Newspaper Page Text
No. 25.
Vol. L.
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1869.
ia
Js/L. ORME Sz SON,
EDITORS AND PROPRIETORS.
Tcrab—5-3,00 per nnnuin, in Advance.
VDVERTisiXG—Persquare of teu lines, each
rt ion, $ • HO. Merchants aud ethers foiall
uU ts jver $ 23, twenty-live per cent. off.
legal advertising.
i dintuy's.—Citationsi'or letters oi ad-
'.Jstration,guardianship,&c $15 00
ea d notice.
, nDlicatioii _
' ,jatiout'or lettersof dism’u ofguard’n
‘^^lication for leave to sell Land
A to Debtors aud Creditors
. i . of Laud, per square of ten lines
^ personal, per sq., ten days
' t .f s _Each levy of ten Zines, or less..
tl'hve sales of ten lines or less
Collector’s sales, persq. (2 months)
2 UU
5 UP
3 50
5 00
3 00
5 oo
1 50
2 50
5 00
5 00
■/ f is—Foreclosure of mortgage aud oth-
L ./monthly’s, per square 1 00
Estray notices, thirty days 3 00
Tributes of Respect, Resolutions by Societies,
Obituaries, «fce.,exceeding six lines, to be charged
transient advertising.
4 .^p^ifsof Land, by Administrators, Execu-
4 „ r yaardians, are required by law, to De held
' the tirst Tuesday in the mouth, between the
j‘ ilirs ,,f tea iu the forenoon and three in the af-
! rii ion, atthe Court-house in the county in which
t „. property is situated.
,;ice of these sales must be given in a public
sazette 10 days previous to the day of sale.
Notice for the sale of personal property must be
:veu in like manner 10 days previous to sale day.
Notices to debtors and creditors of an estate
must also be published 40 days.
Notice that application will he made to the
Court of Ordinary for leave to sell land, must be
published for two months.
Citation* for letters of Administration, Guar-
diaasaip, &c., must be published 30days—for dis-
. ‘ ,/ou from Administration, monthly six months ;
f!,r dismission troin guardianship, 40 days.
Kiles for foreclosure of Mortgages must be
nublishod 'ninthly for four months—for establish-
la r [,m papers, for the full spaceof three months—
tor co upeiling titles from Executors or Adminis
trators, ,vhere bond has been given by the de-
,'usel. the full space of three months. Charge,
jl 00 par sq tafe of ten lilies for each insertion.
Pjolicatioas will always be continued accord
lug to these, the legal requirements, unless otb
(■rivise ordered.
v*!i«dule oi* Macon & Augusta R. R.
Leaves Camak, daily, at —.'2.30 1 M.
>• Milledgeville ti.iOA M.
Arrives at Milledgeville 4 F.M.
“ Camak 90 r 'A.M.
Passengersleaving Augusta or Atlanta on Day
‘asseno-er Train of Georgia Railroad will make
lose connection at Camakfor intermed atepoints
m the above road, and also for Macon, dice. Pas-
en»ersleaving Milledgevilleat 5.30, A M.,reach
itlant a aud Augusta same day.and will make
lose connections at either place for principal
,ointsinadjoining States.
E. W .COLE, Gen’1 Supt.
Augusta, January 7,1S68. 4 t*
IVTaoon <S& 'W'esUern
B.AlLROAI>.
—DAY TRAIN —
Leave Macon 7.45A. M., arrive at Atlanta, 2 P. M
Atlanta 1 ^ A.M.,arriveatMacou, 1.30 P. M
—NIGHT TRAIN — ‘
Leave Macon 8.40 P.M., arrive at Atlanta, 4£P. M
“ Atlanta/j P. M. .arrive at Macon 3.1U A. M
Macon & Brunswick Railroad.
OFFICERS.
G. II. IIAZLE HURST President.
ROB T. SCHMIDT, MasterTransportation.
H. C. DAY Secretary & T reasurer.
LeaveMacou 3 P M.,arrive at Macon, 10.30 A.M.
LeaveHawkinsville7 A. M.,arriveat Hawkins-
ville, 6.30 P. M.
March 1 1 186s 11
Dissentient Opinion in the Two Cases or
Chancelltj vs. Bailey ^ Cleveland if The
Central Railroad vs. Ward & Owens—
In the Supreme Court of Georgia, June
1860.
DRY GOODS!
