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A V
ANNAH, GEORGIA.
i « *■
« FI)M> PAY OCT - l3th
? T.wm MATTES ON EVEBY PAGE.
y JOB GSNERUS SHERMAN
AND BUELL.
TSI
first gamfaiq-n
THE WEST-
OF
"Who Should Have the Credit of
Originating the Plan ?
Letter irom General Buell.
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
GtNERALS IIALLECK, M’CLELLAN,
AND BUELL, AND THE
PRESIDENT.
Interesting
Ac.,
Official
&C.,~ '
Documents,
Ac.,
\j, r , r (lateral IK. T. Sherman and the Spring
Campaign of 1802 in the West.
Major Genera! Sherman, in a recent dis
course at an entertainment given to him in 8t.
L.uis lias undertaken to settle the question as
to who originated the plan of campaign which
resulted in the capture of Fort Iftnry, Fort
] lonelson, Bowliog Green, Nashville, and oth
er important points in Kentucky and Tennes
see, in the spring of 1862. He explained the
matter in these words : _ ■
i remember one evening, np in the old Plan
ter's House, sitting with General Halleek and
General Cullum, we were talking about this,
that, and the other. A map was on the table,
and I was explaining the position of the tjoops
of the enemy in Kentucky when I came to this
State. General Halleek knew well the posi
tion here fin Missouri,) and I remember well
the question he asked me—the question of the
school teacher to bis child—“Sherman, here is
the line; how will yon break that line?”—
“ Physically, by a perpendicular force."—
“Where is the perpendicular?" “The Ten-
ne-see river.” General Sherman then adds:
"General Halleek is the author of that first
beginning, and I give him credit for it with
pleasure.’’
Whether, according to this statement, the
credit should attach to Gen. Halleek or to
General ShermaD, I do not care to enquire;
hut I think proper to notice the general prop
osition, and I here transcribe official dispatches
relating to the question which General Sher
man has undertaken to solve. I should pre
mie by saying that about the 27th and 30th of
November, 1861, two weeks after assuming
cummaud in Kentucky, I wrote to General
McClellan, then General-in-chief, two letters,
of which I have not copies at hand, but
which he can, doubtless, produce, sketching a
plan of campaign for Kentucky and Tennessee,
in which the gunboats and land force under
General Halleek were to take part—the same
plan as that which I subsequently proposed at
less length to General Halleek, and which af
terwards was executed. The present provost-
marshai-general, General J. B. Fry, then my
chief of staff, can testify in regard to those
letters, and the following dispateh has nefer-
enceto the plan submitted in them :
Central McClellan to General Buell.
Washington, Dec. 5, 1861.
General BueU, Ixmisville :
I have again telegraphed Major General
Halleek for information as to his gunboats and
disposable troops. As soon as I receiver reply,
will arrange details with you. Send me
draught of water in Cumberland river to Nash
ville, and in Tennessee river. Your letter of
3l)th received.
(Signed) G. B, McClellan.
The plan was approved by General McClellan,
and as last as troops and materials were re
ceived for as yet I. bad neither army, ordnance,
tor transportation-—they were organized and
placed in positions-to enter opon its execution,
tamely, on.- column at Mnnfordville, on Green
river, on the direct road from Louisville to
Bowling Green ; one coiumn at Green river on
the turnpike from Bardstown to Glasgow ; one
at Columbia, and one at Lebanon; while an-
tother guarded the lower Green river, and
threatened the left flank and rear Of the enemy
at BowliDg Green. The columns at Lebanon and
Columbia also had reference to . other eventu-
alu.es, viz : the movements of Zollicofler’s army,
and a possible movement into £q#t Tennessee,
*h>ch, from the first, was urged upon me from
” tshington with importunities that almost
amounted to orders. : $ - - - - - -
While General McClellan was waiting for
certain preparations ia the force which was to
^-operate from Missouri, especially the gun-
p ats, he was taken ill, and I received the fol-
*° w 'ug dispatch from the late President:
President Lincoln to Gen. Had 1.
Washington, Dec. 13,1801.
Major General McClellan is sick. Are Major
General Halleek and yourself in concert ? - When
feu move on BowliDg Green what hinders it
reinforced from Columbus ? Answer,
iSigned) A. Lincoln.
General Buell to President Lincoln.
Locisvillb, December 31, 1862.
There is no arrangement between General Hal-
and myself. I have been informed by Ma-
General McClellan that he would make suita
ble disposition for concerted action. There is
nothing to prevent Bowling Green being rein
forced from Coiubus, if a military force is not
brought to bear on the latter place.
D C. Buell.
President Lincoln to General BuelL
. Washington, January 1, 1862.
Major General McClellan should not be dig.
„ eil wi, h business. I think you better get in
oncert with Major General Hailcck at onoe. I
"<= you to-night. I also telegraph and write
,L r General H. W. Halleek.
