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CHRONICLE AND SENTINEL.
A IIGUSTA.
FRIDAY MORNING, JULY 10.
FOR PRESIDENT,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON,
Os Ohio ;
The invincible Hero of Tippecanoe—the incor
-0 ruptible Statesman—-the inflexible Republican—
the patriotic Farmer of Ohio.
FOR VICE-PRESIDENT,
/O H N TYLER,
Os Virginia;
A State Rights Republican of the school of ’SS—
one of Virginia’s noblest sons, and emphatically
one of America’s most sagacious, virtuous and
patriot statesmen.
FOR ELECTORS OFPRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT,
GEORGE R. GILMER, of Oglethorpe.
DUNCAN L. CLINCH, of Camden.
JOHN CAMPBELL, of Muscogee *
JOEL CRAWFORD, of Hancock.
CHARLES DOUGHERTY, of Clark.
SEATON GRANTLAND, of Baldwin.
ANDREW MILLER, of Cass.
WILLIAM EZZARD, cf DeKalb. .
C. B. STRONG, of Bibb-
JOHN WHITEHEAD, of Burke.
E. WIMBERLY, of Twiggs.
. FOR CONGRESS,
WILLI AIM C. DAWSON, of Greene.
R. W. HABERSHAM, of Habersham.
JULIUS C. ALFORD, of Troup.
EUGENIUS A. NISBET, of Bibb.
LOTT WARREN, of Sumter.
THOMAS BUTLER KING, of Glynn.
ROGER L. GAMBLE, cf Jefferson.
JAMES A. MERIWETHER, of Putnam.
THOMAS F. FOSTER,- of Muscogee.
- _ -
General Harrison’s Letters.
• In accordance with our promise yesterday, we
publish to-day the Letters of General Harrison, to
Sherrod Williams] and] Harmar Denny, to whick
we invite the attention of our readers. General
Harrison has now endorsed the sentiments and po
litical opinions which are contained in them, and
upon those opinions, he stands cr falls by the fia£
of the American people at the approaching elec
tion. the principles upon which his pc
litical career has been based, through a long and,
f eventful life, and his long tried sterling integrity,
and uncompromising honesty, and devoted patriot
ism, are the Purest guaranty that, if elected,
principles #ill be carried out, at least so far ?* J *
in the power of the Chief Executive. " j
The crowded ■state of our columns toSit />■
not permit us to notice the wiee and worthy
editor ” of the Constitutionalist.
We must also defer a notice of the redoubtable
“L. M.,” by .which we shall place him in a cate
gory to which contempt itself cannot travel down.
£is empty bravado therefore, is in perfect cha
racter, and may be uttered with impunity.
General Harrison’ Creed.
As General Harrison, in his letter Os accept
ance, refers the American people to his letters to
Harmar Denny and Sherrod Williams, for his po
litical creed, and the principles on which his ad
ministration will be conducted should he be call
ed to the Presidential chair; in order that there
shall be no mistake or misapprehension we.sub
join the following correspondence, without.com
ment, only asking the reader to peruse it with
care. He will not fail to agree with us, that Har
rison is the man fitted to administer the people’s
government: —
GEN. WNT. H. HARRISON.
Washington, April 7, 183E.
Sir : I consider it the right of every citizen of
the United States to ask and demand, and to be
fully informed of, the political principles and o
pinions o£ those who are candidates for the va
rious offices in the gift of the people, and the im
perious duty of the candidate to frankly and idly
avow and declare the opinions which he enter
tains. I therefore, as a voter, a citizen, and an
a deep cad abiding interest in
the welfare and orosperity of our common coun
try. and an ardent desire to see the perpetuity of
our free and happy form of government, take the
liberty of asking you tc give me your opinion and
views on the following sulgects :
Ist. Will you [if elected President of the Uni
ted States] sign and approve a bill distributing the
surplus revenue of the United States teeach
State, according to the federal population ofeach,
for internal improvements, education, and to such
other objects as the legislature of the -several
States may see fit to apply the same 1
2d. Will you sign ana approve a bill distribu
ting the proceeds of the public lands to each Stale,
according to the federal population of etch, for
the purposes above specified ]
° Will you sign and approve a bill making ap
propriations to improve navigable .streams above
ports jpf entry 1
4tn. Will you sign and approve (if it becomes
necessary to secure and save from depreciation
the revenue and finances of the nation, and to af
ford a uniform sound currency to the people of the
U. States) a Bill, with proper modifications and
restrictions, chartering a Bank of the United
States.
sth. What is your opinion as to the constitu
tional power of the Senate or House of Represen
* tativetf" of the Congress of the U. States, to ex
punge or obliterate from the journals the records
and proceedings of e previous session 1
A frank, plain, and full answer to the foregoing
inquiries is respectfully and earnestly solicited.
