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(’f i nv*inut , rl from “Fourth Vnze>)
pabl • than eorrup fl on. and appealing
to motives ‘es* profligate than venali
ty- will produce an? impression upon
th** vote of f en million"* of freemen,
scattered over ‘he vast domain whicn
i their favored inheritance. The
fact that these principle arp x from
their very na*ure incaoab'e of acting
upon multitude would prevent them
from operating upon ‘he people, even
4f w e had not the higher security fur
, iehedby their virtue and patriotism.
But it ii (Yeq cully objected, that
ir'*p3t mans of the people are not
stidi ientlv intelligent to decide up
oo ihe quttlifi‘-aiin of so important
an offi eras the chief magistrate of
a great Republic; and yet. that, in
voting for electors, who are merely
the organs of their will, they in
fact determine that question. As
tlic history of all nations, of any
considerable extent, gives at least a
plausible coloring to this objection*
it deserves to be deliberately exam
ined. No political principle is more
firmly established hv the experience
of nations* than ihot the freedom ol
polifhal institutions cannot rise
higher than the intelligence of the
people. All attempts to erect free
governments upon aov other basis
than an intelligent population, have
always resulted, and must ever re
sult, i?i re-action and disaster If,
therefore. I fie committee could be
lieve that the people of ihe United
States are nit sufficiently intelli
gent io perform so essential ts func
tion of popular sovereignty os the
1e tin of iheir chief executive ma
gistrate, they could not resist the
unwrlo’ tne conclusion, that our
gytier.i of g vermtent. i- but a de
lusive lo'pp. renting unsub
foundations, an if ontaiuirg
\v.*bi,i i*4©ir the poinciplei of rapid
degeneracy a*.d er'ain dissolution.
Jto.p -r sd.i’ity t( the J)Pnj)!r. all roust
admit, is the only adequate security
f.r freedom, tli<* great'"conservative
principle of n representative gov
ernment. And what would he the
value of the responsibility of w pub
lie agent, to a people not capable of
electing him? If, therefore, it could
be shewn that the people are not
competent to elect the President, an
argument would result, which if
Would be difficult to resist, in favor
of those political combinations
which, under various forms and
pretences, are ever ready to os*um
the province *f dtel&tingto the peo
pie, and whi<*h can only be regard
ed, when habitual and permanent,
as synonimous with corruption.
Under these circumstances, wc
have e. source of just consolation
ard pride in the reflection, that, in
all that relates to the maintenance
and enjoyment of a system of prac
tical freedom, hist >l7 has left no
record of a people at all to be **nm
pn'<>d the ciiizeus of these Uni
ted States.
\ very brief notice oT the prr.mi-
Dcni circumsfa'o*cs wl ich d?s*in
guish our social ad p-li toil cm.di
tioM from tha of the republic n n&.
t?c*s of antiquity, a f d of the civil
|7 ,] . m ion* of modern *U? ope, w r H
furnish, at on e, the evidence and
the ex|dHna<ion of ibis superi rity.
\o estimate of the comparative
condition of this and ibe an ieot re
publics can le put. whirh d**es not.
embrace tbe invention of the art o’
printing, and the consequent estab
lishment of a free press. These
causes alone have produced per
xn inent revolution in tbe political
condition of tbe human race. So
cieties of freemen have been impro
ved a-*d enlarged, to a degree utter
ly unattainable without these effi
cient means of diff using intelligence,
and tbe republican system has con
sequently received a modification and
extension, which the wisdom of mi
ti<] tit v would have pronounced im
possible. The harangues of their
orators, delivered to collected mul
titudes, were almost the only means
of political intelligence enjoyed by
the people of the ancient republics.