;;'« Ded i A. Lincoln.
consequence of these dispatohes, the follow*
1 ^correspondencepassed between General Htl*
B.h i r mjself - M? first dispatch to General
inav n • r 0&nnot now Pot my hand on. Its tenor
“ay be inferred from the reply;
General Halleek to General Buell.
Cm* in „ „ St. Loom, Jan. 2, 1882.
General Buell, Louisville:
tio “ a ?„ had oo instructions respecting oo-imera-
„ ’ f' 1 “J available troops afein Tbafleld
[ j' th " ! « *t Cairo and Padueah, which are
te. E r nt h o,rwt ! B co, ^«.
*~k. hence I bopwto bq,*Wf to rtfoiv jou
very material assistance, but now useless with-
drawgLof sny troops from this State is almost
impossible. Write me fully. . v
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General Buetl to General Ffalledk:
Head’qbs Dept, op the Ohio, )
Louisville, Jan. 3,1862. j
General;—I received your dispatch, and,
with more delay than I meant, proceed to the sub
ject of it, in compliance with your request, and I
may add also at the wish of the President.
I do not underrate the difficulties int Missouri,
bit I think it is not extravagant to say fh^t fee
'■great power of the rebellion in the West is array
ed on a front, the flanks of whioh are Columbus
and Bowliog Green, and the center about wbtie
the railroad between those paints crosses the T«b-
nessee and Cumberland rivers; ineludiag Nash
ville and the fortified paints below. It is, T have
no doubt within bounds to estimate their force on
that line at eighty thousand men—including a
column about Somerset, Ky., in rear of their
right flank, it is more
Of this force, forty thousand may be set down
as at Bowliog Green; twenty thousand at Colum
bus; though you doubtless hare more information
on that point than I have; and twenty thousand
at the oenter. Considering the railroad facilities
which enable the eDemy to concentrate in a few
hours on any single point of this front, you will
at once see the importance ef a combined attack
onjits centre and flanks, or .at least ot demonstra
tions which may be converted into real attacks
and felly occupy the enemy on the whole frdnt.
It is probable that yoa may-have giren the *ub-
jeof, »v far ea^olnmbus' aJflfitlC'-peejiir aje eon*
corned, »ptcatufatlon tbihtf Khava. With,Infer
ence to the former, at least, I can make no more
than the general suggestion already; -expressed,
that jt should bo fully occupied. f
The attack upon the centre should be made
by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should
say, twenty thonsand men on the two rivers.—
They should, of course, be organized with
reference to the depth of water in the rivers,
and whether they should be of equal or une
qual strength would depend upon that and
other considerations, and can hardly be deter
mined until the moment of departure. The
mode of attack must depend npon the strength
of the enemy at the several points and the fea
tures of the localities. Jt will be of the first
importance to break the railroad communica
tion, and if possible that should be done by
columns moviog rapidly to the bridges over
the Cumberland apd Tennessee. The former
probably would not be reached at first, being
some 31 miles above the first principal battery
that I know of at Dover. The other i«TS miles
above Fort Henry—the first I know of on tbe
Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be
strong enough to do the work alone, they
should establish themselves firmly at the near
est possible point, and remain at least until
they ascertained that reinforcements from nay
columns or some other source would not reach
them. By uniting they could establish them
selves permanently under the protection of the
gunboats.
I say this much rather to lay the subject be
fore’you, than to propose any- definite plan for
your side. Whatever is done should be done
speedily, within a few days. The work will
become more difficult every day. Please let me
hear from you aj once. Very truly ypurg,
' (Signed) D; fj. BnRLt,
Brig. General Commanding.
General II. W. Halleek, Commanding De
partment Missouri.
Not'receiving any reply to my communica
tion, on the 7th I telegraphed to General Hal
leck, as follows : “I am telegraphed by the
President. Can you fix a day for concerted
action ?” To which he replied the game day :
“Designate a day for a demonstration. I can
do nothing more. See my letter of yesterday.”
The letter arriyed subsequently, and is as fol
lows :
GeneraI Halleek to. General Buell.
Headq’bs Dkf’t of; tub Missouri,7
St. Louis, January 6, 1862. j
Brig. Gen. D. C. Buell, Louisville, Kg :
General : I have delayed writing to you for
several days, in hopes of getting some favora
ble news from tbe Southwest. The news re
ceived to-day; however, is unfavorable, it being
stated that Price is making a stand near
Springfield, and that all our available fdrees
will be required to dislodge and drive him
outr »• y.'
My last advices from Columbus represent
that "the enemy has about 22,000 men there.-—
I have only About 15,000 at Cairo, Fort Holt,
and Paducah, and after leaving guards at these
places I could not send into the field over ten
or feleven thousand. Moreover, many of tbtie
are very .imperfectly armed. n , .. 1
Under these circumstances it would be mad
ness for me to attempt any serious operation
against Camp Beauregard or Columbiis.—
Probably in the course of a few weeks I will be
able to send additional troops to Cairo and
Paducah to co-operate with you, but at present
it is impossible j and it seems to me that if you
deeA such uo-operadiop necessary WyW sir-
cMfttyoaijf movemeiifcolL Bowling Graeu should
be delayed. I know nothing of the plan of
campaign, never having received any informa
tion on the subject; but it strikes me that to
operate from Louisville and Paducah or Cairo
against an enemy at Bowling Green is a plain
case of exterior lines, like that of McDowell
and Patterson, which, unless each, of the ex
terior columns is superior to the enemy, leads
to disaster ninety-nine times iu a hundred.