9
SXt(£>IB8 9 SIATO
CROCKERY,
Saddlery, and Harness, <fcc., &c.,
FOR SALE BY
T. T. WINDSOR, & CO.
MILLEDGEVILLE, GA.
SOUTH-WESTERN R. R. CO.
OFFICE, MACON,GA.,March24th, 1HG8-
Columbus Train—Daily.
Leave Macon ; >1 ;’ A-
Arrive at Columbus 111; 1 W' u
Leave Columbus c on x> ‘xt
Arrive at Macon . U.^u tr. i -
Eufiula Train—Daily.
Leave Macon oa p' u’
Arrive atEufaula , rj
Leave Eufaula a’/np’iV
Arrive at Macon d.50 P. M.
Connecting with Al.han.ij Train at Smithiillc
Leave Smithville
Arrive at Albany . --- 3.11 P- M.
Leave Albany
Arrive at Smithville 11.00 A. M.
Connecting with Fort Gaines Train at Cuthbcrt.
Leave Uuthbert 3.57 P.M.
Arrive at Fort Gaines...--- 3.40 P. M.
Leave Fort Gaines 7.05 A.M.
Arrive at Cuthbert ILL’S A. M.
ConneetiBg with Central Railroad and Macon
A Western Railroad Trains at Macon, and Mont
gomery A. West Point Trains at Columbus.
VIRGIL POWERS,
Engineer & Superintendent.
Schedule of the Georgia Railroad.
AX AND AFTER SUNDAY, MARCH 29th
HRS, the Passenger Trains on the Georgia
Hailruad will run as follows:
DAY PASSENGER TRAIN.
(Daily, Sundays excepted.)
Leave Augusta at — - 16 A. M.
“ Atlanta at ..5 A.M.
Arrive at Augusta.. 3.30 P. M.
“ at Atlanta — 6.10 P. M.
NIGHT PASSENGER TRAIN.
LeaveAugustaat...... —.......3 45 P. M.
“ Atlanta at 6.45 F. M.
Arrive at xAugusta - 5.30 A. M.
Atlanta 4.00 A.M.
BERZELIA PASSENGER TRAIN.
Leave Augusta at - 4.30 P. M.
“ Berzeliaat 7.00 A.M.
Arrive at Augusta .8.45 A M.
‘•at Berzelia -G.15 P.M.
Passengers for Milledgeville,Washington and
Athens,Ga.,musttakeDay Passengei Train from
Augusta and Atlanta.
Passengerst'or West Point, Montgomery, Sel
ma, Mobile aud New Orleans must leave Augusta
on Night Passenger Train at 3.45 P. M.,to make
close connections.
Passengers for Nasliville.Corintli, Grand Junc
tion, Memphis, Louisville and St. Louis can take
either train and make close connections.
Through Tickets and Baggage checkedthrough
to the above places.
Pullman’s Palace SleepingCars on all Night
Passenger Trains. »
E . W. COLE, Gen’ISuperint’dt.
Augusta, March 26,1868 4 tf
jltLcuzta SL fWcst fPaLnt
HAIL ROAD.
Day Passenger Train—Outward.
Leave Atlanta 4.45 A. M.
Arrive at West Point 9.50 P. M.
D_ay Passenger Train — Iniraril.
Leave West Point 1.30 P. M.
Arrive at Atlanta 6.20 P. M.
Vight Freight ami Passenger—Outward.
Leave Atlanta --- 4.15 P. M.
Arrive at West Point 11-40 P M.
-V'Zht Freight and Passenger Train—Inward.
Leave West Point......------ 4.20 A. M.
Arrive at Atlanta 11.30 A. M.
SIkulqc. af: <~PdLe.cLu.Le..
OFFICE SOUTH CAROLINA R. R. CO., ?
Augusta, Ga., March 25, 1868. )
AN AND AFTER Sl^NDAr, 29ih March,
HG8,the Mai and Passenger Trains of this
j *4 will leave and arrive at through Central
■Lepat,Georgia Railroad, as follows*.
Horning Mail and Passenger Train
^°r Charleston, connecting Train for Columbia,
■Nouth Carolina, Charlotte Road, and Wilming-
tun and Manchester Railroad.
Leave Central Depot at 5.50 A. M.
Arrive atCentral Depot 3.30 P. M.
