Newspaper Page Text
Vol. L,
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1869.
No. 32.
yC. ORME <Sc SON,
editors and proprietors.
j, r .jD—> 'J.DII Per annum, in Advance.
ilM Kit risisi.—Persquare of ten lines, each
no. Mercnauts and others foiall
' ’’„ts i ver $ 23, t wenty-fivcper cent.off.
LEGAL ADVERTISING.
iir.lu“ ir s' $4 —Citationsfor letter? oi ad
miration .guardianship ,&c | 3 OU
instead notice . 2 00
' ^iicatioutorlettera of dism n fromadiuTt 5 ©0
mrauoui'or lettersofdism’uofguard’n 3 f,o
lJ ‘ itioiitor leaveto sellEand 5 ^
to Debtors and Creditors 3 00
)t Land, per square of ten lines 5 ou
' l e ofpertoaal, per sq., ten days ] 50
^^'■jVj—Each levy of fe» tines, or less.. 2 50
1 * sales of ten lines or less..- 5 00
5 00
"jOeetor’s sales, persq. (2 months)
T,is0Ji ,
^. . .--Foreclosure 01 mortgage and oth-
er monthly’s, per square 1 00
E . tra y notices, thirty days 3 00
Trio ttes of Respect, Resolutions by Societies,
Obituaries, &c., exceeding six lines, to be charged
.transient advertising.
•y*j-desof Laud, by Administrators, Execu-
. ,j. v .r Guardians, are required by law, to be held
'.,j jbe tirst Tuesday in the month, between the
j. urs often in the forenoon and three in the af-
„, u wit, atthe Court-house in the county in which
,. lf property is situated.
V itice of these sales must be given in a public
-uette 40 days previous to the day of sale.
Notice for the sale of personal property must be
. veil in like manner 10 days previous to sale day,
Notices to debtors and creditors of an estate
Wl[j t also be published 40 days.
Notice that application will be made to the
(\,art of Ordinary for leave to sell laud, must be
paolisiied for two mouths.
Citations for letters of Administration, Gnar-
diiuship, &c.., must bo published 30days—fordis-
:1 ssiou from Administration, monthly six months ;
., r iisinissiou trom guardianship, 40 days.
itiles for foreclosure of Mortgages must be
p-ulished monthly for four mouths—for estabiish-
r [0s 1 papers, for the full spaccof three months—
• ir: 1 npeiliug titles from Executors or Adminis-
i: iters, where bond lias been given by the dt;
■etsal. the full space of three months. Cnarge,
>•[ j:j per square of ten Hues for eaeh insertion.
i’oiiicatioas will always be continued accord
G . t.1 these, the legal requirements, unless oth
- vise ordered.
Schedule of Macon & Augusta R. R.
Leaves Camak, daily, at 12.30 P. M.
•* Milledgeville 6.30 A.M.
Arrives at Milledgeville 4 20 P.M.
“ Camak 9.00 A.M.
Passengersleaving Augusta or Atlanta on Day
Ptssenger Train of Georgia Railroad will make
,ose connection at Camaktor inteimediatepoiuts
lithe above road, andalsofor Macon,&c. Pas-
, enters leaving Milledgeville at 5.30, A. M. .reach
Atlanta and Augusta same day,and will make
dose connections at either place for principal
tintsin adjoining States.
E. W .COLE, Gen’l Sup:.
Augusta,January 7,1S68 ^ tf
SOUTH.WESTERN R. R. CO.
OFFICE, MACON,GA., March24th, 1H6U-
Columbus Train—Daily.
Leave Macon 5.15 A. M.
Arrive at Columbus.. 11.15 A.M.
Leave Columbus ........ 1245 P.M.
Arrive at Macon 6.20 P. M.
Eu/aula Train—Daily.
Leave Macon 8.00 A. M.
Arrive atEufaula 5.30 P.M.
Leave Eufaula 7.20 A.M.
Arrive at Macon 4.50 P. M.
Connecting until Albany Tram at S/nilJivillc
Leave Smithville — -- - J
Arrive at Albany - 3.11 P. M.
Leave Albany 9.35 A.M.
Arrive at Smithville 11.00 A. M.
‘ onnutino with Fort Gaines Train at Cutlibert.
Leave Cutlibert 3.57 P. M.
Arrive at Fort Gaines 5.40 P. M.
l.-ave Fort Gaines — - 7.05 A.M.
Arrive at Cutbbert 9.05 A.M.
Connecting with Central Railroad and Macon
»V Western Railroad Trains at Macon, and Mont-
s'onierv it West Point Trains.at Columbus.