Your answer is desired as soon as possible. I
intend this and your answer for publication.
I have the honor to be,
Your humble and ob’dt s’vt,
®® SHERROD WILLIAMS.
general Harrison’s replf.
% North Bend, May 1, 1836.
gj r I have the honor to acknowledge the re
-4 ceipt of your letter of the 7th ult., in which you
t request r3fe to answer the above questions.
From the manner in which the four first ques
tions are stated, it appears that you do not ask
■■■■lriillflHiiik
! I measures to which they respectively refer; but
what would be my course, it they were presented
to me, (being in tha Presidential chair of the U.
States,) in the shape of bills that had been duly
passed by the Senate and House of Representa
tives.
From the opinions which I have formed of
the intention of the constitution, as to the cases
in which the veto power should bo exercited by
the President, I would have contented myself
with giving an affirmative answer to the four
first questions ; but, from the deep interest which
has been, and indeed is now, felt in relation to
all these subjects, I think it proper to express my
views upon each ono separately.
I answer then, Ist. That the immediate re
turn of all the surplus money which is, or ought
to be in the Treasury of the United States, to the
the possession of the people, from whom it was
taken, is called for by every principle of policy,
and indeed, of safety to our institutions, and I
know of no mode of doing it better than that re
commended by the present chief magistrate, in
his first annual message to Congress in the fol
lowing words :—“ To avoid these evils, it ap
pears to me that the most safe, just and federal
disposition which could be made of the surplus
revenue would be its apportionment among the
several States according to the rule of represen
tation
This proposition has reference to a state of
things which now actually exists, with the ex
ception of the amount of money thus to be dis
posed of—for it could not have been anticipated
by the President that the surplus above the real
wants or convenient expenditures of the goveru
would become so large, as that retaining it in the
\ Treasury would so diminish the circulating me
dium as greatly to embarrass the business of the
country.
What other disposition can be made of it with
a view to get it into immediate circulation but
to place it in the hands of the Stale authorities]
So great is the amount, and so rapidly is it in
creasing, that it could not be expended for a very
considerable time on the comparatively few ob
jects to which it could be appropriated by the
General Government; but the desired distribu
tion among the people could be immediately ef
fected by the States from the infinite variety of
ways in ./hich it might be employed by them. By
them it might be loaned to their own banking
institutions, or even to individuals; a mode of
distribution by the General Government which
I sincerely hope is in contemplation by no friend
to his country.
2d. Whilst I have always broadly admitted
that the public lands were the common property
of ail the States, I have been the advocate of that
mode of disposing of them which would create
the greatest number of freeholders, and I con
ceived that in this way the interests of all would
be as well secured as by any other disposition ;
but since by the small size of the tracts in which
the lands are now laid out, and the reduction of
the price, this desirable situation is easily at
tainable by any person of tolerable industry, I
am perfectly reconciled to the distribution of the
proceeds of the sales, as provided for by the bill
introduced into the Senate by Mr. Clay ; the in
terest of all seems to be well provided for by
this hill; and as from the opposition which has
hitherto been made to the disposition of the lands
heretofore contemplated by the representatives
of the new States, there is no probability of its
being adopted, I think it ought no longer to be
insist!;d on.
3. As I believe that no money should be ta
ken from the Treasury of the United States to
be exp ended on internal improvements but for
those which are strictly national, the answer to
this question would be easy, but from the diffi
culty of determining which of those that are from
time to time proposed would be of this descrip
tion. This circumstance, the excitement which
has already been produced by appropriations of
this kind, and the jealousies which it will no
doubt continue to produce if persisted in, give
additional claims to the mode of appropriating
all the surplus revenue of the United States in
die manner above suggested.—Each State will
hen have the means of accomplishing its own
.Jiemes of internal improvement. Still there
will vl , r -rticular cases when a contemplated im
provenn mt will be of great advantage to the
Union i generally, and some particular states, than
to that in which it is to be made. In such cases
as well as those in the new States, where the val
ue of t he public domain will be greatly enhanced
by an i mprovement in the means of communica
tion, tl te General Government should certainly
largely contribute. To appropriations of the
latter c haracter there has never been any very
warm opposition.—Upon the whole the distribu
tion o f the surplus revenue among the States,
saems likely to remove most if not all, the causes
of dis sension of which the internal improvement
systei n has been the fruitful source. There is
nothi ngin my opinion more strictly incumbent
upon those who are concerned in the administra
tion ( »f our government than that of presvering
harm ony between the States. From the con
strue tion of our system there has been, and prob
ably ever will be, more or less jealousy between
the ( General and State Governments; but there
is nr Hiring in this Constitution—nothing in the
char acter of the relation which the States bear
to each other—which can create any unfriendly
feel ing, if the common guardian administers its
fav< >rs with an even and impartial hand. That
thi s may be the case all those to whom any portion
of this delicate power is intrusted should always
act upon the princples of forbearance and concil
iat ion ; ever more ready to sacrifice the interests
of their immediate constituents rather than vio
late the rights of the other members of the fam
ily-. Those who pursue a different course, whose
n jle is never to stop short of the attainment of all
v/hich they may consider their due, will be found
to have trespassed upon the boundary they have
themselves established. The observations with
which I shall conclude this letter on the subject
of the veto power by the President will apply to
this, as well as your other questions.
