Newspaper Page Text
Vol. !-*•
R. Ivx. O 2rl IEw<I E Sc S O JNT ,
editoss and propkietoks.
TerJi*—5 3,00 per annum, in Advuuce.
\bveiitisisu—Per square of ten lines, eaeli
[jjartiuu, ? 1 Hi)." Mercuaiits and others fciall
jjuunts j ver $25, twenty-live per cent. off.
LEGAL ADVERTISING.
Ordinary's. —Citationsfor letters ol ad-
u jutratiou,guardianship,&c $3 00
Hjiuesiead notice y OU
A jjacatiouiorlettersof dism’n fromadm’n 5 00
V, jiioatioutor lettersoi dism’n of guard’n 3 50
i/jiicationfor leaveto sellLand.. 5 00
v'j-ice to Debtors and Creditors 3 00
Silas of Land,/>cr square of ten lines 5 00
S.iie of personal, per sq.,ten days 1 50
S’ieriff$~~E au h * ev y of ten lines, or less.. 2 50
Mort^a^e sales of ten lines or less 5 00
"fax Oolleetor’s sales, per sq, (2 months) 5 00
^^--foreclosure of mortgage and oth
er monthly’s, per square 1 00
Estray notices, thirty days 3 00
Tributes of Respect, Resolutions by Societies,
Obituaries, &c.,exceeding six lines,tobecharged
sS transient advertising.
3T dales of Land, by Administrators, Execu-
t.irs or Guardians, are required by law, to be held
ou t |,e iirst Tuesday in the mouth, between the
hours of ten iu the forenoon and three in the af
, ru ion, atthe Court-house in the county in which
he property is situated.
a ice of these sales must be given in a public
gazette 40 days previous to the day of sale.
Xotice for the sale of personal property must be
given in like manner 10 days previous to sale day.
Notices to debtors and creditors of.au estate
must also be published 40 days.
N nice that application will be made to the
Court of Ordinary for leave to sell land, must be
■juinished for two months.
Citations for letters of Administration, Guar
dianship, &<•.., must be published oOdays—for dis
mission from Administration, monthly six months ;
f or dismission trom guardianship, 40 days.
Rules for foreclosure of Mortgages must be
published ninitltly for four months—for establish-
ins, p ipers,/or the' full spaceof three months—
tor > 11 polling titles from Executors or Adminis
trators, where bond has been given by the de
mised, the full space of three months. Charge,
v| 00 par square of ten lines for each insertion
Publications will always be continued accord
ing to these, the legal requirements, unless oth
erwise ordered.
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1869.
No. 33.
,e5i(idiile of Macon & Augusta R. R.
Leaves Camak, daily, at--- - - - - * 1 P. il.
“ Milledgeville 6.30 A.M.
Arrives at Milledgeville 4.20 P.M.
“ Camak — 9.00 A.M.
Passengersleaving Augusta or Atlanta on Day
assenger Train of Georgia Railroad will make
ose connection at Camakfor iuteimediatepoints
n the above road, and also for Macon,&c. Pas-
Murerstcaving Milledgevilleat 5.30, A. M..reach
tlanta and Augusta same day, and will make
Inse connections at either place for principal
ointsiuadjoining States. _ „ .
E. W .COLE, Gen’l Supt.
Augusta,January 7,1868 4 tf
(UTH-YVESTERN R. R. CO. .
OFFICE, MACON,GA.,March24th, 1863
Columbus Train—Daily.
iave Macon 5.15 A. M.
rive at Columbus I* 15 “■
aveColumbus 12.45 P.M.
rive at Macon - P- M.
Eufaula Train—Daily.
:ave Macon* Ho p’ M*
live atEutaula
ave Eufaula
rive at Macon -- 4.50 P.M.
necting with Albany Trainat Smithvillc
ave Smithville Vu PM
ave Albany Aunt'S’
rive at Smithville 11.00 A. M.
nccting with Fort Gaines Train at Cuthbert.
ave Cuthbert.. r'an P M '
rive at Fort Gaines
ave Fort Gaines A. M.
rive at Cuthbert J.OuA.M.
nuecting with Central Railroad and Mucon
estern Railroad Trains at Macon, and Mont-
•rv West Point Trains at Columbus.