VIRGIL POWERS,
Engineer & Superintendent.
Schedule of the Georgia Railroad.
/ AN AND AFTER SUNDAY, MARCH 29th
yJ 180S, the Passenger Trains on the Georgia
Railroad will run as follows:
DAY PASSENGER TRAIN.
(Daily, Sundays excepted.)
Leave Augusta at 7.10 A M.
“ Atlanta at — 5 A. M.
Arrive at Augusta 3.30 P. M.
“ at Atlanta — 6.10 P. M.
NIGHT PASSENGER TRAIN.
Leave Augusta at — 3 45 P. M,
“ Atlanta at 6.45 P.M.
Arrive at Augusta 5.30 A. M.
" Atlanta 4.00 A.M.
BERZELIA PASSENGER TRAIN.
Leave Augusta at 4.30 P. M.
iierzeliaat 7.00 A.M
Arrive at Augusta 8.45 A M.
at Berzelia —--O.lo P.M,
Passengers for Milledgeville,4A ashiugtou and
Athens,Ga..musttake Day Passenget Train from
Augusta and Atlanta.
Passengers for West Point, Montgomery, Sel
ma. Mobile and New Orleans must leave Augusta
011 Night Passenger Train at -3-45 P. M., to make
close connections.
Passengers for Nashville, Corinth, Gran d J unc
tion, Memphis,Louisville and St. Louis can ta.:c
either train and make close connections.
Through Tickets and Baggage checkedthrougJi
to the above places.
Pullman’s Palace SleepiugCars on all Night
Passenger Trains. .
E . W. COLE, Geu’lSuperiut dt.
Augusta, March 26,1868 I O
jitLcuita SL [West fPaini
RAIL ROAD.
Day Passenger Train—Outward.
Laave Atlanta 4-4u A. M.
Arrive at West Point 9.;>0 1. M.
D.ay Passenger Train—Inward.
Leave West Poiut 1.30 I . M.
Arrive at Atlanta C.20 P. M.
Sight Freight and Passenger—Outward.
Leave Atlanta 4.15 P. M.
Arrive at West Point 11.40 P. M.
flight Freight and Passenger Irani Inward,
Leave West Point —— 4.20 A. M.
Arrive at Atlanta 11.30 A. M.
SI Lancia of. £fcIlccLu.Il
OFFICE SOUTH CAROLINA R. R. CO., ?
Augusta, Ga., March 25,1868.
O N AND AFTER SUNDAY, 29th March,
1868, the Mai and Passenger Trains of this
Road will leave and arrive at through Central
^ e pot,Georgia Railroad, as follows:
Morning Mail and Passenger Train
^ 0r Charleston, connecting Train for Columbia.
South Carolina, Charlotte Road, and Wilming
ton and Manchester Railroad.
Leave Central Depot at 5.50 A.M.
Arrive atCentral Depot -----j-, - 3.30 P. M.
Night Passenger 5f Accommodation Train
Tor Charleston, connecting with Train for Co
lumbia,and withGreenville andColumhiattail*
road:
Leave Central Depot at. 3.50 P. M.
Arrive atCentral Cepotat 7.00 A. Mi
H. T. PEAKE,
General Superintendent
%
The following was written a num
ber of years ago, by a gentleman now de
ceased, and sent to its lately by a friend,
with a request to publish. The said gen
tleman, was a close observer in religious
matters, and became somewhat disgust
ed at the sectarian quarrels theft occurred
at the time be wrote :
I sing the road to bliss above,
The different roads by which we move
To gain a Heavenly seat;
Each stupid sect, in error bound,
Think they the only road have found
To Paradse complete.
The Catholic absolved by Pope,
Thinks heretics deserve a rope,
Or else the burning flame:
Does penance at the Virgin's shrine
Feels purified from every crime.
And claims a saint by name.
The Church of England pay their tith*
And read their long prayers with half closed
eyes, -
And bless their King and Queen.
They’ll be nobility in bliss,
And look on that sect, and on this,
As vulgar, low and mean.
The Presbyterian sourly scowls
Denouncing all as guilty souls
Who are not saved by Fate :
“We are the elect, von are the damned,
Hell like a wallet will be crammed
With God’s own reprobates.”
The Baptist washed in puddle clean,
Join Presbyterians in their scream .
Against the non-elect :
“Repent and be baptized in time,
Nor Christian babies black with crime
Of Adam and his mate.”