4th. I have before me a newspaper, in which
I am designated by its distinguished editor,
“ The Bank and Federal Candidate .” I think
it would puzzle the writer to adduce any act of
my life which warrants him in identifying me
with the interest of the first, or the politics of
the latter. Having no means of ascertaining the
sentiments of the directors and stockholders of
the Bank of the United States, (which is the
one, I presume, with which it was intended to
associate me,) I cannot say what their course is
likely to be in relation to the ensuing election for
President. Should they, however, give me their
support, it will be evidence at least that the op
position which I gave to their institution in my
capacity of representative from Ohio in Congress,
proceeded, in their opinion, from a sense of duty
which I could not disregard.
The journals of the second session of the
thirteenth, and those of the fourteenth Congress,
will show that my votes are recorded against
them upon every question in which their inter
est was involved. I did, indeed, exert myself in
the Senate of Ohio, to procure a repeal of the
law which had imposed an enormous tax upon
the branches which had been located in its boun
daries at the request of the citizens. The ground
of those exertions was not the interest of the
bank, but to save, what I considered the honor of
the State, and to prevent a controversy between
the State officers, and those of the United States.
In the spring of 1834, I had also the honor to
preside at a meeting of the citizens of Hamilton
county, called for the purpose of expressing
their sentiments in relation to the removal of the
public money from the custody of the bank, by
the sole authority of Executive. As President
of the meeting, I explained at some length, the
m obiec^u^wlricl^^wa^coavene^^nulad
vanced no opinion in relation to the re-chartering: 4
of the bank.
A most respectful memorial to the President ia
relation to the removal of the deposites was a
dapted, as were also resolutions in favor of re
chastcring ihc Bank; but as I have already said,,
this was not the purpose for which the meeting
was called, and not upon one presiding
officer, I was called upon to give an opinion, but
in the event of an equal division of the votes.
As a private citizen, no man can be more en
tirely clear of any motive, either for re-chartering
the old institution, or erecting a new one under
the authority of the United States. I never had
a single share in the former, nor indeed in any
bank, with one exception; and that many years
ago failed, with the loss of the entire stock. I
have no inclination again to venture in that way,
even if I should ever possess the means. With
the exception above mentioned, of stock in a
bank long since broken, I never put out a dollar
at interest in my life. My interest being entirely
identified with the cultivation of the soil, I am
immediately and personally connected with none
other.
I have made this statement to show you that I
am not committed to any course in relation to
the chartering of a bank of the United States ;
and that I might, if so disposed, join in the pop
ular cry of denunciation against the old institu
tion, and upon its misconduct predicate an op
position to the chartering of another.
I shall not, however, take this course so oppo
site to that which I hope I have followed through
life, but will give you my sentiments clearly and
fully not only with regard to the future con
duct of the Goverir.nent on the subject of a Na
tional Bank, but in relation to the operations of
that which is now defunct.
I was not in Congress when the late Bank
was chartered, but was a member of the 13th
Congress, after its first session, when the con
duct of the Bank in its incipient measures, was
examined into ; and believing from the result of
the investigation that the charter had been vi ola
ted, I voted for the judicial investigation, will i a
view of annulling its charter. The resolution
for that purpose, however, failed, and shortly af
ter the management of its affairs was commit) ed
to the talents and integrity of Mr. Cheves. Fn >m
that period to its final dissolution, although I
must confess I arn not a very competent judge of
such matters, I have no idea that an rnstitutl an
could have been conducted with more ability, i n
tegrity, and public advantage, than it has been .
Under these impressions, I agree with General
Jackson in the opinion expressed in one of h is
messages to Congress, from which I make tl ie
following extract:—“ That a Bank of the Uni
ted States competent to all the duties which /na y
be required by the Government , might be so or -
ganized as not to infringe on our delegatei I
powers , or the reserved rights of the States, I eh. >
not entertain a doubt.*” But the period for re- •
chartering the old institution has passed, ai :
Pennsylvania has wisely taken care to appropri- •
ate to herself the benefits of its large capital.