} VIRGIL POWERS,
Engineer &. Superintendent-
hedule of the Georgia Railroad.
x AND AFTER SUNDAY, MARCH 29th
1868, the Passenger Trains on the Georgia
road willrunas follows:
DAY PASSENGER TRAIN.
(Daily, Sundays excepted.)
iave Augusta at * *1® A M-
‘ Atlanta at V-m P M
rive at Augusta '« i n P ' M'
NIGHT PASSENGER TRAIN,
iave Augusta at p’ M ‘
rive at Augusta jKf,® A- M.
Atlanta 4.00 A.M.
11ERZELIA PASSENGER TRAIN,
ave Augusta at i'tn a'
rive at Augusta - 8 ’ 4 r S A M.
• at lierzelia 1 • M.
sseno-ers for Milledgeville,Washington and
ns, Ga., must take Day Passengei Tram from
nsta and Atlanta.
sseugersfor West Point, Montgomery, Sel-
MobiTe and New Orleans must leave Augusta
icfht Passenger Train at 3.45 P. M., to make
s connections. .
ssengersfor Nashville,Corinth,Grand Jnnc-
Memphis. Louisville and St. Louis can take
ir train and make close connections.
.rough Tickets and Baggsgecheckedthrongh
eabove places.
illman s Palace SleepingCars ou ail Night
eng, i 1 rains-^ Gen’lSuperiut’dt.
lo-nsta, March 26,1868 L_-iL
itlanta &L (West UPairLt
~ B.AIL ROAD.
Day Passenger Train—Outward.
Leave Atlanta ---- 4.45 A. » .
Arrive at West Point P-
Dau Passenger Train—Inward.
Leave West Point *-*® £ “
Arrive at Atlanta b.2l P.
Xioht freight and Passenger—Outward.
Leave Atlanta 4 'VA o'
Arrive at West Point 11-40 P. M.
Niola Freight,ind Passenger Train—Inward.
Leave West Point.-. 4.20 A. M.
Arrive at Atlanta 11-30 A. M.
/^hcuKjfi af: £Pc.k.e.cLu-Le..
OFFICE SOUTH CAROLINA R.R.CO., ?
Augusta, Ga., March 25,1868. 5
PVN AND AFTER SUNDAY, 29th March,
1868, the Mai and Passenger Trains of this
load will leave and arrive at through Central
)epot,Georgia Railroad, as follows:
Morning Mail and Passenger Train
or Charleston, connecting Train for Columbia,
South Carolina, Charlotte Road, and Wilming
ton and Manchester Railroad.
Leave Central Depot at 5.50 A.M.
Arrive atCentral Depot 3.30 P. M.
''light Passenger if Accommodation Train
For Charleston, connecting with Train for Co
lumbia,and withGreenville andColumbiaRail-
road:
Leave Central Depot at.... .... 3.50 P. M.
Arrive atCeatral Depot at 7.00 A. 1C.
rr m nn A CTO
IDECISIOlSrs ,
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA,
Delivered at Atlanta, July 20, ’69.
Furnished by N. J. Hammond, Supreme
Court Reporter, Expressly for the
Constitution.
Killes Brown, plaintiff in error, vs.
Wm. Wright, et. al. defendants in
error. Motion for new trial from
DeKalb.
BROWN, C. J,
1. A guardian who acted wtth the
caution of a prudent man, and loaned
the money of his wards, prior to the
adoption of the Code, first of January,
1863 and took a note well secured, by
a mortgage upon negro properly, which
was lost by reason of the emancipa
tion of the slaves, is not liable to his
wards for the amount so lost.
2. A guardian who acted in good
faith, and received Confederate Treas
ury notes in payment of debts, due his
wards, at a time when prudent men
generally received them in payment of
all debts due, acted under color of law
and is protected by the acl of 1866 ;
and the Ordinances of the Conventions
of 1865 and 1868, And if he loaned
out the funds so received, prior to the
1st of January, 1863, upon what was
at the time good security, and they
were afterwards lost, by results of the
war, he is not liable.
3. A guardian who loaned out or in
vested the funds belonging to his wards
after the adoption of the Code, without
an order of Court, did so at his own risk,
unless the investment was in the stocks,
bonds or other securities, authorized by
law, and he is liable for the value of
the money or currency received by him
and so invested or loaned,allowing him
a reasonable time to invest it, whether
he lost it or not.
