing .can he more certain than thpt
when a constitution .grants power, and impo
ses limitations on the exercise of that power,
whatever interests may obtain possession of
the government, will be in f .vor of extending
the power at the expense of the limitation ;
and that, unless those in whose behalf the
limitatons were imposed, have, in some form
or mode, the right of .enforcing them, the
power will ultimately supersede the limita-
tion, and the government must operate pre
cisely in the same manner as if the will of
the majority governed without constitution or
limitation of power.
He had thus presented all possible modes,
in which a government, bound upon the will
of an absolute majority, would be modified
and had demonstrated that, in all its forms,
whether, in a majority of the people, as in a
mere democracy, or in a majority of their rep-
resentutive's, without a constitution, or with a
constitution,to be interpreted at the wi 11 of the
majority, the result would be the same ; two
hostile interests would inevitably be created
by the action of the government, to be foil
owed by hostile legislation, and that by fac
tion, corruption, anarchy, and despotism
The great and solemn question here pre
seated itself—la there any remedy for these
evils; on the decision of which depends the
question, whether the people can govern
themselves, which has been so often asked
with so much scepticism and doubt ? There
is a remedy, and but one, the effects of which,
whatever may be the form, is to organize so-
ciety ita refference to this conflict of interests,
which springs out of the action of government
and which caa only be done by giving tc
each part the right of self protection.; which
in a word, instead of considering the comma
nity of twenty four as a single community
having a common interest, and to be gov
erned by, the single will of an entire ma
jority, shall, upon all questions tending to
bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen
against the eleven, take the will notoffoetwen-
ty four as a unit, but that of the thirteen a.i*i
that of the eleven seperately, The majority oi
each governing the parts and< where they con
cur, governing the whole, and where they dis -
agree, arresting the action ofifoe government;
This he would call the concurring,. os dis
tinct from the absolute majority*!... It woubj
not be; sis was gcnerufiy'suppggQ/},?* miuoriu
governing a majority .In eitherway,the number
would be the same whether taken as the abso
lute or as theconcurring majority.Th.us,them .-
jority of the thirteen is seven,and of the eleven
six,and the two together make thirteen,which is
the majority of twenty four. But though th,
number is the same, the mode of counting is
essentially different; the one representing
the strongest interest, and the other, the wea
ker interests of the community. The first
mistake was, in supposing that the government
of the absolute majority is the government
of this people—that beau ideal of a perfect
government, which had been so enthusiast,
cally entertained in every age, by the gener
ous and patriotic, where civilization and liber
ty had made the smallest progress. There
could be no greater error: the government oi
the people is the government of the whole cm-
munity—of the twenty-four—the self govern,
ment of all the parts—too perfect to be re-
duced to practice in the present, or any past
stage of human society. The -government of
the absolute majority, instead of the govern
ment of the people, is but the government of
the strongest interests,-and when not efficient
ly cheeked, is the most tyrauical and oppres
sive that can be devised. Between this ide
al perfection on one side, and despotism on the
other; none other can be devised but that
which considers society, in refference to its
parts, as differently affected by the action of
the government, and which takes the sense of
each part separately, and thereby the sense
of the whole in the maimer already illustra
ted. -j
These principles as he had already stated,
are not afiected by the number of wliich a
community may be composed, and are just as
applicable to one of the thirteen millions, the
number of which composes, oiqr^, as of the
small community of twenty four, tyhich I have
supposed, for the purpose of illustration; and
are not less applicable to the., twenty four
states united in one community, than to the
case of the twenty four individuals. There
is, indeed, a distinction between a large and
a small community, not affecting the princi
ple, but the violence of the action. In the
former, the similarity of the interests of all
the parts, will limit the oppression from the
hostile action of the parts, in a great degree, to
the fiscal action of the government merely ;
but iu the large community, spreading over a
country of great extent, and having a great
diversity of interests, with different kinds of
labor, capital, arid production, the conflict and
oppression will extend, not only to a monop
ly 'of the appropriations, on the part of the
stronger interests, but will end in unequal
taxes, and a general conflict between the en-
tire interests of conflicting sections ; which
if, not arrested by the most powerful
checks will terminate in the most oppressive
tyranny that can be conceived, or in theaes
truction of the community itself.
