Newspaper Page Text
ATLANTA WEEKLY EXAMINER.
CIROULuATIONT OF ‘I'KCE! JESZKLA-JMCUNTESK., 10000 COPIEM!
CHAS. L BARBOUR, Editor
VOLUME 11.
THE WEEKLY EXAMINER
IS Publhed every Thursday morning in the City
of Atlanta, at
ONE DOLLAR PE« ANNUM,
To be paid st rictly in adv, ce.
TSF No subscription tak en for less than six
months.
RATES OF ADV dRTISING.
Advertisements are insert I in the Weekly
Examiner at the following rates: Seventy-five
cent! per square (of 10 lines brevier) for the first
insertions, and 37| cents per square for each sub
sequent insertion.
Advertisements continuing three months or
more are charged at the following rates:
1 Square 3 mnths $4 00
1 .< 6 “ 600
j « 12 “ 10 00
2 « 3 « 600
2 « 6 “ 10 00
2 « 12 “ 15 00
3 « 3 “ 800
3 •• 6 '• 12 00
3 «< 12 « ’ 20 00
4 « 3 “ 10 00
4 « 6 « 15 00
4 « 12 “ 25 00
1 Col’n 3 “ 15 00
i « 6 “ 20 00
I « 12 “ 30 00
i « 3 “ 20 00
I .. 8 “ 30 00
| .. 12 - 40 00
One Square, changeable, one year, sls 00
Two “ “ “ 20 00
Three “ " “ » ™
Four “ “ 30 00
Quarter Column “ “ 40 00
y a l f « « “ 55 00
£BF Advertisements leaded and inserted un-
Ser the head of Special Notices will be charged
•no Dollar per square for the first insertion aud
Fifty Cents for each subsequent insertion
tir Legal Advertisements published at the
usual rates. Obituary Notices exceeding ten
lines will be charged as advertisements.
ST Vearly Advertisers exceeding in their ad
vertisements the average space agreed for, will bo
charged at proportional rates.
TdT All Advertisements not specified as to
time will be published until forbid and charged
accordingly.
Legal Advertisements.
Sales of Land and Negroes, by Administra
tors, Executors or Gurdians, are required by law
to be held on the First Tuesday in the month,
between the hours of 10 in the forenoon and 3
in the afternoon, at the Court House in the
County in which the property is situated.
Notices of these sales must be given in a pub
ic gazette 40 days previous to the day of sale.
Notices for the sale of personal property must
be given in like manner 10 days previous to sale
dav.
Notices to the debtors and creditors of an es
tate mus» also be published 40 days.
Notice that application will be made to the
Court of Ordinary, for leave to sell Land or Ne
groes, must be nublished for two months.
Citations for'letters of Administration, Guar
dianship Ac., must be published 30 days—for dis
mission from Administration, monthy nx months
—for dismission from Guardianship, 40 days.
Rules for foreclosure of Mortgages must be
published monthly for four months—for establish
ing lost papers, for the full space of three months
—for compelling titles from Executors or Admin
istrators, where bond has been given by the de
ceased, the full space of three months.
Publications will always be continued accord
ing to these, the legal requirements, unless other
wise ordered, at the following
Rater •
Citations on letters of Adn inistration Ac. $2 75
do do dismissory om Adminis-
Citation on dismissory from Guardianship, 3 00
Leave to sell Land or Negices, 4 o
Notice to debtors and creditors. ■>
Sales of personal property, t>n days, 1 square 1 50
Sales of land or negroes by executors, Ac. 5 01
Estray a, two weeks,
For a man advertising his wife, (m advance,) 5 0
Letters on business must be (post paid) to en
title them to attention.
THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1856.
Speech of Hon. Hiram Warner.
We are indebted to our Representative from
the Fourth District , for a copy of the Wash
ington Globe containing a report of his truly
able speech in defence of Slavery,and that part
of the President's message relating thereto.—
We regret that our limited space prevents our
laying it nt once before our readtrs. We shall
commence its publication, however, in to-nior
row’s issue. Meantime we copy the following
remarks of a correspondent of the Savannah
Journal k Courier, uot a word of which is too
laudatory of the able speech :
“The Hon. Mr. Warner, of Georgia, deliv
ered a calm, augmentive and able speech in the
House of Representatives today, and was lis
tened to with fixed attention by the most quiet
and respectful auditory I have looked upon this
session. His speech was of a character not
admitting of a hasty and graphic sketch. It
was a clear and philosophic argument in proof
of the assumption that negro slavery, wherever
it exists, is sustained by the law of nations.—
He quoted authorities in proof of this position,
some of which are well admitted in English le
gal and legislative tribunals. He also assumed
that slavery exists in the United States by vir
tue of the Constitution of the Republic, aud
that its existence in the territories of the Unit
ed States is undoubted until inhibited by legis
lation.