The Methodist by madness drove,
Howls dismal on his road above
Denouncing Heavenly ire :
Repent or God will in a trice,
Shake ye o’er Hell like squeeking mice
Suspended o’er the tire.
The Quaker smoothly travels on, , j
Thiuks cash iu hand is fairly won
And all the world are knaves;
But he is honest all his life,
No money gets by wars or strife
And by the spirit prays.
The Shaker dancing to the gate
Of Heaven, calls Mother Ann to wait,
And hear his plea of Love :
“I’ve left the world and flesh you know.
The Devil and all his works below
To dance with you above.
The Unitarian complains,
“The world is bound in triple chains
The Plural Gods adore*'
He finds it easier, you see, .
To make his peace with One, than Three,
And “settle up his score.”
The Universalist will glide
To Heaven, as swift as school boys ride
Down hills of ice and snow,
“Huzzah ! my boys, we’ll all be saved.
For Hell is nothing but the grave
And there is no future woe.”
bones. And in numberless cases the
very State government, whose judicia
ry thus administers the deadly blade to
honest claims, forbade by its legisla
tive authority the collection of ihesr-
ciaims, and is, therefore, responsible
that they are to-day defunct.
We will notice but one more result
of this decision, and then cease.
While thousands of judgments will
be destroyed that were deemed uncon
ditionally solvent, thousands of young
er judgments, that were regarded as
worthless will gain new vitality from
the removal of older conflicting liens.
[Atlanta Constitution.
’Mid such confusion who can tell,
Which is the road to Heaven or Hell,
Or how we may be saved.
W hether his life of prayers and fears ,
Beads and penance for days and years
With thoughts fixed on the. grave.
My counsel is to walk alone.
Keep free from quarrels not your own
And all seditious strife.
Let madmen at each other roar.
Do good to all both great and poor
And lead a virtuous life.
More
Heavy
Important Derisions—Anoilier
Stroke for Relief.
Our Supreme Court, in their rulings,
delivered on the 3d inst., delivered one
that will be found below, that carries
relief a good many degrees to perfec
tion.
In the case of L. N. B. Battle vs.
James A. Shivers, from Warren Supe
rior Court, the tremendous, and we
are constrained 10 say, in. q iitous dic
tum is promulgated that tue suspen
sion of the Statute of Limitations clu
ing the war, did not apply to'the lien
ofjudgments, but notwithstanding the
collection ofjudgments, was absolute
ly stopped, the limitation of their lien
continued, and they must bocoine dor
mant unless levied iu the seven years
prescribed for keepmgjudgments aiive.
It boots us not to look into the law of
the thing. The political ruling of the
court stands ihc supreme law of the
land, and must be obeyed. Judge
Warner, who dissents, as he has done
heretofore, from all the Courts Radical
decisions, rips to pieces the tiimsv rea
soning of Chiel Justice Brown and
Judge McCav, and exposes in bis own
unvarnished and scathing way, the bad
law and worse faith of the legal conclu
sion of his colleagues.
We have to do for practical purpos
es now, only with the results ot the de
cision.
All judgments seven years old, that
have no entry upon them to keep them
alive, are dormant, and lose their lien,
and must be sued like accounts, or
notes, or anything else unsued. They
are simply subject matter and rights to
sue.
It is impossible to estimate the a-
mount of debts that will thereby be
killed. It will run almost, if not quite,
to millions. Hundreds upon hundreds
of claims, now nestling cosily and safe
ly in coders, and pocket-books, and
desks, and believed to be as sound as
gold, and as certain of recovery as the
bond holders deem their fat gold in
terest, are as defunct as door nails.—
Hundreds of robustious, executions,
with broad acres of rich lands legally
bound for their payment, have, by this
decision, lost their clutch upon solven
cy, and now lie as flabby as worthless
rags, and as lifeless as de^l men’s
L. N. B. Battle, vs. James A. Shivers.
Motion to distribute money. From
Warren.
McCAY, J.
An ordinary judgment for money, en
tered up in 1S61, upon which no exe
cution was aued out in seven years
from the dale of the judgment, or upon
which execution, if sued out, no entry
has been made for seven consecutive
years, is a dormant judgment, notwith
standing the acts suspending the Stat
ute of Limitations, and enacting stay-
laws, passed in 1S60, and at different
periods since that time.
L. N. B. Battle vs. James A. Shivers.
Dormant judgments, Statute of Lim
itations. From Warren.