If we turn our attention from these sup
posed cases, and direct it to our government,
and its actual operation, we will find a practi-
cal confirmation of the truth of what has been
stated, not only of the oppressive operation of
the system of an absolute majority, but also a
striking and beautiful illustration, in the for
mation of our system, of the principle of the
concurring majority, as distinct from the ab
solute, which he had asserted to be the only-
means of efficiently, checking the abuse of
power, and of course, the only solid founda
tion of constitutional liberty. That our gov
eminent, for many years, has been., gradually
verging to consolidation, that,the constitution
has gradually become a dea^.lettqr, and that
all restrictions upon the power ^'government
have been virtually removed so as practically
to convert the general government into a gov
eminent of an absolute majority, without
check or limitation, cannot be denied by any
one who has impartially observed its opera
tion.
It is not necessary to trace the commence
ment and gradual progress of the causes
which have produced this change in our sys
tern; it is sufficient to state that the change
has taken place within the last few years.
VVhut has been the result? Precisely that
which might have been anticipated; the
growth of faction, corruption anarchy-, and
not despotism itself, its near approach, as wit
ucssed in the provisions of this bill. And
from what have these consequences sprung
We have been involved in no war. ’We
have been at peace with all the - world. We
have been visited with no* national calamity
Our people have been advancing in gener
al intelligence^ and as great and alarming as
has been the advance of political corruption
the morals and virtue of the community at
large have been advancing in improvement
What, he would again repeat,, is the cause?
No other can be assigned but a departure
from the fundamental principles of the con
stitution, which has converted the govern
ment into the will of an absolute and irres
ponsible majority, and whicbi by the laws
which must inevitably govern,; in all such ma
jorities, have placed in conflict thc great inter
ests of the country, by a system of hostile
legislation; by an oppressive and unequal im
position of taxes; by unequal qad profuse ap
propriations, and by rendering foe entire la
bor and capita] of the weaker mterests subor
dinate to the stronger.
This is tiie causp „qnd foes^^he fruits,
which have converted the government into
the distribution of the loaves and the fishes.
He held it impossible for any one -to look at
the theoretical illustration of the principle of
•he absolute majority in the casus which he
'ad supposed, and not be struck with the prac
tical illustration in the actual operation of our
overnment. Under every circumstance,
•e majority, will ever have its American Sya ;
ivoi—r(lie meant nothing offensive to any
senator)—but the real meaning of the Amer-
tcan system is, that system, of plunder which
the strongest interest ever waged, and will
•ver wage, against the weaker, where the
i uer is not armed with some efficient and
oustitutioiial check to arrest its action. Noth
ing but such check on the part of the weaker
interest can arrest it; mere constitutional lim
itations are wholly inefficient. Whatever in-
terest obtains possession of the Government
will, from the nature of things, be in .favor of
he powers and against the limitations imposed
by the constitution, and will resort to every
device that can be immagined to remove those
restraints. On the contrary', the opposite in
terest; that which he had designated as the
stockholding interest; the tax payers; those
on whom the system operates, will resist the
ibuse of powers and contend for the limita
tions. And it is on that point, then, that the
contest between the delegated and the reser
ved powers will be waged ; but in this con
test, as the interests in possession of the gov
ernment are organized and armed by all its
powers and patronage, the opposite interest
if not in like manner organized and possessed
of a power to protect themselves under the
provisions of the Constitution, will be as inev-
itably crushed as would be a band of unorgan
between the several departments, and in par
ticular the structure and the important func
tions of this body; but to suppose that the sen.
ate or any department of this Government was
intended to be fog guardian of the reserved
. hts, was a great and fundamental mistake,
he Government, through all its departments
■presents the delegated, and not the reserved
powers ; and it was a violation of the fuada.
mental priaciple of tree institutions to suppose
that any but the responsible representative of
any interest, could be its guardian. The dis.
