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42
posed by necessity, il it is not adopt
ed from choice, with this great dif
ference, that the first uniformity w ill
deliver up the votes of the State, to
the active managers in the general
Assemblies, while the latter would
leave them in the hands of the real
sovereigns,' the qualified voters of
the whole State It can hardly be
said that the States would have a
choice, when the option would be
between falling into the general
ticket system, and submitting to a
material dimunilkm of their relative
weight in the election. The ques
tion, then, turns upon tho relative
advantages oflhe general ticket and
district modes of voting; one or the
other of which must soon universally
prevail; and it matters nothing to
the sovereignty of tlie State, wheth
er one shall ho established by the
Constitution, or the other imposed
by noces« ir y; and as the whole point
of this objection is confined to the
more right of choice, and of chang
ing the systems from time to time, it
results that this right cun he of no
value where choice is impossible, and
change not desirable.
2. The second point in the objec
tion is, the supposed diminution of
the power of the State in that ten
dency to scatter the votes which the
district system is admitted to pos
sess.
Admitting that a unity of its voles
may he desirable to a State; that
unity will he produced l.y the di -
ll iet system, as often as the Stale de
sires it. If the majorities in all the
districts arc of the same opinion,
thi y will create the unity by giving
i!,c same vote; if they are not, it is
held to he a violation of the rights
of so many districts as would have
voted differently, to impress their
votes into the service of the domi
nant party in the general Assembly of
the State. In the general ticket
mode of election, the vote of the
State is directed by the majority oi
the State Legislature; the majority
itself influenced by some leading
members; and the ticket, thus ar
ranged is often made to triumph
over the whole State, by the inure
eflect of discipline, and in open vio
lation of the will of the actual sove
reigns, the fair majority of the quali
lieil voters. It i-capabh of demon
stration, that the general ticket elec
tion, especially over a large surface,
>' niton no election at all iiy f lie peo
ple. A small and organised body
s| i|>plv the place of numbers, hv unity
ot design and energy of action. V, ant
of concert in the body of the peo
ple, will render superior numbers of
no avail. Division will destroy their
strength, by scattering their votes;
and ant icipation of defeat will ensure
it, by preventing numbers from going
to the polls.
•'>. The last braneli of tho objec
tion is in ihe supposed tendency to
consolidation, which is seen by some
in the abolition of electors, arid the
substitution of the direct vote of the
people. This is completely and ful
ly answered in a foregoing part of
this report ; to which it may be ad
ded, that, when analysed, it turns
out to be nothing more oe-less than
an old objection in anew form, to the
district system itself For the pur
poses of consolidation, it is perfectly
immaterial whether the people vote
by districts, in their own persons, or
through the agency of electors; and
if this system is established, it is un
known to tlie Committee for what
object the institution ot' electors can
be supposed to he wanting.
Finally, there is a point of view
from which to look at the several
branches of all these objections,
which exhibit them in the light of
anomalous, if not very equivocal,
pretensions to the character of State
rights. It is this.: that they present,
ns contending parties, not the Fed
eral Government on one side, and the
people of a State on the other, but
the Legislature of a Slat* against the
people of the same State : the scr
» ants against their masters, the lead
ing m n against the mass, the few
Complaining that they will lose the
privilege of coiitroliug and directing
ilie votes of the many !
The Committee have based tli ir
plan of amendment upon the propo
sition, that the plan of tho Consti
tution had failed in the election of
President and Vice-President cf the
United States. The points of failure
were indicated in its two leading
features — the institution of electors
and the ultimate election, by s i vn.s,
i a the Jlou*e of Representatives. That
tho first branch of this proposition
lias been fully demonstrated, and the
best substitute proposed which the
case admits of, is respectfully sub
mitted to the decision of the Senate.
The establishment of the second
ranch, and the demon., tration of the
fitness of the proposed substitute,
remain to be attempted.