At April term,‘1868, of Warren Su
perior Court, the Sheriff, in answer to
a rule, granted at the instance of plain
tiff in error, returned, that he had in
hand, two thousand and thirty dollars,
raised from the sale ofCullen Battle’s
properly, by virtue of two fi. fas. in fa
vor of the plaintiff vs. said Battle.—
The answer also slated that a fi. la. in
favor of defendant in error, James A.
Shivers, of cider date than plaintiff’s fi.
fas. had been placed in his hands,
claiming the money, and that the mon
ey would not more than pay said last
fi. fa.
It appeared that the fi. la. in favor of
Shivers was issued 12th of April, 1S61,
and there had been no entry of any
kind thereon by the proper officer to
execute and return the same^within
seven years from the time it was issued.
Thereupon the plaintiff in error tender
ed to the defendant in error an issue
on two grounds :
1. That Shivers’ fi. fa. was dor
mant.
2. That it was paid ofFand discharg
ed. Defendant in error joined issue,
and the same was tried by a jury. On
the trial, the Judge held that tlie fi. fa.
was not dormant. There was no evi
dence of payment. The jury found
the fi. fa. not paid oft'. A motion was
made for a new trial,'on the ground
which suits shall be brought or pro
ceedings commenced in a court of jus
tice, and there is hardly a man in the-
community so ignorant of legal phrase
ology^ that he would not, on hearing
them, at first thought, confirm their
signification to this use of them.
These acts are based on the idea
that the defendant has, by lapse of time
lost his evidence, and have uniformly
these qualifications, that if the plaintiff
has been under certain disabilities, as
infancy, marriage, etc., they shall not
run against him, or if he can prove,
that the defendant has, within the time,
acknowledged the right, his case shall
be saved.
The dormant judgment act contains
none of the ideas included in this state
ment of the essentials of “Statutes 'of
Limitation.”
It does not prescribe a time within
which proceedings shall becommenced
but. only a lime within which an entry
shall he made bv the officer upon the
fi. la. Even a written acknowledg
ment of the defendant that a judgment
is not dormant, would not, as has al
ways been understood among lawyers,
save it. Nor has it ever been pretend
ed, that the death of the plaintiff’, his
lunacy, imprisonment, or in the case
of a woman, her marriage, would pre
vent its operation.
The confusion existing in the minds
of those who call this act a “Statute
of Limitations,” arise from a want of
proper reflection as to ihe nature of
judgments, and of the object and intent
of the dormant judgment act. A judg
ment and the lien of a judgment are
distinct ideas—it is not a part of the
idea of a judgment that it shall have a
lien. The Constitution of the United
States provides that full faith and cred
it shall be given to the judicial proceed
ings of sister States. A judgment of
Alabama is also a judgment in Geor
gia, but it has no lieu, and must be
sued upon. It cannot have error, be
controverted and it imports verity.—
Many of our own judgments have no
lien as such. Judgments in attach
ment, judgments in ejectment, judg
ments against intruders, judgments
foreclosing mortgages, either have no
lien, or do not derive it trom the judg
ment. Judgment in equity rules ab
solute against Sheriff ’s judgments for
temporary alimony had error in this
State until a recent period, no liens, for
the simple reason that they could irot
be enforced by the sale of the defend
ant’s property. In some Slates this
lien is only allowed after levy ; in oth
ers only after entry in a certain book.
In some States the lien is confined to
the county ; in others, to personal prop
erty. At common law the judgment
the defendant, but to regulate the rights
fi. fa. was not dormant, which motion ,lj> nen was IO ' 1 111 a 3 ear an(l a ^ a 3-
that the Court erred in holding that the | ’ lse j! nevet ^ x P* re( l lapse of time
its hen was lost in a year and
It became dormant, not dead. It slept
and might be revived, and it then got
, , . a new lien. The history of our legis-
I am not sure that the verdict was 1
the Judge refused and the plaintiff’ex
cepted.
_ . ,as j laliori on this subject is as follows:
wrong. As far as it went, it seems 1
well enough. I do not think the fi. fa.
was paid off’; but one of the distinct
issues, was whether the fi. fa. was dor
mant ; the Court held that it was, and
the jury failed to pass upon that issue.
We hold that the Judge erred in thus , . , _ . . . ,
holding, and thus misled the jury, so I kmd ol re,,ewal was (lone awa - v w,lb ’
The act of 1799, gave judgments a
lien from their dale, Prince, 420.—
Thisjien lasted only for a year and a
day, and the judgment had to be re
newed on the Court roll from year to
year. In 1811, the necessity tor this
of different judgment creditors and
purchasers with each other. As to the
defendant, the rights of the plaintiff
were but slightly interfered with. The
right to seize his property could be re
joined in thirty days by scire facias, and
by that process, or by action in which
the severity of the judgment could not
be denied, he could, even if by his neg
lect, he had allowed to lose its lien, as
to the third person, keep it up against
the defendant, as long as it was unsat
isfied.