Very respectfully, your ob’t sKt,
H. W. Halleck, Maj. Gen.
And here my reply to the remarks quoted from
General Sherman might rest; but other state
ments in his speeoh make it proper for me to
continue,
My correspondence with General Ha’leck ter
minated for the time, with his reply to my letter
of the 3d of January, and the movement upon’
Bowling Green and Nashville was necessarily
deferred. I had not the ordnance and other ma-
teria-s necessary for a direct attack upon Bowl
ing Green, which was strongly fortified on both
sides of Barren ri^r, and the part which I
originally contemplated for mvseif in the pro
which wa* that General Hal leek should gain a
footing at some point on the Cumberland with
whichTooHtf A»P«n communication on -W ar
rival. There w« np reasonable dpubt of his
being able to do that with a smtoMe tdree, tor as
vet tfie enemy’s, .works on the Tennessee and
’Cumberland ware ahVsfJ/fng.
In tbe mean time I became involved in opera
tions agrinst.GuroiffireyM,^
ern Kentucky, ana Zolhcoffer at Mill Spniig,
and in other important fiJovSments, which di
verted a large portion of my force from tne
Nashville line. The roads fieoam* almost im
passable from the snows and rains of winter,
which suddenly set in with great TijOTK
these circumstances, the abrupt couaaeesOmWP
of General Halleck’s movement, 'without pre-
monitioc, was a source ot anxiety, because I be
lieved that strong support was necessary to make
it successful, and celerity of movement over the
roads on which my troops bad to mareh had, by
that time, becume impossible. Tne following
dispatches, commenced witboat any warning,
Will explain what occurred;
General Halleek to General Buell.
(By Telegraph.)
St. Louis, Jan. 80,1862.
Brigadier General Buell, Louisville;
I bare ordered an advance on Fort Henry and
Dover. It wifi be made immediately.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General Buell to General Halleek.
(By Telegraph.)
Louis viqLa, J an. 30, 1882.
General Halleek, St. Louis;
Please let.me kwow your plan .and fores, and
the.time. . , no\ ,1 t"'tu '
(Signed) P. 0. Buell.
General Halleek to General Buell.
(By Telegraph.)
St Louis, Jan. 31, 1882.
General BueU, Louisville••
Movement already ordered to take and held
Fort Henry, and eut railroad between Columbus
and Dover. Force about fifteen thousand. . 1 till
be reinforoed as soion as possible. Witt telegraph
tbe day of,'investment or attack.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General Buell to General Halleck.
(By Telegraph.)
Louisville, Jan. 31, 1862.
General -HaUcphf St. Louis;
Do you eoamtfar active corporation essential
to your (access ? Because in that case it would
bWascesswy fcv sadKh- fcaaw whs* (be ether'
has to do. It would be several days before I
could seriously engage the enemy, and your
operations ought not to fail. The operation
which was suggested in my letter of yesterday
would be an important preliminary to the next
step.
(Signed) - D. C.' Buell.
The letter referred to, with its enclosures,
suggested in some detail, that the gunboats
should endeavor to run past tbe forts and
destroy the bridges over the Cumberland and
Tennessee;
General Halleck. to General BueU.
(By Telegraph.)
St. Louis, Feb. 1, 1862.
General Buell, Louisville t
Co-operation at present not essential. Fort
Henry has been reinforced, but where from I
have not learned. The roads are in such hor
rible condition as to render movements im -
possible on land. Will write you folly my
plans as soon as I receive your letter of the
30th ultimo. Write me your plans, and I will
ry to assist you.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General Halleck to Gen. Buell:
(By Mail)
Headq’rs Department of the Missouri,!
* ' St. Louis, February 2, 1862. /
Brigadier-General D. C. BuSU, Louisville, Ky.;
General: Yours of the 30th ult., is just
received. At present, it is only proposed to
tafcefand occupy Fort Henry and Dover, and.
8f ‘ possible, cite the railroad from Columbus to
Bowling Green. The roads are in such a hor
rible condition that troops cannot move by
land, dow far we may venture to send the
gunboats np the river will be left for after con
sideration. The mortar boats are a failure;
they cannot be taken up the river, and it re
mains to be determined whether the gunboats
are worth half the money spent on them.—
Only a part of them have yet received crews.
The garrison of Fort Henry, at last accounts,
was six thonsand; it may be farther reinforced
jfrora Columbus.