Night Passenger If Accommodation Train
For Charleston, connecting with Train forCo-
UT ‘bia, ind with Greenville andColumbiaRail-
road:
Leave Central Depot at 3.50 P. M.
&rnve atCentral Depot at 7.00 A. M.
H. T. PEAKE,
General Superintendent
T HE Citizens of Baldwin and adjoins
ing counties will find a large and
good assortment of
Brown and Bleached Goods of all quali
ties.
Calicoes, of all grades,
Dress Goods in great variety,
Hosiery, Gloves and Shelf Goods if all
sorts.
The most complete assortment of
ever offered for sale iu this place, consisting of
Miles & Co’s Philadelphia work; Shelley &
Bros’North Carolina work; Butchelder & Co’s
Brogans, and Children’s Misses’ and Ladies tine
work of all styles.
HATS, of Wool, Felt, Straw, Panama, &c
CR0CK1RY.
A full line of everything that can be called for,
with Glassware and China in Plain and Gilt Tea
Sets.
SADDLERY,
From the old Army up to the fine Morgan Cavalry
Saddle.
Harness—Single and Double,
Blind Bridles, Riding Bridles, Whips, &c
IMiET-A-HIC BURIAL CASES,
Plain, Half Satin, aud full Satin Trimmed, in
Plain Cases and Caskets.
In the Grocery Store next door to the Drug
Store of John M. Clark, will be found
Provisions, Corn, Bacon, Lard, Floor, Sugars,
Coffee, Syrups, Molasses, and everything found
in a Grocery Stock, all of which will be sold at
lowest market rates for CASH.
T. T. Windsor & Co.
Milledgeville, Ga., May 18. 1869 20 tf
]?. H. BEHN,
COTTON and RICE FACTOR
AND
General Commission Merchant,
West of the Exchange,
BAY STREET,
September 8,1868
SAVANNAH,GA
36 ly*
Dr. <3-. W. JONES,
President enlist.
ALL DENTAL opera
tions performed with skill
and care. Artificial teeth
[inserted in allstyles known
to the profession.
Old cases, not comforta
bly worn, can be made so.
Old Gold Plates takeniu partpaymentfor Deu-
tal operations.
13?“Office, East Rooms Darien Bank building.
Milledgeville Oct 13,1868. 41 tf
To the heirs of Sylvanus Prince, deceased,
late of Baldwin county.
N OTICE.—Three months after date, I will ap
ply to the Ordinary of Baldwin county for an
order requiring the administrator of said Sylva
nus Prince to execute titles to me for three hun
dred and twenty-eight acres of land in Baldwin
county,according to the terms of the bond for ti
tles, of said deceased, dated December 12, 1859—
said land being the same sold to me by said de
ceased, and now in my possession.
|JOHN J. BUCK.
March 2.1869 9 3m
METALLIC BURIAL CASES.
A FULL LOT ON HAND of full trimmed
half trimmed, aud plain, of all sizes.
Apply to T. T. WINDSOR, or
JOSEPH T. LANE.
Mr. Lane will also make any kind of wood
en Coffins wanted on short notice.
Milledgeville,March 10,1868 10 tf
For Sale,
A FIRST RATE GIN BAND, six inches wide,
thirty-four feet long.
Also, Wooden running Gear for aGin.
Apply at the RECORDER OFFICE.
Milledgeville, Feb’y 2.1869 5 tf
ARLINaTON
Quranc?
COMPANY.
RICHMOND, VA.
tW° Persons desiring to insure their lives wil
call upon R. M. ORME, Jr.,Ag’t.
Milledgeville, May 19, J868 20 tf
Iverson L. Harris, Judge.
It is not within the narrow confines
of municipal law that we are to look
for the principles upon which a correct
decision of the questions presented by
the record in the above causes can be
made. They are lo be collected from
the vast field of international law, and
especially that portion of it occupied
by war.
The resolution of the legality and con
fiscation and sale ol ihe Railroad shares
in the first case, and in the other of the
legality of the consideration of the prom
issory note given for the services of the
plaintiff in error as a substitute in the
ranks of ihe Confederate army for one
of the p^omissors, can depend, in my
opinion, only on two propositions. If
either ol those propositions be true, the
judgment of the majority of ihis Court
cannot for a moment, be supported.