Mr. Allison, of Pennsylvania, on rising to
reply, rvmaked that he would do so with the
greatest pleasure because of the spirit that
manifestly influenced the Representative from
Georgia, wfiostj sincerity was only equalled by
the gentleman'r courtesy he had exhibited.—
The House. Mr. Alisou remarked, needed such
an example, and he hoped its influence might be
rmliKd in the future bearing of its members.'
THE CHEAPEST POLITICAL AMO NEWSPAPER IN TH- SOUTH—A WEEKLY FIRESIDE COMPANION FOB ONLY ONE DOLLAR A YEAR, IN ADVANCE,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 17. 1856.
Slavery in the Territories.
SPEECH OF HON. 11. WARNER,
OF GEORGIA,
in the House of Representatives,
April lltb, 1856.
The House being in the Committee of the
Whole, and having under consideration the
President’s Annual Message.
Mr. WARNER said:
Mr. Chairman: The gentleman from Indi
ana, [Mr. Brenton,] who last addressed the
committee upon the subject of the Presiden’t
message, thought proper to arraign that offi
cer before the country, for calling the atten
tion of the people of the non-slaveholding
States to their constitutional obligations, in
regard to the institution of slavery as it exists
.n the United States. Before final judgement
‘shall be rendered upon that arraignment, it
may be proper to inquire, whether there exist
ed any necessity, any occasion, for the dis
charge of that high and responsible duty, on
the part of the Chief Magistrate of the Union?
Has there been formed, in any portion of this
Confederacy, a sectional political organization,
for the purpose of depriving the people of the
slaveholding States of rights solemnly guaran
tied to them by the Constitution?
Passing, by, for the present, the repeated
attempts that have been made in some of the
free States to nullify the fugitive slave law;
what sir, have we witnessed in this Hall in re
gard to such a sectioual political organization?
When we first assembled here for the purpose
of effecting an organization of this House, the
senior member from Ohio [Mr. Giddings] de
clared the line of policy that should govern
him and his political friends in that organiza
tion; that line of policy was declared to be, to
invoke the power of this Government for the
purpose of excluding slave property from the
common territory of the Union. The distin
guished gentleman from Massachusetts was
put in nomination for the Speaker s chair, to
curry into practical effect that declared line of
policy; and during the nine week's struggle
which ensued here, that distinguished gentle
man—for tfie purpose of uniting the support of
his political friends—declared, in his place, that
he was in favor of protecting the property of
southern meu as well as northern men in the
common territory of the Union: that is to say,
all such property as is recognized as property
by the universal law of nations, but that prop
erty in slaves was not t o recognized by that
universal law; therefore, was not entitled to be
protected in that common territory; that slav
ery existed in the States by force of positive
law; and that whenever the owner of thut prop
erty took it beyond the territorial limits of
such State, it ceused to be entitled to protec
tion as properly. With these declared opin
ions, the result of that protracted contest is
well known to this House and to the coun
try.
Those who invoke the power of this Gov
ernment to exclude slavery from the common
territory, give as a reason therefore, that they
are in favor of liberty, and in favor of the
extention of liberty. I, too, sir, am in favor of
liberty, and am in favor if the extention of
liberty; but it is not that wild, unbridled, li
centious higher law liberty, what whetted the
guillotine and deluged the streets of revolu
tionary France with blood, but it is that liber
ty which brings healing on its wings; it is
American liberty; it is constitutional liberty;
which protects the citizen in the enjoyment of
all his civil an I religious rights, and his rights
of property; that liberty, sir, which the fathers
of the Republic intended to secure and perpet
uate, not only for themselves but their poste i
ty, when they sealed the bond of union between
the States of this Confederacy. It is the fun
damental principles of that American liberty,
of that constitutional liberty, which I propose
to discuss to-day; aud 1 shall endeavor to
maintain and to demonstrate that, in accor
dance with those fundamental principles, my
constituents have both the legal and equitable
right to take their slave property into the
common territory of this Union, to have it
protected there, aud that this Government has
uo power under the Constitution to deprive
them of that right.
It will be recollected that the Federal Con
stitution was not established to create new
rights, but to secure and protect existing right.
Hence it is material to inquire, what were the
rights of the people of the slaveholding States
in regard to their slave property, before and at
the time of the adoption of that Constitution?
