Newspaper Page Text
universal law of nations. Those who as
sert that slavery exists in the States by
f >rce of positive law can, if that assertion
hs true, very easily settle the question by
the production of the declared will of the
supreme power of such States, embodied
in the form of a legislative enactment;
produce the evidence of that positive law
in a legitimate and authentic form, to sus
tain the truth of the assertion. Those
who assert the affirmative of that proposi
tion, are bound to furnisb the evidence of
that positive law enacted by the States, or
yield the point. They content themselves
with relying on the loose declarations of
judges in the slaveholding States; the
mere obiter dictum of judges, (in cases in
which the question we are discussing was
not presented by the record for their con
sideration and judgment.) as the evidence
of positive law enacted by the supreme
power in the State* declaring that slaves
shall be property within the territorial lim
its of the respective States.
1 he question very naturally presents it
self, if those who assert that slaverv exists
in the States by force of positive law, and
that when the owner of slave property
tikes it beyond the territorial limits
of his State, his title to that property
ceases and determines, why is it, that they
desire to invoke the power of the Federal
Government to exclude slave property
from the Territories? Such an act would
be entirely unnecessary, if the title of the
cwner ceases and determines when lie pas
ses with bis slave property beyond the lim
its of the States where it is asserted his ti
tle exists by force of positive law. The
f ict that you desire to invoke the power of
this Government to enact a law to exclude
slave property from the common territory,
furnishes strong evidence that you have
not entire confidence in the position as
sumed and asserted, that slavery exists in
the States by force of positive law, and
that the owner loses his title to his slave
property by taking it beyond the limits of
such States.
I beg leave to call the attention of the
House t<4 the history of the title of my con
stituents to their slave property. What I
shall say in regard to that title in Georgia,
will be pqually applicable to the other
siaveholding States, so far as the founda
tion of that title is concerned. The colony
of Georgia was originally settled as a free
colony; that is to say, African slavery
was prohibited from being introduced there
by the charter granted to the trustees; it
remained a free colony about fifteen years
after its first settlement; the soil and cli
mate was adapted to slave labor; the col
onists desired to have it, but the home
government refused to repeal the prohibi
tion ; the result was, that the colony was
about to come to nothing; the prohibition
was taken off, and African slaves were al
lowed to be brought into the colony ; some
few were brought in from other slavehold
ing colonies, but the most of them were
brought in by those who were engaged in
the African slave trade; and who they
tcere. the past history of the country fur
nishes abundant evidence. African slaves
were brought into the coiony as property ;
they were made property before they
were brought there ; they were sold to our
people as property, purchased by them as
roperty, paid for by them as property,
eld by them as property, precisely upon
the same footing as they held every other
species of property.
Were those from whom my constituents
originally purchased their slave property
engaged in a lawful trade, in a trade recog
nized as lawful by the universal law of na
tions ? This question came before the
Courts of Great Britain in the year 1S17.
A French vessel called the Le Louis was
engaged in the African slave trade, and
was captured by a British cruiser. France
at that time not having entered into treaty
stipulations abolishing that trade, the ves
sel was taken into a British port, and con
demned by the vice admiralty court as
lawful prize for being engaged in a trade
forbidden by the universal law of nations,
and therefore criminal by that law. From
the judgment of the vice admiralty court
an appeal was taken to the high court of
admiralty of Great Britain. The appel
late court reversed the judgment of the vice
admiralty court, and held that the African
slave trade was not unlawful by the uni
versal law of nations, and was not criminal
by that law, which recognized property in
African slaves. The judgment of the high
court of admiralty was delivered by Lord
Stowell, better known as Sir Wiliam Scott,
and I beg leave to read to the House a
portion of that judgment. Speaking of
the African slave trade, the learned Judge
said;
“Let me not be misunderstood or misrepresented
as a professed apologist, when I state facts which
no man can deny—that personal slavery arising
out of forcible captivity i6 coeval with the earliest
periods of the history of mankind—that it is found
existing (and, a* appears, without animadversion)
in tne ear lies: and most authentic records of the
human race—that it is recognized by the codes of
the most polished nations of antiquity—that under
the light of Christianity itself, the possession of
persons so acquired has been in every civilized
country invested with the character of property, and
secured as such by all the protections of law—that sol
emn treaties have been framed, and national mon
opolies eagerly sought to facilitate and extend the
comatree in this assorted property—and all this,
with all the sanctions of law, public and munici
pal, and witnout any opposition, except the pro
tests of a few private moralists, little heard and
less attended to in every country till within these
very few years in this particular country. What
is the doctrine of our courts of law of nations rela
tively to these nations which adhere to the practice
of carrying on fne African slave trade ? Why
that their practice is to be respected; that their
slaves, if taken, are to be restored to them; and if
sot taken in innocent mistake, to be restored with
costs and damages. All this 6urely, upon the
ground that such conduct on the part of any State
is no departure from the law of nations. The noto
rious fact is, that in the dominions of this country,
and others, many thousands of .persons are held as
Ural property, they and their posterity, upon no
other original title than that which I am now called
upon to pronounce a crime—every one of these
instances attended with all the aggravations that
appertains to the long continnation of crime, if
crime it be; and yet protected by late with all the
securities that can be given to property in its most
respected form."—id Dodson's Admiralty Report,
pp. 250- l-'8.
In Dadrazo vt. Willis, 5th Eng. Com.
Law Reports, page 315, the same doctrine
is fully recognized by the Court of King’s
Bench. Bayly, J., in delivering his judg
ment in that ease, said, speaking of the
African slave trade:
“It is true that if this were a trade contrary to
the law of nations, a foreigner could cot maintain
this action. But it is not; and, as a Spaniard can
not be considered as bound by the acts of the Brit
ish Legislature prohibiting this trade, it would be
unjust to deprive him of a remedy for the wrong
which he has sustained. He had a legal property
in the slaves of which he has, by the defendant's
aet. been deprived.”