The question, then, for me to answer is, wheth
er, under the circumstances you state, if elected
to the office of President, I would sign an act to
charter another bank, I would, if it were clearly
ascertained that the public interest in relation to
the collection and disbursement of the revenue
would materially suffer without one, and thera
were unequivocal manifestation of public opin
ion in its favor. I think, however, the experi
ment should be fairly tried, to ascertain whether
the financial operations of the Government can
not be as well carried on without the aid of a
National Bank. If it is not necessary for that
purpose, it does not appear to me that one can
be constitutionally chartered. There is no con
struction which I can give the Constitution
which would authorize it, on the ground of afford
ing facilities to commerce. The measure, if a
dopted, must have for its object the carrying into
effect (facilitating at least the exercise of) some
j one of the powers positively granted to the Gen
eral Government. If others flow from it, produ
; cing equal or greater advantages to the nation,
so much the better; but these cannot be made
the ground for juslifhing the recourse to it.
The excitement which has been produced by
the Bank question, the number and respectabili
ty of those who deny the right to Congress to
charter one, strongly recommend the course a
bove suggested.
sth. I distinctly answer to this question, that
in my opinion, neither House of Congress can
constitutionally expunge the records of the pro
ceedings of their predecessors. The power to
' rescind correctly belongs to them ; and for every
public legitimate purpose, all Hiat is necessary.
The attempt to expunge a part of their journal
now making in the Senate of the United States,
I am satisfied could never have been made but
j in a period of the highest party excitement, when
; the voice of reason and generous feeling is stifled
by long protracted and bitter controversy,
j In relation to the exercise of the veto powei :
by the President, there is, I think, an important:
difference between the present Chief Magistrate •
and myself. I express this opinion with less dif
fidence, because I believe mine is in'strict accor
dance with those of al! the previous Presidents to
General Jackson.
The veto power, or the control of the Execu
tive over the enactment of laws by the legislative
body, was not unknown in the United Stains
previously to the formation of the present federal
constitution. It does not appear, however, to
have been in much favor. The principle was to
be found but in three of the State Constitutions,
and in but one of them (Massachusetts) was the
Executive power lodged in the hands of a single
Chief Magistrate. One other State (South Car
olina) had indeed, not only adopted this princi
ple, but had given its single Executive Magis
trates an absolute negative upon the acts of the
Legislature. In all other instances it has been
a qualified negative, like that of the United
States. The people of South Carolina seem how
ever, not to have been long pleased, with this in
vestment of power in their Governor, as it has
lasted but two years ; having been adopted in 17-
75 and repealed in 1778, from which time the
Legislature of the State have been entirely freed
from Executive control. Since the adoption of
the United States Constitution, the veto principle
has been adopted by several other States, and un
til very lately, it seemed to be rapidly growing in
to favor.
Befere we can form a correct opinion of the
manner in which this power shall be exercised, it
is proper to understand the reasons which have
induced its adoption. In its theory, it is mani
festly an innovation upon the first principles of
republican government—that the majority should,
rule. Why should a single individanl control!
the will of that majority I It will not be said!
that there is more probability of finding greater
wisdom in the Executive chair than in the halls of
the Legislature. Nor can it possibly be supposed
that an individual residing in the centre of an ex
tensive country can be as well acquainted with
the wants and wishes of a numerous people, as
those who come immediately from amongst them
—the partakers for a portion of the year in their
various labors and employments, and the witness
es of the effects of the laws in their more mi
nute as well as general operations. As far, then
as it regards a knowledge of the wants and wish
es of the pople, wisdom to discover remedies for
existing evils, and devising schemes for increas
ing the public prosperity, it would seem that the
legislative bodies did not require the aid of an
Executive Magistrate. But there is a principle
recognized by all the American Constitutions,
which was unknown to the ancient republics.
They all acknowledge rights in the minority,
which cannot rightfully be taken from them.
Experience has skown that in large assemblies
* Nile’s Register, vol. 48, page 369.
these rights were not always respected. It would
be in vain that they should be enumerated, and
respect for them enjoined in the Constitution.
A popular assembly, under the influence of that
spirit of party which is always discoverable in a
greater or less degree in all republics, might and
would, as it was believed, sometimes disregard
them. To guard against this danger, and to se
cure the rights of each individual, the expedient
of creating a department independent of the oth
ers, and amenable only to the laws, was adopted.
Security was thus given against any palpable
violation of the Constitution, to the injury of in
dividuals, or of a minority party. But it was
: still possible for a wilful and excited majority to
t mact laws of the greatest injustice and tyranny,
\ vithout the letter of their charter.