4. Where the guardian loaned out
the money of his wards, after the adop
tion of the Code, without an order of
Court, and took a note for $1,500 for
its repayment, and the Court on the
trial refused to allow the note to be
read in evidence, because it was not
stamped.
Held : That the Court did not err,
as the guardian was liable in any
event in such case, for the value of the
currency when received, allowing him
a reasonable time to re-invest, and the
note whether stamped or not, was
properly rejected.
Judgment reversed.
Wm. Ezzard, for plaintiff'in error.
Hill & Candler, for defendant in er-
Ellen D. Dicken, plaintiff’ in error, vs.
H. T. Dicken, defendant in error,—
Action for divorce, and motion for
temporary alimony, from Spalding.
BROW N, C. J.
I. On the hearing of a motion for
temporary alimony, pending on action
for divorce, the merits of the cause are
not in issue. But under section 1735
of the Code, the Judge in fixing the
amount of alimony, may inquire into
the cause and circumstances of the
separation, rendering the alimony nec
essary, and in his discretion may re
fuse it altogether ; or he may grant
such alimony, including the expenses
of the litigation, as the condition of the
husband, and the facts of the case may
justify- But the Judge should exercise
a sound discretion ; and should be
careful, that he does not so use this
discretionary power, as to encourage
the separation of husbands and wives,
and increase litigation of this charac
ter.
2, After looking into the cause and
circumstances of this separation, we
are satisfied the Judge did not abuse
the discretion vested in him by the
statute.
Judgment affirmed.
Boynton & Dismuke for plaintiff in
error.
D. J. Bailey for defendant in error.
Martha F. Smith, plaintiff in error, vs,
Thomas J. Cranberry, defendant in
error. Injunction from Monroe.
BROWN, C. J.
1. The will of James Hogan gave to
his wife, during he*- natural life, all his
estate, both real and personal, and at
her death, the estate, with the increase,
to be equally divided,and one-half giv
en by his executors to the lawful heirs
of the body of one of his daughters,and
the use of the other half to his other
daughter during her natural life, and
at her death to go to the lawful heirs of
her body. The will then contains this
clause : “If my wife should, at any
lime, think proper to give any portion
of my estate, thus bequeathed to the
legatees above named, I wish her to
do so only at her own discretion, thro’
and by my executors.”
Held : That the assent of the quali
fied executor to the life estate of Mrs.
Hogan, did not divest him of further
control over the estate. But at her
death, it was the right and duty of the
executor to take possession of the es
tate, with its increase, if any, and to
administer it according to the direc
tions in the will ; and as there were
no specific legacies, the ordinary, on
the application of the executor, had
jurisdiction to order a sale for the pur
poses of distribution in conformity to
tbs will i the vested interest of each
certain proportion of the estate, and
not a vested interest in any particular
tract of land or piece of personal prop
erty*
2. The executor after the death of
the widow, having taken possession of
the lands of the estate, and having ob
tained and order from the ordinary for
the sale of the same amount for the
purpose of distribution among the leg
atees ; and after legal advertisement,
he having sold the &ame at the proper
time and place ; and having through
A purchased the land at his own sale,
and after makiug a deed to A, the
land, on the second day thereafter,
having been reconveyed to him by A,
by regular deed.
Held, that the purchase by the ex
ecutor was not void, but was only
voidable at the option of the legatees ;
provided, they so e'ecied within a rea
sonable time. And the executor after
said sale having claimed and occupied
the land as his own, thereby acquired
an adverse possession of the same, and
a tenant placed upon the land by the
executor after his purchase, was his
tenant, arid such tenant could not
change his landlord by attorning to the
administrator de bonis non of the estate
of Hoga n.
3. The executor after his purchase,
while he had a tenant upon the land,
entered into a marriage contract wiih
the plaintiffin error, and conveyed to
her a life estate, after his death in con
sideration of marriage, without notice
to her of the nature ol his purchase ;
the marriage was then solemnized, and
in a few months he died, leaving the
tenant upon the premises, and his wid
ow commenced action against the ten
ant for the rent, and a proceeding to
dispossess the tenant holding over.