I shall maintain, and undertake to establish,
that the title of my consti ue its to their slave
property is not based upon any positive law of
the State, but that it rests for its foundation
npon the universal law of notions, which recog
nized slaves as property, before, and at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. That
before, and at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, the citizens of the State of Geor
gia—the same being a sovereign, independent'
State—had the undoubted right, according to;
the well established principles of international
law—to take their slave property into any
foreign territory; provided there was no law iu
that foreign territory prohibiting its introduc
tion there, and to have it protected in such
foreign territory—that the law of nations was
adopted as a part of the common law iu the
original thirteen States, constituting a part of
the law of the land before and at the time ofj
the adoption of the Federal Constitution.
It has beeu asserted here and elsewhere that I
slavery exists in the States by force of positive
law; and that whenever the owner takes his
slave property beyond the territorial limits of
such State, his title to that property ceases to
be valid aud operative for the protection of
that property. I controvert this assumed pro
position. There is no statute in the State of
Georgia, either colonial, or since the adoption
of her State constitution, which declares that
slaves shall be property within the territorial |
limits of that State; aud, so far as I know or;
believe, there is not such a statute iu a single >
slaveholding State in this Union, constituting j
the original basis and foundation of title to
slave property. We have many statuteswhich
regulate the institution of slavery—statutes
which confer privileges upoh the slave—stat
utes which regulate the conduct of the master
towards his slave, and which recognize slaves
as property—but uo statute dedaring that
slaves shall be property within the territorial
limits of the State. And when we eome to
look into the history of this thing, it would be
remarkable, indeed, if any such statute had
ever existed. Have you any statutes in the
non-slaveholding S'ates which declare that your
ships, your merchandise, your looms, and your
spindles shall be property within the territo
rial limits of your lespective States? I appre
hend not; no more have we any statutes in the
slaveholding States, declaring that slaves shall
be property within the territorial limits there
of. The truth is, that title to slave property
in the slaveholding States re-ts upon the same
foundation as title to any other species of prop
erty to wit: the universal law of nations.—
Those who assert that slavery exists in the
States by force of positive law can, if that as
sertion be true, very easily settle the question
by the production of the declared will of the
supreme power of such States, embodied in
the form of a legislative enactment; produce
the evidence of that positive law in a legiti
mate and authentic form, to sustain the truth
of the assertion. Those who assert the affir
mative of that proposition, are bound to fur
nish the evidence of that positive law enacted
by the States, or yield the point. They con
tent themselves with relying on the loose dec
larations of judges in the slaveholding States;
the mere obiter dictum of judges, (in cases in
which the question we are discussing was not
presented by the record for their consideration
and judgement,) as the evidence of positive law
enacted by the supreme power in the States
declaring that slaves shall be property within
the territorial limits of the respective States.
The question very naturally presents itself, if
those who assert that slavery exists in the States
by force of positive law, and that when the own
er of slave property takes it beyond the territo
rial limits of his State, his title to that pro
perty ceases and determines, why is it that they
desire to invoke the power of the Federal Gov
ernment to exclude slave property from the
Te: ritories ? Such an act would be entirely un
necessary, if the title of owner ceases and deter
mines when he passes with his slave property
beyond the limits of the States, where is asser
ted his title exists by force of positive law. The
fact that you desire to invoke the power of this
Government to enact a law to exclude slave
property from the common territory, furnishes
strong evidence that you have not entire confi
denac in the position assumed and asserted, thut
slavery ex sts in the States by force of positive
law, aud that the owner loses his title to his
slave property by taking it beyond the limits of
such States.
I beg leave to call the attention of the Hous?
to the history of the title of my constituents to
their slave property. What I shall say in re
gard to that title in Georgia, will be equally
applicable to the other slaveholding States, so
far as the foundation of that title is concerned.
The colony of Georgia was originally settled as
a free colony ; that is to say, African slavery
was prohibited from being introduced there by
the charter granted to the trustees; it remained
a free colony about fifteen years after its first
settlement; the soil and climate was adapted
to slave labor; the colonists desired to have it,
but the home government refused to repeal the
prohibition; the result was, that the colony was
about to come to nothing ; the prohibition was
taken off, and African slaves were allowed to
be brought .into the colony; some few were
brought in from the other slaveholding colonies
but the most of them were brought in by those
who were engaged in the African slave trade; and
who they were, the past history of the country
furnishes abundant evidence. African slaves
were brought into the colony as property ; they
were made property before they were brought
there; they were sold to our people as property,
purchased by them as property, paid for by
them as property, held by them as property,
precisely upon the same footing as they held
every other species of property.