That it was the intention of the
Constitution, in giving to the State,
■ a tho House of Representatives, an
equality of votes for President, to
increase the weight and respecta
bility of the House, and to give tr
ibe small States a chance to act an
ificient part in the election, is equal
ly clear from the Constitution itself,
and from all the cotemporaneous ex
positions of that instrument. Upon
;hese grounds the power in question
lias often been defended : but if the
intention of the Constitution lia
fniled ; if the small Plates have not
lealised the chance wb'ch was iuten.
ded for them ; if the House of Re
presentatives has derived no addi
tional weight or respectability from
acting as umpire between presiden
tial candidates; above all, it real
evil, both to the House and to the
people of the Stales, have been
found to result from this contingent
power of election ; then there can
be no reason for preserving a part of
the Constitution which has failed of
its object, and produces evil instead
of good. The Committee believe
that this failure has been complete,
and that the principles which should
govern the election of a chief ma
gistrate, in a free country, require
that the choice of President of these
United States should r.o longer be
permitted to devolve upontl o House
of Representatives. These princi
ples have been stated, and enforced,
in the course of this report. They
spring from the dangers to which
such elections arc liable. These
dangers arc—
1. Os corruption among the vo
ter--.
2. Os violence, in the heat of the
elections
3. Os coalitions, to elect or defeat
a particular candidate.
Opposed to these dangers are cer
tain rules of action, ripened into
axioms, to the test of which, every
election of a first officer of a repub
lic should be brought. These ax-
• iotas are—
j To prevent corruption.
1. Multiply the voters.
2. Keep lhe candidates from among
| them.
3. Avoid pre-existing bodies ofj
electors.
To prevent violence, and avoid coc ,
lions:
1. Seperate the voter--.
The plan of election in the Com-j
miltoe’s amendment, both for the I
first and second election, has been j
brought to the test of each of these
axioms, and found to abide them.:
The voters will consist of millions, j
and cannot bo corrupted; they will J
be scattered over the territory of the
whole confederation, and cannot hold
an intercourse with tho candidates;
they will vote at several thousand
different places, on the same hours
of tho same day, and can noil her
fight, nor coalesc ; they arc not a
pie-exi -ting body, in (he sense of the
objection, for that term only applies
to small select bodies. j
'Pried by the test of these axioms,
the House of Representatives, as an
electoral college, stands condemned
upon every one of thorn.
1. Ii i- a small body, therefore ca
pable of being corrupted.
2. It is a pre-existing body, there
fore capable of l-cing tampered with.
3. It -its in the presence of the
candidates, therefore, is subject to he
influenced by an intercourse with
them.
4. it Votes in a body, therefore is
subject to violence, and capable of
coalitions.
In addition to these objections, to
which the House of Representatives
is subject, in common with all small
bodies, it is yet liable to others, pe
culiar to i seif, as a Legislative de
partment, viz.
1. The anomaly of a Legislature
creating the executive.
2. The interruption of its regular
business.
3. The introduction of anew test
in elections ot members.
4. The application of anew influ
ence to these elections.
5. The creation of opposition and
administration parties in Congress.
6. The effect of all this upon fair
Legislation.
7. The further effect of all this
upon the mimls of the people, tiie
character of the Government, and
the stability of our Republican insti
tutions.
There is one point, however, and
the Committee are proud to state it,
in which the Hence cf Representa
tives, as an electoral college, must
forever he entitled to a preference
over any other ot" equal numbers,
which can be constituted: it is in
the elevation of its character, in the
talents which distinguish, and the in
tegrity which ennobles it, and which
the pride, virtue, and intelligence of
the people must be forever anxious
to preserve and exalt.
The objeCiions which have been
stated again-1 bringing the election
into the House, are of such a charac
ter, in the opinion of the Commit
tee, ns to merit the most serious con
sideration ; and, when their weight
and importance are duly estimated,
it can hardly be believed that the
framers of our Constitution, if they
could have foreseen the frequent
occurrence ofthat event, would have
consented to endanger the purity of
our Government, and the stability of
our institutions, by consenting to
carry the election before that body,
in any contingency whatsoever. Il
is obvious, from the whole theory
and spirit of the Constitution, that
the President was intended to be
chosen by electors fresh from the
people, and that it never was con
templated that the election should
devolve on the House of Represen
tatives, except in an extraordinary
and rare contingency. Rut, from an
extension in territory, which could
not have been foreseen, and an in
crease in wealth and population be
yond all expectation, tin. pursuits of
our citizens have In come so diver
sified, and so many local i* 1 1 rests
GEORGIA STATESMAN.
have sprung up among them, that it
is almost a vain hope tiiat the election
of President can ever again be ef
fected on the lir-t trial, whether the
people vote direct, or through the
agency ot intermediate electors; and
it seems to be no longer doubtful,
that under ordinary circumstances,
the choice must, hereafter, devolve
upon the House of Representatives
The provision of the Constitution,
intended only for an emergency, thus
becoming one of ordinary application,
and that which the wisdom of our
fathers designed as the “ Medicine oj
the State,” (to be resorted to only in
a dangerous crisis) isto become our
daily bread.”