Held : That the tenant became her
tenant on the death of her husband,and
the administrator de bonis von of the es
tate of Hogan, had no right to interfere
in this litigation, or to maintain a bill in
equity to enjoin her action against the
tenant; the more especially as she re
sided in Bibb county, and the litiga
tion between her and her tenant was
pending iri Monroe, where the bill was
filed. If he, or the legatees of Hogan,
had paramount title, the litigation be
tween plaintiffin error and her tenant,
did not in any way interfere with their
right to commence their action of eject
ment, or other proper proceeding for
the recovery of the land.
Judgment reversed.
WARNER, J.
Concurred in the judgment, but not
in the reversing of the Court. He furn
ished no written decision.
McCAY, J.
Concurred in the judgment forthe fol
lowing reasons :
1. If property be demised to A for
life with remainder to B. and C., and
the executor deliver possession of the
estate to A, who enters upon the lull
enjoyment of the life estate, she holds
it for herself and the remainder
men. And any duty, (as to divide
the estate, or the like,) put upon the ex
ecutor, by the will, after the termina
tion of the life-estate, is a special trust,
and forms no part of his duty as exec
utor, and the supervision of it does not
belong to the Court of Ordinary, but to
the Superior Court.
2. Where one is in adverse posses
sion of laud, against the true owner,
and rents it to a tenant, avowedly, in
his character of adverse holder, the
tenant cannot attorn to the true owner,
or deny the adverse possession of his
landlord.
Lanier & Anderson, R. P. Trippe,
for plaintiff’in eror.
Cabauiss & Peeples, for defendant
in error.
J. G. Brown vs. Seaborn Croley. Com
plaint from DeKalb.
McCAY, J.
If B purchase from A two parcels of
land at the same time, and when they
come to draw the writing, A suggests
Lhat B, to save the writingol two deeds
take a deed for one of the parcels from
C, from whom A had purchased it but
had not yet got titles, saying it would
do just as well, and B consented, and
there was in fact a mortgage on the
land given by C, of which B was igno
rant.
Held, That B, who had the mort
gage to pay, might, in a suit by A on
one of the notes, given at the time,
plead a failure of consideration to the
amount of damage.
Judgment affirmed.
Hill & Candler for plainliffin error.
William Ezzard for defendant in er
ror.
Alfred Wooten, vs. Perry Wilkins.—
Case from Spalding.
McCAY, J.
1. In an action by a father for the
seduction of his minor daughter, the
dying declarations of the daughter, as
to who was the father of her child are
inadmissable, as evidence forthe plain
tiff’.
2. Although this Court may not be
entirely satisfied with the verdict of a
jury, yet if the Court below refuse a
new trial, this Court will not interfere
to grant a new trial, unless the verdict
be manifestly, the result of prejudice,
mistake or corruption in the jury.
Judgment affirmed.
S. D. Irwin for plaintiff in error.
Emily T. Jackson, et. al. vs. Jas. W.
Corbin, et. al. Motion to dissolve
injunction, from Spalding.
WARNER. J.
When J sold a tract of land to I, for
fourteen hundred dollars, receiving five
hundred dollars of the purchase mon
ey, and taking the note of I for the
balance of the purchase money, and
made a warranty deed to J, the pur
chaser, and afterwards died insolvent;
and within a short time after the death
of J, C, a judgment creditor of J, lev
ied an execution upon the land in sat
isfaction of a judgment obtained against
J, anterior to the sale of the land to I,
and a bill was filed by the widow of J,
in behalf of herself and her minor chil
dren, alleging the insolvency of her de
ceased husband, and claiming a year’s
support out of the nine hundred dollar
note given for the land, as being the
only property left for that purpose, and
also alleging that if the land should be
sold by the judgment creditor in satis
faction ofhisdebt, the purchaserof the
land wouid successfully defend the
note as against her and her children,
on the ground of failure of title, and
thereby defeat her claim to her year’s
support out of the note given to herde-
ceased husband for the land which is
unpaid, and which is the only remain
ing estate left out of which she can ob
tain her year’s support. Held: That
it was error in the Court in dissolving
the injunction upon the foregoing state
of facts, inasmuch, as the widow was
entitled to her year’s support out ot the
nine hundred dollar note, and lhat the
sale of the land should have been re
strained until the rights and equities of
the parlies could be adjusted upon the
final hearing of the cause, the purchas
er of the land having been made a par
ty to the bill.