Those propositions are :
1st. If ihe Slates which withdrew
from the Federal Union and formed af
terwards the Southern Confederacy,
were sovereign or perfect States at that
lime, as such Stales, they had a right
lo engage in public war with those
Stales which continued in the Federal
Union ; or,
2d. If the Slates attempting to with
draw from the Federal Union, formed
the de facto government called the
Southern Confederacy, and engaged in
war with those which did not attempt
to withdraw, and that war was recog
nized by the Federal Government as a
civil war, and the Southern Confedera
cy as a beUigeraht power, then from such
recognition, the Southern Confederacy
was invested with ail the belligerent
rights and powers which belong unde
niably lo sovereign States or nations
engaged in public war,or in other words,
the question is, whether the .war be
tween the States was a public or a civil
war.
If the view that I have taken of our
systems of government be founded in
fact, (and I think it is confirmed by all
American history,) it must be conced
ed by all who reason, that when the
Federal Constilulionofl7S9 was adopt
ed by the conventions of the separate
States then ratifying it, they were each
sovereign and independent Slates, with
an unquestionable right either to agree
lo or reject it. If they were then sov
ereign and independent Slates, and
could not have been -coerced by their
associates under the articles of confed
eral ion,(o agree to the more perfect union
of the Federal Constitution, the im
portant inquiry arises and demands a
definite answer—when anti by what in
strument was their sovereign and sepa
rate existences as States lost or surren
dered f That sovereign powers, which
ty, such an opinion, or intimation ol
opinion would ha\e led to the prooipl
and overwhelming rejection of that in
strument.
This contemporary history ought
with every man seaking to understand
the structure of American Govern
meats, lo be decisive of the great point
that the States were as sovereign after
the ratification of the Federal Constitution
as they were under the articles ol con
federation.
The inquiry is then, the Slates bcin<
perfect Stales according lo \ attel, no
whether they had a right to wiihdraw
from the Federal Union or Constilu
tionaf compact mlhovl incurring the pen
altics they hazarded by so doing, but
whether the power to witdraw is not a
right necessarily inherent in every perfect
State ? If they were perfect States,
they had an inherent right to alter their
forms of government, and to institute
new governments. Their obligation to
observe the covenants of the Federal
Constitution was exactly the same as
that resting upon sovereign States
in their Conventions, compacts and
treaties with each other, the engage
merits being between equals, confer
ring rights and imposing restric
tions. The reasons of justification
for a breach of their engagements
hould be so strong as to vindi
cate their acts before the world of pub
lic opinion. Whether broken with or
without adequate cause, or however
those engagements may have been
sought to be enforced, the important
fact stands out unaffected by any of
these considerations, that the acts done
were acts of sovereign or perfect States.
From what I have said it will ap
pear that 1 assert as propositions which
1 think cannot successfully be contro
verted—
1st. That the Federal Constitution
was made by the people of separate,
sovereign and independent States-
2. That ratifying the Federal Con
stitution by separate State Conventions,
they, by such action distinctly asserted
their sovereign and independent char
acter as States.
3d. That lhe Federal Constitution
contains, within itself, no surrender of
their individual character as States.’
4th. ThaL being perfect States, the
Southern Stales, renouncing the obli
gations of the Federal Union, had
an inherent right to form, as they did,
the Southern Confederacy.
5th. That as perfect States, they had
a right lo engage in war, as other sov
ereign Slates could do.
If Lhe proposition, then, be true, that
they were States, ihen the war in which
they engaged with the other States re
maining in the Federal Union, was a
public war. If the war was a public
war, it can admit of no doubt that in
its prosecution, according to the rules
and rights of war, whatever was done
by them was legal, and is so regarded
by (he world.