In this view of the subject, it be
comes a question, which addresses
itself to the mind and heart of every
lover of his country, whether Con
gress can be safely trusted with the
choice of the Chief Magistrate ot
this great and growing Republic, not
as an event, which in a seres of years
may happen; but which it the ordi
nary course of affairs mv.-t inevitably
and frequently occur. Tile first ob
j ction. and the one which cannot
fail to suggest itself to every mind,
is the incompatible nature <3 the
duties which belong to a Legislative
Assembly and to an electoral college.
No principle ought, in the opinion ot
the Committee, to beheld more sa
cred, as none certainly, is more plain
ly recognised in the whole structure
of our Government, than that which
keeps the Executive and Legislative
departments seperate and distinct.
There seems, indeed, to be. infused
into the different branches ot our
Government ,j(doubtlcssfor the wise, t
purposes,) a jealous spirit, which,
generously t herished and properly
directed, may be fruitful of the great
est benefits That the Legislature
should elect the Executive, is an
anomaly; it is altogether inconsis
tent with the most cherished princi
ples of our system, and, in practice,
may be found equally fatal to the
purity of one branch ot the Govern
ment, and the independence of the
other.
The refer nee of this question,
which will call into action the strong
est, and some of the w'orst, passions
of our nature, to a pre-existing
isonv of mex, assembled at the seat
of Government, and from their char
acter and situation, brought into al
most daily contact with til candid
ate, on whom they can confer the
first office in the Republic, and who,
in turn can bestow upon them bril
liant honors and rich rewards must,
from the very nature of things, ex
pose them to the various influences,
by which power and patronage have,
in every age, seduced men from the
path of duty, and tempted them to
betray the most sacred trusts When
we take into view the great and in
creasing patronage of the Executive,
and of the various departments un
der his control, and perceive how
compietely it is in his power to cause
the influence of his office to be felt,
we must shut our eves, to the lights
of wisdom and experience, sf we do
not perceive, that the period is not
far distant, when the office of i’res:-
dent will be conferred as the reward
of open intrigue and the do. pest
corruption. Rut it is not alone against
acts of open and palpable corruption,
that it becomes necessary to guard
A body, even of high-minded men,
ardently engaged in running the race
of honorable ambition, will always
be liable to be deluded by the fasci
nations of office ; and, though they
may not be seduced from their course
by the treasures which may. be thrown
in their way, will be induced to swerve
from their duty by temptations more
congenial to honorable minds ; and
that ready casuistry, by which poli
tic in ns so easily deceive themselves,
will furnish an apology for a course
of conduct, which, in private life,
such men would scorn to pursue.