Best, J., after citing several authorities,
liya:
“It is clear, from these autaorities, that the slave
trade is not condemned by ‘.he general law of na
tions.”
In the ease of the Antelope, reported in
10th Wheaton, page 121, Chief Justice
Marshall, speaking of the legality of the
slave trade, 6ays:
“Both Europe and America embarked in it, and
tor nearly two centuries it was carried on without
opposition and without censure. A jurist could
**hat a practice thus supported was illegal,
and that those engaged in it might be punished
♦•thv personally, or by deprivation of property.”
Bat I have ".till higher authority in favor
of the legality of the African slave-trade
—and that is the Federal Constition. The
African slave trade was not only recognized
as lawful by that Constitution, but it ex
pressly stipulates for its continuance for
twenty years, and provides that each slave
who might be imported into the States
should be taxed not exceeding ten dollars
per head.
Mr. Giddings. Will the gentleman per
mit me to propound a question to him ?
Mr. Warner. Oh yes, certainly.
Mr. Giddings. I would inquire whether
the gentleman holds that those American
Christians, who were captured and held to
slavery, and who were transferred from
owner to owner, by the Algerines, in the
latter part of the last and the first part of
the present century, were property ?
Mr. Warner. 1 am not discussiug the
question of Algerine slavery—I am dis
cussing the question of African slavery, as
recognized by the Constitution.
Mr. Giddings. Does the gentleman ac
knowledge that those Americans, captured
and held by the Algerines, were properly ?
Mr. Warner. I do not make any such
admission, nor is it necessary that I should
do so, for the purposes of my argument.
Mr. Gi<jdings. That is what I want an
answer to.
Mr. Warner. I have not referred to the
Americans who were captured by the Al
gerines. I am discussing the question of
African slavery as it exists in the United
States.
Mr. Giddings. Africans can be held by
Americans as slave property.
Mr. Warner. They were recognized as
property by the universal law of nations
before, and at the time of tlie adoption of
the Constitution, and are now held as pro
perty under the sanction and guarantee of
that instrument.
Mr. Giddings. Are Americans property
when held by Africans as slaves?
Mr. Warner. I do not recollect at this
time such a state of things as the gentle
man from Ohio supposes.
Mr. Giddings. 1 commend the gentle
man to the history of the country.
Mr. Warner. I will not allow the gen
tleman to make a case, for me to discuss. I
am discussing questions which arise under
the laws and Constitution of this country ;
and in return for his admonitory counsel,
would heartily commend him to the Con
stitution of his country, and the obligations
which it imposes.
Mr. Chairman, when interrupted by the
gentleman from Ohio, I was endeavoring
to demonstrate that property in slaves was
recognized by the universal law of nations
before, and long since the adoption of fhe
Constitution; and that my constituents
originally purchased their slave property
from those who were engaged in a lawful
trade, and recognized to be lawful by the-
universal law of nations, and that their ti
tle to their slave property is based upon
that universal law of nations, as it existed
before, and at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, and not upon any positive
law of the State.
I am not ignorant, sir, that long since
the adoption of the Constitution, and long
since the title of my constituents to their
slave property accrued, the United States,
and most of the independent nations of the
world, have entered into treaty stipula
tions, abolishing the African slave trade;
but those treaty stipulations were not in
tended, and could not have the effect, to
divest rights to slave property which had
accrued and vested prior thereto, and
which were recognized by the Constitu
tion as lawful and valid. After the Re
volution, as we all know, the colonies be
came independent States. The State of
Georgia had as perfect and complete ju
risdiction over all persons and property
within her territorial limits, as any Sov
ereign State or nation on the face of the
earth; she owed allegiance to no other
power or Government. The commission
issued by that State to her delegates to
frame the Federal Constitution states her
true character at that time. That com
mission is headed with these memorable
words: “The State of Georgia, by tire
grace of God, free, sovereign, and indepen
dent."
Now, sir, let us inquire whRt rights the
people of that independent State had, in
relation to taking their slave property into
any foreign territory, and to have that
property protected there by the universal
law of nations before and at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution?
I maintain, sir, that a citizen of Geor
gia had, according to the fundamental
principles of international law, the un
doubted right to take his slave property
into any other foreign Territory where the
introduction of such property was not pro
hibited by some positive law operative in
that foreign Territory, declaring it to be
against the policy, or prejudicial to tire in
terests of the Government having jurisdic
tion over that Territory; and to have such
property protected in that foreign Terri
tory. It is the undoubted right of -every
independent sovereign State or nation to
declare by positive law, that the introduc
tion of slave or any other property into
the territory of such State or nation, shall
be against its policy, or prejudicial to its
interests. My position is, that, in the ab
sence of any such declaration as to what
shall be its policy, or prejudicial to its in
tercets in regard to the introduction of
slave property, a citizen of the indepen
dent State of Georgia had the unquestion
ed right to take his slave property into
foreign territory, violating no law of that
foreign territory, and would he entitled to
have that property protected there. Let
us see what are the fundamental princi
ples of international law regulating the
uestion. Huberus, in discussing the con-
ict of laws between independent States
and nations, in book first, section the
second, thus states the rule:
“Every nation from comity states that the laws
of eactfnatioa of force within its own territorial
limits, ought to be in force in all other nations,
without injury to tkeir respective powers and
rights.”
This great fundamental principle of in
ternational law has been fully recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United
States, as applicable to’ the States of this
Confederacy, in the Bank of Augusta vs:
Earle, 13th Peters, 589. Mr. Chief Jus
tice Taney, in delivering the opinion of
•the court in that case, states the rule in
these words:
“In the silence of any positive rule affirming, or
denying or restraining the operation of foreign
laws, courts of justice, presume the tacit adoption
1 of them by their own Government, unless they
are repugnant of its policy, or prejudicial to its
interests. It is not the comity of the courts, but
the comity of the nation which is .administered
and ascertained in the same way, and guided by
the same reasoning by which all other principles
of municipal law are'ascertained and guided.”