To the Stales, thus making public
were withheld by the Slates from the . . _ _
Confederate Congress, which preceded j wa f» belong the rights ot raising and
the adoption of the Federal Constitu- j maintaining arrnie
tion, were by the latter instrument, borrowing money,
delegated lo the departments of gov
ernment under it, (or the exercise ol
those powers for the benefit ot the
States thus united, is undeniable ; but
upon the authority of what publicist
can such delegation lo a common agent
of such sovereign powers be held to be
a surrender of sovereignly t
A complete answer to those who say
that the sovereign characteroflhe Stales
was surrendered by the creation of the
Federal Government, will be found in
the following extract from Vattel; “Fi
nally, sovereign or independent Stales
may unite themselves together by a
perpetual confederacy without ceasing to be
each individually a perfect State ; they
will together constitute a Federal Re
public ; their joint deliberations will
not impair the sovereignly of each
member, though they may in certain
respects, put some restraint on the ex
ercise of it in virtue of their voluntary
engagements. A person does not cease
to be free and independent when he is
obliged tr> fulfil engagements which he
has voluntarily contiacted.” The lat
ter portion ot this extract is conclusive
that the States adopting the Federal
Constitution did not cease to be free
and independent, because they entered
into covenants with each other, and
could in consequence thereof, be
compelled to fulfil the engagements
■which they had voluntarily contracted
Thus it is apparent that the obligation
to fulfil covenants made by a sovereign or
perfect State is entirely compatible
with continuing sovereignty and inde
pendence. I may goa step further and
concede that those SLates who suffer
by a breach of such covenants, may, as
in all cases of leagues, conventions,
compacts and treaties, (for in principle
they stand precisely on the same loot
ing,) redress themselves as sovereign
and independent States can do : but
because such rights of redress have at
tached, they can in no wise affect the char
acter of the Stales, breaking their cove
nants as Stales. Let it be borne con
stantly in mind, that that character re
mains unaltered and unalterable by any
violation of their covenants. There is
no fact more indisputable than that, if
any prominent advocate of the Federal
Constitution had in any one of the Slate
Conventions, either directly or indi
rectly, intimated an opinion, than by
the ratification ot the Federal Consti-
luion, the Slates surrendered their sep
arate individuality and sovereignty as
States, such was the extreme jealousy
lor the maintaiuance of State sovereign-
coining money
using the public
credit, issuing treasury notes, employ
ing all the instrumentalities neccssaty
or appropriate to their defence, weak
ening the power of the adversary, as
by captures on sea or land, and also
by confiscating enemies' properly within
their limits.
In Brown vs. The United States, 8
Cranch, 143, it is said that as to en
emies' property found within the terri
tory of a belligerent power the right of
confiscation is fully admitted by ali pub
licist. War is not itself, an absolute
confiscation. It simply confers the right
to confiscation, which righl is enforced
by legislation. The enemy is not di
vested of his properly by war. His ti
tle remains in full vigor until a hostile
seizure and possession has impaired his
title.
Whilst the practice of declining lo
confiscate debts and credits, and the
private property of an enemy, will be
found to be the wisest and most liberal
policy, and which will, in progress of
time, become the settled rule of all civ
ilized nations, at this day, # by the laws
of war, the right of confiscation is an
uncontrolled power, belonging to sover
eign belligerents.
From, the foregoing line ol argument,
it must be apparent that I entertain the
opinion that the recent war between
the States, was a public war, and that,
therefore, the actual confiscation by lhe
Courts of the Southern Confederacy, of
the Railroad shares owned by North
ern citizens, then the enemies of the
Southern Confederacy, was authorized
by the laws of war, and that the purchas
er thereof, under a sale after its condemna
tion, acquired a valid title, and further,
that the note given in the other case, to
the substitute, to take the place of the
maker in the Confederate ranks, was
founded on a legal consideration.
Since delivering, orally, in June last,
my dissentient opinion to the judgment
of my associates, I have met with, and
perused with care, the first volume of
a work, by the Hon. Alexander H.
Stephens,entitled, “The War Between
the States.” I regret that 1 am preclud
ed, bv the delay which has already oc
curred, and the pressure to forward
this opinion foi publication, that I can
not make, from that great work, ex
tracts that would support the train of
thought which I have expressed. I re
fer, .therefore, to it generally, regard
ing this volume as the most important
contribution ever made by an Arneri
can Statesman, to political science.—
It is destined to become a high author
ity, and will, doubiless, be made a text
book in our colleges.
But it will probably be denied that
it was a public war, a war between sov
ereign States. As it is not necessary
to the maintenance of the conclusions
to which rny mind has been conducted,
to adhere to the position that it was a
public war; I propose, therefore, to con
sider the questions in the record, as
they are affected by civil war.
My associates, when the judgments
of the majority were announced, not
having preceded them by any exposi
tion of the reasons upon which they
were predicated, have left me without
any means ot reply, but by conjecture.