Keep me informed of your forces and plans
apd l will endeavor to assist you ns much as
possible. If we take Fort Henry and concen
trate a)l available forces there, troops must be
withdrawn either from Bowling Green or Co
lumbus to protect the railroads, ff the forr
mer, you can advance; if the latter, we cap
take New Madrid and cut bff the river oom-
mnnication with Colnmbns. But it will take
some time to get troops rosJj *o advance i* 1
sontn ot ran Henry. Very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
H. W. Halleck, t M»j. Gen.
General Buell to GineratHalleck.
[By Mail.]
Headers Dep't of the Ohio, )
Louisville, February 5, 1862. )
General: My plan of operations was
sketched in the letter which I wrote you on
the 3d ultimo. You have, I learn from your
letter and dispatches, entered upon what would
have concerned it on your side, and that is a
very important part of it. I regret that we
could not have consulted upon it earlier, be
cause my work must at first be slow. Besides,
since 1 wrote you, those plans have been
changed, or at least suspended, in consequence
of the diversion of a large part of my efficient
force for other objects which the General-in-
Chief urged as of primary importance, name
ly, an advance into East Tennessee. I have,
however, in consequence of the want of trans-
ponation, and more than all, the impassable
condition of the roads, urged him to allowme
to resume my original plan, and, if 1 am not
■restricted, shall enter On its execution at once.
My troops have, however, been thrown some
what out of position, and it will take some
dgys to get them ipto place. My pcogtear,
too, 'must be slow, for we are dependent on
the railroad for supplies, and that we must re
pair as we fco—the driemy having”very much
damaged it between Green river and Bowling
(jroen—forty miles. That, will take ten or
twelve days. I must go provided with a siege
traiD, because the enemy is strongly intrench
ed with heavy artillery, behind a river, and
the’condition of the roads will, I fear, effectu
ally bar any plan.of attack which will depend
on celerity of movement,
I think it is quite plain that the centre of the
enemy’s line—that part which $bu are now
moving against—is tbe decisiie point ot bis
wholn tront, as it is also the mast, vulnerable.—
If it is held, - or even the bridges on the Ten
nessee and Cumberland rivers destroyed, and
your force maintains itself near those points,
Bowling Green wilt rapidly fall, and Columbus
Will soon follow. Tbe work which you have
undertaken is, therefore, of the veir highest im
portance, without reference to the injurious
effects Ot a failure. There is notiu the whole
field of opei aliens a point at which every man
you can raise can be employed with more effect,
or with the prospect of as important results.
YerT.respMtJuUf, your obedient servant,
D. C. Buell.
General H, W. Halleck, Brigadier General, St.
Louis Missoari.
General Halleck to General Buell.
.(By Telegraph.)
St. Louis, February 7, 1862.
General Buell, Louisville t
Your letter of the 5th met. received. I agree
with you entirely. Bowling Green must be
given op it we hold our position: The enemy
will concentrate at Nashville, Clarksville or
Paris, or will attempt to regain his lost advant
age at Fort Henry or Dover—l think the latter.
It is all-important that we hold our position,
and advance toward Nashville. I fear I may not
be able to do this without more troops. If, from
the coudit on of the roads, you can neither
threaten or attack BowliDg Green, or follow him
to tfie Cumberland, I advise the sending of every
man not necessary to sustain your lines on
Grepn rirer, down theObio, to operate up the
Cfmber.khd or Tennessee. If we can bold Fort
Henry anfi move up these rivers, you yyill have
do further difficulty about Bowling Green. The
pnemy must abandon it and fall back. If he
move j all bis forces against me on the Tennes
see. I may not be able to resist him, but will do
?W*#ti»«* i« my power. 1 have mniy fifteen
thousand men at Foit Henry and Dover. I
throw on - , these suggestions for your considera
tion. If yo° can help me still further 1 know
yon will do so. _ .
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General Halleck to General Buell.
(By Telegraph0
St. Lome, Feb. 7, 1862.
Gen. Buell, Louisville:
Port Henry is oars. The enemy ,i»,»treating
on Paris, pursued by our cavalry. He has been
eOQpeUpd to abandon part of bis artillery. The
gunboat, will proceed up the river at far a* imay
be sa'e. It is bettered tbe enemy is concentrating
his forces at Paris to operate on our Hank. It will
require every man we can get to hold him in cheek
tkbca while a oolumn it lent «p the Tennessee or
Cumberland, or both, to destroy_ bridges. We
many light batteries a. you can spare. General
Grant expects to take Fort Donelson at Dover
to-morrow. If troops »re sent up the Cumber
land they will be preceded by gt nboats.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck
It ie unnecessary to enonmbei Ibis article with
more extracts from tbe official record of the first
ant of this important eanpatgn. leant four or
ganised brigades with artillery,and eight separate
regiments, in all twenty four regiments, by water,
to Teinibree Gen. Hiellefr's oolomhs on the Ten
nessee and Cumberland, and, hi the apprehen
sions of hi. failure iaertssed, wss in the not of
reinforcing him still fhrther when the news of
the fall-of Donelson was received. I .hail per
mit myself to meke soaa reflection.' on the fea
ture. of the campaign-"
Fer«'lfebry»hmi!d*fc**o tbe gunboats, under
Commodore Foot, on the 7th of February; Gen.
