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nV.iu'.al party to which lie docs not he-
’! in* o', jections against the restrictive.
sfVieni, \viiicli have governed his decision
«.i it, shall lie hrieHy stated,without stop-
in * in offer argument* to prove them.-—
lie believes,
1st. That it overleaps the Itoumls of
constitutional power.
j I!y. That it is impossible to execute
it.
v. Tl. tt (he attempt to do so enr-
i)ipts ns, by destroying the correct liabits
of o ir merchants, mi l rendering perjury
iamiliiir.
, 4tlily. 'I'liat it would he ineffectual to
coerc" foreign nations, if executed.
. othly. That it is unjust and oppressive
to (lie commercial pint of the community,
as it il 'strovs an invaluable interest,
which the government is hound to protect.
tiilily. That it completely sacrifices our
only considerable source of r. venue, and
reduces us to depend on a meagre supply
from internal taxation, or to aceummlale
an enormous public debt by loans, procur
ed on hard terms, which government has
no *id <pi ite funds to reimburse
Ttlily. 'I'liat it aims n fatal blow at our
unexampled progress in wealth and gene
ral improvement.
t i’tliesc objections be well founded, none
will deny that they are sufficient. '1'lie
proof of them would lie too elaborate for
the present occasion. A wise policy
would not have resorted to an untried tbe-
orv. so ruinous and in>deqiiute, for redress
of the serious aggressions we have suffered
from the ln-Higetent powers of Europe, in
full view’of the gu n eess vvhi"b h id crown
ed more magnanimous efforts. Y\ ash
ing ion-, by making firm and temperate,
remonstrances against (lie first unequivo
cal important violation of eur national
rivrbts, itiducod (ire.it IVitiio to make
compensation ; and during the odmlnis
tration of A dams, the pride of France was
humbled by an appeal to arms.
This is the only inode w hich the expe
rience of nntion* points out to guard :i-
gaiust injury nnd insult, accumulating by
submission, until the patient suffering
country bo annihilated or enslaved.
On the ot.lier't hand, when the govern
ment were “ ki- ked into a war,” the wri
ter did not feel himself at liberty to prac
tice indiscriminate opposition, to paralyze
the public energy, by degrading the re
sources and magnanimity of nnr country,
and exaggerating those of Britain, to jus
tify the public enemy in measures (lint ad
mitted of no excuse, and thus diminish the
chance for a speedy and honorable peace,
mid endanger the union of the Stoles.—
It is a fund ament'll I v v of every civil so
cictv. Mint, when a question is settled by
the constituted authority, every individu
al is Imund to respect the decision. The
momentous question, whether war was
just and necessary, lias been Mins set
tled. Peace can only be restored by a
treaty to which Great Britain shall as
sent, anil reasomble terms are not to he
obtained from her, bv proving to the
world that we are unable or unwilling to
maintain our rights by (be sword. The
privilege of every citizen to examine the
conduct of rulers is unquestionable, though
in speaking to his country, he maybe o-
verhenrd by her enemies. But (bis riuht.
lik'- every other, may be abused ? AVIiat
pood effect is to bepxpectcd from creating
division when engaged in war with a pow
erful nation, that has not yet explicitly
shown that she is willing ‘n agree to rea
sonable terms of Peace ? Why malee pub
lications and speeches to prove M a! we
arc absolved from allegiunce to the na
tional government, and hint that an at
tempt to divide the empire might he jus
tified ? But the writer goes further : he
has never doubted that the British order-
in council, when actually enforced, were
a flagrant violation of our rights and na
tional honor, and consequently a just
eanse of declaring war. As to the best
time of performing this painful duty, and
the best manner of conducting the war.
he has differed from the government, but
surely Miry are competent to decide on
these points, and private opinion, though
it may be decently expressed, is bound to
submit. On such occasions, regret for the
refractory principle in our nature, which
scatters through nations the misery,crimes
and desolation of war. will rend (be bo
som of the benevolent man ; but if be be
also magnanimous and just, this will not
tempt him to viol Me his duty, or repine at
the arrangement of Heaven. The history
of civil society proves that it is a terrible
necessity, and man must submit to his des
tiny. ‘■Mill greater evils are produced h\
pusillanimous shrinking from conformity
to the mysterious law of his preseut con
dition.