They are constrained, logically, I
think, in order lo maintain their judg
ments, to assume that the Southern
Slates, in attempting to throw oft'the
obligations of the Federal Constitution,
and forming new government and wag-
ng war with the States which remain
ed in the Federal Union, were insur
gents and rebels against the lawful sover
eign authority of the United Stales Govern
ment, and that consequently, whatever acts
were done by them in theprosecution oj such
ins irrection, were illegal and void.
If the late war had been marked
merely by the armed resistance ofsw«c
of the citizens of the State to its laws,
lo the laws of the Federal
Government, as in the vases in Massa-
husetts in 1789, and in Pennsylvania
in 1793, it would very properly have
been called an insurrection, and the acts
of such insurgents have been held as
egal, the relations of the States, to
wards each other not being affected
politically thereby, and those citizens
n revolt, not having acquired the epi
thet and privileges of enemies.
But when such insurrection covers a
Territory or State, and the citizens
are in arms, not by their own will, but
by the compulsory power of the Slate
Government, such resistance assumes
the proportions, and is acknowledged
by the nations as civil war.
In the Supreme Court of the United
States, in what are familiarly known
as the Prize Cases—reported iu 2nd
Black, p. 606—it was urged in argu
ment, that the people ol the South were
insurgents, that they were traitors, and,
as such, could not make war. To this
ustice Grier, delivering the opinion ol
the Court, replied ; “The law of na
tions is called the law of nature. It i§
founded in the common consent, as
well as the common sense, of the world.
It contains no such anomalous doctrine
as that which this Couit is, for the first
time, desired lo pronounce, to wit :—
That insurgents, who have risen in re
bellion against their sovereign, expelled
her Courts, established a revolutionary
government, organized armies, and
commenced hostilities, are not enemies,
because they are traitors, and a war
levied on the Government by traitors,
in order to dismember and destroy it,
is not a war, because it. is an insurrec-
In this extract there are two materi
al declarations ; 1st, it was a war, and
2nd) that the citizens ol the Southern
Confederacy were the enemies of the
Federal Government. The war was,
according to the Supreme Court of the
•United Stales, a civil war.
I have, before expressed my own
conviction that the war was a public
war, as much so, indeed, as the recent
war between Prussia and Austiia ; but
as a tribunal, to which this Court is bound
lo conform its judgment in such cases, has
decided it to have been a civil war, my
associates are constrained,by that judg
ment, to ignore the idea that it was no
more than an insurrection. They are
bound to treat it as a civil war, drawing
after it all the consequences ivliich flow
from such recognition. “A civil war,”
says Vattel, “breaks the bands of so
ciety and goverment, or, at least, sus
pends their force, and effect. It pro
duces, in the nation, two independent
parties, who consider each other as en
emies, and acknowledge p.o common
judge. The two parties, therefore,
must, necessarily, be considered, at
least fora time, as constituting two sep
arale bodies, or distinct societies.—
Having no commort- superior to judge
between them, they stand in precisely
the same predicament as’two nations
who engage in a contest, and have re
course to arms.” This being the case,
it is very evident that the common laws
of w*ar, those maxims of moderation
and honor, ought to be observed by both
parties in every civil war. A civil war
is never proclaimed eo nomine, against
actual insurgents. Its actual existence
is a fact which a, Court is bound lo notice
and to know. Its true test is to be found
in the fact that the regular course of
justice is interrupted by revolt, rebel
lion or insurrection, so that the Courts
of justice cannot be kept open. A civil
war exists,hostilities may be prosecut
ed on the same footing as if those opposing
the Government weie foreign enemies in
vading the land. Mr. \V heaton in his
treatise on the law of nations, says :
“The general usage of nations regards
such a war (civil war,) as entitling both
the contending parlies to all the rights of
war against each other,- and even as re
spects neutral nations.”’ Mr. Justice
Nelson, iu delivering the dissenting
opinion of the minority, in the Prize
Cases, (ihe Judges differed only as to
the point of time when the Uaited States
Government recognized the existence
of civil war,) said :
“In the case of a rebellion, or a
resistance of a portion of the people of
a country against an established gov
ernment, there is no doubt, if, in its
' progress and enlargement the govern
ment thus sought to be overthrown,
sees fit lo recognize or declare the ex
istence of a civil war, that lecognitiou
or declaration will draw after it all the
consequences and rights of war between
the contending parlies as in the case of
public war.”