Grant appeared before Fort Donelson on the
afternoon of the 12th; my troops came in front of
Bowtiog Green at daylight on the morning of the
14tb; found tbe bridges in flames and the place
evacuated; commenced crossing the river and
demonstrating toward Nashville. Owing to the
great difficulty of crossing the river, whioh was
swollen oiit of its backs at Bowling Green, I
did notarrive opposite Nashville until the 23d,
but the effect had been produced, and I had been
expected at Nashville for a week. Fort Donel
son surrendered on the 16th.
■ A-glanoe at the map of Kentucky and Tennes
see will show what effeot these several movement,
had on each other. First, the movement np the
Tennessee and Cumberland not only prevented
the enemy from concentrating against tbe move
ment through Bowiiug Green, but caused him to
divide bis force to such an extent that he deemed
it impracticable to offer successful resistance to
my advance, bat it did not directly cause the
evacuation of Bowling Green, because that occur
red four days before the surrender of DonelsoD,
before, indeed, the attack commenced, and when
the enemy had unfaltering confidence in his abili
ty to defeat it. Second, my operations against
Bowling Green and Nashville prevented the enemy
from concentrating upon General Grant and de
feating him. As it was, and notwithstanding the
twelve .of. my regiments, say 10,000 men, which
helped'tb'make np General Grant’s force <f 30,-
000 or 35,000, General Halleek declared to me
in an official communication that he had been
sorely pressed. Again, the advance through
Bowliog Green rendered the reinforcement of
of Donelson perilous, and its defense beyond a
certain period hopelesg, and must have exerted a
decilive influence upon the character of the strag
gle to hold it. There was nothing else to preveot
as protracted a defense there as was made at
Vicksburg and Port Hudson later in tbe war, for
the enemy had both the troops and the supplies;
nor at tbe worst was there any thing e ss to pre
vent the escapo of at least a large part of the gar-
rUoo, since they commanded the river above by
fortified positions on both sides, and bad large
steamers at their disposal. Thus it is to be ex
plained that when the enemy evacuated BowliDg
Green, four days betore the surrender of Donel
■od, and, while he was yet confident of suc
cess at this point, we see him moving directly for
the defense of Nashville, where he commenced to
throw up works on both sides of the river, instead
of going to the rescue of Donelson, iu doing which
he would have been out off from all supplies and
ail retreat by my movement upon Nashville. In
the same way is it to be explained that after the
fall of Donelson the enemy gave up the contest
for the command of the river, instead of coDtinu-
'“S •» — o,i«iee»llie Hus „rher nninte —L.— >—
had fortified.
Bnt while the operations up tbe Tennessee
and Cumberland were not tbe most arduous,
nor essentially the most valuable, yet it is not
denied that they possess a more fascinating
interest; for there the enemy undertook to give
battle, and the conflict of arms will always, to
the popular mind, be regarded as the brown
ing glory of all military operations.
I am constrained to notice another passage
in General Sherman’s St. Louis speech. He
says: “Gen. Hallepk's plan went further—not
to stop at his first line which run through Co
lumbus, Bowling Green, crossing the river at
HeDry and Donelson, hut push on to the sec
ond lino which rqns through Memphis and
Charleston but troubles intervened at Nashville,
and delays followed; opposition to the last
movement was made, and I myself was brought
an actor on the scene.”
Although Gen. Sherman does not mention
my name, yet the feet of my being in com
mand in Kentucky and Tennessee at the time
alluded to. is sufficiently notorious to make his
charges of “troubles,” delays,” and “opposi
tion,” at Nashville, bear plainly npon me; and
in order, therefore, to show on what founda
tion they rest, I shall give official dispatches
relative to further operations south of -Nash
ville.
My letter of the 30th of January to General
Halleck, and the inclosures accompanying it,
which are too long to be inserted here, pro
posed that a gunboat expedition should be
directed against the bridges on the Tennessee
as high up as Florence and Decatnr, so as to
sever the communications of the enemy be
tween the North and South sides. That sug
gestion- was also communicated to General
McClellan. There is no doubt that it could
hare beep accomplished, but General Hallecks’
letter of the 2d*of February, shows that up
to that time he bad not definitely contem
plate! more than “to take and occupy Fort
Henry and Dover, [Fort ’Donelson] and, if
possible, cat the railroad from 1 Columbus to
Bowling Green.” On the 15th, however, I
received the following dispatch:
St, Louis, Feb. 15,1862.
General Buell, Louisville;
Telegram snout division relieves me greatly.
