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THE FEDERAL UNION.
VOLUME 2—NO* If.
MILLEDGEVILLE, OA. THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1831.
m
WHOLE NUMBER 68.
lOHUTOKa
EDITED BY
j. G. POLHILL & J. A. CiTTHBI^HT.
aUIliiL'LlIUIi D‘ ,i ’ r. T .
pub-shed THIRTY DAYai at least.
1 Notice by Rxectdoy* and. Administrators for Debtors and Credi
tors to render in their accounts, must be published SI A WEEKS.
salts of Neemes by Executors and Administrators must be ad-
vertiseJ-isfXTY DAYS before the day of sale.
•Sales of jiersonal property (except neproes) of testate and intes-
taiuc-ute^ hy Executors and Administrators, must be advertised
FORTY DAYS.
Applications by Executors, Administrators and Guardians teethe
Ooiirtof unlinary for leave to sell Land, must be published FUCK.
MONTHS.
Applications hy Executors and Administrators for Letters Dismis-
»ory, must be published SIX MONTHS.
Applications Tor Foreclosure of Mortea?eson real estate must be
advertised once a month for SIX MONTHS.
Sales of real estate by Executors, Administrators and Guardians,
Tnust be published SIXTY DAYS before the day of sale. These
sales must be made at the court-house door between the hours of 10
in the morning and -4 in the afternoon. No sale from day to day is
Valid, unless se expressed In the advertisement.
Orders of Gourt of Ordinary, (accompanied with a copy of the
tiond. or agreement) to maite titles to land, must be advertiscu
-THREE MONTHS at least.
Sheriff’s Sales under executions regularly granted by the courts,
must be advertised THIRTY DAYS—under mortgage executions,
SIXTY DAYS—Sales of perishable property under order of Court,
yum be advertised, generally, TEN DAYS before the day of sale.
AD orders for Advertisements will be punctually attended to.
'•.'All letters directed to this Office, or the Editors, must be post
paid, to entitle them to attention.
OPINIONS OP THE VICE-PUESIDENT
On Ihe relation of the States and the Genera! Government.
IConununicated tor the "Pendleton Messenger.]
Mr. Symmes—I must request you to permit me to use
your columns, as the medium to make known my senti
ments on the deeply important question, of the relation,
which the Slates and General Government bear to each
other, and which is, at tilts time, a subject of so much ag
itation.
It is one of the peculiarities of the station I occupy,
that while it necessarily connects its incumbent, with ihe
politics of the day, it affords him no opportunity officially
to express his sentiments, except accidentally on an equal
division of the body, over which he presides. He is thus
exposed, as 1 have often experienced, to have his opin
ions erroneously and variously represented. In ordinary
cases, I conceive, the correct course to lie to remain silent,
leaving to time and circumstances, the correction of mis
representations; but there are occasions so vitally impor
tant, that a regard both to duty and character would
seem to forbid such a course; and such, 1 conceive, to be
the present. The frequent allusions to my sentiments,
will not permit me to doubt, that such also is the public
conception, and that it claims the right to know, in rela
tion to the question referred to, the opinions of those, who
hold important official stations; while on my part, desir
ing to receive neither unmerited praise, nor blame, I feel,
I trust, the solicitude, which every honest and indepen
dent man ought, that my sentiments should be truly
known, whether they be such, as may be calculated to
recommend them to public favour, or not. Entertaining
these impressions, J have concluded, that it is my duty to
make known my sentiments; and I have adopted the
inode, which on reflection seemed to be the most simple,
jand best calculated to effect the object in view.
The question of the relation, which the States and
G t acral Government bear to each other, is not one of re-
- cent origin. From the commencement of our system, it
has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention,
while the Constitution was struggling into existence,
there were two pai ties, as to what, this relation should be,
whose different sentiments, c< nsrittitcd no small impedi
ment in forming that instrument. After the General
Government went into operation, experience soon proved,
that the question had not terminated with the labours or
the Convention. The great struggle, that preceded the
political revolution of 1(301, which brought Mr. Jefferson
into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines
and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sus
tained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky reso
lutions, and the report to the Virginia Legislaiuie; and
on the other, in the replies- ct the Legislai uie of Massa
chusetts and some of the other states. ’1 hese resolutions
and tiiis report, with the decision of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania about the same time, (particularly in
the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice M’Kean
and concurred in by the whole bench,) contain, what 1
believe to be, the true doctrine on this important subject.
I refer to them, in order to avoid the necessity of present
ing my vie'us, with the reasons in support of them, in de-
tad.