All experience demonstrates, that
the best security of virtue is found
in avoiding all temptations. But
even if the danger of corruption in
the House of Representatives was
iess alarming in its magnitude, and
less certain in its occurrence, the
Committee would still apprehend,
that the preservation of the charac
ter both ot' the Legislature and the
Executive, and securing to them that
place in the public confidence and
esteem, without w hich their strength
will be but weakness, ard their wis
dom folly, would require that they
should be far removed even from un
just suspicion. In a country like
ours, governed by public opinion, it
is of the last importance, that those
who are appointed to make and exe
cute the laws, and who must always
give tone to our national character,
should conciliate the confidence ot
the people, cr at least stand before
them unimpeachod: That a suc
cessful candidate, exalted to the
Chief Magistracy by the members ot
Congress, should feel a deep s nse
of gratitude towards those to whom
he is indebted for his elevation, is
neither strange nor the subject of
just exception. In the distribution
of the numerous offices w ithin bi
ght, it would be impossibly tor him
so to act otherwise than to exclude
altogether from the range of liis
choice, men, in other respects, well
qualified for the highest otlices, or
to subject himself, however unjustly,
to the imputation of being influenced
by personal and unworthy motive-
But if the olccUon hi the House
of Representatives were liable to >
none of these objections, still, the
interruption it will give to the calm
and regular progress of Legislation,
would itself, be an evil of the most
alarming nature. The mixing up oi
party feeling, personal animosities,
and local interests, with ordinary
acts of Legislation, would unques
tionably, be one of the greatest ca
lamities to which the country could
be exposed. Unless those who cre
ate the laws, like the judges who ex
pound them, are free from prejudice
and passion, it is impossible that they
can fulfil their high duties with puri
ty and wisdom. That the acrimoni
ous feelings, and bitter animosities
excited, in a contested election, in
the House of Representatives, would
not subdue at its close, but would,
for a long course of time, exert an
influence on the deliberations, and
perhaps control the decisions, ot the
Legislature, by disturbing the tran
quility of its course, and tingingevery
Legislative act with party views and
feelings, is too certain to admit ot a
doubt. We may, indeed, tremble
for the fate of the country, when
Congress shall bo degraded into a
mere electoral college, and the high
duties of the Legislature shall be
confided to the opposing tactions,
known only ns tire enemies or parti
zans of t lie admir.i. (ration. Hut this
is not all. The people themselves,
in each a State of things, will be
templed to contribute to this evil,
by sending men to represent them,
on the eve, of every presidential
election, not because of the depth of
their knowledge, the soundness of
their principles, or their peculiar fit
ness for Legislation, but on account
of their political opinions, in relation
to the several candidates for the
presidency. Even after the election
was over, the evil spirit of the time
might continue to operate, and to de
mand the election of candidates who
would be particularly devoted to the j
new administration. That tho ad
ministration it self, should be inser.si-|
b!e to the success of these candid
ates, is not to be expected from hu
man nature. Wishes must be form
ed, and the knowledge, or even sus
picion of these wishes, would bring
an ardent and concentrated force to
the support of the presumed favor
ite : < n the other hand, all the ele
ments of opposition would combine
againstT.hn : merit would bo out <4
the question; the public good no ob
ject, a degrading test would super
cede all the recommendations of
worth and talents; and even the
elections of the State officers might
be brought within the vortex of a
system, so fatal to (lie interests of
the cou. try, ands > full of degrada
tion to the voters anil the candid
ates.
In a Government professedly foun
ded upon the vTill of the people, that
will, when known, should always be
entitled to the most respectful con
sideration. Now, as far as public
will can be ascertained, it is decided
ly opposed to the House of Repre
sentatives, as an umpire, in the last
resort, between the presidential can
didates. Yet, a second choice, by
sonic body of electors, is inevitable;
a majority, or even a large plurality,
cannot be counted upon, in our sub
sequent elections. To whom, then,
shall it be sent back ? who shall
make the second election ? We have
teen that the House of Representa
tives is an unfit place, and that the
people arc against it. Will the pre
sent institution of electors do better ;
and shall they be retained for that
purpose, in defiance of all the objec
tions which lie against them ! On
the contrary, they will be subject to
the main objections which apply
against a pre-existing body; they will
be, moreover, subject to the opera
tion of all the undue influences w hich
might be brought to bear upon the
House of Representatives, without
possessing the same pretensions to
high character and public confidence.
Then there is no better course, than
tO SEND IT BACK TO THE PEOPLE, W itfi
the single, limitation, of confining
their choice to the leading candid-
Clear as the propriety of this
course is to the mind of the Com
mittee, it is not free from objections
in the minds of others. The first
and most plausible of these objec
tions, grows out of a concern for the
rights of the small States, a material
portion of whose power, it is appre
hended, will be lost by taking from
them their contingent faculty of elect
ing the President, bv states, in the
House of Representatives. Before
this objection can he admitted, it
ought to he shewn that this privilege
is actually possessed by the small
States, under the present system.