The ferocious contest that would he the
effect of attempting to skulk from a par
tieipation of Hie burthens of war, by sev
ering the Union, would not be the greatest
calamity. Yet fierce w ould he the conflict
of enr.ig' d partizans,embittered by per
sonal animosity and rivalry,' organized
underdilf-reut governments, about equal
in number, and viewing each other as trai
tors.
In Massachusetts, during the revnln-
tionury war, an overwhelming majority
silenced opposition, and prevented mutu
al havoc ; but in other parts of the country
where parties were more nearly equal",
neighbors often shot each other in Mieir
house- or instantly ltanued their prison
ers. Divided as New K.ngland now is
such would probably be its warfare. ln-
termin .ble hostility, between neighboring
rival n itinns, would be the consequence of
accomplishing such a severance.' Foreign
faction would convulse each of them,
for a weak State can no more maintain its
’■‘gbts against powerful nations without
. drV-n n than a feeble man can
^ wuilhimself among giants without law
(6 prelect hint. The question would ever
be. w hich pow erful nation shall be our al
ly ? Great Britain and France would
each have a strong faction.but patriotism
would be unknown. The energy of the
State would be exhausted in i-lmsing its
master. This slavery would be aggrava
ted by despotism at home, for constant
wars would require great armies and re
sistless power in rulers, and these have
ever been futal to liberty.
If the question be asked, what is to be
dona when we conscientiously belie*
that a ruinous course of measures js pur
sued by our national rule is, and the dear
est l ights and interest of a grpat part of
the Union disregarded and sacrificed, the
answer is, examine the conduct and ex
pose the errors of government without
preaching sedition. Give liberal support
to their measures when right, that you
may be credited w lien you show that they
are wrong. Indiscriiniiiato opposition
raises no presumption.against them, but
it demonstrates that the minority are in
fault. Truth is powerful and will com
mand success, but error naturally tends
to destruction. In every system, perfect
enough to he capable of continued exist-
cn:o, a vis meHicatrl.v exists that will re
store it if not prevented tty improper ma
nagement.—Quackery iney prolong dis
ease, and even destroy the political as
well as the natural body. It'is not diffi
cult to point to the intiinxic principle of
convalescence in our body politic; mid
to shew that the redemption of New-
Fngland is not only possible, but proba
ble. The inttur.il shape and division of
political party woo'd he very different
from that which now exists. The eas
tern and southern Atlantic. 8tPtes are
.made for each other. A man umi woman
might us reasonably quarrel on account
of tlie differences in their formation. New-
Engl.md would soon be. restored from ni
hility iu (lie political system, if impro
per expedients for sudden relief were a-
bamloii d. Something may he done to
accelerate Ms progress ; but reproach-and
invective aggravate the raging of passion
and confirm prejudices which ore alrea
dy inveterate. Magnanimous modem
(ion, candid discussion, and experieme
of (he evil consequences of utopian pro
jects, would do mm It to convince n ma
jority of the community, that commerce
is entitled to protection; that it is too
valuable to tin- public, to be sacrificed—
tint it is contradictory and unreason
able for fhe government to render great
expenditures ne.essary by a declaration
of war, and at thw same time dry up Hie
only productive source ol revenue.; to
ask for n loan of 25 millions, and at the
same moment destroy the confidence of
the commercial parts of the Country,
where only capital stock exists ; to lay
taxes sufficient to produce popular odium
but the product of which will be inade
quate to relieve the public necessity; and
to prosecute, at an enormous expellee, a
useless and hopeless invasion, without
men or money, or credit, and with a dis
gusted people. The resources and ener
gy of a powerful nation ought not to be
wasted in the wilderness, but thrown on
the element where our wrongs were in
flicted, and nur brave countrymen have al-
ready repeatedly triumphed. They are
adequate to teaching our enemies to imi
tate the justice of Jupiter, while they
affect to scatter his thnmlerho Is.
SAMUEL DEXTER.
Washington, February 14, 1814,
WILKINSON’S ARREST.
There appears to be no doubt that Ge-
neral Wn kinson is arrested. The fol
lowing extract from a review' of the cam
paign in the National Jidvocate, a paper
which is understood to be peculiarly pa
tronized by the Secretary of War. perhaps
explains the grounds of the arrest.
[Phil. Tru“ Jlmericcn.']