The leading object of the act was to
regulate the relative acts of third par
ties—to place a qualification or con
dition, on the lien, the failure to ob
serve which should cause it to give
way to these rights.
This condition was a simple entry
by a proper officer once in seven years.
Not as some suppose an entry, showing
some action under llrc fi. fa., any offi
cer informing the Court of any fact in
reference to the writ which was the
proper subject of a return. An entry
of no ptoperty ; an ‘entry dismissing a
levy ; postponing a levy ; an entry
that the detenclanl iesiste.d the officer;
an entry that that the plaintiff’ had or
dered that the fi. fa. to bo levied on
particular property, and that he had
ordered such levy dismissed—would
any of them, I presume, have been a
compliance with the law. These en
tries, by the act of 1810,’ were all to
be transacted on the Sheriff’s execu
tion docket, and filed in the clerk’s of
fice, etc., for public inspection. Any
entry showing that the plaintifT claim
ed that the fi. fa. was not satisfied,
would answer the intent of the law.
So completely was this act consid
ered as having sole reference to the
iien, to the rights of third parties, that
this Court, in 9th Georgia, declared in
general terms that the law did not ap
ply to judgments which had no lien, or
the lien of which (as mortgages) were
fixed by something else than the judg
ment.
This act of 1S23 is still the law, a-
dapted almost in words, by the act of
1S-56, and by the Code.
But by the act of 1850, and also by
the Code, a new idea is introduced.
By the act of 1S56 it is provided that
if this entry is not made, the judgment
shall not only lose its lien but it shall
be taken to be satisfied, and by the
Code it is provided, Section —, that if
in three years after a judgment be
comes dormant, it is not removed, it
shall be taken to be satisfied. By the
act of 18-50 il was taken to be satisfied
as soon as dormant, by the Code in
three years after. This provision of
the act of 1850, as well as of the Code,
fills the idea of a Statute of Limita
tions, and was suspended by the acts
referred to, and the judgment in this
case, if it has not been dormant three
years since the suspension of the acts,
has ceased, is not dead—satisfied—it
cution has been issuer), and seven
years have expired, from the time of
the last entrv upon the execution, made
by an officer authorized to execute and
return the same; such judgments may
be revived scire facias, or be sued on
within three years from the time they
become dormant.’* Held: That the
latter portion of this section, which
limits the period within which a dor
mant judgment may be revived, by
scire facias, or action, is in the legal
sense, a Statute of Limitations, and is
properly so classed, as it bars all right
of action on the judgment, if proceed
ings are not commenced within three
years after the judgment became dor
mant, by persons laboring under no
legal disability. It puts an end to liti
gation, and is a statute of repose.
Held further: That said portion of
said section, which relates to the lieu
ol judgments, is not in any legal sense
a Statute of Limitations, and was no
more suspended‘by the act of 1860, or
the subsequent acts suspending the
Statute of Limitations, than a mechan
ic’s lien, which he may enforce, on
condition that he commence proceed
ings within a limited lime. Taken in
connection with section 3525, it impos
es certain conditions on a plaintiff'
in judgment; upon compliance with
which, he may maintain hia lien. These
conditions arc, in case the defendant
has sold his property to a honujide pur
chaser lor a valuable, consideration,
who is in possession ; that the plain
tiff must have a levy made on the. prop
erty, if personal, within two years—if
real, within four years, or the lien is
discharged. And if he fails to have
ari execution issued within seven years
from the date of the judgment, or af
ter the execution has issued—if he fails
to have an entry made upon il by the
proper officer for seven years, he loses
all lien upon the property of the de
fendant, no matter in whose hands it
may be. But in such ca:e the right is
not barred, the judgment still lives,
litigation is not at an end, and there is
no repose. The plaintiff’ may at any
time within three years revive the dor
mantjudgment by the proper proceed
ing, and restore it to all its vitality and
vigor, with lien upon the property of
the defendant from the date of its re
newal, and by having the proper entry
made upon it, once in every seven
equal benefit of the laws, before the
Courts. The 1935th section of the
Code declares that “the rights of cred
itors shall be favored by the Courts, and
every remedy and facilitv afforded
them to detect, defeat and annul any
effort to defraud them of’ their just
rights.” This provision of the Code
was recognized and adopted bv the
Constitution of 1864. But, in tnv judg
ment, the decision of the Court below
was right, upon a fair construction of
the act of 1866, eommonlv known as
the Stay Law. By the first section of
that act. executions were to be stayed
until the first of January, 1S70; that
was a definite 'period of time fixed lor
the operation of the act upon execu
tions issued upon judgments. The
third seciion ot the act declares, “that
all Statutes of Limitations relating to
liens affected by this act, shall be sus
pended during the continuance of the
act.” It was the declared intent of the
Legislature to suspend the running of
ihe Slalule of Limitations relating to
liens, until the first day of January 7 ,
1870; for that was the time fixed by
ihe first section of the act for its contin
uance. The intention of the Legisla
ture is quite as clear and manifest as
il it had been declared in so many
words, that the Statute should be sus
pended .until the first day of January,
1870. The first section of the act was
to continue of force until the 1st Janua-
ty, IS70. The Statute of Limitations
relating to liens, affected by the act,
was suspended until that tune. It is
true, that the first and fourth sections
of the act of 1866 have heen declared
unconstitutional and void, but the third
section of that act is not unconstitutional
and has never been declared to»be so.