The Committee believe that it is not;
for they cannot admit that a privilege
personal to a member of Congress,
can be treated as the privilege of the
State which Ire represents. Now, rt
is notorious, that a large portion, il
r.ot a majority, of the Repr senia
lives who have heretofore been call*
. and upon to vote for President in the
House of Representatives, have giv
en that vote according to the dic
tates of their own feelings and judg
ment. In this course they have held
themselves justified on the ground,
that, in giving their votes, they acted
in the character of electors under the
Constitution, and not ia their repre
scrUuit . e capacity. It is also certain,
that, as no meßns are provided for a
distinct expression of the V ill of the
States upon the subject, (as between
the candidates who may finally be
brought intocompetetion,) it is mani
fest that the Representatives may
not know, or knowing, may feign ig
norance of the opinion ot the State,
which he represents, even if he ac
knowledges an obligation to conform
to it, when known. In many cases
he certainly will be ignorant of it; in
mo t, lie must be without instruc
tions ; and in all, he may disregard
them. If, then, the privilege oi vo
ting for President, in the House of
Representatives, is claimed and ex
ercised by the member, as an elector
under the Constitution, and not as a
Representative from his State ; il the
member, and not the State, exercises
volition upon this point ; if he de
nies the right of tlie State to direct
his vote, or admits the right and
avoids the obligation; and if the
State has neither time nor means to
manifest her will, or power to en
force it, or the right of vacating the
vote after it is given; then, tins
boa ted privilege may fairly be set
down as belonging, practically, to the
member, and not to the State from
which lie comes. The question wdiich
then presents itself, is one of con
flicting claims to power, between an
individual, on one side, and the State
which he represents on the other;
between a member of Congress, in
his seat, and tlie forty thousand per
sons who placed him there. Holding
this to be the only question present
ed by the objection under considera
tion, the Committee feel no difficulty
in assigning the privilege to tho party
which, from its own position, is
fartherest removed from undue influ
ence—by its numbers, is most diffi
cult to be corrupted; which, indi
vidually, has as much, and, aggre
gately, infinitively more interest in
the welfare of their country ; and
whose lack ot’ information, if any, is
| amply compensated by the disinter
i estedness of their motives : and, in
! this transfer of power from the mem
bers oi Congress at Washington, to
! the whole body of their constituents
tat home, it is the opinion of llie Com
mittee that the State would be a
gainei, instead of a loser. Still, this
contingent vote for President, in the
House of Representatives, is the
cherished form of a lost substance
among the smaller States, and*al
though now reduced to nothing but
an idea, they may be unwilling to
give it up, without receiving the be
nefit of some concession from the
larger ones. Here, then, is room for
a compromise : the door opens for
one ol those mutually advantageous
adjustments, by help of which the
Constitution was made, and without
w hich it cannot be amended The
large Slates overwhelm the small
ones, with the consolidated vote of
the general ticket; the small States
balance the great ones, with the sin
gle representative in the House of
Representatives. Now', it has been
shewn that this apparent power in
the great States to consolidate their
vote, is, in reality, the usurped pow
er of some individuals of the State
Legislatures, yet, to the small States
its effect is just the same as if the
real sovereignty of the State had di
rected its force against them. It has
also been shown that this supposed
power of the small States to balance
tHe great ones in the House of Re
presentatives, is, in fact, the power
of the members in Congress from
such States. Yet, to the large ones,
the effect is just the same as if it
was the power of the States. Here,
then, is a grievance on ach side;
and, to get rid of it, and receive, in
return, a great, substantial, and ar
dently desired concession from the
other, the large States have nothing
to do but to giv e up an abuse, and
the small ones to surrender an idea.
The only direct objections to the
seco?ul election by the people, (sup
posing the first to have been adopt
ed,) which have come to the knowl
edge of the Committee, are few in
number and easy of answer. The
apprehension of violence in such re
newed and protracted contest, is ex
pressed by some. But, if the Com
mittee have been successful in show -
ing that nothing of this kind is to be
dreaded in the first election, the only
proper inquiry now is, whether the
second can produce that effect which
the first- could not. The Committee
affirm the negative of this proposi
tion, and appeal to that well known
law in physiology which makes apathy
succeed to violence the moment the
crisis of excitement has passed a wav;
and to the fact, that the number of
candidates being reduced in the se
cond contest, the peculiar causes of
excitement, arising from personal
acquaintance and local interests, will
also be reduced in exact proportion
to this reduction in the number of
candidates. Instead of violence, in
difference and neglect of the elective
franchise is still more to be dreaded
m the second than in the first ilec
tion.