To move from Bowling Green on Nashville is
not good Btrategy, Come and help me take and
hoIiKFort Donelson and Ctarkmlle, [then] move
to Florence, cutting the railroad at Decatur, and
Nashville must be abandoned precisely as Bowl
ing Green has been: ' All we want is troops in
mass on the right point, and the enemy is de
feated with scarcely a blow; but I fear I have not
forces enough for tips new strategic moye, qnd at
the same time observe Colnmbns. Come and
help me and all will be right. We can olear Ten
nessee as we have clearedKentucky.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
Although it is a digression from the qaestion I
now have in hand, that is, as to whether Genera'
Halleck’s asserted designs upon the enemy’s
“second line” wtre thwarted, yet I shall here
transcribe a dispatch of precisely the same date
as the foregoing, to show how two distinguished
officers differed in rega.’d to the movement 1 was
then making:
Washington, Feb. 15, 1862.
General BueU, Louisville :
Yours of to-day is received. Tbe movement
on Nashville is exactly ri^bt. If Gen. Grant’s
safety renders it absolutely necessary, of course
reinforce him as you propose, but tbe great ob
ject is tbe occupation of Nashville. If that is
gajped, or eyen when your advance from Rowl
ing Green is well marked, they will abandon
Donelson if the way is open for it. Do yon need
more rolling stock on tbe railroad and how
(Signed) G, B. McClellan.
The result proves that General McClellan
was certainly right, though it does not neces
sarily follow that General Halleck was ia all
respects wrong. I now return to thB original
Of course the dispatch of General Halleck
shadows a plan. It was written before the fall
of Donelson, and contemplated that the ene
my would, even after that event, hold on to
the line of the Cumberland—a very reasona
ble supposition, if my movement against
Nashville had not precluded it, B«t it is evir
dent that tfie idea of moving upon Florence
must have been abandoned in almost tbe same
breath, for there it in existence a dispatch
dated about the 2Qth, from General Halleck to
bis subordinates oti. the Cumberland, calling
am much M "ty f* »«tro«gb in th* tiwly
of Nashville, such, he predicted, a* this con-'
tinent had never witnessed; and I myself re-'
ceived the following dispatch : 1
St. Louis, Feb. 20, 1862.
General Buell ; we are in possession of
Clarksville in large force,-with plenty of sup
plies. Move to that place rapidly by forced-
marches and effect a junction. Send all avaii-j
able troops around that can reach there by-
water sooner than by land. Don’t hesitate a:
moment. If you will come, we are sure of
Nashville and Columbus, and perhaps Mdm-!
phis also. Answer, yes or no.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
Bnt white at one moment general HaHeak wan
proposing to me that we should move conjointly
upon Florence to compel the eraenatten ot Naslk
ville, and at tbe aext moment was raHyiog hie
forces for a terrible struggle on tbe Cnmbenand'
itself, I was actually taking possession of Nash
ville and his plans were unnecessary ter either,
object. Bo tbe only opposition to his plans in
that instance was in the current of events, which
flowed on and left his plans behind. 1 do not
impute this to General Halleck as a folly, bnt it
may serve to teach General Sherman, if be can;
find no lesson in his own experience, that in
fallibility ia the business ot war is ot very rare
attainment.
The truth is that tbe “enemy’s second line,” of
which General Sherman talks, did not exist un
til the first was destroyed. It is immaterial who
originated tbe idea of ’pushing on” to it It waa
tbe D&tural sequel of tbe first step. Tbe deteose
was organizing in the vicinity of Corinth, and to
that quarter the attack would naturally teed. The
following dispatches will show the history of the
consultations with reterence to it:
General BueU to General McClellan.
Nashville, March 1, 1862.
Mojor-General McClellan, Washington T
Yours of yesterday and to-day received. I
have two divisions—say eighteen thousand men
and thirty-six pieces of artillery. McCook’s
division will cross to-morrow. Wood will
close upon him, I think, by the day after. I
have sent the troops back to Clarksville. John
ston will not stand at Murfreesboro—in fact,
is preparing to get out of tbe way. I hope to
be able to crowd him a little. Th&ir plan
seems to be to get in rear of the Tennessee,
and in positions to concentrate either on Hal-
Jeck or me. I will say more about this when
my information is clearer, and until then I can
not weffl determine my movements. You are
aware that, for reasons given some time ago,
Carter’s is the only column moving toward
Hast Tennessee. I have not heard of iris be
ing beyond Cumberland Ford.
(Signed) -D. C Buell.
General McClellan to General Buell.
Washington, March 2,1862.
General BueU, Nashville :
1 have telegraphed General Halleck that it is
important to seize Decatur, and thus cut General
A. S. Johnson from Memphis and Columbus,
Of corn se you must hold Nashville firmly, and
Chattanooga is a very important point to gain.
Arrange details with Halleck. Co-operate fully
together, and give him all assistance, yoa can.
Push Carter forward as rapidly as possible.
What is Garfield doing ?
(Signed) G. B. McClellan.
General BueU to General Me Clel/au.
(By Telegraph.^
General McClellan, Washington:
Dispatch received. 1 have tour divisions up—r
three and a half on this side of the river—those
coming by land. I can’t get exactly at Wbkt
Halleck: is doing, and therefore can’t see how to
assist him at this moment if be should Deed it.