As my object is simply to ft ate my opinions, I might
pause with this reference to documents, that so fully and
ably stale all of the points immediately connected with
tins ck;cpiy important subject, but as there are many,
who may not have the opportunity, or leisure to refer to
them, and, as it is possible, however clear they ma> be.
that different persons may place different interpretations
on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may
be fully known, - and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to
state summarily the doctrines, which I conceive they em
brace.
Their great and leading principle is, that the General
Government emanated from the people of the several
states, forming distinct political communities, and acting
in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from ail
of the people forming one aggregate jiolitical communi
ty; that the Constitution of the United Slates is in fact
a compact, to which each State is a party, in the charac
ter already described; and that the several States or par
ties, have a right to judge of- its infractions, and in cases
of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a
power not delegated, they have the right, in the last re
tort, to use the language of the Virginia resolutions, “to
interpose for asserting the progress of ike evil, endfor main
taining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights
and liberties appertaining to them.” This right, of interposi
tion, thus solemnly asrerted by the State of Virginia, be
it called what it may, state right, veto, nullification, or
by any other name, I conceive to be the fundamental
principle of our system, resting on facts historically as
certain, as our Revolution itself, and deductions, as sim
ple and demonstrative, as that of any political, or moral
truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recogni
tion depends, the stability and safety of our political in
stitutions.
I am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doctrine
Jiave always, now and formerly, regard it in a very dif
ferent light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I
{relieve such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be
l> j recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep
^nd sincere attachment to our political institutions, and
the union of the States. I never breathed an opposite
sentiment; but on the contrary, I have eve. considered
them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and
promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity;
and next to these, I have ever held them most dear.
Nearly half my life has passed in the service of the Un
ion, and whatever public reputation I have acquired, is
indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has,
indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to
be^ my greatest political fault. Yv ith these strong feel ings
of attachment, I have examined with the utmost care,
the bearing of the doctrine in question; and so far from
anarchical, or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be,
the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Un
ion itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to
the States the right of protecting their reserved powers,
ftnd which would vest in the General Government, (it
matters not through what Department,) the right^f de-
termii.g exclusively and finaily the powers delegated to
it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the Slates,
and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of
c. federal Union. As strong as this langurge is, it is not
Stronger, than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who
said, to give to the General Government the final and ex
clusive right to judge of its powers, is to make “its 4‘s-
cretion and not the Constitution the measure of its powers;”
and that “in all casts of compact between parties having no
common Judge, each party has an equal rigid to judge for it
self, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of
redress.” Language cannot be more explicit; nor can
higher authority be adduced. __
That different opinions are entertained oh tins subject,
I consider, but as an additional evidence of the great di-
yersity of the human intellect. Had not able, experien
ced and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the high
est respect, taken different views, I would have thought
the rignt too clear to admit of doubt; but I an* taugh.
by this, as well os hy many eimiiv instances, to tiea
Will, deference opinions differing from my cwn. The er
ror may possibly be with me; but, if so, I can only cay,
; hat lifer the most mature and conscientious examina
tion, i have not been able to detect it. But with all pro-
P* deference, I must think, that theirs is the error, who
deny, what seems to be an essential attribute cf the con
ceded sovereignty of the slates; and who attribute to the
General Government a right utterly incompatible with
v, ’hat all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted char
acter; an error originating principally, as I must think,
in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions,
and on what constitutes the only rational object of all
political constitutions.
it has bren w ell said by one of the most sagacious men
of antiquity, that object cf a constitution is to restrain the
government, as that oj laws is to restrain individuals.. The
remark is correct, nor is it less true, where the Govern
ment is vested in a majority, than where it is in a single
or a few individuals; in a republic, than a monarchy or
aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the
maxim, that the majority ought to govern, than I have,
taken in its projier sense, subject to the restrictions impe
ded by the Constitution and confined to subjects, in which
every portion of the community have similar interests;
but it is a great error to suppose, sis many do, that the
right of a majority to govern is a natural & not a conven
tional right; and, therefore, absolute and unlimited. By
natm'e every individual has the right to govern himself;
anil Governments, whether founded on majorities, or mi
norities, must derive their right from the assent, express
ed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such li
mitations, as they may impose. ‘Where the interests are
the same, that is where the laws that may benefit one,
will benefi t all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place
them under the control of the majority; but where they
are dissimilar, so that the law, that may benefit one por
tion, may be ruinous to another, it would be on the contrary
unjust and absurd to subject them to its will; and such,I
conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests.