Judgment reversed.
D. J. Bailey, 8. D. Irvin, for plain
tiffs in error.
Doyle & Nunnally for defendants in
Center & Treadwell vs. L. H. Davis.
Case from Fulton.
Warner, j.
Where Davis, the landlord, on the
4lh day of June, 1859, entered into a
written contract with Center & Tread
well to rent to them a store-room, then
in the process of building, in the city of
Atlanta, for the term of one year, for
the sum of eight hundred dollars per
annum, with the privilege of renting
said store-room for three additional
years at the same rale, and Davis, the
landlord, stipulated on his part to have
said store-room “well. Jit ted up and ready
for use, by the second Monday in Au
gust, 1S59,” and the tenants went into
possession of the store-room alter its
erection, occupied it for one year, and
in pursuance of the original contract
between the parties, rented the store
room for another year. It also appears,
from the record, that after the making
of the rent contract, Davis, the land
lord, proceeded to erect over the store
room rented to the plaintiffs, and over
the adjoining store room, rented to an
other tenant, a boarding-house and
kitchen, the boarding house, in front of
the building, and the kitchen over the
back part thereof, and constructed a
platform or walk over the valley be
tween the two store-rooms, leading
from the boarding-house so built over
the store-rooms to the kitchen, the land
lord rented the boarding-house, kitch
en and fixtures so erected over the
store-rooms to another tenant, who oc
cupied the same. These fixtures were
erected by the landlord, when the
plaintiffs renewed their lease for the
second year, under the original con
tract. The evidence in the record
shows lhat, in consequence of the erec
tion by the landlord of the buildings
and fixtures over the store room, and
the use thereof by his tenants to whom
he rented the same, the plaintiffs have
been damaged by the water thrown
upon their goods in the store-room, to
the amount of twelve hundred dollars,
as assessed by five merchants called on
for that purpose. Held: That inas
much as the landlord stipulated in his
contract, to have the store-room well
fitted up and ready for the use of the plain
tiffs, that if he afterwards erected ob
structions over the building which
caused the plaintiffs to be injured, ei
ther by his own negligence, or that of
his tenants or agents in the use theieof,
he is liable for the damages resulting
(herefrom.
Held, also: That the agreement of
the tenants to make repairs, as stated
in the record, extended only to ordina
ry repairs of the building, and did not
extend to making repairs by removing
permanent fixtures erected by the land
lord, from which the injury to the
plaintiff resulted.
The Court charged the jury: “But
the law does not require the landlord to
sweep the premises and keep them
clean while the tenant is occupying
them : this is the tenant's business if the
house was properly built and kept in
repairs, ana if being kept clean, no
damages would have resulted, defendant
is not liable. If the kitchen overhead
was built after plaintiffs first went into
the house, and they received their ten
ancy without objection after it was
built, the trouble of sweeping and keep
ing clean the premises is no matter of
which plaintiffs coukl afterwards com
plain.” Held: That this charge of the
Court in view ol the facts of this case
was error, and calculated to mislead
the jury. The plaintiffs were only ten*
iri
ed, they were only bound to sweep
and keep that clean ; it was not their
business, or duty, to sweep and keep
clean the premises above them, which
caused the damage ; they had no legal
right to go there for lhat purpose. The
landlord was bound by bis contiact to
to keep the store-house rented to the
plaintiff’s fit for the use for which he
rented it to them, and if by obstructions
placed there by himself, and used by
his tenants, such obstructions rendered
the store house unfit for the purposes
for which it was rented, and damage
resulted therefrom, the landlord is lia
ble therefor, and ibe plaintiffs have the
legal right to complain whenever dam
aged thereby, whether they renewed
their tenancy under their original con
tract, after the creation of the obstruc
tions by the landlord or not.
Judgment reversed.
McCay, J., concurred as follows:
A landlord who rents a portion of a
tenement to A, is bound, either by him
self or his other tenants, to keep the re
mainder of the building in such a con
dition as that the portion occupied by
A, shail be le.iantable, and if he fails,
he is liable for the damages which A
may receive from his neglect.