The extent of a republic, or, in
other words, of a government ema
nating from the people, and respon
sible to them, is confined, by ao im
perious political necessity, to such
limit*, that the proceedings of the
central administration may he
promptly, certainly, and generally
communicated to the extremes of
the country. Adverting, therefore,
to the limited means id’communica
ting intelligence possessed by the
an dents, (he reason is apparent why
their republics were so extremely
contracted. They were, of necessi
ty. simple democracies ; and, in the
davi of their greatest purity and
splejador, the portion of the people
which really governed was confined
to their chief cities, because that
portion alone wai within (he reach
of the only existing sources of polit
ical intelligence. On the contrary,
the great body of the people of the
United k tatrs, dispersed over an im
mense region, to whine soil they*?
are attached jiv the strongest ties,
receive daily, in the tranquillity
of retirement, from books, docu
ment*, ’ legislative discussions, and
the chronicles of passing events, that
knowledge of !he affairs of the Re
public, which the Greeks and Ro
-1 mans received almost entirely from
(be occasional debites of their ora
> trs before the assciabliei of the peo
ple. It is, therefore, extremely ob
vious. that any inference u ifavora
ble t the political capabilities of
the American people, which can be
drawn from the history of those re
publics, must be founded up >n loose
analogies, calculated rather to de
lude than to ct.ligbten.
A con pa? isoo between t*ie United
Staiea a*u) the civilized nations of
modern limes, will lead to results
equally fluttering.
All ’thegreat political societies
of modern Europe having a feudal
origin, are const ranted upon feudal
principles. A permanent inequali
ty of'property, maintained by law,
and consecrated by usige, has na
turally produced the extremes of a
proud arjitoc.racy and a degraded
populace, without any intermediate
power sufficient (g control their ir
regular tendencies. In such a state
of thing?, it is not diffi isl, to con
ceive. thud papula* electioii of the
ohief executive magistrate would
(brow (he hostile element! <;fsocio
tv in?') sucli vi- lent collision n* to
involve in anarchy and ruin all (hat
i sacred in (he institutions <*f the
country. But nil the American
communities which compose (he U.
Slaves, ere essentially different, both
in their origin and cons'-ruetmn,
from those of modern Europe Our
ancestors, in the full ma'urity of
reason, with no conse -rased errors
to embarrass (hern, reared up, trom
elements, a system of
practical freedom; aod, from the
first settlement of the country, eve
ry successive generation has been
accustomed (o exsroisc the functions
of self-government, in every fmtn,
and in overy variety of combine sons.
Nor are we less favorably distin
guished in the nompn-ifioa of our
social system, than in its origin
The abolition of the law# of pri
mogeniture has prodo-ed a general
equality of property, an I this again,
together with the equality of civil
ad political privileges, has pla
ced a general diffusion of know
ledge, of which history furnishes
no example. AJmot the entire
miss of our population
in character sad situation, with
what fs denominated the middle in
terest in England’ and which is
justly considered, by her most en
lightened statesmen, a? the soundest
part of her population. In extend
ing he elective system in the Uni
ted States, therefore, beyond all
former precedents, we do nothing
more than adapt our p ikies! to our
so *!al system. In fact, so widely
and ffrrent is our situation ftom that
of any oHier nation, that it may be
truly said, that the people would fie
sJe%s liable to make an injudicious
: choice of a chief magistrate, than
of any other important officer of the
government. Such is the admira
ble distribution atid subordination of
political powers in our system, and
such the variety of practical schools
of preparation and trial through
which a statesman must pass, be
fore he can aspire, with just or rea
sonable expectations of success, to
the highest office it the republic,
ih:.t the qualifications and pieten
sions of the candidates can always
be determined by the wisdom of
their past measures, and the impor
tance of their past services. A*
these arc the only indications of
wisdwti) upon whi< h it would be safe
to rely, in (be selection of an offi
cer of mi h vast responsibility and
importance, •( is satisfactory to re
flect, (hat they are indications, al
so, of so palpable a kind, (ha* (bey
cannot fad (o make (heir just im
pression, both upon (be intelligence
and gratitude of so enlightened and
patriotic people.