I have the authority of Mr. Webster
upon this point, who, in his correspon
dence with Lord Ashburton, demanding
satisfaction for slaves from the British
Government, which had been taken into
one of the Bahama Islands, and set free
by the authorities of that place. He com
bated the idea that a man’s title to his
■ slave property has no extra territorial
operation, in the following strong and.em
phatic language. After referring to local
law in respect to marriages, he continues:
“Did any one ever imagine, fhat local law acted
upon such marriages to annilulinte their obliga
tions, if the party should visit a country in which
marriages must be celebrated in another form?
It may be said, in auch instances, personal rela
tions are founded in contract, and, therefore, ought
to be respected; but that the relation of master and
slave is founded in contract, and therefore is to b<
respected only by the taw of the place which recog
nizes it. Whoever so reasons encounters the
authority of the whole body ot' law from Grotius
down, because there are numerous instances in
which the law itself presumes, or implies contracts;
and prominent among these instances is the very
relation which we are now considering, aud which
relation is holden to draw after it mutuality of ob
ligation.”—Correspondence of the Creole case. Senate
document, Twenty Seventh Congress, vol. I, p. lilt.
Mr. Nathan Dane, whose authority I
know will not be questioned in the free
States, in the sixth volume of Dane’s
Abridgement, p. 430, speaking of the law
of nations, savs:
“In the United States, as in England, the law
of nations is adopted in its full extent by the com
mon law, and is held to be a part of the law of tin
land.”
In Madrazo vs: Willis, (5th Eng. Com
! Law Rep., 313,) these fundamental prin
ciples of international law were practical
ly applied to slave property by the cour
of King’s Bench in Great Britain, in the
year 1820. The question arose upon th<
following state of facts: A Spanish sub
ject being engaged in the African slave
trade (Spain not having entered into treat}
stipulations abolishing that trade) am’
purchased three hundred slaves on -th«
coast of Africa, and had them on boari
his vessel on her return voyage, when sh<
was captured by a British cruiser, an<
taken into one of the ports of Great Brit
ain, where the slaves, by the law of tha?
kingdom, became free. The Spaniard
brought his action of trover in the court:
of Great Britain against the captain of the
British cruiser to recover the value of hit
vessel and stores, and the value of his thm
hundred slaves. On the trial before tin
Lord Chief Justice, he doubted whether,
in a British court, the plaintiff could main
tain his action for the value of his three
hundred slaves, and directed the. jury t<
find the damages separately; so much fo
the vessel and stores, and so much fo
the three hundred slaves—the latter con
stituting much the largest item.
On the question being submitted to s
full bench of judges, they were unanimous
ly of the opinion that the plaintiff was en
titled to recover the full value of his thre*
hundred slaves, as well as the value of hi
vessel, and stores, and awarded judgment
therefor; recognizing the validity of tin
Spaniard’s title to his slave property
which was good by the laws of his nation,
in a British court. The slaves were no
taken by the Spaniard into the kingdom o
Great Britain, in violation of her laws, bu
were seized upon the great highway o •
nations, upon the empire of the seas, upoi
common ground, where the Spaniard hac
as much right to be with his property as
the Englishman; and the principle would
have applied with equal force if the slaves
had been seized upon common territory,
the joint property of Great Britain and
Spain. The same principle is applicable
to the common territory of the Union,
which is common ground, being the joint
property of all the States, where the citi
zen of Georgia has as much right to be
with his slave property as the citizen oi
Ohio has to be there with his property—
neither violating any law of that territory
by going into it with their property.—
When the citizen of an independent State,
who has a title to his property good and
valid by the laws of that State—and I
have shown that slaves were recognized as
property by the universal law of nations,
and that the law of nations was a part of
the common law—goes into foreign terri
tory with that property, violating no law
of that territory, these great fundamental
principles of international law go with
him; they are above him and around him;
he inhales them in the very atmosphere
which he breathes; they protect his per
son and his property; he cannot escape
their binding influence unless, indeed, be
goes beyond the pale of civilization, and
there the principles of international law
cease to operate
Mr. Sandidge. Allow me to recall to
the mind of the gentleman from Georgia a
case precisely in point, to establish that
which he is trying to establish before the
committee. It is this: 1 noticed it in the
newspa pers 6ome time last year. A gen
tleman from Brazil went to Prussia, carry
ing with him a slave. It was there at
tempted to deprive him of the services of
that slave; and the highest tribunal of that
country decided—according to the argu
ment of the gentleman from Georgia—that
his owner was entitled to him; that the
matter should be decided according to the
laws of the country from which the party
came, and that he should have the right to
held his shave, and to carry him with him
from the country at his pleasure. The
gentleman from Georgia may have seen a
notice of the case.
Mr. Warner. I do not recollect having
seen it, but I have no doubt that that is the
correct principle; I have no doubt that it
Is in ccmsonance with the universal law of
nations—-with the great principles of in
ternational law. It existed in this count
ry,-and was a part of the law of the land
at the time the State of Georgia and the
other States entered into the constitution
al compact. I have endeavored to estab
lish the proposition, that before and at the
time oF the adoption of the Constitution
the citizens of the independent State of
Georgia had the right, according to the
well-established principles of international
law, (which constituted a part of the law
of the land.) to take their slave property
into any foreign territory where its intro
duction was not prohi: ited, and to have it
protected there. I have endeavored to
show what were the fundamental rights of
the people of that State to their slave
property, before and at the time of the
adoption of the Federal Constitution.