That section of the act remains intact,
and because t^ie other sections ot the
act have been declared unconstitution
al, that fact does not prevent a refer
ence to them to ascertain what was
the intention of the Legislature in the
enactment of the third section as to the
period of time for which the Statute of
Limitations, relating to liens, was to be
suspended, that it was the intention, of
the Legislature to suspend the running
of the Statute of Limitations, relating
to liens, until the first day of January,
1870, I think is clear and indisputable,
and taking the most favorable view of
the question tor the plaintiff’ in error.
years, he may keep it in life for an in- j the lime should not be counted against
definite period of time, without any i ihe defendant in error, until the rendi-
limitaticm whatever. ! lion of the judgment of this Court, de-
2. It is no Statute of Limitations be- ! daring the first and fourth sections of
cause none of the. disabilities which J the act of 1866 unconstitutional.
stop the running of the Statute of Lim
itations in any way affecL the cundi
tion upon which the lien is retained.
If the person having ihe right of action
dies, the Statute of Limitations stops
running against his estate tiff represeu-
Sorne interesting and important facts
are reported as the experience of a
couple of balloonists who made an
ascent a few days since from Memphis,
Tenn. Mr. S. D. Thompson, the sero-
as follows :
tation is taken upon the estate, if the naut, reports as follows:
thrift does not. exceed five, vears. Rm “Ihe highest altitude attained by
the balloon, as shown bv the harome-
tiine does not exceed live years. But
if a plaintiff’ in judgment dies the next
day after il is rendered, and there is
thai they failed to pass upon, whether
the 11. fa. was, or was not dormant.—
We. are ol opinion that it was dormant,
and on this ground we reverse the
judgment.
The great, and indeed, the only
question in this case, is whether the
act of 30th November, 1860, and sub
sequent acts, suspending ihe Statute of
Limitations, and the several acts en
acting stay-laws, suspend also the dor
mant judgment act. I11 our minds, is
the dormant judgment act a Statute of
Limitations ? It is argued that this
Court has called it—in 7th Geo., an
act limiting the lien, and Oth Geo., act
of limitations—and that it is classed in
the Code with the Statutes of Limita
tions. The dormant judgment act does
not limit the lien ofjudginent and there
is a certain loose sense, in which it
may be called a Statute of Limitations.
In this sense, however, duv statute
limiting the time within which an act
shall tie done is a Statute of Limita
tions. This sense would include acts
fixing a time within which deeds to
laud or mortgages shall be recorded,
within which an appeal shall be en
tered, a writ of error, or certiorari sued
out, or within which a widow shall
make her election of a childs part in
stead of dower, and many other acts
of like character, all of which limit the
period within which certain acts shall
be done on pain ot loosing a right.—
And in a certain loose popular sense,
they may be, and sometimes are, spok
en of as statutes limiting the rights re
ferred to, and some of them are even
classed in the Code in the same chap
ters with the Statutes of Limitations.