But another objection, of a kind
red spirit with that which has been
just considered, is frequently urged
against the change pr posed. It is
said that (he appointment of eleet
ois by the people would so directly
involve (lie canvass for the Presi
dency kstdf, as to produce a degree
■
of popular oxciteraent subversive of
the order and peace of society. The
remarks already offered, in relation
to the dispersion of our population,
(he peculiar structure of our socie
ty* and (he general diffusion of in
telligence, are sufficient to show,
that nothing in the experience of o
ther countries can be regarded as
a just foundation for suub an ap
prehension. But f there are other
views of the subject, which will
lead us to the conclusion, that the
tendency of the proposed change,
upon which this objection is found
ed, 1* one of its strongest recom
mendations.
The order of the social virtues
and social duties in the U. Spates,
is nearly (he reverse of that which
existed amongst the Greeks and Ro
mans, In an ordinary state of
things, when no great emergency
calls for patriotio sacrifices, the
duly which principally engrosses
the feelings and effrts of an Amer
ican citizen, i* to make provision
for his comfortable subsistence, and
to satisfy the edaims es hi* family,
Whereas, the fiisi consideration of
a Greek or a Roman citizen, both
in peace and in war, was the t?lory
of his country. Our tendency,
therefore, is tn give too exclusive
aw attention ?* private pursuits, and
sink into indifference in relation to
the general concents of the repub
lic ; while (ho tendency of the
G reeks and flotnan9 was to inter
meddle perpetually in pnbli * affairs,
to the neglect and detriment of
their private concern*. Our dan
ger. therefore, is too much popular
apathy; then 9 was too much popu
lar excitement. And though (he
stale of thing*) existing here, is more
deeply founded in nature, atid fur
nishes a moce substantial basis for
a durable and extended system of
liberty, *t eerraiid? indicates the
nec.estiiy of such constitutional ‘ar
rangements as w*!l rouse the atten
tion of the people to 90 great n na*
tior,d q ie<fin:i as (he election of a
chief magistrate. No s'rougar or*
idence me*J be offered, of the exis
tence of s*idi a nci'cssityj than the
ftHtiMl state of pnh ? b* opinio* on that
subject, at this moment, in m%ny
pari sos the Unioo. The people
hav* b-cn so long aoeustoKied to
have no ir (ial agency In the ei
erkion of a President, that the idea
is not uncommon, thal they have
nothing t*> do vrith it. As the ine
vitable icdc*n-y of this stfcte of po*
pnl-tr I‘d to in ,s rease the
power (I isfluenre of political
managers end uov.dneipled combi
nation*, it is of the last importance
(hat it shonld be corrected, if possi
ble. The committee arc of the
opinion that the plan submitted wilf
fucnis’i the remedy.
But it yet remains that we in
quire whether the people should
vole by a general ticket or by dis
trict* The committee will, there
fore. proceed to state the considers
tions which have induced them to
adopt the latter system. It was as
eveidently !be, intention of the fra
mens of (he constitution, as it is the
dictate of sound policy, that the
President of the United Stales
should he the choice of the people
and not of ‘he Stales, It i9 true,
they contemplated an infusion of
the federal principle info the elec
tioo, in f!e proportion of the Sena
t*P9 to (he Representatives in Con
gress ; and thi* prop rtion is retain
ed in the plan proposed by the com
mittee.
But to extend the federal princi
ple to the whole body of the elec
tors, would be nothing less than sa
crificing the rights, the interests,
and the power of the people, to the
false and imaginary idol of State
consolidation.
Assuming if a* an undeniable po
sition, that a majority of the peo
ple of the United States have a right
to elect he President, and (hat the
wdl of such majority ought to pre
vail, it can be demonstrated that
the svsfem of voting by a general
ticket, would render this fundamen
tal principle of our government the
sport of accidental combinations.
Six of the States, for example, if
they give a unanimous vote, can el
ect the President. But if they vote
by a general ticket, the candidate
who obtains a bare majority of the
popular vote, receives the unanim
ous electoral vote of the State.