Were those from whom my constitnents orig
inally purchased their slave property engaged
in a lawful trade, in a trade recognized as law
ful by the universal law of nations ? This
question came before the courts of Great Bri
tain in the year 1817. A French vessel called
the Le Lou s was engaged in the African slave
trade, and was captured by a British cruiser.
France at that time not having entereed into
treaty stipulations abolishing that trade, the
vessel was taken into a British port, and con
demned by the vice admiralty court as lawful
prize for being engaged iu a trade forbidden by
the universal law of nations, and therefore crim
inal by that law. From the judgement of the
vice admiralty court an appeal was taken to
the high court of admiralty of Great Britain
The appellate court reversed the judgment of
of the vice admiralty court, and held'that the
African slave trade was not unlawful by the
universal law of nations, and was not criminal
by that law, which recognized property in Afri
can slaves. The judgment of the high court of
admiralty was delivered by Lord Stowell, bet
ter known as Sir William Scott, and I beg
leave to read to the House a portion of that
judgement. Speaking of the African slave
trade, the learned judge said :
“ Let me not be misunderstood or misrepre
sented as a professed apologist for this practice
when I state facts which no man can deny—
that personal slavery arising out of forcible
captivity is coeval with the earliest periods .of
the history of mankind—that it is found exist
ing (and, as appears, without animadversion) in
the earliest and most authentic records of the
humau race—that it is recognized by the codes
of the most polished nations of antiquity—that
under the light of Christianity itself, the pos
session of persons so acquired has been in every
civilized country Invested with the character of
property, and secured as such by al! the protec
tions ofjaw—that solemn treaties have been
framed, and national monopolies eagerly sought
to facilitate aud extend the commerce ‘in this
asserted property—and all this, with all the
sanctions of law, public and .municipal, and
without any opposition, except the protests of
a tew private moralist’, little heard and less at
tended to in every country, till within these
very few years in this particular country.—
What is the doctrine of our courts of the law
of nations relatively to those nations which ad
here to the practice of carrying on the African
slave trade ? Why that their practice is to be
respected ; that their slaves, if taken, are to be
restored to them ; and if not taken under in-
I nocent mistake, to be restored with costs and
damages. All this surely, upon the ground
that such conduct on the part of any State is
no departure from the law of nations. ■ The
notorious fact is, that in the dominions of this
country, and others, many thousands of persons
are held as legal property, they and their pos
terity, upon no other oiiginal ” title than that
which I am now called upon to pronounce a
crime—every one of these instances attended
with all the aggravations that appertains to the
long continuation of crime, if it be ; and vet
protected by law with all the securities that can
be given to property in its most respected
forms.”—2d Dodson’s Admiralty Report, on.
256-’l-’2.
In Madrazo vs. Willis, sth Eng. Coni. Law
Reports, page 315, the same doctrine is fully
recognized by the Court of King’s Bench.—
Bayly, J., in delivering his judgment in that
case, said, speaking of the African slave
trade :
“ It is true that if this were a trade contrary
to the law of nations, a foreigner could not
maintain this action. But it is not ; and, as a
Spaniard cannot be considered as bound by the
acts of the British Legislature prohibiting this
trade, it would be unjust to deprive him of a
remedy for the wrong which he has sustained.
He had a legal property in the slaves of which
he has, by the defendant's act, been depriv
ed.”
Best, J., after citing several authorities,
says :.
“ It is clear, from these authorities, that the
slave trade is not condemned by the general
law of nations.”
In the case of the Antelope, reported in 10th
Wheaton, page 121, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking of the legality of the slave trade,
says :
“ Both Europe and America embarked in it,
and for nearly two centuries it was carried on
without opposition and without censure. A
jurist could not say that a practice thus sup
ported was illegal, and that those engaged in
it might be punished either personally, or by
deprivation of property.’’
But I have still higher authority in favor of
the legality of the African slave trade—and
that is the Federal Constitution. The African
s ave trade was not only recognized a lawfu
by that Constitution, but it expressly stipulates
for its continuance for twenty years, and pro
vides that each slave who might be imported in
to the States should be taxed not exceeding ten
dollars per head.
Mr. Giddings. Will the gentlemen permit
me to propound a question to him ?
Mr.’ Warner. Oh yes, certainly.
Mr. Giddings. I would inquire whether the
gentleman holds that those American Chris
tians, who were captured and held to slavery,
and who were ’ transfered from owner to owner
by the Algerines, in the latter part of the last
and the first part of the present century, were
property?
Mr. Warner. I am not discussing the
question of Algerine slavery—l am discussing
the question of African slavery, as recognized
by the Constitution.