Browx, C. J., dissenting.
In my opinion, the verdict and judg
ment in this case was right, and I can
not concur in the judgment of reversal.
The tenants elected to take the sec
ond lease for three years, with full
knowledge that the kitchen and pass
way were over the store-room, just as
they remained, till the damage was
done. And if the tenant who occupied
the rooms over the store after the date
of the second lease, negligently and
wrongfully obstructed the gutter, so as
to prevent the free passage of the wa
ter from the roof; and there was no de
lect in the roof or gutter, but while it
was perfect, it was filled up with trash
by the negligence of the tenant above,
he, and not the landlord, was liable for
any damage that ensued by his negli
gence or his wrongful act. In that case,
the obstruction placed in the gutter by
the tenant above, was a nuisance of
which the tenant below had a right to
complain, and if injured by it, he had
a right to recover damages against the
tenant above, for maintaining it to his
injury.
The Code, section 2919, defines a
nuisance to be “anything thatwoiketh
hurt, inconvenience, or damage to an
other ; and the fact that the act done
may otherwise be lawful, does not keep
it from being a nuisance.”
If, then, the filling up of the gutter,
which was perfect in itself, was caused
by the negligence or the wrongful act
of the tenant above, and was a nui
sauce, and it was not so filled when the
tenant below took the second lease, (he
decision of this Court in the case, Va-
son vs. the City Council of Augusta,
not yet reported, clearly fixes lhe lia
bility on the tenant who maintained the
nuisance, and not upon the landlord.
In that case, this Court says: “A land
lord who has leased premises to a ten
ant is not liable for a nuisance main
tained upon the premises by the tenant
during the lease. If the nuisance ex
isted upon the premises when the lease
was made, the landlord is liable. But
if the tenant continues the nuisance af
ter he obtains exclusive possession and
control, lie alone is liable for its con
tinuance. As the landlord, under our
statute, is liable for necessary repairs
on the premises, if the nuisance grows
out of his neglect to make the repairs,
the tenant may make them, and set off
the leasonable value against the rent
due the landlord.”
But it is objected, that the case just
cited was a criminal proceeding against
Vason, the landlord. So it was. But
what difference does that make ? What
reason applies in favor of the exemp
tion of the landlord in the one case,
that does not in the other. If he who
maintains a nuisance is subject to in
dictment and punishment for so doing;
and is also subject to an action for
damages by a person injured by the
nuisance ; where is the reason for the
distinction between the two cases?
With what propriety can it be contend
ed that Davis was not liable to indict
ment for this nuisance, if it had result
ed in general public injury, because he
did not maintain it; and that his ten
ant was alone subject to punishment
because he did maintain it ; but that
Davis was liable in damages to a par
ticular individual injured by it ? Are
we to lay down the rule of law, that
the tenant is liable criminally, because
he alone maintains the nuisance ; but
that the landlord is liable civilly, to an
action for damages in case an individ
ual is injured by the nuisance, which
is maintained by the wrongful act of
the tenant alone ?
It is said the contract and the stat
ute of the Stale makes the landlord li
able for all necessary repairs. Grant
it. But how does this avail the plain
tiffs in error ? What repairs were want
ed ? There is no evidence that either
the roof or the gutter was out of repair
in the place where the injury occurred.
They were perfect, and the damage
resulted from the obstruction of the
gutter, by the wrongful act of the te i-
ant above. If there had been no ob
struction in the gutter, there would
have been no damage.
But admit that the cleaning out of
the gutter was understood by the par
ties to be included in the necessary re
pairs of ibe roof; I incline to think the
nartiAg ^ mnrl ,h~ v»r.
diet was still so' included, while it was
not, properly speaking, right. The
evidence was i:> conflict, but there was
positive testimony before the jury, that
the plaintiffs in error called the atten
tion of Davis, the landlord, to the con-
lion of the roof, stating that it needed
repairs, and that he told them to have
the repairs made and charge to him,
and they agreed to do it.