<c On the ISth of October', when all
those contingencies had occurred which
forbade an attack on Kingston, Mien it
was Mint General Wilkinson liecamr
eager and ardent for attacking that place
—for taking a province, and for captur
ing four thousand men ! lien it was.
that liia instructions, of Mm 5th August,
became both positive and imperative,
leaving him no choice ! Then it was, that
lie demanded from the secretary a Pre
sidential mandate for goingto Montreal!
If the secretary had not seen the drift
of all this shuflling. lie would have been
suited to manage sticli a tortuous mnuceu-
vro: but he saw it in a moment— he found
the General seeking only a loop-hole for
escape; aud he therefore, wisely deter
mined, to leave him none. The orders
vnu have received, says lie, leave you a
‘ hoiee betw een going to Kingston or Mon
treal : you, alone are responsible for
choosing rightly, and 1 will not. now, al
ter the tenor of these orders. And whv
—because, to d • so, would but lie sub
stituting my opinion for yours.” The
General found himself ensnared in his
own net : and henceforward, we hear no
more of his going to Kingston, nor any
more of his wanting the President’s order
to proceed to Montreal. Ilis retreat cut
olfin this direction, what ishis next shift f
H ■ calls a council of war, submits to it
the state of his provisions, and wishes to
terminate the campaign even before he
gets to Prescott. This fact is stated in
his letter of the nth November, to Gene
ral Hampton—but here again his arti
fice failed : his “ General officers niuini-
iixouslv agreed, that it should nnt pre.
vent tin* progress of the expedition.” Ilis
delays were, however, such as to bring
the enemy upon his back—ind after
tome previons scratching, they so beset
j him on the llth November, as to make
a battle unavoidable—But after all, so
| bad was bis health, and so intent upon
executing ll;e orders of gnvcrr.r. id, ibat
i ter losing upwards of three hundred
men, he withdrew from the attack of-ltiuO,
and left to the enemy Mie field of battle,
bis wounded and one piece of artillery.
The reader will distinctly perceive that il
was mere anxiety to prosecute the vews
of government tliaf prevented film from
following up these 1600 inc:i. Fortune
was now about to throw in Ins way the
means of closing the campaign as be wish
ed, He invited Hampton to join him but
leaves to Iris discretion the choice of Mie
place of junction. This was not confi
dence in Hampton ; for he had none—
hut an artifice to lead tiiui officer in the
error lie had committed. If 8t. Regis
was so decidedly a point at which a
junction ought to have been made, why
leave any thing to Hampton’s judgment ?
He knew- Hampton's personal aversion
to him, and Mini if any tiling was left to
himselfhe would employ the latitude con
ceded to him to avoid Wilkinson’s im
mediate command His calculations were
not mistaken. Hampton unfortunately
seized the occasion, and obeyed the im
pulse of personal feeling. On the errors
of*tliis officer, w e have already spoken.—
lie was completely the victim of Wil
kinson's artifice and of bis own passions,
and furnished Wilkinson with a pre
tence for terminating the campaign i<f .St.
Regis. That there w as no solid reason
for terminating it there is evident—Be
cause the fioo men in gariisou at Montre
al was all the effective force iu front of
his corps; because, if the force in his
rear was h capable of disturbing (be
main action of the campaign, he should
have taken ett'ee.liial means to beat atid
destroy it : and the garrison at Kings
ton and Prescott destroyed [though we
tailed of getting to Montreal] (he upper
province was won ;” and because Hamp
ton would liave detained Provost with his
motley for^'C of 2.100 men on Mie south
side of the St. Lawrence—so Mint there
was no real insurmountable obstacle to
the ultimate success of the campaign.
FAILURE OF THE CAMPAIGN.
The following, extruded from the Docu
ments communicated by lire President
to Congress, on Mie subject of (lie last
campaign, exhibit the different opipi
. onsas to Mie proper point of attach,&.
particularly llje opposition of the Com
manding General to the attack on
Kingston,
Extract from the Journal of the Secretary
of War.
“ 4th October, 1813, Gen. Wilkinson
arrived at Sackett's Harbour, on this day,
from Fort George. He immediately vi
sited the Secretary of War, in company
with generals Lewis nud Brown, aud iu
he presence of those offi- ers remonstra
ted freely and warmly against making an
attack on Kingston—urging the proprie
ty of passing that post aud of going di
rectly to Montreal.
“ The secretary of war differed from
Gen. Wilkinson in opinion, but thought
bis objections worthy of consideration,
and proposed a meeting on the day follow
ing for that purpose.