Mr. Giddings. Does the gentlemun acknowl
edge that those Americans, captured and held
by the Algerines, were property ?
Mr Warner. Ido not make any such ad
mission, nor is it necessary that I should do so,
for the purposes of my argument.
Mr. Giddings. That is what I want an
answer to.
Mr. Warner. I have not referred to the
Americans who were captured by the Alge
rines. lam discussing the question of Afri
can slavery as it exists in the United States.
Mr. Giddings. Africans can be held by
Americans as slave property.
Mr. Warner. They were recognized as
property by the universal law of nations be
fore, and at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, and are now held as property un
der the sanction and guarantee of that instru
ment.
Mr. Giddings. Are Americans property
when held by Africans as slaves ?
Mr. Warner. Ido not recollect as this
time such a state of things as the gentleman
from Ohio supposes.
Mr. Giddings. I commend the gentleman
to the history of the country.
Mr. Warner. I will not allow the gentle
man to make a case for me to discuss. I am
discussing questions which arise under the laws
and Constitution of this country; and in re
turn for his admonitory counsel would heartily
commend him to the Constitution of his coun
try, and the obligations which it imposes.
Mr. Chairman, when interrupted by the gen
tleman from Ohio, 1 was endeavoring to demon
strate that property in slaves was recognized
by the universal law of nations before, and long
since the adoption of the Constitution ; and ;
that my constituents originally purchased their
slave property from those who were engage 4
in a lawful trade, and recognized to be lawful :
by the universal law of nations, and that their ,
title to their slave property is based upon that ,
universal law of nations, as it existed before. <
and at the time of the adoption of the Consti- ,
tution, and not upon any positive law of the ,
State.
1 am not ignorant, sir, that long since the
adoption of the Constitution, and long since
the title of my constituents to their slave prop
erty accrued, the United States, and most of
the independent nations of the world, have en
tered into treaty stipulation abolishing the Af
rican slave trade : but those treaty stipulations
were not intended, and could not have the effect,
to divest rights to slave property which had
act rued and vested prior thereto, and which
were recognized by the Constitution as lawful
and valid. After the Revolution, as we all
know, the colonies became independent States.
The State of Georgia had as perfect and com
plete jurisdiction over all persons and property
within her territorial limits, as any sovereign
State or nation on the face of the earth ; she
owed allegiance to no other Power or Govern
ment. The commission issued by that State to
her delegates to frame the Federal Constitution
states her true character at that time. That
commission is headed with these memorable
words ; "The State of Georgia, by the grace of
God. tree, sovereign, and independent.’’
Now, sir.let u- inquire what rights the peo
ple of that independent State bad, in relation
to taking their slave property into any foreign
territory, and to have that property protected
there by the universal law of nations before
and at the time of the adoption of the Consti
tution ?
I maintain, sir, that a citizen of Georgia had,
according to the fundamental principles ofin
ternational law, the undoubted right to take
his slave property' into any othern foreign Ter
ritory where the introduction of such
property was not prohibited by some
positive law operative in that foreign Territory,
declaring it to be against the policy, or preju
dicial to the interests of the Government hav
ing jurisdiction over that Territory ; and to have
such property protected in that foreign Terri
tory’. It is the undoubted right of every inde
pendent sovereign State or nation to declare
by positive law, that the idtroduction of slave
or any other property into the territory ofsueb
State or nation, shall be against its policy, or
prejudicial to its interests. My position is,
that, in the absence of any such declaration as
to what shall be its policy, or prejudicial to its
interests in regard to the introduction of slave
property, a citizen of the independent State of
Georgia had the unquestioned right to take bis
slave property into foreign territory, violating
no law of that foreign Territory, and would be
entitled to have that property protected there.
Let us see what are the fundamental principles
of international law regulating this question.—
Huberus, in discussing the conflict of laws be
tween independent States and nations, in book
first, section second, thus states the rule :
“ Every nation from comity admits that the
laws of each nation of force within its own ter
ritorial limits, ought to be in force iu all other
nations, without injury to their respective pow
ers and rights ”
This great fundamental principle of interna
tional law has beeu fully recognized by the Su
preme Court of the United States, as applica
ble to the States of this Confederacy, in the
Bark of Augusta vs. Earle, 13th Peters, 589.
Mr. Chief Justice Taney in delivering the opin
ion of the court in that case, states the rule in
these words:
“ In the silence of any positive rule affirming,
or denying, or res'.raning the operation of for
eign laws, courts of justice, presume the tacit
adoption of them by their own Government,
unless they are repugnant to its policy, or prej
udicial to its interests. It is not the comity of
the courts, but the comity of the nation which
is administered and ascertained in the same
way, and guided by the same reasoning by
which all other principles of municipal law are
ascertained and guided.”