Now, if the cleaning out of the gut
ter was part of the repairs, and the
tenants agreed to have them made, at
the expense of the landlord, and they
neglected it, he is not liable to them
for the damage tesulting from their
own negligence. And as the jury,
whose province it was to decide on
the credibility and weight of the evi
dence, have found this issue for the
landlord, and the Judge who tried the
case, is satisfied with the finding, we
should not, in my opinion, disturb the
verdict.
If this damage Was the result of a
nuisance, the tenant who maintained
the nuisance, and not the landlord,was
liable. But if it resulted from neglect
to make proper repairs, the plaintiffs
in error, who had agreed to have them
made at the expense of the landlord,
and had neglected to do so, have no
right to recover from the land lord .dam
ages which resulted from their own
neglect. In either view of this ques
tion, I think thejudgmenl of the Court
below ought to be affirmed.
J. M. Calhoun & Son, for plaintiffs
in error.
D. F. Hammond, for defendant in
error.
[ From Atlanta Ialeltigenccr.']
Attornry Genera! Farrow's Opinion.
When do County Elections take place in
Georgia 1—How long do these officers
and General Assemblymen hold ?—Fur
ther Legislation necessary.
The following important opinion,ad
dressed by Attorney General H. P.
Farrow, to Governor Bullock, on the
time of bolding elections for county of
ficers, has been handed to us for pub
lication. We invite the attention of
our readers to it :
Attorney Geneiul’s Office, >
Atlanta, Ga., Aug. 7, ’69. )
Governor :—Your communication
of the 31st ultimo, with enclosed pa
pers, came duly to hand, and I have
given them that consi leralion which
the importance of the question present
ed demands.
The question submitted, and upon
which you ask for my written opinion,
is one which has been projxiunded to
me by a number ol county officers who
were not, under the law, entitled to the
opinions ol the Attorney General, and
to whom J did not, therefore, feel al
liberty to tender my opinion. There
is a great difference of opinion among
the people as to when the next elec
tion tor county officers will take place,
and it is very proper that the question
should lie auihoriiatively answered and
put at rest.
The Constitution itself and not the
Code, determines the term for which
county officers have been elected, and
those who insist that the election for
county officers will take place next
winter, betray great ignorance ol the
Constitution upon which they have so
recently voted.
The 9th Article of rhe Constitution
says : “The county officers recogniz
ed as existing by the laws of this State
and not abolished by this Constitution,
shall, where not otherwise provided
for in this Constitution, be elected by
the qualified voters ot their respective
counties or districts, and shall hold
their offices for two years.”
Therefore, it is clear that by virtue
of the 9th Article of the Constitution,
county officers will hold their offices
for two years unless it is otherwise
provided for in the Constitution.—
Does the Constitution otherwise
provide ? and if so, to what extent ?
It does otherwise provide in the case
of every county officer elected in the
election which commenced on the 20th
day of April, 1868. Thatelection was
held underand by virtue of an ordi
nance adopted by the Constitutional
Convention on the 10th of March, 1S6S ;
and all civil officers elected under the
Constitution,‘by the people, were then
elected, except Justices of the F'cace.
That ordinance provides that all of
ficers elected at that time, shall “hold
their offices as though they were elect
ed on the Tuesday after the first Mon
day in November, 1S63,” and if more
over provides that they “shall continue
in office till the regular succession pro
vided for after the year 1868, and un
til successors are elected and quali
fied.” The Constitution itself affirms
the validity of that ordinance and gives
it all the force and power to be derived
from a Constitution—kence the pres
ent county officers will hold their offi
ces for more than two years from the
lime fhey were elected, but after the
first regular succession, such officers
will only hold for two years—except
in cases where the Constitution fixes a
different term, as in the case of the of
fice of Ordinary which is for fouryears.
Those who contend that the old ejec
tion laws contained in the Code, and
found from Section 1345 to J.350 in
clusive, are still of force, and must
control the next election for co inty of
ficers, and bring on the election nearly
one year before the offices can jiossibly
become vacant, should remember that
all our laws governing elections were
null and void by the Reconstruction
Laws and our Constitution. If these
sectionsi>f the Code are ot force now,
of course they have been of force all the
lime since they were first made a part
ot our law. If they were of force at
the time of the election on the 20ih of
April, 1868, then it follows that there
has been no election ol county officers
under the Reconstruction Laws. If
that election was not valid, then the
whole reconstruction of the Southern
Slates was without authority of jaw.