“ The meeting took place accordingly,
when gen'l Wilkinson presented the pa
per No. t. That, marked No. 2 was
presented by the secretary, and the opi
uion with which it closes w.is adopted i.s
that which should regulate the move
ments of the ai iny.”
No I.
Reasons for •attacking Kingston ante
rior to v n descent upon Montreal:
1st. We shall capture a garrison of 800
"r 1000 and demolish a strong hold of
tlie enemy.
2d We shall destroy his naval depot
f nd magazines of every species.
3rd. \v e shall by this operation dimin
ish his force, destroy his resourc es, aud
place the division at the head of Mie lake,
under He Rotteuburg, in great difficulty
and distress: and
4th. We shall destroy every naval re
source, and of eoiiseqiienrc prevent (ho
building, equiping and even repairing a
single vessel.
jgaiust this atttaek it may be urged:
1st. i'liat the reduction of (lie place
may cost more time than we calculate on.
2d. It may encumber us with wounded
and sick ; and
3d. It is possible the British squadron
nny, as heretofore, elude commodore
Ghaiinocy, and find us before Kingston,
or evert >ke us on the St. Law rente.
In the first place, from the lateness of
(he season, the loss of a few days may ex
pose us to the autumnal rains, and jeo
pardize the chief object of the campaign.
In the second place, our own force will
be. diminished aud our own movements re
tarded ; and
In the third place the chief object of
the campaign, the capture of .Montreal,
will be utterly defeated, and'our own ar
my subjected to great difficulties, losses
and perils. Submitted to the lion, the se
cretary of war.
JAMES WiLKINSON.
No. 11.
1st. The Niagara division will proba
bly arrive here in a clay or two.
2d. The weather is yet good and the
lake navigable by scows aud boats.
3d. The enemy’s main force is in the
neighborhood of fort George and his fleet
at the head of the lake.
4th. The garrison of Kingston does not
exceed 80j or 1000 men.
51li If we effect a landing at M‘Pher-
snns’s tarn:, on the eastern side of Kings
ton, a point may be seized which will
command the town, the forts and the har
bour ; and within seven hours after the
landing is effected a sufficient battery uiav
lie erected nud iu operation.
6lh Nine and twelve rounders will !
suficicnt for burning block houses. &c. and
may be dragged by the men.
7th. The time necessary to redu >e the
place will not exceed a single day, and
of course will not materially‘interfere, on
that account, with our object below.
Sjh. '('lie loss we tnay sustain can only
be conjectured.—Judgin g from that at
Fort-George, w here enemy were more
numerous, it will he inconsiderable.
9th. The advantages of taking Kings
ton are two; yon sever (lie enemy’s line
ofcommuuicntion,nnd you expel him from
his only secure harbor.
The premises assumed nnder the 1st.
2d. 3d, 4tli and 5th heads may change.,
and our conclusions with them. The on
ly safe decision therefore is that if the
British fleet shall not escape (,'om. Chaun-
cey & get into Kingston Harbour; If the
garrison of that plr.ee be not largely re
inforced : and if the weather lie such as
to allow us to navigate the lake securely,
Kingston shall be our find object, other
wise, wc shall go directly to .Montreal.
JOHN ARMSTRONG
Sackett's Harbor, 5th Oct. 1813.
BURNING OF NEWARK.
The following is the order of the Se
cretary of War, in consequence of whieh
Newark was burnt.
War department, Oct. 4, 1813.
Sir—Understanding that the defence
of tiie post committed to your charge,
may render it proper to destroy the town
of New ark you are hereby directed to up-
prise its inhabitants of this circumstance,
and to invite Ibeni to remove themselves
aud their effects to some place of greater
safety.
I am&e.
JOHN ARMSTRONG.
Brigadier General M-Ciuve, or
officer commanding at Fort
George, Upper Canada.
RODGERS’CRUIZE.
Copy of a tetter from Commodore Rodgers
to the Secretary of the A avy.
U. States Frigate President,
Sandy-Hook Bay , Feb. 19,1814,
SIR.—1 have to acquaint you that 1 ui
l ived at my present enchorage lust ^ ven •
■]tng at five o’clock, after a cruize ot 75
days, and now have Mie honor m detail
to you the particulars.