I have the authority of Mr. Webster upon
this point, who in his correspondence with Lord
Ashburton, demanding satisfacticn for slaves
from the British Government, which had been
taken into one of the Bahama Islands, and set
free by the authorities of that place. He com
bateil the idea that a man's title to his slave
property has no extra territorial operation, iu
the following strong and emphatic language.
After referring to local law in respect to mar
riages, he continues:
“ Did any one ever imagine, that local law
acted upon such marriages to annihilate their
obligations, if the party should visit a country
in which marriages must be celebrated in
another form ? It may be said, in such instan
ces. personal relations are founded in contract,
and, therefore, ought to be respected ; but that
the relation of master and slave is not founded
in contract, and therefore is to be respected cnly
by the law of the place which recognizes it.—
Whoever so reasons encounters the authority
of the whole body of public law from Grotius
down ; Itecause there are numerous instances in
which the law itself presumes, or implies con
tracts ; and prominent among these instances
is the very relation which we are now consid
ering, and which relation is ho den to draw
after it mutuality to obligation.”— Correspon- j
deuce in the Creole case, Senate document, I
Twenty-Seventh Congress, vol. 1, p. 117.
Mr. Nathan Dane, whose authority I know
will not be questioned in the free States, in the
sixth volume of Dane’s Abridgement, p. 430,
speaking of the law of nations, says :
“In the United States, as in England, the
law of nations is adopted in its full extent by
the common law, and is held to be a part of
the law of the land.”
In Madrazo vs Willis, (sth Eng. Com. Law
Rep., 313.) these fundamental principles of in
ternational law were practically applied toslave
property by the court of King’s Bench in Great
Britain, in the year 1820. The question arose
upon the following state of facts : A Spanish
subject being engaged in the African slave
trade (Spain not having entered into treaty
stipulations abolishing that trade) had pur
chased three hundred slaves on the coast of
Africa, and had them on board his vessel on
her return voyage, when she was captured by
a British cruiser, and taken into one of the
ports of Great Britain, where the slaves, by the
law of that kingdom, became free. The Span
iard brought his action of trover in the courts
of Great Britain against the captain of the Bri
tis cruiser to recover the value of his vessel and
stores, and the value of his three hundred slaves.
On the trial before the Lord Chief Justice, he
doubted whether, in a British court, the plaint
iff could maintain his action for the value of
his three hundred slaves, and directed the jury
to find the damages separately; so much fur
the vessel and stores, and so much for the three
hundred slaves—the latter constituting much
the largest sum.
On the question being submitted to a full
bench of judges, they were unanimously of the
same opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover the full value of his three hundred
slaves, as well as the value of his vessel, and
stores, and awarded judgment therefor: recog
nizing the validity of the Spaniard's title to his
slave property, which was good by the laws of
bis nation, in a British court. The slaves were
not taken by the Spaniard into Great Britain,
in violation of her laws, but were seized upon
upon the great highway of nations, upon the
empire of the seas, upon common ground, where
the Spaniard had as much right to be with his
property as the Englishman ; and the princi
ple would have applied with equal force if the
slaves had been seized upon common territory,
the joint property of Great Britain and Spain.
The same principle is applicable to the common
territory of the Union, which is common ground,
being the joint property of all the States, where
the citizen of Georgia'has as much right to te
with his slave property as the citizen of Ohio
has to be there with his property—neither vio
lating any law of that territory by going into
ii with their property. When the citizen of
an independent State, who has a title to his
property good and valid by the laws of that
State—and 1 have shown that slaves were re
cognized as property by the universal law of
nations, and that the law of nations was a part
of the common law—goes into foreign territory
with that property, violating no law of that
territory, these great fundamental principles of
international law go with him: they are above
him; he inhales them in the very atmosphere
which he breathes; they protect his person and
his property ; he cannot escape their binding
influence unless, indeed, he goes beyond the pale
of civilization, and there the principles of inter
national law cease to operate.
Mr. Sandidge. Allow we to recall to the
mind of the gentleman from Georgia a case
precisely in point, to establish that which he is
trying to establish before the committee. It is
this : I noticed it in the newspapers some time
last year. A gentleman from Brazil went to
to Prussia, carrying with him a slave. It was
there attempted to deprive him of the services
of that slave ; and the highest tribunal of that
country decided—according to the argument of
the gentleman from Georgia—that his owner
was entitled to him ; that the matter should be
decided according to the laws of the country
from which the party came, and that he should
have the right to hold his slave, and to carry
him with him from the country at his pleasure.