The next question to be considered is,
whether that State has delegated the pow
er in the Constitution to this Government
to deprive her of those fundamental rights?
Has she delegated the power in the Con
stitution to this Government to deprive her
of the fundamental right which she had,
as an independent State, to take her slave
property into the common territory of the
Union, there being no law in that terri
tory which would be violated hy -doing
so? It is contended that this Government
has that power by the clause which de
clares that—
“Congress shall have power to dispose of, and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting,
the territory or other property belonging to the
United States, and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of
the United States, or of any particular State.”
The grant of power in this clause is in
regard to the territory as property. Con
gress has power to dispose of it as proper
ty, as well as any other property belonging
to the United States; may make “all need
ful rules and regulations respecting the
territory” considered as property, hut who
can believe that it was the intention of the
framers of the Constitntion to delegate
those great inherent rights of property
which I have been discussing to-day by
this clause of the Constitution? But'sup
pose we are mistaken in this, view of it,
an I that it was intended by this clause to
delegate the powCrlo the Federal Govern-
ment.to -deprive the people of the States
of the right to control their property, when
the latter portion of the clause forbids you
to exercise it so as to prejudice the claim
of any particular State, and to exclude
slave property would be not only to pre
judice the claims of one State, but the
claims of fifteen States of this Union; for
the common territory being the joint prop
erty of all the States, the slaveholding
States claim an equal right to enjoy it with
their property; and if you exercise the
power to exclude them with their proper
ty, vou prejudice their claims to that ex
tent, which yon are forbid to do. The
principles of equality are indelibly
stamped on the face of the Constitution.
There is one clause in the Constitution
which declares that—
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States.”
This principle applies with much strong
er force when applied to the common ter
ritory, which is the joint property of all
the States. Surely the citizens of each
State ought, upon principle, to be entitled
to the same privileges and immunities in
the common territory of all the States as
they would in the States. No, sir, the
framers of the Constitution never con
templated for one moment that they had
delegated the power in this clause Jo Con
gress to deprive them of those great funda
mental rights which belonged to them in
respect to their property; but, on the con
trary, the. delegates from the southern
States refused ;to enter into the compact
until it was expressly stipulated that if
their slave property should escape and
get into the free States, they should be
surrendered up.
The ordinance of 1787 has sometimes
be relied on as conferring the power on
Congress to exclude slavery from the Ter
ritories, but it will be recollected that
ordinance was adopted prior to the forma
tion of the Constitution. That was a com
pact between sovereign States, having
the undoubted right to make it, and five
free States have been formed out of the
Northwest Territory ceded by Virginia,
which, but for that generous cession,
would have been slave territory. The
rights secured by the Constitution are
wholly independent of that ordinance, and
have no necessary connection with it.—
Those great fundamental rights which I
have been discussing belonged to the peo
ple of the States before and at the time of
the adoption of the Constitntion. They
entered into, and constituted an essential
element of their slave property, part and
parcel of it; and, not having delegated
them in the Constitution, they have them
now; and it is by virtue of those preexist
ing rights which are, solemnly guarantied
by the Constitution, that my constituents
claim to be entitled to take their slave
property into the common territory, and to
have it protected there. The States are
the original source of power: the Federal
Government has no power except that
which has been delegated to it by the
States in the Constitution; and the States
have now, as declared by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in New York
rs: Miln, 11 Peters, p. 138—
“The same undeniable and unlimited jurisdic
tion over all persons and things within their ter
ritorial limits as any foreign nation, where that
jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the
Constitution of the United States.”
But. sir, independent of their legal right,
my constituents have the equitable right
to take their slave property into the com
mon territory of the Union. That terri
tory is the joint property of all the States,
siaveholding as well as non-slaveholding.
There are but two ways in which property
can honestly be acquired in this country
the one is by labor and industry; the other
by inheritance or bequest. A citizen of
Georgia by his labor and industry acquires
capital-money—a citizen of Ohio by his
labor and industry does the same thing;
the citizen of Georgia vests the proceeds
of his labor in slave property, the citizen
of Ohio vests his in merchandise, or stock,
or in whatever he may choose to invest.
They both desire to emigrate to the com
mon territory with the common proceeds
of their labor; and we will suppose that
this Government shall, hy an usurpation
of authority, pass a law excluding slave
property from that territory. The citizen
of Georgia and the citizen of Ohio meet
upon the border of that territory. The
citizen of Ohio is told that he can pass into
that common territory with the proceeds
of his labor and industry and enjoy it; but
the citizen of Georgia is told, that he can
not go into that common territory and en
joy the benefit of his labor and industry
“Why,” he inquires, “have not I obtain
ed my property as honestly and fairly as
the citizen of Ohio who has just gone in;
and am 1 not as much entitled to enjoy
the benefit of that common territory as lie
is?” “Certainly you are, but your prop
erty is of a different species, and, therefore
you must keep out.” Is that equality, oi
justice, between citizens entitled to equal
privileges, and equal rights, under a com
mon Government? Can any Government
that shall pursue such a course of policy
maintain the confidence of the people?
But sir, we have been told by those
who advocate this line of -policy that they
do not desire to interfere with slavery in
the States where it exists; and yet it is
their intention to prevent the extension of
slavery, by excluding it from the common
territory—to surround the slave States
“with a cordon of free territory, and com
pel slavery, like a serpent, to sting itself to
death!” Now it matters but’little with
me, whether a man takes my property
outright, or restricts me in the enjoyment
of it, so as to render it of but little or no
value to me. It is gn interference with
my rights in either case; the interference
is one of degree only. Any restraint upon
the use and enjoyment of my property in
as full and ample manner as I might other
wise do, bnt for the restriction, is an inter
ference with it. There is not a slavehold
er in this House or out of it, but who
knows perfectly well that, whenever slave
ry is confied within certain specified limits,
its future existence is doomed; it is only a
question of time as to its final destruction.