And this I take to be the orgin of the veto
p ower, as well in the State Governments as that
i ol ’ the United States. It appears to have been
th c intention to create an umpire between the
co ntending factions which had existed, it was
, be ; lieved, and would continue to exist. If there
wa s any propriety in adopting this principle in
1 the Government of a State, all the reasons in
1 favi >r of it existed in a tenfold degree for incorpo
| rath ig it in that of the United States. 'lhe op
eiati ons of the latter, extended over an immense
tract of country, embracing the products of almost
every clime, and that country divided too into a
numl >er of separate Governments, in many re
spects independent of each other and also of the
comm on federal head left but little hope that they
could always be carried on in harmony.—lt could
, not be doubted that sectional interests would at
times) nedominate in the bosoms ol the immedi
ate re) iresentatives of the people and the States,
and combinations formed destructive of the pub
lic good, or unjust and oppressive to the minority.
Where could a power to check these local feel
ings, and to destroy the effects of unjust combina
i tions be better placed than in the hands of that
department whose authority, being derived from
i the same common sovereign is co-ordinate with
the rest, and which enjoys the great distinction
of being at once the immediate representative
of the whole people, as well as of each particular
State 1
In the former character the interests of the
whole community would be rigidly supported,
and in the latter the rights of each member stead
fastly maintained. The representation from the
State authorites in the Electoral Colleges, I con
sider one of the most felicitous features in the
Constitution. It serves as an eternal memento
to the Chief Magistrate, that it is his duty to
guard the interests of the weak against the un
just aggressions of the strong and powerful.
From these premises you will conclude that I
consider the qualified veto upon the acts of the
legislature, conferred by the constitution upon the
President, as a conservative, power, intended on
ly to be used to secure the instrument itself from
violation, or in times of high party excitement
to protect the rights of the minority, and the in
terests of the weaker members of the Union.
Such indeed, is my opinion, and such we must
believe to be the opinion of nearly all the distin
guished men who have filled the Executive chair.
If I were President of the United States, an act
which did not involve either of the principles
above enumerated must have been passed under
very peculiar cicumstances of precipitancy or op
position to the known public will, to induce me
to refuse it my sanction.
If the opinion I have given of the motive of
the framers of the Constitution, in giving thf
veto power to the President, is correct, it follows
that they never could have expected that he, who
was constituted the umpire between contending
factions, should identify himself with the interests
of one of them, and volutarily razee himself from
the proud eminence of leader of a nation, to that
of chief of a party. I can easily conceive the
existence of a state of things by which the chief
Magistrate of the State may be forced to act up
on party principles; but such a course is entire
ly opposed to all the obligations which the Con
stitution imposes on a President of the U. States.
The immense influence which he possesses, will
always give his party the preponderance; and the
very circumstance ot its being an Executive par
ty, will he the cause of infusing more bitterness
and vindictive feeling in these domestic contests.
Under these circumstances, the qualified veto
given by the Constitution may, if the President
should think proper to change its character, be
come as ohsolute in practice as that possessed by
the Kings of England and France. From the
great variety of local interests acting upon the
members of the two Houses of Congress, and
from the difficulty of keeping all the individuals
of a large party under the control of party disci
pline, laws will often be passed by small majori
ties adverse to the interests of the dominant party;
but if the President fhink proper to use the veto
power for the purpose of promoting the interests
of his party, it will be in vain to expect that a
majority so large as two thirds in both Houses
would be found in opposition to his wishes. In
the hands of such a President, the qualified veto
of the Constitution would in practice become
absolute.
I have, upon another occasion, expressed my
views upon the danger of a dominant Executive
party. It may perhaps, be said that the Chief
Magistrate will find it impossible to avoid the in
fluence of party spirit. Several of our Chief
Magistrates, however, have been able to escape
its influence; or what is the same thing, to act
as if they did not feel it. As one mode of avoid
ing it, it would be my aim to interfere with the
legislation of Congress as little as possible. The
clause of the Constitution, which makes it the
duty of the President to give Congress informa
tion of the state of the Union, and to recommend
to their consideration such measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient, could never be
intended to make him the source of legislation.
Information should always be frankly given, and
recommendations upon such matters as come
more immediately under his cognizance than
theirs. But there it should end. If he should
undertake to prepare the business of legislation
for the action of Congress, or to assume the
character of code-maker for the nation, the per
sonal interest which he will take in the success
of his measures will necessarily convert him into
a partisan, and will totally incapacitate him from
performing the part of that impartial umpire,
which is the character that I have supposed the
Constitution intends him to assume, when the
acts passed by the Legislature are submitted to
his decision. Ido not think that he should take
the lead as a reformer, even when reformation is
in his opinion necessary. Reformers will be nev
er wanting, when it is well understood that the
power which wields the whole patronage of the
nation will not oppose the reformation.
I have the honor to be, with great considera
tion and respect,
Sir, your humble servant,
W. H. HARRISON.
LETTER TO HARMAR DENNY.