I have proposed an interview with him, and
would like you to be present. He has to defer tt
a few days. I sent Garfield to chsse Marshall en
tirely oat of Kentucky. Have not beard from
him recently. It wiil bring him down toward
Cumberland Gap, and I will unite him with Car
ter, whom, in the mean time I hope will have
gained some advantage at the Gap-
Use all your persuasion against the appoint
ment of a military governor for Tonnetsee. It
will do infinite harm. Beg the President to wait.
(Signed) D. C. Buell.
I bad on the 1st suggested to Gon. Halleek
that we should meet and ooosult with reference
to futnre operations.
General Halleck to General Buell.
St. Louis, March 3, 1862.
Gen. Buell, Nashville:
Columbu- is nearly tamed. The mortar-boats
will bombard it tbis afternoon, and Pope will at
tack New Madrid io»morrow morning, * *
* I will make an appointment to meet yon as
soon as the Columbus movement is ended.
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General Buell to General Halleek.
Nashvillb, March 3, 1862.
General Halleck, St /.emit,- ; •
What can { do tq aid your operatiens against
Columbus ? Remember I am separated from
you by the Tennessee river. Johnston is moving
toward Decatnr and burning the bridges as be
goes. (Signed) 9. C. Buell.
General Halleck to General Buell.
St. Louis, March 4, 1862-
Generaf BueU, Nashville:
If Johnson has destroyed the railtoqd and
bridges in his rear be cannot setnrn to attack
you. Why not come to the Tennessee and opera
ate with me to cat Johnson’s line with Memphis,
Randolph, and New Madrid, Columbus has
been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concen
trating at New Madrid and Island No. 10. I am
concentrating a force of twenty thonsand against
him. Grant, with bis available force, has gone
up tbe Tennessee to destroy connection at Cor
inth, Jackson and Humboldt. Estimated strength
of enemy at New Madrid, Randolph, and Mem
phis is fifty thonsand. It is ot vital importance
to separate them from Johnston’s army. Come
over ta savannah or Florence and we oan do it
We then oan operate either on Decatur or Mem
phis, or both, as may appear best
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General BueU to General Halleck.
Nashville, MgrcR a, 1862,
General Halleck, St. Louis ;
Your views accord with my own generally,
but some slight modifications seem to me ne
cessary. At least there are details about which
we ought to be able to consult freely. Can we
not meet at Louisville iu a day or so ? I think
it very important. The concentration of my
troops and transportation cannot be completed
for some days. We have had two formidable
rivers to cross, aud have forced ourselvea here
without transportation or baggage.
The thing which ( think of vital importance
is that you seize and hold the bridge at Flor
ence in force- Johnston is now at Shelbyville,
some fifty miles south of this. I hope you
will arrange for our meeting at Louisville.
(Signed) D. G. Buell.
General Halleck to General BueU.
St. Louis, Mo., March 6, 1862,
General BueU, Nashville:
I cannot positively leave here at the present
time. Events are passing on so rapidly that I
mast be all the time in telegraphic communica
tion with Curtis, Grant, Pope, and Commo
dore Foote. We mast consult by telegraph-—
News down the Tennessee that Beauregard has
twenty thousand men at Corinth, and is rapid
ly fortifying it. Smith will probably not-be
strong enough to attack it. It is a great mis
fortune to lose that point. I shall reinforce
Smith as rapidly as possible. If you could
send a division by water around into too Ten-
nessee it would require only a small amount
of transportation to do ifc Would -raoeive all
its supplies by the river,
fSigned ] H. W. Halleck.
General BueU to General Halleck.
Nashville Mareh 9,1862.
General Halleck, St. Louis; .
I did not get your dispatch of tha 6tb until
yesterday—that 0 t the 8th today. I suggest the
fallowing: Tha ensmy «an move from on* aide,
of tha river In tbe other at pie star*, and if wg
attempt to operate on both rides without tha
samefaeilitir of transit we are liable to be t*ateS
in detail. Tim point which I previously suggest
ed is the only one from which w* can operate
centrally. TOW secured, we Can set according to;
circumstances either way. t If yon oosupy
point, I will reipforpe you by water or imayou
by land. Otherwise I may detach. too little to
serve yon, or else so much ss to endanger Middle
Tennessee, tbo -impoflance of #hfcb I need not
allude to. If we con&meftKl think we ooatd
better.understand each other. .
' (Signed) ' ' D. C: Buell;
General Halleek to General Buell.
Sr. Lows Mareh JO, 1862.
General Buell, Nashville
My force* are moving.up tjbe Tennessee river
as rapidly as we can dbtara transportation.— 1?
and Humboldt, it is deemed bestto land at Savan
nah, and establish a depot. The transportation
-will Serve as'forries. The selection is left to C.
F. Smith,, who- commands the advance. Pope
baa turned Island No. 10, bnt the enemy shows
no disposition to evacuate. Curtis ia, asking for
reinforcements in Arkansas. I must send him
some troops intended for tbe Tennessee. Yon do
not say whether we are to expect aar reinforce
ments from Nashville.) .