In pursuance of your directions, I sail
etl from Providence the 5th of Deeember;
and although I expected to have mn the
gauntlet through the enemy’s squadron,
that was reported to be cruising be ween
Block-lsf ml aud Gayhcad for the pur
pose of intercepting the President, 1 h;.d
the good luek to avoid them. The day
after leaving Providence, 1 re-caplmeli
the American .schooner Comet, of aud
bound to New-York, with a cargo of cot
ton, from H&vnuriah, which had been cap
tured by the Kumilies and Loir,& in then
possession about 4 8 hours. In a few
hours after re-capturing the Comet, a situ
was discovered to the eastward, which !
felt inclined to avoid, from the circum
stance of the weather being hazy ami
knowing that I was in the neighborhood
of an enemy’s squadron ; from "an ndvun
tage of w ind, she was enabled however to
gain on our lee beam at a distance of 3 oi
4 miles, owing to which 1 was induc'd to
shorten soil, with the intention of ottering
be battle in the morning, should nothin]
else be in sight, ami she not be a ship oi
the line. The weather becoming more
obscure at 2 o’clock, prevented our seeing
her until daylight, when she stood frthi.
us to the N. E although the Piesidenl was
hove too to let her come up. From this
date until the 25th, we did not see a sin
gle sail, except the Recovery, [a brig be
longing & bound to Penobscot, front t-t.
Bartholomews, in Imilast,] until alter
reaching the longitude 35 and latitude 19,
being carried Miat. far East by u severe 8.
West gale, arcoinpincd by such a heavy
seu as to render heaving too iiiiprueiicabb
without infinite risk, when two large sai.s
were discovered standing to the north
ward, and to which 1 gave chase, belitv
ing, us well from the situation in which
they were first diseoveted, as the mani
fest disposition they afterwards shew
ed to avoid a seperation, that one yvas
a frigate anil the other an Indiantan
under her convoy; in this I yvus mis
taken, for on a nearer approach 1 could
discover the headmost was a fiigatr
with 7 ports abaft her gangway, and the
other a ship of equal or litfle inferior
force ; on discovering their decided supe
riority, and supposing them to be enemy’s
ships, I endeavored during the succccdim.
night to separate them by steering a difli-r
cut course, and occasionally shew ing e.
light—but w as uunble to succeed, for the
headmost at one time was so near (hat she
fired a shot over us, whilst her consort
yvas but a few hundred yards astern of her.
1 now directed our course to be altered,
made sail, and continued (he remainder of
the uight to shew them a light occasional
ly! bill to no t fleet, as at day-light they
were discovered to be in a situation to
unite their force. After this I shaped
a course to reach a position to windward
of Barb aloes, on a parallel of longitude
with Cayenne, and did not meet another
yessel till the 30th, when falling in with
a Portuguese brig, and receiving informa
tion that she had been hoarded 30 hours
before by two British store ships hound to
the West Indies \\ith 3000 troops on
board, I erouded sail to the w estw ard in
hope of overtaking them ; in this I was
again disappointed, and alter a pursuit
of four days, hauled fin liter southward to
gain the latitude of Barbadoes; and ii,
that situation on the 5tl: of January cap
tured the British merchant ship Wander
er, 7 guns and to men, from London bound J
to Jamaica, pa:tlv loaded with plan-j
mid will, pnsone.s, nlffi-h ." a
other British yesscL had been cun
by two Fr. u I. 44 gm frigates, the v’^' 1
sa and Ny mpbe, the same sliij g 1 |" .TV
len in Mi 14 days before <>n board
tbe I rinee Georce 1 sent »be pris m ,,T
captured iu Mie Wanderer to Barbu (V
on parole. On the 9th of January. ui l5 |*
still to the wind ward of Batin does, I e °
(un d the s’ ip I dwnrd of C g U „j
men, irnin London bound to Lm.,,:-,
in ballast—which vessel 1 «!*„ » U uk If
Having lea ml from the master of the Kj*
ward I.s wi ll as those of the Wanderer
and'Prince l corge,that they had license
p,'.rated in the Bay of Biscay from
convoy, consisting of the Queen 74, ty V(>
frig.Mis, cad two sloops of war, 1 was i n
due.id owing to a belief that the convoy
w-s still to tlie eastward, to remain t?>
windward of Bat hr does until the ici,
January, when finding they must have
passed, I changed my ground and ran off*
Cayenne, and tiam thence down the coast
of Surinam, Berhie.e & Damarurujthrrumh
between Tobago & Grenada; thence thro*
the Caribbean Sea. along the south cast
side of Porto Rico through the Mona Pas.