So that, assuming the population of
the United Stales to be eight mill
ions, a little more than two millions
of the people might elect the Presi
dent. Let us again suppose, that
there are two States, one contain
ing nine hundred thousand people;
and entitled to thirty electoral vote,
and the other containing eight hund
red tfiousand people, and entitled to
twenty-six electoral vo(es.—Let us
further suppose, that there are two
candidates for the Presidency, of
whom one is supported by five hun
dred thousand of (he people of the
first supposed State, and the oilier
by the remaining four hundred
thousand, aud the entire eight hun
dred thousand of the oilier state.
Under these circutnitauees, the can
didate who obtains the support of
only five hundred thousand of the
people, would receive thirty electo
ral votes,while twelve hundred thou
sand people could give the opposing
candidate only twenty-six! Accor
ding to this sy3texn of false equations
a large minority of the people is 4
precisely equal to 00 minority at all.
By thus entirely excluding the
Slate minorities from the caeula
tion, in making up the general ag
gregate, the people arc literally
immolated, by hundreds of thou
sands, at the shrine of an artificial
and delusive system, which, by ma
king a majority equal to the whole
in e* 4i State, gives a minor
ity an equal chance f r the ascen
dency in the Union.
T he true popular principle, in the
opinion of the cxnmittee, is that
which prevails in all other popular
elections throughout the United
Satc*. In tlio election, for exam
ple, of the Gogeroor of a 8la(e, by
(he people, a candidate docs not
count the unanimous vote of every
county where he happens !o obtain
a majority, but the respective ma
jorities of the several candidates
arc added to their respective minor
ities, ami the aggregates thus pro
duced, are taken as (he true ex
pression of the popular will. If#
(hen, hi all that relat#* to the •** ttn
ino defence and general welfare,”
the people of the United Stales aro
really I obi regarded as one people ;
if all the citizess of the Republic,
whether their lot happen! $0 be cast
on the oae side or the other of an
imaginary line, as o equally entitled
to tiieir vote and (heir voice, in (be
common fjoocerns anil common
councils of the Union ; if it be wise
to exclude from those rouncUs the
peculiar and exclusive feelings of
states; and if the uian who is to
preside over the common destinies
of ail, should have peculiar obli
gations to discharge ai*d pe idiae
feeling* to indulge, towards none of
(he States, we are tinder the most
9oleiri < obligations to reject a plau
for electing the Presides, which
would array States against States,
in ambitious •< flirt for the muste
rs. and equal It ganrifi ! *e the urm
iientible rights of the people, aod
the general harmony of the Union.
But (here is another object ion to
the system of voting, by a general
ticket, which the committee consid
er ueanswei’&ble.
It h a practical proposition, con
clusively established by the expert
enee cf all the stales where the ex
periment has beer; raada. that this
system tend#, by an iuevitable ue
erssity, to trac. fer into the hands
ofa few the power of controlling
(be entire suffrage of the state. In
a state entitled to thirty electors,
aud composed, perhaps, of fifty
counties* it must be appareni# that
almost every county would vote far
an entire ticket of its own ; and that
tbe popular will would be thus ex
po gi to such distraction, as eons
pleteiy to endanger its success,
without some means of giving it
concentration. And as the power
of the individuals sr’ected for this
pup >se must be 00-exteitsiv® with
the wills which it would be (heir
object to concentrate, it would fol
low, that they would virtually de
cide which of the presidential can
didates should receive the whole el
ectoral vote of (he state. At the
first commencement of such a sys
tem, whea ?he persons clothed with
the authority of uniting (he popular
will were really its representatives’
no great evil would he experienced.