You may take any single slaveholding
county in the southern States, in which the
great staples of cotton and sugar are culti
vated to any extent, and confine the
present slave population within the limits
of that county. Such is the rapid, natural
increase of the slaves, and the rapid, ex
haustion of the soil in the cultivation of
those crops, (which add sc much to the
commercial wealth of the country,) that in
a few years it would be impossible to sup
port them within the limits of such county.
Both master and slave would be starved
out; and what would be the practical effect
in one county, the same result would hap
pen to all the slaveholding States. Slave
ry cannot be confined within certain speci
fied limits without producing the destruc
tion of both master and slave; it requires
fresh lauds, plenty of wood and water, not
only for the comfort and happiness of the
slave, but for the benefit of the owner. We
understand perfectly well the practical
effect of the proposed restriction upon our
rights, and to what extent it interferes with
slavery in the States; and we also under
stand the object and purpose of that inter
ference. If the slaveholding States
should ever be so regardlesss of their rights
and their honor as co-equal States, to be
willing to submit to this proposed restric
tion for the sake of harmony and peace,
they could not do it. There is a great
overruling, practical necessity which would
prevent it. They ought not to submit to
it upon principle, if they could, and could
not if they would.
It is in view of these things, sir, that the
people of Georgia have assembled in con
vention, and solemnly resolved that if
Congress shall pass a law excluding them
from the common territory with their slave
property, they will disrupt the ties that
bind them to the Union. This position
has not been taken by way of threat or
menace. Georgia never threatens, but
Georgia always acts, whenever it is neces
sary and proper for her to act for the pro
tection of her constitutional rights and the
rights of her people. She will not act
hastily or rashly, but not the less firmly
on that account. She intends to place her
self right in the face of the world, in regard
to this question. She has delegated me,
in conjunction with my abler and more ex
perienced colleagues, to make known her
rights here, and to proclaim them to the
American people. She desires to main
tain those rights within the Constitution,
and for that purpose invokes the support
of the country, in order that those rights
may'be respected and observed. I have
endeavored to present those rights to the
consideration of this House to-day, in good
temper, and as becomes the Represent
ative of one of the old thirteen States of
this Confederacy.
I concur in the sentiment uttered by the
senior member from Ohio, [Mr. Giddings,]
that we should discuss principles here; and
1 will add, after we have discussed them, we
should regulate our conduct by them, not on
ly here, but everywhere. My constitutents
have no desire to force their institutions
upon those who do not like them; all they
ask is to be unmolested in the enjoymeut
of those rights which were gaurantied to
them by the Constitution, not to be re
cognized as superior, nor as inferior,
but simply as equals in this Confedera
cy-
But it has been said here, that the South
acted in bad faith in consenting to the re
peal of the Missouri compromise. What
is the history of that compromise? That
act was forced upon the South by the
aggtessive policy of the North. The
Louisiana Territory was slave territory,
and Missouri was formed out of that terri
tory; the North resisted her admission in
to the Union, because slavery was recog
nized by her constitution; and, for the sake
of peace and harmony, the South consent
ed to the line of 36° 30', north of which
slavery should be excluded. The term
cor/tpiomise necessarily implies a surrendef
of legal rights for the purpose of settlement
—a waiver of constitutional rights for that
object; no more was ever intended by that
act. The South always maintained that
it was unconstitutional; but acquiesced in
it solely upon the principle of compromise,
with the understanding that it was to be
applied to all the territory of the Union;
and it was so applied at that time. Mis
souri was admitted as a slave State. Iowa,
formed out of the Louisana Territory,
which was|originally slave territory, has
been admitted as a free State.
But how did the North regard this
sacred compromise at the time, and since?
On the 6th of March, 1820, the act was
passed, authorizing the people of Mis
souri Territory to form a State constitution
by the eighth section of which act slavery
was excluded north of 36°30'. On the
2d of March, 1821, the house of Represen
tatives passed a resolution providing for
the admission of Missouri into the Union,
by the proclamation of the President, upon
certain conditions to be performed by the
Legislature of that State, when nearly the
whole Indy of northern Representatives
voted against the resolution for her admis
sion; and yet they now pretend to say,
that they have sacredly kept that sacred
compact, when it was repudiated by their
votes during the same session at which it
was passed; and the contemporaneous his
tory of that period shows that this same,
compromise, now so sacred in the estima
tion of many northern politicos, was con
demned and denounced by the entire
North.
The next territory that was acquired
was Texas, which was also slave territory.
The compromise line was extended
through that territory, the North appropriat
ing all the slave territory north of 56° 30'
to freedom, as she did from the shtve terri
tory of Louisiana. The South, acting
upon the understanding that the com
promise line was to be applied to all the
territory of the Union, carried out that un
derstanding in good faith in regard to the
slave territory of Texas.
The next territory which was acquired
was from Mexico; that was free territory.
The South was still willing to abide the
compromise line; and extend it through to
the Pacific; but the North refused—will
ing to abide it so long as slave territory
could be appropriated to freedom, but
when that compromise line was to inure to
the benefit of the South, its binding obliga
tion was denied and repudiated' Then
it was that the South became released
from all obligation to abide by that com
promise, and was remitted to her original
constitutional rights in respect to the com
mon territory. It has been said that the
South received the benefit of the admission
of Missouri into the Union as a slave State.
The reply is, that Iowa has been admitted
into the Union as a free State, with this
marked difference, however, that Missouri
was orignally slave territory, and Iowa,
which was originally slave territory, is
now a free State. The South has gained
nothing, and lost the State oflowa as slave
territory. The impartial historian will
be at no loss to discover who it was that
first repudiated the Missouri compromise
in Tespect to the common territory of the
Union.