That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is im
possible to doubt.—They are to be found in every coin-
mu; ily, in a greater, or less degree, however small, or
homogeneous; and they constitute, every where, the great
difficulty of forming, and preserving free institutions.
To guard against the unequal action of the laws, when
applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is in fact,
what mainly renders, a constitution indispensable; to
overlook winch, in reasoning on our Constitution, would
be to omit the principal' element, by which to determine
its character.—Were there no contrariety of interests,
nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and
preserve free institutions. The right of suffrage alone
would be a suffioit r.i guaranty. It is the conflict of op
posing interests which renders it the most difficult work
of man.
Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and
distinct classes of die community, as is the case in Eng
land, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome and
most oi the free states of ant.quity, the rational consti-
tutional provision is, that each should be represented in
die Government, as a separate estate, with a distinct
voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in or
der to check their encroachments. In England, the con-
stitution has assumed expressly this form; wliile in the
governments of Sparta ar.d Rome the same thing was
effected under different but not much less efficacious
f >ruis. The perfection of their organization, in this par
ticular, was that, which gave to die constitutions of these
renowned states all of their celebrity, which secured their '
liberty for so many centuries, and raised (hem to so great
a height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitu
tional provision giving to the great and separate interests
of the community the right of self protection, must ap
pear to those who will duly reflect on die subject, not
less essential to the preservation of liberty, than the right
of suffrage itself. They in fact have a common object,
to effect winch, the one is as necessary, as the other; to
secure responsibility, dial is, that these who make and exe
cute the laws should be accountable to those, on whom the
lairs in reality operate; the only solid and durable foundation
of liberty. If without the right of suffrage, our rulers
would oppress us, so, without the right of self protection,
the major, would equally oppress the minor interests oi
the community. The absence of the former would make
the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter
the feebler interests the victim of the stronger.
Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate class
es of society. We have wisely exploded all such dis
tinctions; but wc are not, on that account, exempt from
all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and
dangerous condition of our country unfortunately, but
too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively
geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate,
soil, situation, industry and propuetion, but are not,
therefore less necessary to be protected by an adequate
constitutional provision, than where the distinct interests
exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, grea
ter, as such separate ard dissimilar geographical interests,
are more liable lo come into conflict, and more dangerous
when in that state, than those of any other description;
so much so, that ours is the first instance on record, where
they have not formed in an extensive territory, separate and
independent communities, or subjected the ichole to despotic
sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also,
must be the sincere prayer of every lover ol‘ Lis country.
So numerous and diversified are the interests of our
country, that they could n» ; be fairly represented in a
single government., organized so, as to give to each great
and leading interest, a separate and distinct voice, as in
the governments, to winch I have referred. A plan was
adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel
in its character. The powers of the government were
divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geo
graphically. Ore General Government was formed for
the whole, to which was delegated all of the powers sup
posed to be.necessary to regulate the interests common to
all of the States, leaving others subject to the separate
control of the_States, being from their local and peculiar
character, such, that they could not lie subject to the w ill
of the majority of the whole Union, without the certain
hazard of injustice and oppression. It was thus, that the
interests cf the whole were subjected, as they ought to
be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local
interests were left under the controul of the Stares sepa
rately, to whose custody only, they could be safely con
fided.—This distribution of power, settled solemnly by
a constitutional compact, to which all of the States are
parties, cons» itutes the peculiar character and excellence
of our political system. It is truly and emphatically
American, without example cr parallel.
To realize its perfection, we must view the General
Government and the States as a whole, each in its pro{>er
sphere sovereign and independent, each perfectly adap
ted to their respective objects; the States acting separate
ly, representing and protecting the local and peculiar in
terests; acting jointly, through one General Government,
with the weight respectively assigned to each by the
Constitution, representing and protecting the interests of
the whole; and thus perfectingby an admirable, but sim
ple arrangement, the great principle of representation and
reponsibiiity, without which no government can be free,
or just. To preserve this sacred distribution, as origin
ally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed
orb. is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of
which, the duration of our Constitution, of our Union,
and, in all probability, our liberty depends. How is this
to he effected?
The question is new, when applied to our peculiar pe
culiar political organization, where the separate and con
flicting interests of society are represented by distinct,
but connected Governments; but is in reality an old
question under a new form, long since perfectly solved.
Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been
separately represented in any Government.; whenever
the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the
experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one
mode, by which such political organization can be pre
served; the mode adopted in England, and by all Gov
ernments ancient and modem, blessed with Constitutions
deserving to be called free; to give to each co-estate the
right to judge of its powers, with a negative, or veto on
the acts of the others, in order to protect against en
croachments, the interests it particularly represents; a
principle which all of our Constitutions recognize in the
distribution of power among their respective Depart
ments, as essential to maintain the independence of each,
but which to all, who will duly reflect on the subject,
must appear, far more essential, for the same object, in
that great and fundamental distribution of powers be
tween the States and General Government. So essen
tial is the principle that to witlihold the right from either,
where tlie sovereign power is divided, is in fact to annu
the division itself, and to consolidate in the one, left in th>
exclusive possession of the right, all of the powers of the
government; for it is not possible to distingush, practi
not finally to resist, the will of a dominant majority.
But it is useless to multiply arguments. Here it pos
sible that reason could settle a question where the pas-
callv, between a government having all power, pad one j sirns and interest of men are concerned, the point would
having tie right to take what powers it pleacea Ncr have been If ng sinc§ settled 1
dots it in the least vary the principle, whether the distri
bution of power between co-estates, as in England, or
between distinctly organized, but connected governments,
as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, wliile
the necessity is greater in cur case, as the danger of con
flict is greater, where the interests of a society are divid
ed geograpliically, than in any other, as lias already been
shewn.
These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible; and
I am at a loss lo understand how any one, who lias'ioa-
turely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who
has read history or studied the principles cf free govern
ments to any purpose, can call them in question. The
explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact,
that in every free stale, there are those, who look more
to the necessity of maintaining power, than guarding
against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but simply
to state a fact apparently necessary, to explain the con
trariety of opinions, among the intelligent, where fhe Ab
stract consideration of the subject, wbuld seem scarcely
to admit of a. doubf. If such be the tfue cause, L must
think the fear of weakening the government too much, in
thjs case^ to be in a great measure unfour3%d, or, at least
that the danger is .much less from that, than the opposite
side. I do not deny that a .power, of so high a nature,
may be abused by q State; but, when I reflect, that die
States unanimously called the general government into
existence with all of its powers, which they freely sur-
rended on their part, under the conviction that their com
mon peace, safety and prosperity required it; that they
are bound together by a common origin, and the recollec
tion cf common suffering and a common Iriumph in the
Croat and splendid achievement ofiheir independence; &
that the strongest feelings .of our nature, and among
them, the love of national power and distinction, are on
the side of the Union; it does st em to me, that the fear,
which would strip the States of their sovereignty, and
degrade them, in fact, to mere dependent corporations,
lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peacea
ble prof.ee!ion of those interests, which they reserved un
der their own peculiar guardianship, when they created
the General Government, is unnatural and unreasonable.
If those who voluntarily created the system, cannot be
trusted to preserve it, w hat power can?
Bo fur from extreme danger, I hold, that there never
was a free state, in which this great conserrati^j princi
ple, indispensable in all, was ever so safely lodged. In
others, when the co-estates, representing the dissimilar
and conflicting interests of the community came into con
tact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or
force. N ot so in ours. Should the General Government,
and a State come into conflict, wc have a higher remedy;
the power which called the General Government into
existence, which gave it all obits authority, and can en
large, contract, or abolish its pow er, at its pleasure, may
be invoked. The States them selves may be appealed
to, three- fourths of which, in fact, forma power, whose
decrees are the Constitution itself, ar.d whose voice can
silence all discontent. The utmost extent then of the
power is, that a Stata acting in its sovereign capacity, as
one of the parties to the Constitutional compact, may
compel the Government, created by that compact, to sub
mit a question touching its infraction, to the parties, who
created it; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is
proposed to resort to the novel, the hazzardous, and, I
must add, fatal project of giving to the General Govern
ment the sole and final right of interpreting the Constitu
tion, thereby reversing the whole system, making that
instrument the creature of its will, instead of a rule of ac
tion impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating in
fact the authority which imposed it, and from which the
government itself derives its existence.
That such would be the result, were the right in ques
tion vested in the Legislative, or Executive branch of the
Government, is conceded by all. No one has been so
hardy, as to assert, that Congress, or'the President ought to
have the right, or to deny, that if vested finally and ex
clusively in either, the consequences which I have stated
would not necessarially follow ; but its advocates have
been reconciled to the doctrine, on the supposition, that
there is one Department of the General Government,
which, from its peculiar organization, affords an inde
pendent. tribunal through which the Government may ex
ercise the high authority, which is the subject of conside
ration, with perfect safety to all.
I yield, I trust, to few, in my attachment to the Judici
ary Department. I am fully sensible of its importance
and would maintain it to the fullest extent in its Consti
tutional powers and independence ; but it is impossible
for me, to believe,!hat it was ever intended by the Con
stitution, that it should exercise the |lower in question, or
that it is competent to do so, and if it were that it would be
a safe depository of *Le power.