The following extracts from General Harri
’ son’s letter to Harmar Denny, will show the prin
ciples by which the Ohio farmer will be guided
in his administration of the government, should
he be elected.
They are so plain that every hardworking man
in the community can understand them. They
are the principles on which our fathers acted in
the formation of the constitution, and are the
touch-stone of the Whig creed. “Among the
principles proper to be adopted by any executive
sincerely desirous to restore the administration to
its original simplicity and purity, I deem the fol
lowing to be of prominent importance.
“I. To confine his service to a single term.
“ 11. To disclaim all right of control over the
public treasure, with the exception of such part
of it as may be appropriated by law to carry on
_the public gervices, and that to be applied me
cisely as the law may direct, and drawn from the
treasury agreeably to the long established form of
that department.
“ 111. That he should never attempt to influ
ence the elections, either by the people or the
State Legislaluie, nor suffer the federal officers
under his control to take any other part in them
than giving their own votes when they possess
the right of voting.
“ IV. That in the exercise of the veto power,
he should limit his rejection of bills to: Ist. Such
as are in his opinion unconstitutional. 2d. Such
as encroach on the rights of the States or individ
uals. 3d. Such as involving deep interests, may
in his opinion require more mature deliberation
or deference to the will of the people, to be as
certained at the succeeding elections.
“ V. That he should never suffer the influence
of his office to be used for purposes of a purely
parly character.
“ \I. That in removals from office of those who
hold the appointment during the pleasure of the
Executive, the cause of such removal should be
stated if requested, to the Senate, at the time the
nomination of a successor is made.
“ And last, but not least in importance,
“VII. That he should not suffer the Execu
department of the government to become the
source of legislation; and leave the whole busi
ness of making laws for the Union, to the depart
ment to which the constitution has exclusively as
signed it, until they have assumed that perfected
shape, where and when alone the opinions of the
Executive may be heard. A community of pow
er in the preparation of the laws between the le
gislature and the Executive departments, must
necessarily lead to dangerous combinations, great
ly to the advantage of a President desirous of ex
tending his power. Such a construction of the
constitution could never have been contemplated
by those who framed it, as they well knew that
those who propose the bills, will always take care
of themselves, or the interests of their constitu
ents, and hence the provision in the Constitution
borrowed from that of England, restricting the
originating of revenue bills to the immediate rep
resentatives of the people.
So far from agreeing in opinion with the distin
guished character who lately retired from the
Presidency, that Congress should have applied to
him for the project of a banking system, I think
that such an application would have manifested
not only great; subserviency upon the part of that
body, but an unpardonable ignorance of the chief
danger to be apprehended from such an institu
tion. That danger unquestionably consists in a
union of interests between the Executive and the
bank.
Would an ambitious incumbent of the executive
chair neglect so favorable an opportunity as the
preparing of the law would give him, to insert in
it provisions to secure his influence over it 1 In
the authority given to the President by the Con
stitution to recommend to Congress such meas
ures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,”
it was certainly never intended that the measures
he recommended should be presented in a shape
suited for the immediate decision of the Icgisla
tuie. The sages who made the Constitution, too
well knew the advantages which the crown of
England derives from the exercise of this power
by its ministers, to have intended it to be used by
our chief magistrate, or the heads of departments
under his control.
The boasted principles of the English Constitu
tion, that the consent of the democratic branch
is not only necessary to receive money from the
people, but that it is its inviolable prerogative al
so to oiiginate all the bills for that purpose, is true
in theory, but rendered utterly false and nugatory
in effect, by the participation of the ministers of
the crown in the details of legislation. Indeed
the influence they derive from sitting as members
of the House of Commons, and from wielding the
immense patronage of the crown (constitutional
or usurped,) gives them a power over that body,
that renders plausible, at least the flattery, or as
it is more probable, the intended sarcasm of Sir
Walter Raleigh, in an addresss to James 1., that
the demand of the sovereign upon the Commons
for pecuniary aid, was required only ‘“that the
tax might seem to come from themselves.”
“ Having thus given you my opinion of some
things which might be done, and others which
should not be done, by a President coming into
power by the support of those of the people who
are opposed to the principles upon which the pre
sent administration is conducted, you will see that
I have omitted one, which is deemed by many of
as much importance as any other, I allude to the
appointment of members of Congress to office by
the president.
The Constitution contains no prohibition of
such appointments, no doubt because its authors
could not believe in its necessity, from the puri
ty of character which was manifested by those
who possessed the confidence of the people at
that period. It is, however, an opinion very ge
nerally entertained by the opposition party, that
the country would have escaped much of the evil
under which it has suffered for some years past, if
the Constitution had contained a provision of that
kind. Having had no opportunity of personal
observation on the conduct of the administration
for the last ten years, I am unable to decide upon
the truth or error of this opinion. But I should
be very willing that the known subserviency of
the Legislature to the Executive, in several mem
orable instances, should be accounted for in a
way some what less injurious to the character of
the country and to republicanism itself, than by
the admission that the fathers of the land, the
trusted servants of a virtuous people, be seduced
from the path of duty and honor, by the paltry
trappings and emoluments ol dependent officers.