(Signed) H. W. Halleck.
General BueU to Gen . Halleck.
• Nashville, March 19,1862.
General Halleck, St. Louie ;
. The possession and absolute security of the
co on try, north at the Tennessee river, with
Nashville as a center, fa of vital Importance,
both in a political and military point, of view.
Under no circumstances should it bo .prolonged.
It enables as, with the Tennessee as a base, to
operate east, west, and sonth. All our ar-
rangements should look to a centralization of
our force for that object. W« cannot tell now
which direction to take when we get within
reach of the enemy. You cannot well tell
eF’-ha
• e e e • i
'V e • i • • e
Hkadquartebs Sub District or Oskichm, >
Savannah, Ga^ Oct. IS, 1865. j
Circular, I
No. 28/ f
On and after Urns date artwlee in the Public
Market of this city will he
prices. Prisons violating (ho arder, lyill bs re
ported to this Office and summarily dealt ,wit£*
By command of ‘ ° ‘
h P Br *’V *?J- M-iBRANNAN.
W» H Folk, lat h*#; »
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Country Dried Beffi.*_.
Coftry Cured Beef.-V-V
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Baas, per lb..,..
Drum, per lb
FYeab Water Tront
Salt “ «
Sheephead || *
HuHet, large sixe, per bunch, |
Mullet, amaU size, per bunch
Brim, per bunch of five.....-^
Perch, per bunch ol five
Suckera, **
Whiting «
Codfish,per lb
Shrimp, per quart
Crabs, each
Sturgeon, per lb
Sausages, fresh pork....
Bacon, per lb, from
Butter, perlb;.
Clams, per bushel
what force you may meet at the West; still 1cm
can I teU what may come in the direction of
Stevenson.
With this view, the establishment of your
force on tbis side of tbe river, as high up as
possible, i* evidently judicious; and with the
same-view it would be unnecessary and unad-
visible to change the line on which I propose to
advance. I ran join you almost; if not quite,
as soon by water, in better condition, and
with greater security to your operations and
mine. I believe you cknnot be too promptly
nor too strongly established on tbe Tennessee.
I shall advance in s very few days—as soon
as our transportation is ready.
(Signed) D. C. Buell.
President Lincoln to General Buell.
Washington, March 10,1862.
General BueU, Nashville ;
The evidence is very strong that the enemr in
front of us here is breaking np and moving off.
Gen. McClellan is after him. Some of tbe torde
may be destiDed to meet yon. Look and be pre-.
pared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to as
sist yon if needed.
(Signed) A. Lincoln.
The foregoing dispatches are sufficient to show
the gist of the consultation which preceded tbe
operations against tbe enemy’s “second line."—
They do not betray any opposition—they scarce
ly present any great difference oi conviction—
they show merely a discussion, while we were
preparing ear forces for action, in regard to
Bain* pewftnkl" consultation, but wh'ch occu
pied a number ot days by the tedious and unaat-
lSfoctory means of telegraphing.
Ifris.no part of my present purpose to criti
cise Gen. Halleck’s views in regard to those
points or to enforce my own. We were indepen
dent commanders. We owed no apology for any
opposition which we deemed it our duty to make
to the views pf each other; and the charge ot op
position cotrtd as well be made against one as
against the other.
- Squally unfounded is tbe imputation of un
necessary delay, resulting from opposition or any
other cause. My army moved as soon as it was
ready to move. It made its movements from the
&Tst through the snows asd floods of winter and
spring by actual marching; and from that time
to tbe present, daring the war, no movements
have been made by as large a force, under similar
'oireumstanees, with greater promptness and
celerity,: General Halleck carried his troope up
the Tennessee river on steamers, without the
maans *t meviag twenty miles front its bank*,
and of course, to that extern, he moved so much
more rapidly, as stumers can ran faster. than
men can w*ikj bnt when it came to marching by
land we do not find more alacrity in starting, or
celerity in overcoming’distanoe than other armies
have exhibited. It took-one month after the bat-
tie of Shiloh to prepare for a oampaign whioh the
enterprise of the enemy precipitated, and nearly
a month longer (o overcame the sixteen miles
which separated the opposing armiu.
What had the pretended delays at Nashville
to do with this oousuuiption of time in as
General Sherman expresses it-r-‘‘pushing on to
the second line ?” Nothing. The truth is,
Generri Halleck bad not on tbe ground the
m«an* of moving away from the river earlier
than be didq and if i»» derived to move on tbe
river, there certainly would not have been
mope temerity in throwing himself between
the widely divided columns of the enemy than
in placing himself within arm’s reach of their
united force. I’ am not now criticising Gen.
Halleck. I am exposing the indiscreet pre
tensions and unfounded assertions of bis
friends. When more responsible persons than
General Sherman shall avoir these imputations
of delay, I shall have further to say on that
subject. D. C. Buell.
New Yoritj August 31, 1865.
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