These quotations establish, beyond
dispute, that by the laws of nations,
where a civil war exists, and it has
been recognized by the government
claiming paramount authority, that civ
il war stands upon the same footing, in
all respects, as does a public war be-
Iween independent nations, and such
recognition draws from it all the rights
and consequences which belong to pub
lie war. The Act of Congress of the
13th July, 1861, says Mr. Justice Nel
son, recognized a slate of civil war be
tween the Federal Government and
the Southern Confederacy, and made
it territorial. In the recognition of civ
il war by the Acts cf J3th July, J861,
is involved, necessarily the recognition
of the Southern Confederacy as a bel
ligerent power, or government de fac
to ; for they are synonymous. Such
recognition was a concession to the
Southern Confederacy of the same bel
ligerent powers and rights which the
Federal Government claimed and could
exercise. It drew alter it the acknowl
edgment that it was a government,
with all the departments necessary to
the exercise of the powers and rights
belonging to government, and that they
were legally invested with such pow
ers and rights as instruments or means
essential to its existence.
Such belligerent power or de facto
government, then, could rightfully do,
in carding on the civil war and main
taining its resistance, what a free and
independent State could do—the meas-
uft;3 ol right and power and means be
ing precisely the same in both belliger
ents. It follows from this postulate,
that in the administration of justice in
the decision of questions before its
Courts, indeed, in all matters touching
its own defence or security, the acts of
the several departments of a belliger
ent power or de facto government, are
as legal and unquestionable as are
those of independent nations.
It is insisted by'the counsel for the
C. R. R. & Banking Company that the
Prize cases shew that nothing more
was decided by them than the exist
ence of war and of belligerent rights
whilst the war continued.
ing to arms, insurrection and treason,
that Government has condoned it by re
cognizing it as civil war ; ail its power
over those in arms ceased by raising them
to its level and terming them and treating
them as enemies, and the epithets of Reb
els and Traitors, applied to. them so
freely, through ignorance or malice, are
as inappropriate and untrue as they are
insulting and devoid ot magnanimity.
It is evident lrom the premises, that
the Federal Government has no right
whatever to vacate the judgments of
the Prize and other Courts ot the Con
federate Government, in sequestering
or confiscating enemies properly within
its limits, nor in any mode can it di
vest the title of a bona fide purchaser
of such property actually confiscated, so
as to restore it to the original owner,
unaffected by what has transpired.*
It should be remembered that con
quest gives no right to private proper
ly not seized and appropriated as boo
ty at the time, and hence the Railroad
shares in the hands of a bona fide pur
chaser, under a judicial condemnation
and sale, not having been re-seized or
re captured by the arms of the Federal
Government, the doctrines of he jus
postLiminii could not obtain.
Confiscated during the civil war as
enemies property and sold, and not hav
ing come again into the lianas of
the conquering Government, it is inca
pable of being restored to its original
owners. The claim of the original
owners is against the Federal Govern
ment for compensation or indemnity
for the loss they sustained.
If the reasoning employed in this
opinion, or, rather so much of it as
flows directly from the decisions of the
Prize cases, and the laws of nations be
sound, it necessarily follows (hat as
Ward and Owens are bona fide pur
chasers ol the Railroad shares which
were confiscated bv the laws of the
Confederate Government, judicially
condemned as enemies property in one of
her Courts, and sold bv a public offi
cer of that Government, and thereby
passed out of the possession and control of
that Government, that their title under
such sale, is good againsl the claim of
properly of the original owners, and
that the Central Railroad and Banking
Company should be decreed to cause
appropriate entries ot the ownership of
Ward and Owens to be made on the
block-book of the Corporation. It must
follow, also, in the other case, that the
note given by Bailey and Cleveland
If by this they meant to say that the to Chancely for his services as a sub-
Supreme Court of the United States
held that it was gn insurrection only,
and did not change the relations of
the States engaged so as lo make
their citizens respectively enemies to
each other, they have greatly misun
derstood the extent ot the principles of
public law upon which the cases were
decided.
The Prize cases admit that in organ
izing the rebellion, the States acted as
States claiming to he sovereign ; that it
w’as no loose organized insurrection,
having no defined boundary or posses
sion, it had a boundary marked by
lines of bayonets, and south of this line
slitute for Bailey in the Confederate
army .is founded on a valid consideration,
and that judgment should have been
rendered in favor of Chancely.