The gentleman from Georgia may have seen a
notice of the case.
Mr. Warner. I do not recollect having
seen it, but I have no doubt that that is the
correct principle; I have no doubt that it is in
consonance with the universal law of nations—
with the great principles of international law.
It existed in this country, and was a part of
the law of the land at the time the State of
Georgia and the other States entered into the
constitutional compact.
I have endeavored to establish the proposi
tion, that before and at the time of the adop
tion of the Constitution the citizens of the in
dependent State of Georgia had the right, ac
cording to the well established principles of in
ternational law, (which constituted a part of
the land.) to take their slave property into any
foreign territory where its introduction was
not prohibited, and to have it protected there.
I have endeavored to show what were the fun
damental rights of the people of that Slate to
their slave property, before and at the time of
the adoption of the Federal Constitution.
The next question to be considered is, wheth
er the State has delegated the power in the
Constitution to this Government to deprive her
of those fundamental rights? Has she delega
ted the power, in the Constitution to this Gov
ernment, to deprive her of the fundamental right
which she had, as an independent State, to take
her slave property into the common territory of
the Union, there being no law in that territory
which would be violated by doing so?—lt is
contended that this Government basthat power
by the clause which declares that—
“ Congress shall have power to dispose of,
and make all needful rules and regulations re
specting, the territory or other property be
longing to the United States, and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so construed as to
prejudice any claims of the United States, or of
any particular State.”
The grant of power in this clause is in regard
to the territory as property. Congress has
power to dispose of it as property, as well as
any other property belonging to the United
States ; may make “all needful rules and reg
ulations respecting the territory” considered as
property; but who can believe that it was the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to
' <lelegate those great inherent rights of property
■ which I have been discussing to day by this
j clause of the Constitution? But supp.se we
are mistaken in this view of it, and that it was
intended by this clause to delegate the powre
to the Federal Government to deprive the peo
pie of the States of the right to control their
property, then the latter portion of the clause
forbids you to exercise it so as to prejudice the
claim of any particular State, and to exclude
slave property would be not only to prejudice
the claims of one State, but the claims of fifteen
States of this Union; for the common territory
being the joint property of all the States, the
slaveholding States claim an equal right to en
joy it with their property; and if you exercise
the power to exclude them with their property,
you prejudice their claims to that extent, which
you are forbid to do. The principles of equal
ity are indelibly stamped on the face of the
Constitution. There is one clause in the Con
stitntion which declares that—
-The citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States.”
This principle applies with much stronger
force when applied to the common territory,
which is the joint property of all the States-
Surely the citizens of each State ought, upon
principle, to be entitled to the same privileges
and immunities in the common territory of all
the States as they would in the States. No,
sir, the framers of the Constitution never con
templated for one moment that they had dele
gated the power, in this clause, to Congress to
deprive them of those great fundamental rights
which belonged to them in respect to their prop
erty ; but, on the contrary, the delegates from
the southern States refused to enter into the
compact until it was expressly stipulated that
if their slave property should escape and get
into the free States, they should be surrendered
U P-
Ihe ordinance of 1787 has sometimes been
relied on as conferring the power on Congress
to exclude slavery from the Territories, but it
will be recollected that ordinance was adopted
prior to the formation of the Constitution.—
That was a compact between sovereign States,
having the undoubted right to make it, and
live free States have been formed out of the
Northwest Territory ceded by Virginia, which,
but for the generous session, would have been
slave territory. The rights secured by the
Constitution are wholly independent of that
ordinance, and have no necessary connection
with it. Those great fundamental rights which
I have been discussing belonged to the people
of the States before and at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. They entered
T. BURKE, PROPRIETOR
NUMBER 36.
’ into, and constituted an essential element of
■ their title to their slave properly, part and
> parcel of it; and, not having delegated them
f in the Constitution, they have them now ; and
s it is by virtue of those pre-existing rights which
t are solemnly guarantied by the Constitution,
■ that my constituents claim to be entitled to
f take their slave property into the ermmon ter
t ritory, and be protected there. The States are
? the original source of power; the Federal
t Government has no power except tint which
I' has been delegated to it by the States in the
t Constitution ; and the States have now, as
' declared by the Supreme Court of the United
1 States, in New York vs. Miln, 11 Peters, p.
; 138—
; I “ The same undeniable and unlimited juris
diction over all persons and things within their
territorial limits as any foreign nation, where
■ that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained
1 by the Constitution of the United States.”