Its powers are judicial and net political, ar.d are ex
pressly confined by the Constitution “to all cases in law
and equity arising under this Constitution, the Jaws cf
the Unit eel States and the-treaties made or which .ff'ail
be made, under its authority;” and which I have high
authority in asserting, excludes political questions, and
comprehends those only, where there are parties amena
ble to the process of the Court.* Nor is its incompcten-
cv less clear, than its want of Constitutional authority.—
There may lie many and the most dangerous infractions
on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by ail,
the court, as a Judicial tribunal, cannot from its nature
take cognizance
point; and the reason applies equally to all others, where
Congress perverts a power, from an object intended, to one
not intended, tlie most insiducus and dangerous of all the in
fractions; and which mey be extended to idl of its poicers,
more especially to the taxing and appropriating. But, sup
posing it competent to take cognizance of all infractions
of every description, the insuperable objection still re
mains,"that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the
power in question.
It is an universal and fundamental political principle,
that the power to protect, can safely lie confided only to
those interested in protecting, or their responsible agents,
a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs.—
The danger in our system is, that the General Govern
ment. which represents the interest of tlie whole, may en
croach upon the States, which represent the peculiar and
local interest, or that, the latter may encroach on the for
mer. In examiniog tliis point, we ought not to forget,
that the Government through all of its Departments, ju
dicial, as well as others, is administered by delegated
and responsible agents; and that the power which really
controls ultimately all the movements is not in the agents but
those who elect or appoint them. To understand then its
real character, and what w r ould be the action of tlie sys
tem m any supposable case, we must raise our view from
the mere agents, to this high controling power which fi
nally impels every movement of the machine. By doing
so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a ma
jority, compounded of the majority of the States, t alien as
corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the
States estimated in federal numbers. These united con
stitute the real and final power, which impels and directs
the movements of the General Government. The ma
jority of the States, elect the majority of the Senate ; of
the people of tlie States, that of the House of Represen
tatives ; the two united, the President; and the Presi
dent and a majority of the Senate appoint tlie Judges j a
majority ofwhoin, and a majority of the Senate and the
House with the President, really exercise ail of the
powers of the Government, with the exception of the
cases where the constitution requires a greater number
than a majority. The Judges are, in fact, as truly the
Judicial Representatives of this united majority, as the
majority of Congress itself; or the President, is its legist
lative, or executive representative; and to confide the
power to the Judiciary to determine finally and conclu
sively, what powers are delegated, and what 'reserved,
would be in reality to confide it to the majority, whose
agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in
various ways; and, of course, to subject, (against the
fundamental principle of our system, and all sound po
litic « reasoning.) the reserved powers of die States, with
all oi the local and peculiar, interests, they were intended
to protect, to the will of the very majority; against which,
he protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by
which die Judges hold their office, however valuable the
provision in many other respects, materially vary the
case. Its highest possible effect Wrould be to retard and
forever, by the Stare of Vir
ginia. The report ofher Legislature, to which 1 li^ve al
ready referred, has really, in my opirian, placed it beyond
controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, it says
“it ha? been objected” (to the right bf a State to interpose
for the protection ofher reserved rights) “that the Judi
cial authority's to lie regarded, as tlie sole expositor of
the Constitution; on this objection it might be observed,
first, that diere may be instances of usurped powers,
which the foims of the Constitution couM never draw
within tlie control of tlie Judicial department; secondly,
that if the decision of the Judiciary be raised above the
sovereign parties to the ..constitution, die decisions of the
other departments, notoarried by the forms of t|M consti
tution before die Judiciarjj must be equally aughorative
and final with the decision of that Department. But die
proper answer to ttaxtbjection is, diat die resolution of
, the General Assembly relates to those great and extraor-
dinaryjAges^ in which all of the forms of die Constitution
may prove ineffectual rfgainst infractions dangerous to
the essential -rights of the parties to it. The resolution
supposes, that dangerous powers not delegated, may not
(#ily Jse usurped and executed by the other departments,
but that the Judicial" Department may also exercise, or
sanction dangerous powers beyond tlie gi ant of the Con
stitution, and consequently that the ultimate right of the
parties to the Constitution to judge, whcdier the com
pact has been dangerously violated, must extend to viola
tions by one delegated authority, as w ell as by another—
by the Judiciary, as well by the Executive or Legisla
tive.”
Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to
me, it is objected, that if one party has the right to
judge of infractions of the constitution, so has the other,
and that consequently in cases of contested jxrwers be
tween a State and the General Government, each would
have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when
sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or
compacts, and that of course, it would come to be a mere
question of force. The error is in the assumption, that
the General Government is a party to the Constitution
al Compact. The States, as has been shewn, formed the
compact, acting as sovereign and independent Communi
ties. The General Government is but its creature; and
though in reality a government with all the rights and
authority w hich belong to any other government within
the orb of its powers, It is, nevertheless, a government
emanating from a compact between sovereigns, and par
taking in its nature and object, cf the character of a joint
commission, appointed to superintend and administer tlie
interests in winch all are jointly concerned, but having,
beyond its proper sphere, no more power, than if it did
not exist. To deny this would be to deny the most in
contestable facts, and the clearest conclusions; while to
acknowledge its truth is to destroy utterly the objection,
that the appeal would be to force, in the case supposed.
For if each party has a right to judge, then under our sys
tem of government, the final cognizance of a question of
contested power w ould be in the states, and not in tlie
general government. It would be the duty of the latter,
as in ail similar cases of a contest between one or more
of tlie principals as a joint commission or agency, to
refer the contest to the principals themselves. Such are
tlie plain dictates of reason and analogy both. On no
sound principle can the agents have a right to final cogni
zance, as against the principals, much less to use force
against them, to maintain their construction of their pow
ers. Such a right would be most monstrous ; and lias
never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases.
That the doctrine is applicable to the case of contested
power between the Slates and the General Government,
we have the authority not only of reason and analogy,
but of the distinguished statesman already inferred to.—
Mr. Jefferson, at a late period of his life, after long ex
perience and mature reflection, says, “With respect to
our state and federal governments, I do not think their
relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They
suppose the former subordinate to tlie latter. Tliis is not
the case. They are co-ordinate departments of one sim
ple and integral whole. But you may ask, if the two de
partments should claim each the same subject of power,
where is tlie umpire to decide between them ? In cases
of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both par
ties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground ;
but if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a con
vention of the states must be called, to ascribe the doubt
ful power to that department which they may think
best.” It is thus that our Constitution by authorizing
amendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode
of malting them, lias by a simple contrivance, with its
characteristic wisdom, provided a power which in the last
resort, supercedes effectually the necessity, and even the
pretext forforce; a power to which none can fairly ob
ject ; with which the interests of all are safe; which can
at least as may be necessary to illustrate tlie opinions
which I have already advanced. Anxious, however, to
intrude aslitile as possible; and with that view, will, as
far as may l e consistent with my object, avoid all de
bar ea We topics.
‘Whatever diversity of opinion may exist, in relation- to
the principle, or the effect on the productive industry of
the country, cf the present, or any other Tariff of protec
tion, there are certain political consequences flowing
from the present* which none candoubt^uid oll/nust de
plore. - It would ‘ be in vain to attempt unRmceaq thm it
has divided die country into two great geographical divis
ions, and arrayedthem against each oilier, in opinion at
least, if not int^reL also, on some of the most vital of po
litical subjects; ott itattnance, its commerce, and its in
dustry; subjects calculated, above oil others, in time cf
peaUfrt* produce excitement, and in relation to which,
the Tariff hda placed tlie sections in question in deep and
dangerous oonflief. If there be any point on which die
41 Was going to say Southern section, but to avoid, ac fur
as possible, die painful feelings such discussions are cal
culated to excite, I shall say) weaker of the two sections
is unanimous, it is that its prosperity depends, in a ereat
measure, on free trade, light taxes, economical, and, as
far as possible, equal disbursements of the public revenue,
and an unshackled industry, leaving them to pursue
whatever may appear most advantageous to dieir inter
ests. From the Potomac to the Mississippi, there are ft w
indeed, however divided on other points, who would nof,
if dependent on their volition and if they regarded die in
terest of their particular section only, rurn ve from com
merce and industry every shackle, reduce the ltverae to
the lowest point that the wants of the government fairly
required, and restrict the appropriations to the most mod
erate scale, consistent with the peace, the security, ar.d
the engagements of the public; and who do not believe
that the opposite system is calculated to throw on them
an unequal burthen, to repress their prosperity, and to
encroach on their enjoyment.