The termination of the civil war in
the conquest ot the Southern Confed
eracy as a belligerent poirer, produced
consequences which the necessities of
this argument do not require me to
consider further than to say, that, be
yond all denial, the States composing
it remained as States during that war
with perfect organization, performing
all their functions with the same regu
larity as they had previously to the
war. Conquest dissolved the Confed-
is enemies territory, claimed and held in j erate Government, but the Stales corn-
possession by an organized hostile belli- ' posing it remained. The conquest m-
gerent power. I stored the authority of the Federal
But counsel say that the belligerent | Government where it had been dis~
rights belonged lo the Southern Con- j placed by the Confederate Govern-
federacy only whilst the war continued. | ment, and conferred the right only to
It is certainly true, belligerent rights ' change or alter the politicaMaw3 or in-
exist only whilst war continues, and if I stitutions adverse to its own, accord
ing to its policy or will; but conquest
did not, could not give to the corf-
quering Government any power over
the executed, and past, so as to annul
that, which, when done, was legal, and
by its own concession, was a rioht be-
this truism was all that was meant to be
be asserted, it would not have challeng
ed remark; but, if thereby, it was
meant Lo assert, or covertly lo insinu
ate, that the conquering Government
could at its will or pleasure retract
when the war was ended what it had longing to a belligerent power.
granted during the war, and that it could
ireatas illegal acts which, during the
war were conceded, to be legal, it is a
proposition so monstrous from its un
mitigated iniquity, as lo shock the rea
son and forbid its consideration. Com
mon sense would revolt at such a pre
tension by a conqueror, as it would be
antagonistic to all those maxims of jus
tice, honor and equality, which are sup
posed to regulate the relations of Gov
ernments in war arid in peace.
Conquest gives no right to undo what,
tin ring the war, was rightfully done.
What ever acts were done by a bellig
erent power, in the exercise or enforce
ment of belligerent rights, stands after
wards as they stood when done—legal
and unimpeachable. Any other conclu
sions would make the concession of
belligerent rights, if not sheer nonsense,
a mere mockery, a fraudulent device
lo lull the fears ot a belligerent adver
sary at the time, and to acquire sub
stantial and unequal advantages there
by, and upon the cessation of hostili
ties to re-assert all the powers and
claims which had been waived.
It is nol for the Federal Government,
claiming sovereign rights and suprem
acy over the Southern Confederacy,
with which it waged war, to reduce
ibt? latter to obedience—to treat, after
its recognition of the war as a civil war,
the Southern States as in insurrection,
or their citizens who took up arms at
the command of the Stales as rebels or
traitors.
Its jurisdiction over them has passed
away by Us consent and acts. They can
be treated only as foreign enemies, over
whom the municipal laws of the con
quering Government cannot be extend
ed. That Government cannot drag
the citizens of the conquered de facto
Government now before its municipal
tribunals to answer lo charges of trea
son. II theie was originally, in resort-
And here I may be pardoned for re
ferring to an opinion entertained in
1865 by the highest functionary of the
U. S. Government, as 1 learned it from
the then Provisional Governor of Geor
gia, viz: “That ail the acts done du
ring the civil war by the Stale Govern
ments were illegal; ar:d that upon its
termination, there was not within the
State a single rightful functionary of her
own creation, with authority to legis
late, to interpret, or execute her laws.”
I mention this fact, not directly with
in the line of the argument used to de
monstrate the incorrectness of the
judgments of my associates, though it
springs from the same mistake of re
garding the late war as a mere insur
rection, common to the reasoning of all
ot them, but to exhibit how* terrible are
the errors into which men of great abil
ity, invested with immense power, do
fall, from disregarding the clear and
simple principles of public law, which
I have endeavored to illustrate and
apply.
The existence of such a political
chaos arising from civil war and con
quest, as is so distinctly indicated by
the opinion just mentioned, it is appre
hended is without a type since the crea
tion of man. An opinion like this might
be viewed with a tolerant indulgence,
if the principles of public law were un
settled, floating in the mind, vaguely
apprehended, and casually drawn into
application by statesmen ; but when
for centuries they have been explored
in all their bearings, considered in all
their force, pursued in all their conse
quences, and reduced to a code of defi
nite rules, furnishing a just and com
mon standard to which nations do ap
peal with confidence in the adjustment
of their controversies, there should be at
this day no excuse for ignorance or
misapprehension of them. 'These prin
ciples, when they come in conflict with