But if the evil really exists, and if there be good
reason to believe that its source is to be found in
the corruptibility of members of the Legislature,
an effectual remedy cannot be too soon applied.
And it happens in this instance that there is a
choice of remedies. One ot those, however, is in
my opinion, free from the objections which might
be offered to the other. The one to which I ob
ject is that which the late President has been so
loudly called upon to adopt, in consequence of a
promise made at the commencement of his ad
ministration; viz: that the Executive under no
circumstances should appoint to office a member
of either branch of the National Legislature.
There are, in my mind, several weighty reasons
against the adoption of this principle. I will de
tain you with the mention of but two of them ;
because I believe that you will agree with mo
that the alternative I shall present, while it would
be equally effectual, contains no feature to which
a reasonable objection could be made.
“As the Constitution contains no provision
to prevent the appointment of members of Con
gress to office by the Executive, could the Ex
ecutive, with a regard to decency and justice,
without usujping power from the people, declare
a disqualification which they had not thought ne
cessary 1 And where is the American citizen
who regards the honor of his country, the cha
racter of its people, or who believes in the supe
riority of a Republican form of government, who
would be willing to proclaim to the world that
the youthful nation which has attracted so much
of its attention, which it has so much admired
for its gigantic strength, its undaunted courage,
its high attainments in literature and the arts,
and the external beauty of its institutions, was
within, a mass of meanness and corruption 1
That even the chosen servants of the people
were ever ready, for a paltry consideration, to
abandon their allegiance to their lawful sove
reigns, and to become the servants of a servant.
The alternative to the degrading course, is to be
found in depriving the Eexecutive of all motive
for acquiring an improper influence over the
Legislature.
“To effect this, nothing in my opinion is ne
cesary but to re-establish the principles upon
which the administration was once conducted,
with the single addition of limiting tK e
of the President to one term. A condensed p** 3
meration of what I conceive those priociDl«* I
have been is given above. And I thinks* 0 i
can doubt, that if faithfully carried out 1
would be effectual in securing the indep e L] y
of the Legislature, and confirming the c
tion between it and the Executive, to that i* ■!
which is warranted by a fair construction 0 f a®
Constitution. I can conceive but two mot - I
which could induce a President of the p
States to endeavor to procure a controlling *
fluence over the Legislative body, viz—* 0 3 iU "
petuate his power, by passing laws to incrc 3 T
his patronage—or to gratify his vanity, 3 f I
taining their sanction to his schemes andV
jects tor lire government of the country,
1 thus assimilating his situation to that of the h U
iled monarebs of Europe. The principles abov
suggested would effectually destroy any (W
* sition of the person elected by the combined I
> votes of the opposition to place himself in e itU |
attitude. Retiring at the end of four year?/
• private life, with no wish or prospect of any k! II
of his succeeding/ legitimate or adopted, Mfi
leave the government as prosperous and.p crei 5
its administration, as when it passed from /
s hands of the great ‘A postFe of Democracy/ to Z
Father of our Constitution.
“ To the duties which I have enumerated,„
‘ proper, in my opinion, to be formed by a T
dent, elected by the opposition to the preset-1 ■
administration, [and which are, as I oeliew,ojf
constitutional obligation.] I will add anothc 1
j which I believe also to be of much important PI
j 1 mean the observance of the most conciliate
; course of conduct towards our political opponent!
After the censure which our friends have sofof.
j ly and so justly bestowed upon the present chief *
Magistrate, for having in no inconsiderable lV
j g rce > disfranchised the whole body politic,
j al opponents, I am certain tliat no oppositionist,
| true to the principles he professes, would aj!
I* prove a similar course of conduct in the person ■:
whom his vote has contributed io elect. Fn y
Republic, one of the surest tests of a heahkt
i state of its institutions, is to be found in the ini
munity with which every eitiacn may, upon all
occasions, express his political opinions and evet
his prejudices, in the discharge of his duty as
electin'.