After the Missouri compromise had been
repudiated by the North in regard to the
territory acquired from Mexico, the South
voted for the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which
contains the true principles of non-inter-,
vention by Congress with the question of’
slavery as it exists in the United States,
in regard to the common territory of the
Union—the true principles of the Con
stitution, which recognize the equal rights
of the people of all the States to the en
joyment of that common Territory. That
act ought to bp maintained, not only be
cause it is right, just, and equal in its
E revisions to the people of all the States,
ut because it will have the effect to sup
press agitation by demagogues, botk North
and South, of the question of slavery.—
To use a common expression, it will take
the wind out of the sails of that class of
politicians in both sections, who will be
then unable to navigate in still waters.—
In the South that class of men claim to be
the exclusive friends of slave institutions,
and ask for a seat in Congress to protect
that particular interest exclusively. In
the North that class of men claim tlie stip-
port of the people, because they are the
exclusive opponents of the slavery aggres
sions of the South, as they are pleased to
represent themselves; and the result is,
when they meet here the country is kept
in a continual excitement, the legitimate
business of the country neglected, that they
make political capital for themselves at
home, in order to obtain place and
power.
I do not intend to be understood, sir, as
saying that there are any of that class of
men here now from either section of the
country; the present company, you know,
sir, is always excepted. I am only speaking
of what might happen, and probably will
happen, if this question of slavery agita
tion be not withdrawn from this Hall, and
referred to the people of the Territories,
where it legitimately belongs, and where
the Kansas-Nebraska act refers it. It is,
sir, for maintaining the salutary provisions
of this act, so essential for the peace and
best interests of this great country, as well
as the obligations imposed on him by the
Constitution, that the President of the
United States has been denounced as a
doughface. Far better is it for him, sir, as
a man, and for his reputation as an officer,
that he should be denounced as a dough
face, in maintaining the integrity of the
Constitution of his country, than that he
should have given occasion to have been
denounced as a perjured traitor to that
Constitution which he had solemnly sworn
to support and maintain in all its sacred
provisions.
From the Richmond Enquirer.
Fillmore’s Services to the South.
clamorous and consistent abolitionist. Tna •
Letter was a deliberate exposition of *,i s principle!
on the relations of slavery; and, in his nuhiin *
duet, he adhered with lidclity to the
that platform. In every controversy affectiSlV*
interests ot the South which agitated th,> ^ .
during Fillmore’s service in Congress, he esnm?.^
the cause of abolitionism with the utmost
his feebie and negative nature. al °*
Now, this ugly'and stuhbom fact sorely
es Fillmore’s friends in the South. Therm!,!**'
take to escape its consequences, and to redeol"
the character of their candidate by an incest, ,
and elaborate panegyric, on his Patriotism in th 9
Presidency. AH at once, they say, and by som®
miraculous agency, he was cleansed of the original
corruption of his nature, was converted from h:
lifp-lono* rnnvlftinnc rtf tko C.. _ • . .
and infan
illustrated
life-long convictions of the injustice and infamy
of negro slavery, and has henceforth illustrated „
Late Elections—Democratic Prospects.
We took occasion a few days since, to notice
with some satisfaction, the result of the late North
ern elections. They indicate that the tide of aboli
tionism, which flowed so portentously soon after
the passage of the Kansas Bill, is now on the ebb.
They indicate that the Northern Democracy, par
tially paralysed fora while, is rapidly recovering
its strength—preparing itself for a great triumph
over the enemies of the Constitution and the
Union, and the presidential contest of next fall.
The Journal of Commerce received this morning,
has the following paragraph bearing on this sub
ject: .
The Prospect.—The immense gains of the Demo
crats in our large cities and towns, and in those
States where elections have been held this Spring,
although opposed by a combination of the Know
Nothings, Republicans and Abolitionists, show
very clearly which way the wind blows. A year
ago. in each of the States alluded to, viz: New
Hampshire Island and Connecticut, the Demo
crats were defeated by an overwhelming majority.
This year the combination against them has been
more extensive aud complete than before, yet in
each case they press very closely upon the heels of
their opponents. Until last year, there had been
an Abolition or Free Soil party, which neither
sided with the Democrats nor with the Whigs.
But at the late elections, they have fraternized
lovingly with the opponents of Democracy; and
the consequence is, that although the Democrats,
in each of tlie States mentioned, polled a vote
nearly, if not quite unprecedented, they are still
slightly in a minority. But they now see the full
strength of the enemy, and the amount of work to
be done. All that remains is, to do it. And the
opportunity is near.
^ But further. Not only is the Democracy of the
North recovering its lost strength. There is
something more to be said: Judging from the tone
of its presses and the resointions of its public meet
ings, it is daily becoming sounder in its senti
ments. Its organs are taking bolder and higher
ground in opposition to anti-slavery fanaticism.
The Free Soilers, whom a mistaken policy in form
er years tolerated, have either deserted, or been
driven out of its ranks. Their places are being
supplied with Conservative Clay Webster Union
loving Whigs. The N. Y. Post and its Van Bu-
ren Abolition clique, have sought admission into
the Black Republican camp, and the Democracy
is now free from their treacherous presence. The
consequence is, that the Democracy of the North,
as imperitive as their brethren of the South, de
manded of the Cincinnati Convention a distinct
and emphatic approval of the Nebraska bill, with
a full repudiation of the isms of the day.
Of course the struggle next fall will be a severe
one. The Black Republicans lately exulting in
the belief that a victory was within their grasp,
will not yield without a tremendous conflict. Yet,
they will be defeated. The South has but to stand
firm:—to rally in solid phalanx, her fifteen States
in support of the Constitution and the Union, and
patriotism will gloriously triumph.
From the Richmond Enquirer.
The Enow Nothings of the South.