If, on the other hand, it is admitted
that the present incumbents were le
gally elected, then it follows lhat the
Reconstruction Laws and the Consti
tution prevail over said sections of the
Code,and lhalatthat time those sections
were superceded, obsolete, and void.
If they were void, then what has since
re-enacted them ? They were inoper
ative and void then, and are to this
day ; for when a law is once annulled
it is annulled forever, and can only ex
ist again by re-enactment. If it hail
been the purpose of the framers of the
Constitution, who also framed this or
dinance, to recognize these sections of
the Code as still of force, why would
they have disregarded them in the last
election ?
There can be no doubt that under
the changes wrought by the Recon
struction Laws, and the new Constitu
tion, those sections of the Code , under
which it is contended by some, the
election for county officers should be
held next January, are entirely obso
lete, and that the General Assembly
must provide for an election and suc
cession, just as it has in the case of
Justices of the Peace, before any elec
tion can be held for county officers.
If there should be no provision made
by the General Assembly at its next
session lor an election and regular suc
cession, then by virtue of that provis
ion of the Constitution which provides
they shall hold till their successors are
elected and qualified, they would sim
ply continue in office until the next
General Assembly could provide tor
an election.
Therefore, it is my opinion that there
is at this lime no law regulating the
time for the election of county offfeers,
and that before any election can be
held there must be further legislation,
lam very respectfully,
HENRY P. FARROW,
Attorney General.
His Excellency Rufus B. Bullock Gov
ernor of Georgia.
An Eccentric Frenchman.—Count
de Chateauvillard, who has just died
in Paris, was, in his day, one ot the
most brilliant meivand dashing eques
trians ot France. It was he, who one
day rode Op the steps ot the Jockey
Club (ilieu at the corner of the Rue
Dronel and Boulevard) anil played a
game of billiards on horseback." He
rode lor some time a most vicious horse.
A friend said, “if you ride .that horse
three months longer, I’ll bet he kills
you.” The Count replied, “What do
you bet?*’ “Twenty-five thousand
francs.” “Taken.” The Count felt
in honor bound to his friend to ride the
horse every day, and the horse showed
himself to be so very vicious, that the
Count had his coffin made and sent
home, far he was sure he would re
quire it before long.
His wife (who had long been ex
tremely uneasy lest his horse should
kill him,) seeing her husband look up
on the horse as dangerous—as she her
self considered him ; no sooner saw
the coffin placed in her husband’s dress
ing room, than she went to the stable,
armed with a pair of pistols, and shot
the dangerous steed through the head.
On one occasion the Count was ask
ed by a friend, a Marquise, to see her
to her carriage. They were at a ball.
Going down stairs some one trod on her
dress and tore it. She asked for a pin.
The Count took from his scarf a dia
mond pin worth $600 and piesented it
to her. She declined, saying, “Oh,
Count, it is entirely too valuable.” “Is
that the only objection to the pin?”—
“Certainly.” This was no sooner out
of the Marquise’s mouth, than he broke
off the diamond, threw it out ot the
neighboring window, and gave the
golden pin to her.
The other evening, two Irishmen
new to this country and belonging to
the belter class of emigrants, arrived
in Toledo late in the evening and stoo
ped at the Island House. They were
shown to a room far up in the building,
the gas lighted, and they were left a-
lone. The w r eather was hot, the win
dows open, and the two gentlemen sat
down to enjoy a chat. Soon, attracted
by the light and the prospectof a square
rneal, a troop of the hungriest of the
hungry Toledo mosquitoes bore down
on the ill-fated Hibernians. They fought
and bled, but the enemy constantly
received reinforcements, and the trav
elers were in despair. The clerk was
summoned and asked agoniziugly :
“Is there no defence ag&inst these
blood-thirsty craturs?” He told the
travelers that if they put out their gas
and closed their windows they would
experience relief. They acted on the
su gg e ‘ s t>°n and placed themselves be
tween the sheets. Just as they be
gan to doze, a lightning bug, which had
strayed into the room, caught the eyes
of one of the travelers. He roused "bis
companion with a puach: “Jamie,
Jamie, it is no use, here is one of the
4**“ ”■ “ Innipm.'l