On all these deeply important measures, the opposite,
opinion prevails, if not with equal unanimity, with at least
a greatly preponderating majority, in the other and stron
ger section; so much so, that no two distinct nations ever
entertained more opposite views of policy than these (wo
sections do, on all the important points to w hich I have
referred. Nor is it less certain that this unhappy con
flict, flowing directly from the Tariff’, has extended itself
to the halls of legislation, and has converted the delibera
tions of Congress into an annual struggle betw een the
two sections; the stronger to maintain and increase the
superiority it has already acquired, and the dther to
throw off, or diminish its burdens; a struggle in whidi all
the noble and generous feelings of patriotism are gradual
ly subsiding into sectional ami selfish af tacTuirf-nls.* N or
has the effect of this dangerous conflict ended here. Tfc
has not only divided the two sections on the important
point already stated, but on the tteepeVand more danger
ous questions, the constitutionality of a protective Tariff,
and tlie general principles and theory of the Conttitutioii
itself; the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority,
giving a construction to the instrument, which the other
believes would convert the General government into a
consolidated, irresponsible government, with the total
destruction of liberty; and the weaker seeing no hope cf
relief with such assumption of powers, turning its eye to
the reserved sovereignty of the states, as the only refuge
from oppression. I shall not extend these remarks, as I
might, by shewing that while the effect of the system cf
protection was rapidly alienating one section, it w as not
less rapidly, by its necessary operation, distracting and
corrupting the other; and betw een the two, subjecting
the administration to violent and sudden changes, totally
inconsistent with all stability and feisdom in the manage
ment of the affairs of the nation, of which we already see
fearful symptoms. Nor do I‘ deem it necessity to en
quire whether this unhappy conflict grows out of true, frr
mistaken views of interest on either, or bot h sides. Re
garded in either light, it ought to admonish us of the ex
treme danger to which our system is exposed, ar.d the
great moderation anffwisdom necessary to preserve it.
If it comes from mistaken views, if the interests of the two
sections as affected by the Tariff, be realiy the same, and
the system instead of acting unequally, in reality diffu
ses equal blessings, and imposes equal burdens on every
part, it ought to teach us how liable those, who ore dif
ferently situated, and who view their interests under dif
ferent aspects, are to come to. different conclusions; even
when their interests are strictly the same; and tonse-
quentl] r , with what extreme caution any system of policy
ought to be adopted, and with what a spirit of modera
tion pursued, in a country of such groat extent and diver
sity as ours. But if on the contrary, *the conflict springs
really, from contrariety cf interests, if the burden be on
one side, and the benefit on the other, then are we taught
a lesson not less important, how little regard we have for
the interests cf others, while in pursuit of our own, or at
least, how apt we are to consider our ov’n interest, the
interest of all others; and of course how great the danger
Jot
and from memory.
mode, by freeing the compact from every defect and uncer
tainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is
impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to
devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual,
and at the same time consistent with what are the rela
tions and acknowledged powers of ute two great depart-
nit nts'of our government. It gives a beauty and secu
rity peculiar to our system, which if duly appreciated,
will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations;
but if not, our splendid anticipation of the future will
prove but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering,
T he Tariff' itself is a strong case in and the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a
consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute
one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis
of the sovereignty of the states, or on the unrestsained
will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other
unlimited ones, in which injustice and violence, and force
must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that where
the majority rides, the minority is the subject; and that if
we should absurdly attribute to the former, the exclu
sive right of construing the constitution, there would be
in lad bet’-teen the sovereign and subject, under such a
governmfY»,'no constitution; or at least nothing deserv
ing the hame, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred
an instrument;
How the States are to exercise this high power of in
terposition, which constitutes so essential a portion of
their reserved rights that it cannot be delegated without an
entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our
system from a. federal into a consolidated government, is a
question, that the states only, are competent to determine.
*Tiie arguments which prove that they possess the
power, equally prove, that they are in the language of
Jefferson “fee rightful Judges of the mode and measure of
redress.” But tlie spirit of forbearance, as well as the
nature of the right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in
cases of dangerous infractions of the Constitution ; and
then only in the last resort, when all reasonable hope of
relief, from the ordinary action of die government, has
failed; when if the right to interpose did not exist, the
alternative w ould be submission and oppression on one
side, or resistance by foice on the other. That our sys
tem should afford, in such extreme cases, an intermediate
point between these dire alternatives, by which the go
vernment may be brought to a pause, and thereby an in
terval obtained to compromise differences, or, if impracti
cable, be compelled to submit tlie question to constitu
tional adjustment, through an appeal io the states them
selves, is an evidence of its high wisdom; an element^
not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength;
not of anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety.—
Its general recognition would of itself in a great measure, 1/
not altogether, supercede the necessity of its exercise, by im
pressing on the movements of the government, that modera
tion and justice so essential to harmony and peace, in a coun
try of Such vast extent, and diversity of interests as mars; and
would if controversy should come, turn the resentment of
the aggrieved, from the system to those who had abused
its powers, (a point all important,J and cause them to
seek redress, not in revolution cr overthrow, but in reformation.