That any man with the least pretension to poli
tical information can concede to Fillmore the re
motest chance of election to the presidency is a
proposition that we utterly deny and repudiate.
Why, the party which affects to support him is
split into so many factions that nobody can as
certain its identity. The bulk of the knout noth
ing organization is under the control of black re
publicans; and they are in open rebellion against
Fillmore—not so much because they distrust his
opinions on slavery as because of the desperate
condition of his fortunes. It is barely possible
that he may carry a single northern State.
in the South the prospect is even more cheer
less in the eyes of Fillmore’s followers. They
cannot count with any certainty on the support
of the whigs, to whose alliance they are indebted
for their partial success in the South. Their own
party is rapidly melting away by defection, and
tumbling to pieces under the heavy blows of its
own members. The terror of its discipline is now
derided, and its organization has lostall its strength
and consistency since the public have had a
glimpse of its workings. Its ticket is a palpable
antithesis. Between an inveterate whig of the
federal school and a democrat who owes all his
consequeuce to a personal and political subser
viency to Andrew Jackson there can be no identi
ty of opinion or of interest. If Donelson's prin
ciples of public policy are just, then Fillmore is
the arch-enemy of the country. If Fillmore is a
sound politician, then Donelson should be hanged
as a traitor. To say nothing of other measures,
Fillmore and Donelsou are in antagonism on the
tariff, and distribution, internal improvement, and
sub-treasury—all of which are living and active
issues before the country. Whigs support Fill
more because he takes tlie whig view of these ques
tions. Will they put Donelson in a position
where he may succeed to the presidency, and re
verse the policy of his predecessor on every great
measure of public economy? 'i he idea is absurd.
Whig know nothings will not support Donelson;
democratic know nothings will not support Fill
more. A house divided against itself cannot
stand. In the next presidential contest the know
nothing party will sustain the most inglorious de
feat. Every one foresees the result.
Why, then, in a contest which involves the dear
est interests of the South, will persons professing
friendship to the South deliberately throw away
strength that may be essential to its safety? Or,
rather, why will they aid and abet the common
enemy by a diversion which, if it have any effect,
must neutralize the patriotic resistance of the de
mocracy? Is it possible that with the blind ven
geance, if not with the strength of the giant, they
would involve friend and foe in indiscriminate
ruin? Is the desire to defeat the democracy so
strong with the know nothing party that they
would accomplish their purpose by the sacrifice of
the South? Is party dearer to him than country?
Their conduct is intelligible on no other supposi
tion. They are not so stupid that they cannot
foresee the disastrous results of their policy, if, in'
deed, it have any other result than thefrown ig
nominious defeat. But what to them is the sal
vation of the South if it be accomplished by per
petuating the ascendency of hated democracy?
No! better for them that slavery and the South he
sunk into fathomless perdition, if" they can only
join hands with black republicans, and with sav
age yell dance in drunken revelry over the pros
trate body of the democratic party.
h:s conduct all the virtues of a pure and w, sa
patriot. It is xn no envious spirit of detraction
but solely out of regard for the truth of history
that we propose a bnet inquiry into the propriety
of such extravagant eulogy of the.“pattern Prexi
dent. *
When the country was in a state of excessive
agitation and alarm, and it was thought by some
very good people that tlie enactment of the famous
compromise measures was essential to the
of the Union, Millard Filimore was Vice Presi
dent of the United States, and in virtue of this
high office possessed considerable influence in tlm
Senate, especially over the conduct of Northern
Whigs. Is there any contemporaneous proof that
in this moment of extreme danger to the Union
and of utmost need in the South, Fillmore moved
a finger in support of the Fugitive Sfavo Law?
The fact that not a single Whig Senator from the
North voted for the measure, affords conclusive
evidence that its success was in no measure due
to Fillmore’s favor. But did the bill receive even
the passive approval of his own judgment? That
it did not we have the testiony of his own public
and deliberate declaration. Iu 1854, Fillmore
made an excursion to Kentucky, and in Louisviiie
delivered himself of a speech, in which he under
took to narrate the circumstances of his succes!
sion to the Presidency. Here is a choice extract;
“In Texas and New Mexico, a civil war threat
ened. Texas made preparations to take posses
sion of a portion of New Mexico. He felt it his
duty to maintain the laws of his country. One of
the laws required that the people of the Territory
Holloway's Medicines.—We are not in the habit
generally of noticing the thousand and one medi
cines of the day; but when a really meritorious
one is before the public, we think it doe to ihe af
flicted that the fact should be made known. We
have used Holloway’s Pills and Ointment in cases
of humors, bruises, and scalds, with beneficial ef
fect, and there are cases within our knowledge of
extraordinary cures performed in diseases of long
standing. Psofessor Holloway’s Ointment and
Pills are among the few preparations which perform
all the cures for which they are recommended.
We are satisfied that for purifyng the blood, regu-
of New Mexico should be protected. As a means
of protecting, he immediately ordered a portion of
the army and munitions of war to the frontier of Tee-
as to do duty there. The army teas put in motion
and then, and not till then, did Congress act upon
the subject. F
Texas and New Mexico acquiesced in tho
action of Congress. Mr. Filimore spoke of tho
adoption of tlie compromise measures of 1850 es
pecially of the fugitive slave law. This late, he
said, had some provisions in it to which lit had objec
tions. He regretted the necessity of its being passed
at all; but the constitution required the giving up
of fugitive slaves, and it was not for him to decide
whether this was a compact; he had sworn to
maintain it, and he would do so to his last hour.
When the bill came to him from the two houses,
in tlie midst of hurry and confusion and difficul
ties; he examined it, and a doubt came up in his
mind whether it was not unconstitutional, as denying
the right of habeas corpus to the fugitive slave, lie.
referred the question to our accomplished Kentucky
lawyer, his Attorney General, who gave his opin
ion that the law was not a violation of the consti
tution; and thereupon, said Mr. Fillmore, I gave
my signature to the bill.”