But, sir, independent of their legal right, my
i constituents have the equitable right to take
their slave property into the common territory
of the Union. That territory is the joint
property of all the States, slaveholding as well
as non slaveholding. There are but two ways
in which property can honestly be acquired in
this country : the one is by labor and industry;
the other by inheritance or bequest. A citizen
of Georgia by bis labor and industry acquires
capital-money—a citizen of Ohio by his labor
and industry does the same thing ; the citizen
of Georgia vests the proceeds of his labor in
slave property, the citizen of Ohio vests his in
merchandise, or stock, or in whatever he may
choose to invest. They both desire to emigrate
to the common territory with the proceeds of
their labor ; and we will suppose that this Gov
ernment shall, by an usurpation of authority,
pass a law excluding slave property from that
common territory. The citizen of Georgia and
the citizen of Ohio meet upon the border of
that territory. The citizen of Ohio is told that
he can pass into that common territory with
the proceeds of his labor and industry and
enjoy it; but the citizen of Georgia is told,
that he cannot go into that common territory
and enjoy the benefit of his labor and industry.
“ Why,” he inquires, “ have not I obtained my
property as honestly and fairly as tie citizen
of Ohio who has just gone in ; and am I not as
much entitled to enjoy the bentfit of that com
mon territory as he is ?” “ Certainly you are,
but your property is of a different specie, and,
therefore, you must keep out.” Is that equali
ty. or justice, between citizens entitled to equal
privileges, and equal rights, under a common
Government ? Can any Government that shall
pursue such a course of policy maintain the
confidence of the people ?
But, sir, we have been told by those who ad
vocate this line of policy, that they do not de
sire to interfere with slavery in the States where
it exists; and yet it is their intention to pre
vent the extension of slavery by excluding it
from the common territory—to surround the
slave States ‘with a cordon of free territory, and
compel slavery, like a serpent, to sting itself to
death!" Now it matters but little with me,
whether a man takes my property outright, or
restricts me in the enjoyment of it, so as to
render it of but little or no value to me. It is
an interference with my rights in either case ;
the interference is one of degree only. Any
restraint upon the use anil enjoyment of my
property in ns full and ample manner as I might
otherwise do, but for the restriction, is an in
terference with it. There is not a slaveholder
in this House or out of it, but who knows per
fectly'well that, whenever slavery is confined
within certain specified limits, its future exist
ence is doomed; it is only a question of time
as to its final destruction. You may take any
single slaveholding county in the Southern
States, in which the great staples of cotton and
sugar are cultivated to any extent, and confine
the present slave population within the limits
of that county. Such is the rapid, natural in
crease of the slaves, and the rapid exhaustion
of the soil in the cultivation of those crops,
which add so much to the commercial wealth
of the country,) that in a few years it would be
impossible to support them within the limits
of such county. Both master and slave would
be starved out; and what would be the practi
cal effect in any one county, the same result
would happen to all the slaveholding States.—
Slavery cannot be confined within certain spe
cified limits without producing the dcstrcct'on
of both master and slave; it requires fresh
lands, and plenty of wood and water, not only
for the comfort and happiness of the slave, but
for the benefit of the owner. We understand
perfectly well the practical effect of the pro
posed restriction upon our rights, and to what
extent it interferes with slavery in the States ;
and we also understand the object und purpose
of that interference. If the slaveholding States
should ever be so regardless of their rights, and
their honor, as coequal States, to be willing to
submit to this restriction, for the sake of har
mony and peace, they could not do it. There
is a great, overruling, practical necessity which
would prevent it. They ought not to submit
to it upon principle, if they could, and could
not if they would.
It is in view of these things, sir, that tho
people of Georgia have assembled in convention,
and solemanly resolved that, if Congress shall
pass a law excluding them from the common
territory with their slave property, they will
disrupt the ties that bind them to the Union.
This position has not been taken byway of
threat or menace. Georgia never threatens,
but Georgia always acts, whenever it is neces
sary and proper for her to act for the protec
tion of her constitutional rights and the rights
of her people. She wei 1 not act hastily or rash
ly, but not the less firmly on that account.—
She intends to place herself right in the face
of the world, in regard to this question. She
has delegated me, in conjunction with my abler
and more experienced colleagues, to make
known her rights here, and to proclaim them
to the American people. She desires to main
tain those rights within the Constitution, and
for that purpose invokes the support of the
friends of the Constitution in every portion of
the country, in order that those rights may be
respected and observed. I have endeavored to
present those rights to the consideration of this
House to day, in good temper, and as becomes
the Representative of one of the old thirteen
States of this Confederacy.
CONTINUED ON TUB FOURTH PAQB.