The delay of a second election, is
the last of the objections which has
come to the know ledge of your Com
mittee. This, as involving a ques
tion of mere detail, may be passed
over with little more than a state
ment and explanation of the plan of
the Committee on this point. il
provides, that the first election shall
bo held on the first Thursday and
Friday in August, 1828, and cn the
same day < in every fourth vc : thcre-
[February 28,
after ; that Congress shall be in ses
sion on the second Monday in Octo
ber of these years, to receive and
count the votes; and that the second
election, when found to be necessary,
shall take place on the first Thurs
day in Dec. following. These pro
visions remove all objections rela
ting to delay and want of time. The
first election will take place at the
period when the people are least en
gaged at home, and will hav the
further recommendation of taking
place on the same day on which sev
eral of the States now hold their
general elections, near the time at
which many others hold them, and
tiie one to which all the States would
in all probability, soon conform. An
interval of about sixty days would
then remain for collecting the votes
in the different districts, and certify
ing the results to the President of
the Senate; a period amply suffi
cient to send in tli returns from the
most remote States. A further in
terval ol about sixty days would be
allowed for giving notice of, and hold
ing the second election ; a sufficient
time, in the opinion ot the Commit
tee, to communicate to the people
the simple fact that a second election
was ordered ; the day itself being
fixed beforehand, and the minds of
lhe voters made up about the can
didates, and the fact itself unofficially
known before the people would re
quire no furtt.cr notice, than that
which w ould enable them to go to
the polls. For this purpose, the
time allowed will be twenty days
more than enough, in the remotest
sections of the Union. For collect
ing the votes in the districts, and
certifying the results a second tiim
to the Prcsidi nt of the Senate, three
months would still remain, as the
new officers would not he wanted
until the fourth of March. The
fact that Congress would be in ses
sion two months longer than usual in
every fourth year, is an additional re
commendation to the details of (his
plan ; it being now well known that
tho short sessions, (from the great
increase of business and of members,)
have become too short for the ac
complishment of the business on
hand, some two hundred orders of
the day usually remaining undecided
at the last hour ot these sessions,
and all tho time and labor lost which
had been expended upon them.
Tiie Resolution submitted by the
Committee would, they confidently
believe, entirely effect tiie great ob
ject of an election by the qualified
voters of the States,upon the second,
at all events, if not upon tue first tri
al. But, as it is within the range of
mere possibility, that inoic than two
persons may have the two highest
numbers, in the first election, and
that two or more may have the same,
and the highest number in the sec
ond, itvvas believed by some that
the plan of amendment would not be
complete, unless some provision was
made for this remote contingency or
a mere possibility ; the committee
have therefore agreed, in such case,
to leave the decision to the existing
provisions of the Constitution ; con
sidering it superfluous trouble to
write out any new provision for a
case which will almost certainly nev
er occur, and which may, therefore,
safely undergo a nominal reference
to the same body which, as a r. al
electoral college, has received their
decided disapprobation.
BRAZIL.
Extract of a letter to Mr. Sanderson, of the
Merchants’ Coflee House, Philadelphia.
“In (Le enclosed paper, dated the
nth Dec. last, you will find that tie
Emperor of Brazils has declared too
against the United Provinces of Rio
de la Plata. Great preparations were
making w hen I left Rio, to carry on
the war with vigor ; fitting out all
their men of w ar, and enlarging their
army—there was a general press for
the land and sea service—several
transports with sailed for
Montevideo, and there was a strong
naval force oil Buenos Ayres, block
ading that port. There is now seve
ral Buenos Ayres privateers (and it
is said, some pirates) on the coast
of the Brazils. One of them was 01.
Cape Frio, and had made several
captures. In a short time we may
expect any number of privateers,
(some with commissions on both
sides,) and our trade to that coast
will be very hazardous unless our
Government see the propriety of
sending out a respectable naval force
to protect our merchant vessels
against the lawless privateers that
w ill be swarming hi those seas.
Markets at Rio were very dull for
American produce. Sugar, coffee,
and hides, were scarce and high.
The Empress of the Brazils had
lately presented a sen and heir to his
Imperial Majesty—there was great
rejoicing on the occasion.
If I was to venture to give an
opinion, I should say that Don Padro
will leave off wearing his crown, be
fore the young prince can do w ithout
his caps.
From what I could learn while a
was at Rio, I iyn satisfied that there
is a strong party in the Brazils against
the powers that be. lam also very
well assured that Bolivar intends to
take a peep into that country, before
he retires from the field ; this was
the general opinion in Upper Peru,
when 1 left Arica in October last