It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute where the al
ternative tpmud be force, tending to prevent, and if that fails,
lo correct peaceably, the. aberrations to which all political sys
tems tare liable, and which, if permitted to accuntulate, with
out correction, must.finally end in a general catastrophe.
I have now said what 1 intended, in reference to the ab
stract question of the relation of the states to the general
government, and would here conclude, did I not believe
that a mere general statenwt of an abstract question,
without including that which may have caused its agita
tion, would be considered b)rmany imperfect, and unsat
isfactory. Feeling that such would be justly the case, I
am compelled reluctantly, to touch on the Tariff, fo fat,
• I refer to the authority of Chief Justice Marshall in the cere of
ibnatiism RoUtons. I have pot be4nabM leaver Ml the speech
definitely close all controversies in the only effectual j in a country of such acknowledged diversity of interovts,
, . of the oppression of the feebler by the stronger interest,
and in consequence of it, of rh** most fatal sectional c-.r-
flicts. But which ever may be the rau.-e, the rea., or
supposed diversity of interest, i: cannot doubted, that
the political consequences of the prohibitory system, be.
its effects in r«ther respects, beneficial, or nU.rwise. are
really such, as I have stated; nor can if be d< >;ib(ed, that
a conflict between the great sections on questions so vi
tally important, indicates a cor« ao n cf the country, so
distempered and dangerous, as to demand the most seri
ous and prompt attention. It is only, when we come to
consider of the remedy, that, under the aspect, I am view
ing the subject, there can be, among the informed, and
considerate, any di versity of opinion.
Those, who have not duly reflected on its dangerous
and inveterate character, suppose that the disease «vilt
cure itself; that events ought to be left to take their < wu
course; ar.d that experience, in a short time, will prove,
that the interest of the whole community, is the same, iu
reference to the Tariff, or; at least, whatever diversity *
there may how be, time will assimilate. Such lia* been ^
their language from the begmnA^W^vpffeftunat^ tfie*'
progress of events has been the reverse. The coutury is
now more divided than in 1634, and then, more than in
1816. The majority may have increased, but ihe op
posite sides are beyond dispute more determined and ex»
cited, than at any preceding period. Formerly the sys
tem was resisted mainly, as inexpedient; but now, as un
constitutional, unequal, unjust and oppressive. The re
lief was sought exclusively hem the- QyiamtaQwvem-
ment; but now, many drivea to despair, are raising their
eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the States, as the on
ly refuge. If we turn from the past, and present, to the
future, we shall find nothing to lessen, but much to ag
gravate the danger. The increasing embarrassment, and
distress of the staple States, the growing conviction, from
experience, that they are caused by the prohibitory sys
tem principally, anil that, under its continued operation,
their preser* pursuits must become profitless, and that
their great and peculiar agricultural capital, cannot be
diverted from its ancient and hereditary channels, with
out ruinous, losses, all concur to increase, instead of dis
pelling the gloom; that hangs over the luture. In fact, to
those who wili duly reflect on the subject, the hone, that
the disease will cure itself) must appear perfectly illusory.
The question is in reality one between the exporting and
non-exporting interests of the country. there no
experts, there would be no Tariff. It would be perfectly
On the contrary, so long as there are States,
which raise the great agricultural staples, with the view
of obtaining their supplies, and which must depend, cm
the general market of the world, for their sales, the con.
flict must remain, if the systeljMduHdd. continue, and the
disease become more and more inveterate. Their inter
est, and that of those, who by h’gh duties would confine
the purchase of their supplies to "the home market, mutt
from the nature of things in reference to the Tariff, be in
conflict. Till, then, we cease to raise the great staples
cotton, rice and tobacco, for the general market, and till
we can find some other profitable investment for the im
mense amount of capital and labour now employed in
their production, the present unhappy and dangerous
conflict cannot terminate, unless with tlieproliibitcry sys
tem itself.
In the meantime, while idly waiting for itarterminatiro,
through its own action, the progress of events, in anoth
er quarter, is rapidly bringing the contest, to an immed:-
*The system if continued, must end. not only In suhjretiny tie jr.,
rfUMry and property of the weaker section to the control of tics
stronger, but in proscription and political disfranchisement. L\
must finally control elections and appointments to officer * writ
as sets of legislation, to the groat increase of the frolic as of »-<-■
mostly, and of the fatal tendency tea tessplgte aUoasifeakssweett
the section*.