tribution of the powers of the General Govern
ment apd its organization, were arranged to
prevent foe abuse of power, in fulfilling the
mportant trust confidedtoit;and not,as propos
in'.; re instrument of taking money (irony one
portion of the community to be given" to an
other, and which has rallied around it a great,
u powerful, and mercenary < corps of office
holders, office seekers, And expectants, desti
tute of principle and patriotismi ’and who have
no standard of morals or politics but the will
of the Executive—the will of him who has
ized militia, when opposed by a veteran and
trained corps of regulars. Let it never be for-
ottenthat power can only be opposed by
power, organization by organization; and on
tiiis theory stands our beautiful federal sys
tem of government. No. free system was
ever farther removed from the principle that
the absolute majority, without check or limi
tation, ought to govern. To understand
what our government is, we must look to the
Constitution, which is the basis of the sys
tem. He did not intend to enter into any
minute examination of the origin and the
source of its powers; it was sufficient for his
purpose to state, what he did fearlessly, that
derived its power from the peopln of the
separate states, e«ch ratifying bv itself, each
binding itself, by its own separate convention,
and tiie concurrence of the majorities of the
several states forming the constitution; thus
taking the sense of the whole by r that of the
several parts, representing the various inter-
ests of the entire community- It was tiiis
concurring and perfect majority which formed
the constitution, and not that majority which
would consider the American People as asin
gle community, and which instead of repre
seating fairly and fully the interests of the
whole, would but represent, as has been sta
ted, theinlerest of the strongest section. No
candid man can dispute that he had given
a correct discretion of the constitution ma
king power, that power which created and or
ganized the government; which delegated to
it, as a common agent, certain powers,
trust for the common good of all the States
and which had imposed strict limitation and
checks against abuses and usurpations. In
administering the delegated powers, the coil
stitution provides very properly, iu order to
give promptitude and efficiency, that the gov
ernment should be organized upon the princi
ple of the absolute majority, or rather of two
absolute majorities combined: a majority of
the states considered as bodies ^litic, which
prevails in this body, and a majority of the
People of the states, estimated in federal nuin
hers, ia the other House of Congress,
combination of the two prevails in the choice
of the President; and of course, iu the ap
pointment of judges, they being nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate,
It is fous that the concurring and tiie absolute
majorities are combined in one complex sy
tern; the one in forming the constitution, and
tiie other making and executing the laws;
thus beautifully blending the moderation, jus-
tice, and equity of the former and more per-
feet majority with the promptness and energy
of the latter7*but less perfect.
To maintain the ascendency o* the Constitu
tion over the law making majority, is the great
and essential point on wliich the success of the
system must depend; unless that ascendency-
can be preserved, the necessary consequence
must be, that the laws will supercede the con.
stitution, and finally the will of the Executive,
by the influence of its patronage, will sup er
sede the laws, indications of wliich are already
perceptible. This ascendency can only be
preserved through the action of the states, as
organized bodies, having their own seperate
Governments, and possessed of the right, un
der the structure of our system, of judging of
their seperate powers, and of interposing their
authority to arrest-foe enactments of the Gen
eral Government within their respective lim
its. He would not enter, at this time, into
the discussion of this important point; as it
had been ably and fully presented by the; sen.
ator from Kentucky, [Mr. Bibb] and others
who had preceded him in this debate, on the
same side ; whose arguments not only re
mained unanswered, but were unanswerable.
It was only by the power of iuterpretation
that the reserved rights of the states could be
peacefully and efficiently protected against
the encroachments of the General Govern-
uient,that the limitations imposed upon its au
thority would be enforced and its movements
confined to the orbit allotted to it by the con
stitution.
It had indeed, been said in debate, that this
could be effected by the organization of the
General • Government itself, particularly by
the action of this body, which represented the
states, and that the states themselves must
look to the General Government for the pre
servation of many of the most important to
their reserved rights. He did not [said Mr.
C.] underrate the value to be attached to the
organic arrangement of the General Govern
ment, and the wise distribution of its powers
terously supposed, to protect the reserved pow.
ers, which are confided wholly to the guardi
anship of the several states.
Against the view of our system which fie
had presented, and the right of the state to in
terpose, it was objected that it would lead to
anarchy and dissolution. He considered the
objection as without the slightest foundation,
and that so far from tending to weakness or
disunion, it was the sourse of the highest pow.
er, and of the strongest cement. Nor was
its tendency in this respect difficult of explana-
tion. The government of an absolute major,
ity, unchecked by efficient constitutional res.
traint,though apparently strong, was in reality
an exceedingly feeble government. That ten.
lency to conflict between the parts; which he
had shewn to be inevitable in such govern,
inents, wasted the power of the state in the
hostile action of contending factions,. which
left very little more power than the excess of
the strength of the majority over the minority.