But it would be absurd to suppose that
the act of November 30th, i860, and
the subsequent acts now under consid
eration, suspended these acts. It is
apparent, therefore, that these suspend -
ing acts, from I860 to 1866, musi
use the words “Slatuteol Limitations”
in a sense less comprehensive than the
literal, philological sense of the words
themselves.- What is that sense ? The
words “Statutes of Limitation” have
for centuries had, in legislation and
among lawyers, a technical sense.—
Books are written upon them ; chap
ters in other hooks are devoted to them
and they have a well-known, uniform
and distinct technical signification.—
‘jTbey aie acts limiting the time within
ami judgments were declared to be of
full force till satisfied, and that renewal
on the Court roll, from year to year,
should cease. Prince, 436. The Courts
however, still seem to have held that
they lost their lien, unless renewed in
some way ; for in 1S12, it was provid
ed that it should not be necessary to
renew judgments in any way whatever.
Prince, 440. From this time until
1S22, the lien of a judgment seems to
have heen as imperishable as thejudg-
ment itself, which was of full force un
til satisfied.
Under this slate of things, great evils
arose. “Judgments were collusively
kept open or made tlve instruments of
fraud on innocent purchasers, and of
ten operated oppressively on vigilant
and bona fi.de creditors.” Act of De
cember 19th, 1S22. Prince 451.
To check this it was provided that
the clerk should keep a satisfaction
docket tor the special purpose of en
tering satisfaction of judgments ; and
that the sheriffs should keep fair and
regular execution dockets, wherein
should be entered the executions de
livered to them, the duties of their de
livery, and their acts and doings there
on. That that, they should file these
dockets with'the clerk on the first day
of the term of the Court, to which they
should be made returnable ; which
dockets it was required should remain
in said office, subject to the inspection
of al I persons concerned. Act of 1SJ 0.
• Prince 436.
But this seems not to have stopped
the evil, and in 1822, Prince, 463, the
dormant judgment act was passed, re
citing as I have quoted—the evils and
enacting as a remedy, that a judgment
should be void unless there was a re
turn upon it in seven years. Some of
the Judges seem to have held that the
effect of this was to declare the judg
ment incapable of reversal, if the re
turn was not made as provided ; and
in 1823, Prince, 458, the act was re
enacted in terms, a proviso added de
claring that judgments might be re
versed, and enacting that the judg
ments held by the Courts under the
act ol 1322 incapable of reversal, sl«uld
nevertheless be so capable.
No one can read these several acts
without being drawn to the conclusion
that there intent and object was, not
10 limit the rights of the plaintiff against
.nay be revived against the defendant j no representation on his estate during
and his property—its lien to dale from j l j ie wbtde period,^ the judgment is still
the revival.
ter, with the proper correction made
for difference of temperature, was 11,-
670 feet. We experienced no difficul-
dormant, and the lien lost if the proper | l y in breathing, nor any unpleasant
entry is not made within seven years, j sensation, except from the cold, the
The same rule would apply in case | thermometer having sunk to 50 degrees
the plaintiff in judgment is a married 1 Fahrenheit.
woman, au infant, an idiot, insane, or } “Among the other phenomena ob-
unprisoned, all of which are exceptions
which stop the running of the Statute
of Limitations
served, I might mention that the bal
loon, in ascending, always assumed a
whirling motion from right to left,while.
3. But it is insisted that the act ofi in descending, il whirled from left to
I860, known as the Slay Law, express- i right, and when the barometer indicat-
ly suspends the Statute of Limitations j e< J an equipoise, it remained stationary,
The acts of 1865 and 1868, contain
ed a provision, which in a very fair
sense might be said to have suspended
the dormant judgment act. Statute of
Limitations relating to liens affected
by the act are therein suspended. But
that act has by constitutional authority
been declared void, unconstitutional—
an act that never was the law—an J no
liens were affected by it—it therefore
suspended no statute relating to liens,
and the defendant’s case is not helped
by that act. It is a truth, remarkable,
f4iat the idea of the suspension of the
dormant judgment act, by the act of
Nov. 30th, I860, etc., was not present „j s i ature only intended to suspend the being English levers, and in good or
e,l ,0 the Court below ... .this case, g „ r Li.nilauous as lo liens <*;<!«. At the height of two miles, two
Some ol the tamt lawyers,, o Georgia , thc Law remilillcd | egollv or them stopped, while .ho other two
were concerned in .he cause-Gen. I jn * rce _ am| f )() | onger . UmJc r the j continued to run. The poekel com-
pas which Dr. Bell furnished me, and
as to liens. So it does: But what
liens? All liens, -says the Statute affect
ed by tliat act. This Court, whether
its judgment was right or not, lias de
clared the Slay Law unconstitutional i
and void. Il is very clear that the Le
turning in neither direction. From this
observation I am satisfied that latitude
and longitude can be calculated iu a
balloon al night by means of nautical
instruments.