Bui the slightest attention to the
history of ambition, the tendency
of power, or the lessors of our own
experience, will convince us that
such combinations change, in the
natural course of things, from tem
porary expedient to permanent in
stitutions; and that, from beiug tlio
mere organs of the will of the peo
ple, they assume, under pretexts
which ambition is seldom at a loss
<o devise, the power of dictating to
the people,
la making these remarks, the
committee feel conscious that they
are rather recording the history of
the times To which they live, than
their own speculations. And it is
upon (his high authority that they
predicate tfie opinion, that if (he
plan jf voting by a general ticket
were established, a ceniral power
would spring up in almost every
stafe, consisting of the ruling poli
ti'*itKs3 ot the day, who would be
bound to the people by no tie of re
gular responsibility, and be, in eve
ry respect, more liable to cabal, in
trigue, and corruption, than the
Legislature itself. Aud when we
reflect that the cniire electoral vote
of a siale, upon which (he presiden
tial election itself might turn,
would frequently depend upon the
integrity of a few men, perhaps of
a single individual, it is difficult to
conceive a state of thiogi in whidg[
there would bo stronger induced
merits, or greater facilities for in
trigue and corruption. By divi
ding the states info districts, all
these evils would be avoided. The
will of the people would be fairly ex-
i\o political combinations
would be necessary or practicable.
Kvery district would, at least, havo
its own oonfre of operation.* upon
which corruption would be brought
to bear, with its inducements vastly
diminished; and its consequences
proportionality less to be dreaded.
‘Die last branch of the
under which the committee are ao- ‘
ting, remains to be oonidered.
They have found it impractica
ble absolutely to exclude the possi
bility of the election of President
and Vice President devolving, in a
ny event, upon Congress ; but they
believe, u idee the plan submitted,
the contingency would not happen
once in a century, upon which <h<s
election would devolve upon that
b ody. They propose, in (be event
of no person receiving a m*j irity of
the electoral votes at the first bal
loting, that the electors shall again
meet, forthwith, in their respective
state*, and vote for the two persons
having the highest uu alter of votes
in (he first instance. This will al
most invaluably ensure an election
by the electors, at the second bal
lofth-g. Indeed, it may be fairly
presumed, that every candidate who
is convinced he cannot be one of the
two highest in the first instance,
wsl! withdraw from (he c*oo<est ;
and, in this manner, the probability
of an election, at tae (!•%( balloting’
will be very oaeh mrcasd
This branch of fpeamendment is
recommended by Ml the reasons
which can be.urged against the el
ection of (be President by the H ouse
of Representatives. And these, in
the opinion of the committee, are
cogent and conclusive
All history teaches us the melan
choly truth, that, in the election of
a Üblef of a gr*at Re
public. intrigue aod corruption, un
der the various aod insidious dis
guises which they ar4 of
assuming, areth* deleterious prin
ciple* against which the precau
tions of human wisdom sre leas* c
pable of providing an ftTcetual re
sistance. f l he danger to be appre
hended from these principles, is in
direct proportion to the fempfaiion
and the means of rendering them
efficient instruments in promoting
the views of ambition. And what
prize can hold out more attractive
temptations to the amhitims than
the Presidency of the United Stales?
—ln pursuit of what object is even
a virtuous mi ni so much exposed to
the blandishing delusions of thaC
wretched casuistry, whig# makos
(he end sanctify the means? And
when we advert to the immense
store of patronage which weuhl be
pl&c.ed fo** di<**cihutian in tffii hands
of the successful aspirant, i? cannot
be disguised, that be would have
precisely those means of tampering
with the members of the Home of
Representatives, by which the Mage*
of wickedness might be receives in
the disguise of virtue's recompense;
and the wretch who sold his iite
grity, might almost delude himself
into the belief that be was serving
his country. It is exceedingly un
pleasant to indulge the idea, (hit
the representatives of & virtuous
aud enlightened poople could evet
be swerved from any duty by selfish
or sinister view*; but, we have the
authority of more than human wig*
dom for saying, “ lead lis not into
temtation •” It is, therefore, the
deliberate opinion of the committee,
that the only effectual mode of pre
serving our government Irotn the
corruptions which have undermind
ed the liberty of so many other na
tions. is to confide the election of our
chits ttwcutm Mdgittr ate to those