But a government based upon the principle
of the concurring majority, where each great
interest possessed within itself foe means of
self protection, which ultimately requires the
mutual consent of all the parts,necessarily cau.
ses that unanimity in council,and ardent attach,
ment of all the parts of the whole, and rives
an irresistible energy to a government so con
structed.
power and patriotism, and conclusively show*
hot only that there was not one which had
not some contrivance, under some form by
which the concurring assent of the different
portions of the community was made necessa-
ry in the action of Government, but also, that
the virtue, patriotism and strength of the state,
were in direct proportion^ to the perfection of
toe means of securing such assert.' In csti.
mating the operation of this principle in our,
system, which depends, as be had stated, on
me right of interposition on foe part of the
states, we must not omit to take into consid.
eration the amending power, by which new
powers may be granted, or any derangement
of the system be corrected, by the concurring
assent of three fourths of foe States, and thus
in the same degree, strengthening the power
of repairing any derangement occasioned by
the executive action of a state. In fact, the
power of interposition, fairly understood, may
be considered in the light of an appeal against
the usurpations of the General Government,
the jointagent of all the states to the states them!
selves,to be decided under the amending power,
affirmatively in favor of the Government, by
the voice of three fourths of the states, as the
highest power known under the system.
Mr. C. said, that he knew the difficulty, in
pur country of establishing the truth of the
principle for which he contended, though res.
ting upon the clearest reason, and tested by
the universal experience of free nations.
He knew that the governments of the several
states would be cited as an argument against
the conclusion to which he had arrived, and
which for the most part, were constructed on
the principle of the absolute majority; but in
his opiuion, a satisfactory answer could be
given; that the objects of expenditure which
fell within the sphere of a state Government,
were few and inconsiderable, so that be their
action ever so irregular, it could occasion but
little derangement. If, instead of being mem.
bers of this roat confederacy,they formed dis.
tinct communities, and were compelled to
raise armies, and incur other expenses neces.
He might appeal to history for the truth of
8rtry to their defence, the law’s which he had
these remarks, of which the Roman furnished
the most familiar and striking. It was a well
known fact, that from the expulsion of the
Tarquins to the time of the establishment of
the Tribunarian power, the Government feil
into the state of the greatest disorder and
distraction,and he might add, corruption. How
did this happen 7 The explanation will throw
important light on the subject under con
sideration. The community was divided in
to two parts—the Patricians and the Plebei
aits, with the powers of the state principally
ia the hands of the former, without adequate
check to protect the rights of the latter. The
result was as mi at he expected. The Pa
trici ms converted the -towers of the govern
ment into the means of making money, to nn
rich themselves and their dependants. They,
in a word, had their American System, grow-
ing out of the peculiar character of the Gov
ernment and condition of the country. Th.s
requires explanation. At that period, accor
ding to the law's of nations, when one nation con-
quered another, the lands of the vanquished
belonged to the victors; and, according
to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired,
were divided into parts, one allotted to the
poorer class of people, and the other -ssi /ned
to the use of the treasury* of which the Patri-
ciaus had the distribution and administration.
The Patricians abused their power by witB-
holding from the people that which ought to-
havc been allotted to them,and by converting to
their own use that which ou^ht to have gone
into the treasury. In a word, they took to
themselves the eutire spoils of victory', and
they had thus the most powerful motive to
keep the State perpetually involved in war, to
the utter impoverishment and oppression of
the. people. After resisting the abuse of
power by all peaceable meaus, and the op
pression becoming intolerable, the people at
last withdrew from the city—they, in a wor-1,
seceded ; and to induce them to reunite, the
Patricians conceded to the Plebeians, as the
means of protecting their separate interest,
the very power which he contended was ne
cessary to protect the rights of the States;
but which is now represented as necessarily
leading to disunion. They granted to the
people the right of choosing three trtbu es
from among themselves, whose persons should
be sucred, and who should have the right of
interposing their veto, not only against the
passage of laws, but even against their execu
tion—a power which those who take a shal.
low insight into human nature, would pro.