Mark the language in which Fillmore defines
his relations to the Fugitive Slave Bill: it em
braces “provisions to which he had objections;”
he “regretted the necessity for passing it at all; - '
“a doubt came upon his mind whether it was un
constitutional, as denying the right of habeas
corpus to the fugitive sl^ve;” he referred the ques
tion “to the Attorney General, who gave his opin
ion that the faw was not a violation of the con
stitution, and thereupon,” (in the sense of where
fore, implying logical sequence,) said Mr. Fill
more, “I gave my signature to the bill.” Js there
one word in these sentences that implies approval
of the fugitive slave law? On the contrary does
not the langnage clearly express a reluctant and
constrained acquiescence in a measure, against
which his judgment aud his feelings revolted, and
for the passage of which he took care to relieve
himself of all odium by shifting the responsibility
upon the shoulders of the Attorney General!—
There is no hearty commendation of the law as an
act of justice to the South, and no rebuke ofthe
abolitionists for their opposition to it. But more
than this: the first official act of President Fillrilore
was to give the foremost place in this cabinet to
Daniel Webster, who was notoriously opposed to
the Fugitive Slave bill, and who declared, in a
subsequent speech at Buffalo, that it would not
have received his vote, if he had remained in the
Senate, without an amendment securing jury trial
to the negro in the State in which he was captur
ed. In tne speech from which we take the above
extract, Mr. Fillmore declared that there was per
fect-unity of opinion between himself and the mem
bers of his cabinet. But he was present when
Webster made the declaration, and would have
protested if he had not approved the sentiment.—
Indeed, it was notorious at the time, (such was
Donelson’s language in the Union,) that the elo
quent and expert Secretary of State was put for
ward to represent his chief and the entire Ad
ministration.
That Fillmore did not support the fugitive slave
bill before its passage, is proved by his own subse
quent declaration that he objected to its provis
ions, and that he entertained a doubt of its constitu
tionality until the Attorney General relieved his con
science. His judgment was not determined in re
gard to the measure until he become President
and was assured by the competent officer that it
did not violate the Constitution. In the face of
this statement, the most impudent partisan of Fill
more cannot claim that he is entitled to praise for
the enactment of the law for the recapture of fu
gitive slaves. His own language attests the re
luctance with which he gave the executive sanc
tion to the bill; but his private judgment and per
sonal feelings were overcome by a pledge to his
party, that lie would not veto any measure which
did not involve a palpable violation of the Consti
tution. By constraint of the same pledge, arid in
vii toe of the same principle of opposition to tha
exercise of the Executive veto, Mr. Fillmore could
not negative a bill for the repeal of the fugitive
slave Jaw or the reestablishment of the Missouri
restriction.
The fugitive slave law was the fulfilment of an
obvious obligation of the Constitntion. The hopes
of the Union hung upon its success. Yet Fill
more moved not a finger, uttered not a word, m
its support. When, after an arduous struggle
and with the aid of Democratic votes alone, it
fought its way through Congress, and was pres
ented to the President for signature, Fillmore hesi
tated, raised objections, entertained doubts, and
at last gave it the Executive sanction with an air
of constraint and strong repugnance. And for
this pitiful and ungracious service, the South must
enter into bonds of perpetual obligation. The
South will not affect the hypocrisy of gratitude to
the man who doles out its rights in niggard meas
ure and with such reluctant air.
Whatever scruple of conscience Fillmore might
have had against the enactment of the Fugitive
Slave Law, its excution wa3 his clear and impera
tive duty. And, if in the discharge of this duty
be had displayed the least zeal or energy, he
might have compensated the South for the reluc
tance with which he yielded to its firet demam •
Unfortunately for himself, and for the interests o
the South, the languor with which he enforce
was quite equal to the disgust with which he sign
ed the bill for the recapture of fugitive slaves.
Everybody will recollect the case of Crafts- *
was the first attempt to execute the law; and it was
of the utmost consequence that the efficiency
the measure should be so signally established as
bear down all opposition, and prevent any tut
attempt at resistance. A gentleman from Georg
sent an agent in search of two slaves. Crafts
wife, who were living in Boston. They wt
found without difficulty, and might have
captured and secured if any effort had be® 1 *®'
to enforce tlie law. The Marshal refused
his duty. -The slaves paraded the streets, d'“
the authorities, and at last, in open day, embar
on a steamer for Europe. They took up their 6
joum in London, were caressed by the aboimi
aristocracy of England, and allowed to lDS
Southern ladies with impunity. Great was
rejoicing of the Abolitionists over this result,
they had a right to celebrate their victory, v
a signal triumph. From that day the f u ^ 1
slave law became a dead letter for all practica p
their
sacri-
poses. .,
The South were enraged and humiliated by
defeat. Then they discovered that they had ■
ficed honor as well as substantial interest* i
shadow. Their indignition should be *
against the guilty object. It was Millard Fi
who suffered an abolition mob to defy and P
upon the law for the recapture of fugitivs
With any adequate demonstration of force,
might have been executed, the majesty ot g
ment vindicated and the rights of the ft ,)U __
taiued, by the capture ana return ofthe * . er .
It was at least due to the South that the
ous Marshall should be dismissed; but Film ^
tained him in office, and is thus an acco P
his crime. another
Boston has since been the scene of Jn
violent resistence to the fugitive-slave i»_ of
this last instance, the undisciplined iro P“ r t ^ 8
the mob were reinforced by alt the energx j
—fuiitMM was lnbniteiy
lating the stomach, and curing liver and billiona state government. The resistence was
complaints, no better remedy can be foend.—Ban-1 m0M > desperate, hot Franklin Pierce was
far Damttrat.