sage, (low a the north side of Jamaica und
other leevvaid islands, without meelinaa
single vessel of the enemy, or any other
than 4 Spanish drogers and 1 Swedish
ship, until 1 got near the .’Manilla R,. e f.
near w hic h, after capturing and sinking
the Biiiish schooner Jonathan, loude'd
with rum and dry goods [the most va|„ a .-
ble part of which I took on board] I h au |[
ed over for the Florida shore and struck
soundings oil' St. Augustine, and f rom
thence run on soundings os fur as Charles-
ton, passing within 4 or 5 miles of Colum
bia Island, and us ne r to Savannah as the
weather and depth of water would allow
without meeting a single vessel except a
Spanish ship from the Huvannalt, bound
to Spain, but steering for Savannah, i u
consequence of having sprung a h ak.
Arriving off Charlestown, [which was
on the llth inst.j I stretched close in
w ith the Bar & made the private signal
of the day to two schooners lying
in Rebellion Roads, ami which from
their appearance, I believed to be pubiio
vessels. AM, r remaining all day offthe
Bar with ei .ors hoisted and the* fore,
mentioned signa, displayed, without bel
ing able to couiinuuicale with the st liom-
ers, I stood to the northward# and ai 7
o’clock the next, morning discovered and
eh. s, d a ship to the southward, which af
ter pursuing s or 0 miles, Jed uie t<> tha
second sail, [a brig under her topsails,
with her top-gallant mast housed and
flying jib bourn rigged in] und from
thence to the discovery of a third sail,
represented from die mast-bead to be a
large frigate ; on discovering llw.(bird
sail, added to the niauceuv res of the first
arid second, I was induced to believe them
part ol an enemy’s squadron, ard accor
dingly hauled up and stood foi the for
mer to ascertain her character; and after
making her Corn the deck, precelved she
was a frigate as reported. I now tacked
and shortened sail, believing that to
wards night 1 might be enabled to eut off
the ship [which was either a small fri-
te or large sloop of war] attd brig,from
the -third or largest sail, at this time 9 or
to miles (0 the vvinward ; in this however
I was 1 ot able to effect my purpose, ow
ing to the weather sail [between sun
set and dark [bearing down for the a*
thers. Judging now from the manoeuvres
that after dark they would chase, I stood
to the eastward undtr short sail; believ
ing that in M e morning I n.i. lit find them
iu some disorder ; at day light, however,
owing to the haziness of the weather,
tiiey were r.ot to tie seen; consequently I
wore nr.d stood ba'-k to the vvestwaixfto
make them again, and in a few minutes
discovered two [one on the lee. the other
on Mie vveathfr bow] to which 1 gave
chase, but after chasing them about half
an hour, the w eather becoming more clear
and two large ships suddenly making
their appearance (one on the weather
ami the other on the lee beam) 1 changed
my course to the eastw ard ; when the lour
immediately crowded sail in pursuit; but,
owing to tbe weather, assisted by the ene
my ’s manner ot chasing, 1 was enabled to
-.‘•t clour of tlieni without difficulty in a
few hours. From tliis 1 pursued a enurso
on soundings (except iu doubling (’ape
Halterus) to 18 fathom water oil the De
laware. where in a log, 1 fell in with a
large vessel, npparantly a man of war.
Shortened sail to topsails and 1 lenred ship
for action, but she suddenly disappear*/
ing and in a few minutes she, or some o2
• her vessel near being heard to lire signal
juns. 1 stood on to the northward from
a belief I was near another squadron.—
Fi run the Delaware I saw nothing until I
made Sandy Hook, when I again fell in
with another of the ensniy’s squadrons,
and by some unaccountable cause was per
mitted to enter :he bay, allliou:'h in tl<*
presence of a dcciduliy superior force, af
ter having been obliged to remain oiit«id#
seven hours and a half waiting for tb*
tide.
I am, &c.
JOHN RODGERS.
Hon. Win. Jones, secietary of the Navy-
Richmont*, March S,
GRE AT FIRE AT YORK TOWN.'
Extract to the Edi orl dated
York, March 4.
“ Yesterday about 3 p. m Mrs. Gibbon’s
bouse in this place look tire, and together
with the county Court-house, the rhurch,
(lie spacious dwelling of the late Presi-
Neison, and the whole of the town
detit * , ....
below the hiil, except Charlton's uui