nouuce inconsistent with the strength and uni
ty of the State, if not utterly impracticable.—
Yet so far from that being the effect, from
that day the genius of Rome became ascen
dant, and victory followed her steps till she
had establisned an almost universal domin
ion. ;
How can such a result, so contrary to all
anticip ition, be explained ? The explanation
appeared to him to be simple. No measure
or movement could be adopted without the
concurring assent of both foe patricians and
plebeians, and each thus became dependent
on the other, and of consequence, the desire
and objects of neither could be effected with-
out the concurrence of the other. To obtain
this concurrence, each was compelled to con
sult the good will of the other, and to elevate
►to office, not simply those who might have the
confidence of the order to which he belonged,
but that of the other. • The result was, th Jt
men pdssessing those qualities which would
naturally command confidence, moderation,
wisdom, justice and patriotism, were elevated
to office; and'these, by the weight of their
authority, and the prudence of their counsel,
together with that spirit of unanimity, neces
sarily resulting from the concurring assent of
the two orders, furnishes the real explanation
of foe power of the Roman State, and of that
extraordinary ,wisdom, moderation and firm,
ness which in so remarkable a degree char,
acterised her pnblic men. He might illus.
trite the truth of the position he had laid down,
by reference tQ the histoty of all free states,
ancient and modern, distinguished for their
1 iid down as necessarily controlling the ac- 3
tion of a state where the will of an absolute
and unchecked majority prevailed, would
speedily disclose themselves in faction, auar-
chy and corruption. Even as the case is,
the operation of the causes to which he had
referred, were perceptible in some of the Lit.
ger and more populous members of the Un
ion, whose Governments had a powerful cen-
tr.il action, and which already showed a
strong tendency to that moaied action wliich
is tne invariable forerunner of corruption and
convulsions.
But to return to the General Government;
we have now sufficient experience to ascer
tain that the tendency to conflict in its action,
is between southern and oilier sections. The
1-tier having a decided majority, mast halrnu.
l11_, be possessed of the powers of the (lav-
eminent both in tiiis and in the other House:
and beiiu; governed by that instinctive love of
power so natural to tiie human o; they
must become the advocates of the power of
Government, and in the same degree oppo
sed to the limitations ; while the other aud
weaker section is as necessarily thrown on
the side of the limitations. In one word;
the one sectio ; is the natural iruardian of the
delegated powers and tne o:h r of the rcsor.
ved; and the straggle on the side of the for-
merwillbe to eni rge the powers, while that
on the opposite side will be to r strain them
within their constitutional limits. The con
test will, in feet, be a contest between pow
er and liberty, and such he considt red tlw
present—a contest in which tiie weaker see-
tion, with its peculiar labor, productions, and
situation, has at stake all that can be dear to
freemen. Should they bo able to maintain ia
their full vi .or their rosreved rights, liberty
and prosperity will be their portion; but if
they yield and permit the stronger interest to
consolidate within itself all jthe powers of the
Government, then wll its fate be more
wretched than that of the aborigines which |
they have expelled, or of their slaves, in
this great struggle between the delegated and
reserved pewerk, so f.r from repining that his
lot and that of those whom lie represented, is
cast on the side of the latter, he rejoiced that
such is the fact; for though we participate in
but' few of foe advantages of the Government,
we are compensated, and more than compen
sated, in not being so much exposed to its
corruption. Nor did he repine that the duty,
so difficult to be discharged as the defence
of foe reserved powers, ugainst apparently
such foarful odds, had been assigned to them.
To discharge successfully this high duty, re-
quires the highest qu i!i‘i ;s moral and intel
lectual ; and should we perform it with a zeal
and ability in proportion to its magnitude, in
stead of being niece planters, our section will
become distinguished for its patriots and
statesmen. But on the oth r hand, if we
prove unworthy of this high destiny—it we
yield to the steady eucruchroent of power,
the severest and most debasing calamity and
corrupiion will overspead the land. Every
southern man, true to the interests of his sec
tio i, and faithful to the duties which Frovi-
deuce has allotted him,-will be forever exclu
ded from the honors and emoluments of this
Government, which will be reserved for those
only, who have qualified themselves by politi
cal prostitution, for admission into the Magda-
dalen Asylum.
Tins Collection Biu—~Mr. Clay, in one
of his speeches in foe Senate expressed it as
his opinion, that if was proper the collccuon
bill should be passed, because it was neces-
sary to display the power and firmness of the
government in foe execution of it* duty; ye
those who are opposed , to foe bill, level all
their artillery against fog administration and
its friends, and style Mr. Clay their western
allv Perhaps their friendship tow rds bun,
results from the fact, that while he thought
foe bill should be passed, he failed to vote tor
it either on its being ordered to a third reading
or on its final passage. It is immaterial to them
what a man thinks, provided he does not
act in opposition to their views;-—Selected-