“We took with us four watches, all
Toombs, Judge Stephens and Mr. Pot- ,• 1 • r< r ^ 1
, . 1 7 - • 11 ruling ol uns Court, the btav Law was
lie—and the decision was made by no ,, ,- - . .
, • • . .1 t i o J c never legally in force lor a single day.
ess a jurist than Judge Reese, of 0 J
Wilkes; yet it does not seem to have
occurred to any oi these astute and
learned gentlemen, that the act of 30th
November, 18(50, had anything to do
with the case, and it cannot but occur
to an ordinary mind, that this lact is
very significant as to what was the
general understanding of the country
as to the’ meaning of thc Legislature
in the passage of the act of 30fh No
vember, 1S60, and the subsequent acts,
simply suspending the Statute of Lim
itations. One cannot but suspect that
but very few persons so understood it,
or men of the character of these gentle
men would hardly have permitted so
vital a point to have passed unnoticed.
Ori thc whole, we conclude that the
dormant judgment act has not suspend
ed by any ol the acts referred to. The
judgment in this case is dormant. The
act of 1366, so far as it declares judg
ments satisfied and discharged, and
the provision of the Code limiting the
time within which it shall be reversed,
were suspended; and if this judgment
can be saved by the suspension of that
part of the act of 1S56, and that part
of section —of the Code, by virtue of
the actsyeferred to, it is not satisfied
that it may lie reversed. We do not
decide that question, as it is not made
by the record.
Judgment reversed.
Brown, C. J., concurring.
1. By section 2683, of the Code, it
is declared that: “No judgment here
after obtained in the Courts of this
State, shall be enforced, after theex-
pirat on of seven years, from the time
of its rendition; where no execution
has been issued upon it, or where exe-
It therefore never affected any liens,
which was a very delicate instrument,
became completely depolarized, and
and as the Statute of Limitations was bas since been gradually regaining its
only suspended as to liens affected bv j pnlanty, though it is still worthless,
it, and none were affected by it, the “The effect of the ascension on my
own system is remarkable, and very
interesting to me as a matter of specu
Statute was suspended as to none.
The Slay Law having been declared
null and void, it is in law as it it had
never been passed; and creditors are
no moie entitled to claim legal rights
under it now than debtors were when
il was brought before this Court and
set aside in the interest ot creditors.
Warner, J-, dissenting.
Thr only question in this case is,
whether the fi. la. issued upon a judg
ment obtained the 7th ot April, 1859,
was 1lor mant under the provisions of
the 4th section of the act of 1856. The
decision of this question depends upon
the fact, whether the act of 1856, as
applicable to this case, is a Statute of
Limitations. If it is, then, the running
ot the Statute of Limitations, was sus-
panded during the war by the several
acts of the Legislature, including the
ordinance of 1865, and the execution
was not dormant. In my judgment, the
act of 1856, limiting the time, within
which, judgments and executions shall
be enforced from the tine of the last en
try on such executions, is a Stutute of
Limitations, and has uniformly been re
cognized to be sucli, by the legal pro
fession, the Legislature, and by this
Court—and so far as I know, or be
lieve, the people of this State have reg
ulated their conduct under it as such ;
and a different construction now will
operate as a cheat and a snare, to de
prive honest, confiding men of their
just rights. Both creditor and debtor
have sufficed alike by the calamities of
the war, and both shpuld have the
tation. As soon as I returned to Mem
phis in v friends remarked lliat I looked
much more ruddy in the face than be
fore. I can scarcely gel enough to eat.
I attribute lh>s to the expansion ot the
veins and cells of the body in the Tari
ffed air, whereby the fluids of the body
circulate with greater freedom. Pro
fessor Wise was a confirmed dyspep
tic before lie began ballooning, but this
effected a complete and radical cure.
From the great change produced upon
my own system, I should not hesitate
to recommend a balloon voyage to my
one suffering from a disordered stom
ach or liver.”
Cure for Cancer.—A well known
citizen of Philadelphia, who had been
using a weak solution of carbolic acid
as a wash to correct the offensive order
arising from a cancerous affection, dis
covered that the application also en
tirely removed the cancer. One fourth
of au ounce of carbolic acid is diluted
with a quart (thirty two fluid ounces)
of water, and the lotion is applied three
times a day 7 . A weak solution con
taining one-eighth of an ounce of car
bolic acid to the quart of wafer would
probably be a saler application.
(Philadelphia Ledger-
There is this difference between hap
piness and wisdom—he who thinks
himself the happiest man really is so ;
but he who thinks himself the wisest is
generally the greatest fool.