“The question may perhaps be asked of me
what security I have in my power to ofler,
if the majority of the American people should
select me for their chief Magistrate, that I would
adopt the principles which I have herein laid
down as those upon which my administrate
would lie conducted ; I could only answer by 1
referring to my conduct, am? the dispositic! 1
manifested, in the discharge of the duties of sev. i
eral important offices which have heretofore bee; j
conferred upon me. If the power placed in rav i
hands has, on even a single occasion, been used 1
for any purpose other than that for which it was 1
given, or retained longer than necessary tc ac-
complish the objects designated by those from t
! whom the trusts were received, X will acknow- ]
ledge that either will constitute a sufficient reason 1
for discrediting any promise I may make, under «
the circumstances in which lam now placed. <
I am, dear sir,
truly yours, , 1
WM. H. HARRISON. J
To Hon. Habmab Db.vsx, j
c
From theNetc Orleans Bulletin, I
Florida War* *
Last Attack or the Indians.— A gem’* c
man, resident of this city, just arrived from Flo;-! a
rida, has furnished us with the following accoumj J
of a bold attack of the Indians on a steam boat.! J
The steam boat Irwinton, Capt. Brown, from j,
Apalachicola bound to Columbus, when below |
the town of Irwinton, and above the military i
post, was fired into from the shore, by Indians, f
The Irwinton had 15 passengers, 3of whoo
were ladies—Mr. Brooks and family, Mr. Ham- *
ilton, wife and child (for New York), Judas i
Spang, Mr. Metchner ot Geo. and others. Capt ’
Brown, having perceived several smokes on shore, s
suspected Indians were in the neighbor Hood, and s
advised his passengers to retire to the cabin j s
They had only done so. when a volley was fired,! I
killed the cabin boy, named John Gill, of Phts-l 11
burg. The Indians fired from both shores.- J
Some of the bullets passed through the cabii .
and the passengers threw themselves upon tbej {
floor, and escaped the shots. The pilots also cast ,
themselves upon the deck, and were unhurt. I
The Captain was at this time below crowdin? I
the fires. An alarm was now given that the boil J
was crowded with Indians, “and we are lost.” ;
Alongside of the boat was a loaded barge whickji
she was towing up, on which they first got, an! Is
then entered the steamer. Eleven of these scowk
diels came off in a canoe, three of whom, re *
jumping to the barge, capsized the canoe
the other eight, who were passed floating dowa. *
Two of the Indians who got on board the Invur
ton, were killed by the engineer aud mate, who |
knocked them down with wrenches,and threw J
them into the wheel, where they were torn tope- <1
ces. The third, who appeared to he the leader, and |
who supposed his men were with him, enteral t
the cabin calling loudly to the others to follow : .
him. Most of the passengers had hid themselKsJ 1
and the Indian posted himself at the head of tbef
table, apparently waiting a moment for reinforced ]
merit. Mr. P. Henricks seized a chair, as tb«| ;
only weapon of defence at hand, when thechiej j
threw a chair at him across the table. Mr. Meld-1 1
ner, of Randolph county. Geo., a stout manff j i
about fifty years of age, then clasped the IndianK J
in his arms from behind, and endeavored to lore* I i
him out of the cabin, but was not able. At this j #
time the mate came in and stabbed him in the ab‘
domen, and throwed him also in the wheel. Judge X
Spang continued at the wheel, assisting andec- » <
couraging the pilots during the whole affair.
- c
From the Savannah Georgian. r
From Florida.
Fort J. R. Smith, June3o, 1810. j
On the 29th inst. as a train of six U
corted by six men, under the command el a not [ |
commissioned officer,) in proceeding from P O,l
Fanning to Fort McCrabb, they were fired up°° [ |
by a party of twenty Indians, concealed nearly f
Town Hammocks. The Wagon Master, |
was ahead of the train, had his horse shot m 0 I
under him. One mule belonging to the train | j
killed, but no man injured. The i#dians carri r
off the wagon covers, and finding themselves p u - f «
sued by a party of regulars, sent out for tbaJP Ul J
pose, crossed the Suwannee above Old f
A detachment of regulars are now hot in P u ‘ sU **’ £ ::
and it is to be hoped their efforts to^'
them may prove successful. In haste.
When I am at a Whig meeting, I
ly put my band upon my pocket. — Dr. Dun M
Pshaw, Doctor I Nobody wishes to ste
your whiskey bottle.— Prentice.
1
Important Jcihcial Decisions. —An acU
was brought in the Supreme Court of i
setts, on Tuesday last, on a post note for» ’ (
which had been presented on the morning 0 | l
! last day of grace, but being refused by the cas J
was protested, and an attachment im® e Si
made. The question was whether an acl ! oll n |l
, be brought on a post note, payable on a gn|- a f l|
before the expiration of banking hours on i |
The Chiefjustice gave it asthe opinionott *
that a note was saleable on any part olihe | ,
which it was due. oU rt, J
It has also been decided by the sam ® t S’
that where the promise of a note P a * d efl ; of S
certain, day contracts not to demand pa> a 1
! it until a certain time after its matu . n y ’ oD tb* fl
t 1 not prevent his recovering